Aversion and Accommodation

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Political Change and Urban Regime Analysis in Dutch Local Government: Rotterdam 1998-2008

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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OUTLINE

1.1.   Introduction

In 2002, a political party in Rotterdam (the Netherlands) called Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*) won the Rotterdam local elections with almost 35% of the votes. The party and its leader Pim Fortuyn had an ambitious political agenda to change Rotterdam government, especially by placing more attention on safety policy. They also took a quite hostile position towards the established local actors, such as other political parties, the mayor, and the civil service. Most of these actors in turn were not willing to cooperate with Liveable Rotterdam. In the Dutch (local) political system and culture in which change takes place by cooperation and consensus, it thus seemed that the implementation of Liveable Rotterdam's political agenda was not likely to succeed. Nevertheless, four years later, changes consistent with Liveable Rotterdam's agenda seemed to have taken place on several issues, most notably safety policy. If this was indeed what happened, the question is, how?

The theoretical tool with which to explore this topic is 'urban regime', a concept that is familiar in Anglo-American urban studies, but less so for Dutch and other European cases. This dissertation is therefore also an exploration into the usefulness of the urban regime concept to study political change in Dutch local government.

This dissertation is embedded within, and owes much to, a larger research project into Rotterdam's safety policy between 2002 and 2006, led by professor Pieter Tops. The end result was published in 2007 (Tops 2007; see for prior publications: Hendriks, Tops 2004; Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006). With the application of urban regime analysis, and with a larger time frame and an emphasis on how change takes place, this dissertation builds on that research. (For more on the benefits of that project for this dissertation, see section 1.4.)

1.2.   Research questions and relevance

This research focuses on how political change takes place in Dutch, mainly Rotterdam, local government. 'Political change' in this context should be interpreted as the implementation of a political agenda or programme, in this case the 2002 political agenda of the political party called Liveable Rotterdam. That agenda consisted of several desires, of which the following are the most noteworthy (see chapter 5):
- Improved safety (policy)
- A stricter immigration and integration approach (or at least more open discussion about related problems)
- Greater accountability of politicians and civil servants
- More citizen input into policymaking.

In 2008, it seemed that the changes sought by Liveable Rotterdam had taken place on several of these topics. Two dates are noteworthy here. In 2002, Liveable Rotterdam not only won the municipal council election but also achieved a place on the municipal board, consisting of the mayor and aldermen, that is the day-to-day governing body of the municipality. It seems that this governing presence made many of the changes possible, such as a 'zero tolerance approach' to improve public safety and a municipality that was empowered to interfere in people's personal living conditions (see also: Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops 2007). The other date is 2006, when a new municipal council election removed Liveable Rotterdam from the board. It seemed, nevertheless, that most of the party's changes remained in place (see also: Van Ostaaijen 2008).

These observations raise the question of how far these changes (if they were changes at all – which remains to be confirmed) can be related back to Liveable Rotterdam. Even though the electoral result was often celebrated as 'historical', Liveable Rotterdam did not receive an absolute majority of the votes or of seats in the municipal council. It could assure such a majority only by cooperating with other political parties in a political coalition. And cooperation could not have stopped there. In the system of Dutch local government, several directly and non-directly elected, governmental and non-governmental actors are involved in local decision making, a process that is characterised by negotiation, accommodation, and consensus (see chapter 3). In the 2002 election campaign, Liveable Rotterdam and its leader were quite hostile towards the larger part of the establishment that makes up that system, particularly the Labour Party (see section 4.3.3), but also other political parties, its politicians, the mayor, the police, and civil servants. The hostility was mutual; several political parties, including the Labour Party, refused to engage in political coalition negotiations with Liveable Rotterdam and its leader Fortuyn.

This situation raised the question of how, in a system characterised by accommodation and consensus, a party hostile to the main actors that make up such a system could move towards cooperation with those same actors. Would Liveable Rotterdam adjust, or would the system and culture of accommodation and consensus change due to the participation of this party? These questions form the empirical starting point of this dissertation. The approach I have chosen is, however, a general one, based on the political change – specifically, the implementation of Liveable Rotterdam's agenda – that took place between 1998 and 2008, particularly regarding safety policy. As we have seen, the core of this time frame is a period in which the largest party was hostile towards other actors in Rotterdam local government. The choice of the time frame is explained further in section 1.3.

The relevance of this question has to do with the role Liveable Rotterdam played as Fortuyn's first political and electoral success and as an electoral frontrunner. After 2002, many parties emerged on the national and local level that displayed a similar anti-establishment attitude. In Rotterdam, not only did it seem that the party had been (partly) successful in implementing its agenda but, in comparison to many similar

Dutch local parties, Liveable Rotterdam was not marginalised in the consequent election. This fact might say something about how the Dutch system and culture of accommodation and consensus deals with political parties that seem adversarial towards it. Moreover, it might provide lessons on what similar parties, despite anti-establishment attitudes of their own, might be able to achieve when they enter the Dutch municipal councils and consequently the boards of mayor and aldermen.

This research will use the concept of the 'urban regime' to answer the question of how political change in Rotterdam has taken place. The urban regime concept, of which Clarence Stone is regarded the main founder, has been developed by several additional authors. Stone studied over forty years of politics in the city of Atlanta (Stone 1989). He saw that public officials and top businessmen who represented different interests but shared common goals were able to unite and form a coalition that governed the city for several decades. Over the years, the urban regime concept has been seen mainly as an intense and durable cooperation between public and private actors. However, there are other strands of thought about what an urban regime is or how it can be used (see chapter 2). One of them is that an urban regime captures all aspects of local governing by making a distinction between four analytical elements (italics added):

- An *agenda* to address a distinct set of problems
- A governing *coalition* formed around the agenda
- *Resources* for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition
- A *scheme of cooperation* through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing (Stone 2005a: 329).

These four elements will be used to analyse what has changed in Rotterdam government between 1998 and 2008 relative to the 2002 political agenda of Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn. This model also presupposes that when the four elements are aligned – in other words, when actors possessing sufficient resources align around a particular agenda – implementation of that agenda is likely.

This research is also an exploration into the usefulness of the urban regime concept to study change in Dutch local government. The concept has been applied mainly in an Anglo-American context. Many authors therefore question its cross-national value (see chapter 2). Especially when applied in a system and culture of accommodation and consensus such as in the Netherlands, the concept, particularly to analyse political change, has yet to prove its value.

The following question is at the centre of my research:

> *Is 'urban regime' a valuable concept in analysing political change in Dutch local government, particularly Rotterdam's safety policy between 1998 and 2008?*

The phrase 'valuable' relates to two things. First, does the distinction in the four urban regime elements provide a good structure to describe and analyse the development of Rotterdam's (safety) policy? Second, does the political change in Rotterdam exist out of the alignment of the four urban regime elements?

Three secondary questions help to answer the primary one:

1. How can the urban regime concept be used to analyse political change?
2. How does political change take place in Dutch local government?
3. What insight does the urban regime concept provide in analysing the political change in Rotterdam?

The concept of urban regime is explained in chapter 2. Chapter 3 contains background information about Dutch local government. Political change in these questions is defined as the implementation of a political agenda or programme – in this dissertation, the 2002 political agenda of Liveable Rotterdam and its leader, Pim Fortuyn.

1.3.   Research approach

Chapter 2 contains a summary of the literature on the urban regime concept. This concept has been developed based on the work of several authors, of which Clarence Stone is regarded the most important. Stone studied over forty years of politics in the city of Atlanta (Stone 1989). However, after his publication, a period of 'challenge and response' (Stone 1989: 260) began, and different interpretations of the concept were expressed, some in theoretical but the majority in empirical studies. Chapter 2 describes the main development of the concept, from Stone's study in 1989 to (for practical reasons at the time of the present writing) 2009, as well as the main discussion points and areas of criticism. The chapter also presents the choices made in this dissertation regarding those discussion points.

Chapter 2 also provides the answer to the first sub-question and contains a model to analyse political change in local government. This model is based on ideas put forward by Clarence Stone (1989; 1993; 2005a) and Orr and Stoker (1994). It identifies three legislative periods: a starting point with the emergence of a new agenda of change; the development of these proposed changes; and the eventual institutionalisation of the changes. For each of these phases, the four urban regime elements are analysed: the agenda, the coalition behind the agenda, the resources available to implement that agenda, and the scheme of cooperation that unites the coalition.

Chapter 3 provides an introduction to Dutch local government and the answer to the second sub-question of how political change develops there. The chapter starts with insights into Dutch democracy as a system and culture of accommodation and consensus. The second part focuses on Dutch local government and its main institutions and actors. In the Netherlands, governing takes place in a fragmented system based on

interplay between several governmental actors and institutions. Businesses in general do not play a large role, but semi-governmental organisations have increased in importance. The system and culture of accommodation and consensus imply that – in contrast to more Anglo-American majoritarian systems or, at least, to the context the urban regime was originally applied in – change proceeds based on the compromise of a large group of actors, which can lead to severe delays in policy development. It seems that the Dutch system, also on the local level, is therefore ill suited for (rapid) change, as proponents of the so-called 'viscosity-discourse' confirm.

Chapters 4-7 contain the urban regime analysis for the Rotterdam case and thus are needed to address the third sub-question, which is answered more explicitly in chapter 8. The urban regime model from chapter 2 is taken as a starting point for this empirical study, mapping out a chronological analysis of the development of Liveable Rotterdam's 2002 political agenda through the four urban regime elements of agenda, coalition, resources, and scheme of cooperation.

Figure 1: Chapter outline of urban regime analysis in Rotterdam

Time frames	Urban regime elements			
	Agenda	**Coalition**	**Resources**	**Scheme of cooperation**
0) Rotterdam government to 2002 (and after 1940), with a focus on 1998-2002	Chapter 4.2	Chapter 4.3	Chapter 4.4	Chapter 4.5
1) Emergence of Liveable Rotterdam 2001-2002	Chapter 5.2	Chapter 5.3	Chapter 5.4	Chapter 5.5
2) Rotterdam government 2002-2006	Chapter 6.2	Chapter 6.3	Chapter 6.4	Chapter 6.5
3) Rotterdam government 2006-2010 (analysis to 2008)	Chapter 7.2	Chapter 7.3	Chapter 7.4	Chapter 7.5

The development of that political agenda, in which safety is central, first of all focuses on the legislative period of 2002-2006, when Liveable Rotterdam was the largest party in the municipal council and part of the board of mayor and aldermen. The last phase is the phase when Liveable Rotterdam was no longer the largest political party in the municipal council and no longer part of the political coalition and board. This phase

begins with the local elections in March 2006 and, for practical reasons at the time of this writing, is analysed to 2008.[1] Before analysing the Liveable Rotterdam political agenda (phase one of the model), Rotterdam history up to 2002 is broadly sketched to see what Liveable Rotterdam's agenda reacts against and where it is situated within that history, as well as to see whether the seeds of this Liveable Rotterdam agenda can be seen prior to its emergence. This phase focuses on the last legislative period before Liveable Rotterdam's electoral victory (1998-2002). All four periods will be analysed with the same urban regime elements. Figure 1 shows the complete model for urban regime analysis in Rotterdam between 1998 and 2008. Chapter 8 contains the answers to the third sub-question and the main research question.

1.4. Research methods

This research opts to stay close to the way urban regime studies are conducted, particularly Clarence Stone's study on Atlanta (1989). In Stone's historical research, he relies on his own earlier work on Atlanta and 'a large body of secondary literature' that for his case was extensive (Stone 1989: 259). An important source for Stone has also been the city's newspaper, the *Constitution*. As a side note, Stone mentions that because of the important use of this public source, much of the information used to construct his research was public. With some modesty, he consequently claims that his work mainly consisted of detecting and structuring that information and making the pattern of events visible. He finished his research by interviewing 97 'participants in the civic and political life of Atlanta' (Stone 1989: 259). Luckily, just as in Atlanta, much information about Rotterdam is also public, and an extensive amount of secondary literature is available, including my own and that of the research team in which I was engaged (see further on). This material is added, with personal observation and a series of interviews, in order to answer the questions of urban regime analysis (see figure 1). In this section, this triangulation of methods will be further elaborated.

1.4.1. Reading documents

This research has benefited from earlier research in which I was involved. The main research results (Hendriks, Tops 2004; Van Ostaaijen, Hendriks 2006; Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Van Ostaaijen, Tops 2007; Van Ostaaijen 2008) as well as the empirical data leading to these results are important sources for this research, mainly for chapter 6. In general, the most important sources are the official government documents (the coalition accord, the municipal board programme, and important policy documents). Most of these are public and have been obtained through the official municipal website (www.rotterdam.nl and, regarding safety, www.programmabureauveilig.nl, now www.rotterdamveilig.nl). Other public documents used are notes from the municipal council meetings, briefings from the board meetings, and notes from the municipal council committee on governing and safety

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[1] Nevertheless, some noteworthy later observations are added.

(obtained through www.bds.rotterdam.nl). Notes, such as from the Safety Steering Group and the Directors Meetings, have been obtained through the Safety Bureau (*Programmabureau Veiligheid,* from 2006 onwards known as *Directie Veiligheid*). Newspapers have been valuable sources, especially the local/regional newspaper *Rotterdams Dagblad* (in 2005 merged into *Algemeen Dagblad*). National newspapers frequently referred to are *NRC* and *Volkskrant*. Local Rotterdam newspapers such as *Havenloods* have been used only occasionally, as they are not available in digital form. Rotterdam publications include the city magazine *Rotterdams Tij* and the *Stadskrant*. In addition, I have used digital newsletters from *Rotterdams Dagblad*, *Rotterdams Tij*, *Stadskrant*, the Alliance of Rotterdam Neighbourhood Associations (*SBR*), and the Safety Bureau, and I have consulted numerous websites and TV reports. Research reports by students or research institutes and the reports from the Rotterdam local court of audit proved very useful. All these reports, documents, and newspaper articles are listed in appendixes 1, 2, and 3. They have been studied with the following urban regime-related questions in mind:

- Do the documents show that the agenda changed after 2002 and/or after 2006?
- Do the documents show that the coalition changed after 2002 and/or after 2006?
- Do the documents show that the resources changed after 2002 and/or after 2006?
- Do the documents show that the scheme of cooperation changed after 2002 and/or after 2006?

1.4.2.   Interviewing

Two interview rounds were conducted between 2003 and 2006. Stavros Zouridis, Frank Hendriks, and Pieter Tops conducted a first round of about twenty interviews in 2003. Pieter Tops, Tjibbe Reitsma, and I conducted the second round of about forty interviews in 2005 and 2006. The interviews were open-ended and were especially aimed to reconstruct the developments between 2002 and 2006. The questions focused on safety and the role of the interviewee in related changes, or on the way his or her work was affected by the new municipal board and safety approach. Because of our extensive involvement in Rotterdam, we used our own knowledge from document analysis and informal contacts as well as a 'snowball' method to find suitable interview partners. Most of them were in one way or another connected to or affected by the municipality's safety approach, whether positively or negatively. All this data helped to construct what the urban regime elements (agenda, coalition, resources, and scheme of cooperation) looked like between 2002 and 2006. All of the interviews from the second round are written out. From the first round only written summaries exist, and those interviews are not cited in this dissertation.

In November and December of 2007 and January, February, and March of 2008, I undertook an additional 'open ended' interview round of about forty interviews, which were needed for the subjects where documents or reports did not provide (suf-

ficient) information. The list of previous interviews was taken as a starting point to determine whom to interview (Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops 2007). Several of the same people were interviewed to see whether the image they had previously provided had changed during the years that Liveable Rotterdam was no longer part of the municipal board (from May 2006 until the day of the interview). People who had not been previously interviewed were included either because they now occupied important positions as new actors (such as Labour Party politicians) or because they represented groups earlier underrepresented in the research (such as non-governmental organisations). Some extra interviews with civil servants were also held between November 2008 and February 2009, mainly to add information on the way civil servants adapted to board policy. A list of all the interviews can be found in appendix 4.

The interviews in 2007, 2008, and 2009 were focussed more strongly on the specific objectives of this research – mainly, an analysis based on the four urban regime elements. They focussed on the regime elements between 2002 and 2008, and the two possible breaking points: the start and end of the electoral period in which Liveable Rotterdam was the largest political party. With the urban regime elements in mind, I wanted to know the following:

- (How) did the agenda change after 2002 and/or after 2006?
- (How) did the resources change after 2002 and/or after 2006?
- (How) did the coalition change after 2002 and/or after 2006?
- (How) did the scheme of cooperation change after 2002 and/or after 2006?

The purpose of the interviews was to learn how the interviewees themselves or their organisation responded to the Liveable Rotterdam board and the changes. The questions nevertheless hardly ever explicitly addressed the urban regime elements. They instead referred to what change the individuals witnessed in general; or they concerned specific changes, such as regarding immigration or the 'zero tolerance' policy. Depending on the interviewee, some themes were also emphasised and/or others discarded. The total list of questions can be found in appendix 6. Note that there are no specific interviews conducted regarding the analysis of 1998-2002, but several of the people interviewed worked for the Rotterdam government in that period, and their experiences from that time proved a valuable addition to the documentary analysis for this period.

1.4.3. *Participatory observation*

From February 2004 until April 2006 I had my own desk at the Safety Bureau to generally conduct my own research. For the Expertise Agency, a department within the Safety Bureau, I conducted small tasks, such as leading a workshop or representing them at a researchers' meeting. In general, I was at the Safety Bureau one day per week and spent most of my time there working on the research, gathering documents, and talking to people. Access to the internal computer network was available. During and also after this time, I attended some public or internal municipal meetings. All of them are listed in appendix 5.

1.4.4. *Literature study*

The work on urban regimes in this research was mainly undertaken in the period 2003-2004 (partly with Eefke Cornelissen – amounting to some conference papers that are listed in appendix 1) and the summer 2006-winter 2007. The literature study was based on document search through (digital) libraries, conference websites and relevant journals. A 'snowball' method has also been applied in seeking those articles that were often referred to in other articles or that seemed to be interesting (i.e. close to my research or with a different stance on the concept). This method has led to a broad range of articles. Several talks with Clarence Stone between 2005 and 2009 and with other scholars that have worked on or with the urban regime concept, such as Karen Mossberger, helped sharpen my interpretation of the numerous articles and opinions as well as the urban regime concept as a whole.

1.4.5. *Translation and use of quotes*

The sources for all documentary quotes are mentioned after the quote. All interviews were conducted in Dutch and have been made anonymous, meaning that in most cases a function but not a name is given (with some exceptions, such as that of the mayor). I have translated all quotes, from both documents and interviews, from Dutch into English. I have tried to stay with the original text and meaning as close as possible. Nevertheless, any wrong interpretation or translation is, of course, solely my fault.

CHAPTER 2   URBAN REGIME AND URBAN REGIME ANALYSIS

2.1.   Introduction

This chapter is devoted to answering how the concept of 'urban regime' can be applied to an analysis of political change in local government. After introducing the concept (2.2), the chapter proceeds with an overview of Clarence Stone's work on Atlanta, since Stone is regarded as the main founder of the urban regime concept (2.3). Next, the chapter explores the development of the concept in the decades following Stone's research (2.4) and revisits one of the most debated topics within the literature: what are the characteristics that define an urban regime (2.5)? Based on those characteristics, the last section of this chapter will build a framework for how to study political change in local government (2.6).

2.2.   Concept introduction

Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946 - 1988 was published in 1989 (Stone 1989). Author Clarence Stone develops the concept of an 'urban regime' to describe government in Atlanta. Stone defines an urban regime as 'the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions' and illustrates it with a case study of Atlanta. Like many others, I consider this book to mark the beginning of the debate about the use and value of the urban regime concept (e.g. DiGaetano, Klemanski 1993a; Stoker 1995; Ward 1997; Painter, in Lauria 1997; Henry, Paramio-Salcines 1999; Dowding 2001; John 2001; Sellers 2002, Davies 2002; Pierre 2005; Mossberger 2009). I therefore take *Regime Politics* as a starting point for this theoretical chapter.

The fact that Stone gives a very detailed description of the (Atlanta) urban regime does not mean that the concept emerged out of thin air. Stone is the first to acknowledge that the concept of 'regimes' is founded on the work of other authors. Stone is inspired, for instance, by Stephen Elkin, who provides building blocks for the urban regime concept (Elkin 1987). Elkin does not use the concept of a regime in the same sense that Stone does, but he does talk about urban alliances between public officials and business leaders. His case study of Dallas comes especially close to what Stone would later describe as an urban regime. Other scholars also used the term 'urban regime' prior to Stone's *Regime Politics*. Fainstein and Fainstein, for instance, describe a local regime as a circle of powerful administrators and elected officials who move in and out of office, in order to distinguish this governing group from the more stable and overarching entity of the state (Fainstein, Fainstein 1983: 256); and Reed describes black-led and black-dominated administrations backed by solid council majorities as 'black urban regimes' (Reed 1988: 138). Stone's own prior publications also lead toward *Regime Politics* (e.g. Stone 1980; 1986; 1988). I mention these publications in order to note that before the publication of *Regime Politics*, the phrase and concept of

(urban) regime had already made its entrance in the literature on urban politics but that an overarching general meaning, let alone a general reference point, was still absent. With *Regime Politics*, at the very least, such a reference point is created.

The idea of regimes also has its meaning in other disciplines. In organisational theory, regimes are used as typology to classify different organisations (Lammers et al. 2001). One distinction is between mechanical and organic regimes. A mechanical regime is characterised by hierarchy and coordination from the top, which gives it a specific role in the organisation; an organic regime, on the other hand, has a more fluid place within the rest of the organisation and adjusts itself through interaction with other parts of the organisation (Lammers et al. 2001: 147). Regimes also appear in other disciplines, such as the natural sciences; but the discipline in which the regime concept is most closely related to the urban regime concept is in the area of international relations.

2.2.1. *International regime theory*

The urban regime concept has strong roots in the literature on international relations. In particular, the idea of mutually beneficial cooperation between relatively autonomous actors, which makes a strong entrance in the urban regime literature with Stone's work on Atlanta, is derived from international regime theory. Regime theory emerges in this discipline in the 1970s. It has been connected with the growth of international nongovernment organisations and the increasing cooperation of countries when there is no hegemonic power that orders them to do so (Junne 1992: 9).

According to Humphreys, Ruggie was the first to use the term 'international regime' (Humphreys 1996). In 1975, Ruggie defined a regime as 'a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states' (cited in Humphreys 1996). A definition that has become more mainstream is that a regime consists of 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner cited in Humphreys 1996). Regimes therefore function as a stable set of principles, norms, rules and procedures that guide international cooperation (Junne 1992: 9).

In the 1980s, regime theory became dominant especially in U.S. writings on international theory (Junne 1992: 10). There is, however, no common agreement on what a regime is; different 'schools' emerge which apply different interpretations and criticise each other's conclusions. Some such criticisms are that preferences of actors are sometimes incorrectly regarded as static; that the attention to the cooperation between states ignores the autonomy and importance individual states have in the regime-building process (for instance, someone has to take the initiative); and that a focus on a particular cooperation ignores the global picture in which regimes take shape (Junne 1992).

Even though an urban regime clearly shares some characteristics with the international-relations regime concept, and even though the international regime theory clearly is a source of inspiration for the urban regime, the concept of urban regime is not just a transposition of these ideas to an urban level. Stone's concept emerged out of an analysis of an empirical and local case.[2]

2.3.   Clarence Stone and his work on Atlanta

In *Regime Politics*, Clarence Stone provides a thorough insight into what he considers an urban regime to be. What is important to remember is that Stone's question is first of all an empirical one. Stone wanted to find out why in Atlanta, despite tension, unlike other cities in the southern part of the United States, racial polarisation did not dominate the city's civic life during the first decades after the Second World War (Stone 1989: ix, 11).

To answer this question, Stone studied over forty years of politics in the city from 1946 to 1988. When the black population of Atlanta in 1946 had obtained the right to vote, it increasingly became a force to be reckoned with within the city. Among its desires, this electorate wanted more room to live and to build houses. The city's elected officials became more aware of this growing need. The city's mayors between 1946 and 1988 had to take the new electorate into account. They accommodated 'the black vote' with a gradual decreasing of racial regulations. In 1973 the link between city hall and the black electorate became even stronger when the first black mayor was elected. The predominantly white business elite, organised in the Central Atlanta Progress, lacked those large numbers to become a strong electoral force, but it did have other resources it could mobilise. The business elite wanted to see Atlanta adjust to a new era – the era of the automobile – and its investments and loans helped the city overcome its financial problems. The business elite also wanted to keep black expansion under control, but was not in favour of racial unrest, which would damage the image of the city and therefore business.

In *Regime Politics*, Stone describes the process of behind-the-scenes negotiations between city hall and the business elite, exploring how this coalition was able to pursue an agenda that benefited both groups. Under the slogan 'the city too busy to hate', the

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[2] Stone does, however, want to provide an answer to the 'community power debate', mainly by shifting the main question in urban political research from 'who governs' to how governing is done. Others see Stone's urban regime idea as an emphasis on the abilities of local governments themselves in guiding changes; this emphasis is seen to oppose both contemporaneous literature about urban politics that depicts city governments as possessing relatively little power to cope with (economic) changes and Marxist theories about the subordinance of urban government to capital and economic forces that exceeded the urban level (e.g. DiGaetano, Klemanski 1993a; see also section 2.5.3).

black middle-class electorate, increasingly represented by city hall politicians, and the mainly white and coherent business elite established a working relationship. At first sight they may seem to have had little in common, but both parties wanted changes for the city. The business elite wanted to adjust the city to the changing technological and social circumstances. The growing black (middle-class) electorate wanted to diminish the exclusion of blacks from public life and to gain more room for housing. Both could only achieve their aims by working together. The business elite possessed access to investment activity, while the black middle-class electorate provided the political leadership. Both were indispensable resources in fulfilling the aims. The behind-the-scenes negotiations resulted in a long-lasting cooperation between city hall and the business elite. Stone labelled this an urban regime.

> City Hall has to deal with a powerful business sector and sharp limitations on its own authority. Thus, public officeholders have to come to terms with private interests, especially business interests. That process is the core of what I call the urban regime (Stone 1989: ix).

Later in the book, Stone defines an urban regime as

> the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions (Stone 1989: 6).

Stone gives several conditions that characterise an urban regime. An urban regime is about the *informal arrangements* that surround the (formal) working of government (Stone 1989: 3). If cities are 'organizations that lack a conjoining structure of command' (Stone 1989: 5), Stone wants to answer the question of 'how in the face of complex and sometimes divisive forces, an effective and durable capacity to govern can be created' (Stone 1989: xi). The answer to this question is the informal coalition. Regime building is about establishing new ties between organisations, about how different norms and values existing within institutions relate to each other when working together within an urban regime. Trust plays an important part in forming these arrangements. It is important that the main actors or individuals in a regime trust and know that they can count on each other. Only through repeated interactions do trust and the regimes founded upon it solidify (Stone 1989: 180).

Further, the informal group has to be relatively *stable* and to possess *access to institutional resources* that are needed to execute the agenda of the urban regime. Informal cooperation is no goal on its own. In Atlanta the cooperation emerged out of necessity. The two groups needed each other's resources. The business elite had financial power, the black middle-class had electoral power. Moreover, the coalition needs to be stable. It is not an ad-hoc cooperation. Stone makes this point by describing the Atlanta regime's cooperation for a period over more than forty years. Both these points by no means imply that the relationship also has to be equal. In Atlanta, business was clearly dominant; it was a very coherent and organised group that dominated city hall more

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than city hall dominated business. But this fact does not weaken the mutual dependence that characterises a regime. Mutual dependence is not necessarily equal dependence.

A regime is also *empowering*. It aims at achieving results that could not be achieved without the cooperation of the partners. In Atlanta the results of the regime varied, from building an expressway system on the one hand to developing new housing for blacks, desegregating the school system, and organising a National Black Arts Festival on the other. All these activities emerged out of cooperation between regime partners.

2.3.1.   *The social production model of power*

For Stone, urban regime governing is not about command and control but about how different actors can get things done. Given the fact that communities (such as cities) are divided into many sectors with independent actors, cooperation cannot be achieved by hierarchical power, *power over*. Cooperation is obtained by informal arrangements, by *power to* or by social production power. *Power over* can be exercised in some groups but cannot be used to dominate another independent group. (Note the similarity with 'international regime theory'.) In Atlanta, business and city hall are both autonomous groups and have certain competences and capacities, but cannot dominate each other. The social production model of power is about how an urban regime establishes and is able to achieve publicly significant results. For Stone, this form of power is something in which his concept of urban regime differs from elitism and pluralism, which are more occupied with the *power over* model, which articulates who has the power to control or dominate others (Stone 1989). (That vision of power resembles a familiar definition of power: 'the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others' [Wrong 1979: 2]).

From a distant perspective, an urban regime is an informal coalition dealing with internal and external challenges. In the case of Atlanta, such challenges were metropolitan decentralisation, changing race relations, and mobile capital (Stone 1989: 161). Such challenges at that time were perhaps not very different from those in other cities, but, Stone argues, only by looking at the specific local circumstances can the way Atlanta reacted to these challenges be explained.

> If Atlanta is exceptional, its exceptionalism lies primarily in the strength and ability of its governing coalition to carry out an activist agenda in the face of resistance and opposition (Stone 1989: 178).

The coming together of an urban regime is not always a process in which all the members see this big picture immediately. Some business elite members in Atlanta were in favour of the segregation system and some black middle class members were not always happy with the close connection between city hall and the business elite. The regime-building process was therefore never fixed.

It is the interaction amongst all those participants that shapes the direction of a regime. Selective incentives are important in the establishment of a regime.

> Most people most of the time are guided, not by a grand vision of how the world might be reformed, but by the pursuit of particular opportunities… perhaps a nonprofit housing venture, a community theatre, a job-training program, saving a black business from financial setback, conservation of park land, a food bank for the hungry, an historic preservation ordinance, or an arts festival (Stone 1989: 193).

Establishing and maintaining the biracial coalition was about 'struggle and conflict'. There were always other possibilities that could alter the regime. A distinction can be made between internal and external conflicts affecting such a regime. Internal conflict is when the partners constituting the regime clash. In Atlanta, Mayor Jackson tried to work more independently from the business elite, but soon learned that cooperation proved more fruitful ('Go along to get along', in Stone's words [Stone 1989: 192]). External threat is when the urban regime is threatened from the outside, which in fact follows from an important characteristic of the urban regime concept: that an urban regime excludes some actors. Urban regimes are about aligning the actors needed for the implementation of a certain agenda; actors that are not needed for those aims are thus not included. And there are always a substantial number of actors that do not profit from the regime, either because they are excluded from it or because they do not subscribe to its agenda and thus do not want to be a part of it. However, when a substantial body of such outsiders achieve a partnership that is strong enough and workable, and when they do not fear the short-term disadvantages (the punishments for 'not going along'), a regime can be overthrown (Stone 1989: 229-230). This is a very difficult process, because the opponents should not only provide new regime partners and new ways of interacting; they should also be able to provide a new set of ideas. In both the internal and the external conflict, the urban regime's strength is tested (Stone 1989: 182).

2.3.2.   *Let the process of challenge and response begin*

Stone's empirical study of Atlanta introduces the concept of urban regimes, with that city's specific circumstances providing the building blocks of the concept. However, Stone already suggests that his concept may be applicable to other cities:

> In this study, I have argued that governance in Atlanta can usefully be understood by the concept of an urban regime. By implication, I also suggest that this same concept would be a fruitful starting point in the study of governance in other communities. In short, I contend that "urban regime" is an illuminating concept, casting light on Atlanta's political experience and, potentially, on the experience of other communities as well (Stone 1989: 256).

Stone acknowledges that, much like the development of pluralism and elitism, the development of the urban regime concept is a process that will have to unfold in time.

> Over time, it should be possible to cumulate observations about sets of conditions (again, including the intentions of purposive actors) that are associated with various regime forms and how they change (Stone 1989: 257).

A few years later, Stone elaborates on the urban regime concept in an article, now also referring to urban regime *theory*, which seems to be an aggregation of urban regimes and regime theory, the latter as referring to the general (international) regime theory that urban regime is related to. In the abstract at the beginning of the article, Stone states his meaning of the (urban) regime theory approach.

> Regime theory starts with the proposition that governing capacity is not easily captured through the electoral process. Governing capacity is created and maintained by bringing together coalition partners with appropriate resources, nongovernmental as well as governmental. If a governing coalition is to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda (Stone 1993: 1).

As a small side note, it should be stated that scholars have always questioned whether the idea of an urban regime really constitutes a theory. 'Urban regime theory' is no encompassing theory like the works of Marx or Habermas, and its explanatory power is debated. The urban regime is first and foremost an analytical concept. Over the years, therefore, the term 'theory' has often been dropped or replaced by 'analysis'. It is for this reason that I also will speak mainly of 'urban regime analysis'. Whether there is nevertheless some explanatory value to the concept is something that will be discussed later.

Stone uses the word 'agenda' in the definition above. More attention will be given to the meaning of the agenda within urban regime analysis later in this chapter, but for now it suffices to state that the agenda is important for regime partners and regime building. If the regime partners do not comply with the agenda, the regime is bound to vanish.

In the article, Stone speaks of an urban regime in more general terms, somewhat detaching it from its Atlanta roots. Like in his 1989 Atlanta research, Stone states that regimes build through interactions people have. People and actors look for others who possess necessary resources, which are sometimes material (money), or sometimes less tangible, such as skills, charisma, organisational capacity, or technical expertise (Stone 1993: 11). Stone stresses that urban regimes are about:
- The composition of a community's governing coalition
- The nature of the relationships among members of the governing coalition
- The resources the members bring to the governing coalition (Stone 1993: 2).

Stone ends his article with a more detailed distinction of regime types. In *Regime Politics*, Stone distinguishes a 'caretaker' regime that is mainly concerned with the provision of routine services from an 'activist' regime that has a more complicated task. Postwar Atlanta is characterised by an activist regime. The agenda of an activist regime is broader and includes topics such as redevelopment that make the level of coordination between regime partners more difficult (Stone 1989: 188). The agenda also plays an important role in Stone's 1993 distinction. In general, the broader the agenda, the more will be required of the governing coalition and the harder it will become to mobilise the resources around it. Stone distinguishes four urban regime types:

- *Maintenance regimes* are focused not on change but on preservation. The maintenance regime has the easiest agenda to implement since provision of resources is not very difficult.
- *Development regimes* are aimed at change, primarily of land use. This regime works best when the public is passive and elite coordination is at play. Selective incentives and small opportunities like contracting fees and concrete projects (e.g. new schools or parks) can diminish conflict inside and outside the regime.
- *Middle class progressive regimes* focus on issues that have somewhat less to do with economic issues than the development regimes, such as environmental protection, historic preservation, and affordable housing. These regimes are involved in making the city attractive for investors. A progressive regime often needs broader support than a development regime, from either private non-business partners or citizens.
- *Regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion* aim at broad development programmes regarding issues such as education and job training, improved transportation access, and home ownership. These programmes need mass involvement of the lower class themselves.

2.4.   Development of the concept 1989-2009

This part of the chapter is devoted to the development of the urban regime concept over the twenty years since the publication of Stone's *Regime Politics*. In this section I will discuss only those articles regarding the *urban* regime. The use of regime theory in general is beyond the scope of my research and is not analysed here. As we will see, the use of the urban regime is varied enough to warrant discussion on its own terms. Any use of the word 'regime', unless stated otherwise, from now on refers to urban regime.

2.4.1.   The first years

After *Regime Politics*, the first publications about urban regimes are articles describing urban developments in the U.S. Most of these articles find their way into *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, a journal on social, political, and economic urban issues (since 1995 known as *Urban Affairs Review*), or other journals such as *Journal of Urban Affairs*, or conference

papers and presentations. Rather than offering a theoretical deepening of the concept, these articles often demonstrate practical uses of it.

Scholars in some early articles compare the urban regime concept to older concepts for describing urban development and government. Bennett favours the urban regime metaphor over that of a progressive city or a 'black machine', because an urban regime focuses on the struggle to form a governing coalition, which, as the urban regime literature has shown, is not necessarily the same as an electoral coalition (Bennett 1993). The urban regime metaphor explains why African-American control over city politics does not automatically lead to a black urban agenda; some black mayors also enjoy support from the white business community and do not depart completely from 'its' agenda (Bennett 1993: 429, 437).

Harding compares urban regimes to growth coalitions (Harding 1994a).[3] Urban regimes, he argues, enjoy a great strength in the fact that they regard city governments not as being powerlessly dominated by economic forces but as having an autonomous mode of influence. Harding regards urban regimes as a more promising concept than growth coalitions. The urban regime concept seems to promise an ability to move beyond the focus on economic development, which the growth coalition never was able to do (see also Bassett 1996: 548).

> Regime theory is more expansive than the growth-machine literature in suggesting there are various types of regimes, having forms that reflect the wider economic, social and political environment, not just a single growth-machine model (Harding 1994a: 361).

Bennett uses the urban regime concept to analyse the four-and-a-half-year administration of Harold Washington, Chicago's first African-American mayor. Bennett does not consider the progressive city concept the most useful, because Washington's administration was too short to really judge its accomplishments. That Bennett chooses the urban regime concept instead implies that for him the urban regime concept is useful for studying not the results but the process that leads to a governing coalition. The same standard applies in an article by Orr and Stoker about the mayoralty of mayor Young in Detroit (Orr, Stoker 1994).

> Orr and Stoker's regime study of Detroit... explores factors such as the nature of the potential regime partners and the weakness of civic organisations to

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[3] The concept of growth coalitions or growth machines is derived from the work of Harvey Molotch (1976; 1993). The growth machine thesis is based on the assumption that growth is 'the political and economic essence of virtually any given locality' and that areas fight over 'anything that supports growth', such as highway routes, airport locations, or defense contracts. To do this, important stakeholders such as business actors unite in 'urban growth coalitions' or 'urban growth machines' (Molotch 1976: 309, 311).

explain how the collective action obstacles to effective city leadership were not overcome (Stoker 1995: 66).

Orr and Stoker's main finding is that an effective public-private partnership did not emerge. In the end of Young's mayoralty two possible regimes fought for dominance.

> An incomplete and internally divided coalition pursuing a downtown revitalization strategy is being challenged by an embryonic and underfunded coalition pursuing a human-capital strategy. In contrast to the situation described in Atlanta and elsewhere of cohesive and dynamic coalitions, Detroit is a study of failed regime building (Orr, Stoker 1994: 65).

For Orr and Stoker, the question of whether a regime existed or not in Detroit is of secondary importance. They consider the focus on the problems of collective organisation and action as the key contribution of regime theory (Orr, Stoker 1994: 48). The authors put this contribution in contrast with the community power debate, where the two sides tried to claim victory by showing that an elite or a plural system was or was not in place. But when an urban regime is not found in the city, this does not diminish the value of the analytical framework, as this framework can also provide insight in the preceding governing process (see more in section 2.6).

Orr applies the concept to Baltimore, where business first refused to meet with a strong civic organisation. Business was nevertheless essential for its resources. Under mayor Schaefer, an urban regime focused on economic development was in place. The urban regime concept is used to show how this old agenda was replaced by a new agenda focusing on education. Orr notes that changes not only in the city itself but also in key public positions strongly affected the new agenda (Orr 1992).

2.4.2. *Altering the concept*

All the authors quoted in the previous section describe situations that demonstrate close and durable cooperation between city hall and the local business elite, thus remaining relatively similar to the Atlanta urban regime as described in *Regime Politics*. Another approach is to broaden the concept to make it more applicable in other circumstances and countries. This approach is suggested in an article in which the authors argue that, to make the urban regime concept applicable in the U.K., it is necessary to loosen the concept's theoretical link with the business sector.

> In this article the authors broaden the definition of urban regimes to fit the British urban experience… We conceive of regimes as modes of governance that entail formal and informal arrangements for policymaking and implementation, both across public and private domains and within the public domain, the balance of which differs among nations and over time (DiGaetano, Klemanski 1993a: 54, 58).

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For DiGaetano and Klemanski the absence of the otherwise indispensable role of business participation does not signify the absence of a regime. They almost seem to take the fact that cities have some form of urban regime as a starting point for their analysis. Their description of the regime in Bristol, for instance, is characterised by a lack of business participation and no strong consensus among the partners. Nevertheless, the authors call it an urban regime (DiGaetano, Klemanski 1993a).

There are also other scholars who, while upholding the urban regime concept for their research, claim that although business was an important coalition actor in Atlanta, its participation is not necessary in order to speak of an urban regime. Menahem (1994), for instance, claims that regimes are products of their environment, which is usual a nation-state. Thus, in heavily centralised bureaucratic states, bureaucracy and not the private sector or business may turn out to be the strongest actor within an urban regime. Menahem gives Israel as an example, but also claims that this approach can be relevant in other countries. According to him, bureaucratic actors and their autonomy are little discussed in the U.S. context (Menahem 1994: 38). Harding, too, points towards the necessity to make the urban regime concept more widely applicable. He suggests that the community power-structure debate shows the failure to do so, which should not be repeated.

> It is astonishing to have to record that with the exception of some unpublished doctoral theories, there exist no studies of community power in Britain (Crew cited in Harding 1994a: 367).

As we will see in section 2.5., in the 1990s a debate developed within the literature on how the urban regime concept could be applied in other contexts (mainly outside the U.S.). Some scholars argued that this required a different interpretation of the concept, which other scholars opposed. In the next section, we will see the unfolding of this debate.

2.4.3. *A mainstream but diverse concept*

After 1989, the use of the urban regime concept or term quickly appeals to other scholars. The main popularity of the concept is in its practical use for urban research. The concept quickly became not only a 'dominant paradigm' for urban research (Davies 2002: 1) but also a popular tool and a 'familiar and popular phrase' (Stoker 1995: 62).

> The dominant analytical framework of urban political research in the United States for the past two decades has been urban regime theory (Pierre 2005: 449).

This popularity leads to the emergence of numerous urban regime subtypes, developing on Stone's Atlanta research or describing distinctions from that study's empirical circumstances. In 1996, Ward already counts thirteen subtypes of urban

regimes: entrepreneurial, instrumental, business-centred activist, pro-growth-market-led, pro-growth-government-led, growth management, progressive, symbolic, middle-class progressive, lower-class opportunity, social reform, caretaker, and organic (Ward 1996: 435). Without being exclusive, a list of some other subtypes of urban regimes would include the bureaucratic (Menahem 1994); corporate (Turner cited in Whelan et al. 1994); planner, distributor, grantsman, clientelist, radical, vendor, commercial, free-enterprise (Kantor et al. 1997); nonregime (Burns, Thomas 2006); pluralist, federalist (Elkin 1987); directive, concessionary, conserving (Fainstein, Fainstein 1983); policy (Dowding et al. 1999); comprehensive, social-ecological, upscale, and local Fordist (Sellers 2002).

These types of urban regimes often emerge when scholars use the concept, most often as described by Stone or Stoker (see further on), for an original (usually American) case study. These authors often conclude that the 'original' urban regime characteristics or description (most often meaning Stone's Atlanta research, but sometimes less defined) do not neatly fit their case, and therefore label it a new type of urban regime. Table 1 shows several of those case studies.

Table 1: A selection of urban regime publications and the authors' conclusions

Article	City	Period	Urban regime?
Pelissero, Henschen, Sidlow 1991	Chicago	1983-1990	Yes: cooperation between city hall and the private sector.
DeLeon 1992	San Francisco	1965-1985	Yes: pro-growth regime from 1965-1985, overthrown in the eighties.
Orr 1992	Baltimore	1971-1987	Yes: regime focused on development, especially the rebuilding of the harbour.
Bennett 1993	Chicago	1983-1987	Yes: black urban regime in place; urban regime good concept to look at coalition formation in Chicago.
Orr, Stoker 1993	Detroit	1974-1994	No: failed regime building around downtown revitalisation, regime around human capital possibly emerging.
DiGaetano, Klemanski 1993a	Bristol and Birmingham (U.K.)	1980-1993	Yes: progrowth regime in Birmingham and progrowth/growth-management regime in Bristol; urban regime good concept to look at how local government copes with changing political-economic landscape.

DiGaetano, Klemanski 1993b	Detroit (U.S.) and Birmingham (U.K.)	1979-1991	Yes: pro-growth regimes with business in both industrial/motor cities encourages downtown and industrial development.
Levine 1994	French cities	1970s-1980s	Apparently: French cities show willingness to work with business in pursuit of new investment, even though business is less influential.
Menahem 1994	A Tel Aviv neighbourhood (Adjami)	1980s	Yes: neighbourhood redevelopment achieved by a coalition of bureaucrats and politicians.
Whelan et al. 1994	New Orleans	1986-1990	Yes: predominantly caretaker regime from 1930s-1970s, subsequently changing gradually into a corporate regime.
Bassett 1996	Bristol	1990s	N/A: different regime characteristics apply; author leaves it open whether this city constitutes a coherent urban regime.
Strom 1996	Berlin	1989-1996	N/A: German and American cities differ in political and cultural dynamics; but concept offers insight into Berlin development.
Purcell 1997	Los Angeles	1977-1997	No: no common agenda between government, business, and homeowners association.
Rigos, Paulson 1996	St. Petersburg (Florida)	1960-1996	N/A: study of regime change is underdeveloped; authors describe downtown development process.
Sites 1997	New York	1978-1997	Yes: under leadership of three consecutive mayors, changes from a pro growth, to a progressive, to a caretaker regime.
Beauregard 1997	Philadelphia	1942-1970s	Yes: pro-growth regime established between political, business, and civic leaders after 1942 onwards, but first signs of downfall shown after 1962.
Keating 1997	Cleveland	1960s-1990s	N/A: growth peak in the 1960, followed by deindustrialisation and decline, then new coalition around sports in the 1990s.

Harding 1997	Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Edinburgh, Hamburg, Manchester	Ca. 1980-1997	No: distinct structure of public-private relations; comparison of these European cities with urban regime or growth coalition is not possible.
John, Cole 1998	Leeds and Lille	1980s-1996	Not yet: both cities have 'regime like qualities' due to participation with business, but it remains to see if this cooperation will be long-lasting.
Dowding et al. 1999	Six London boroughs	Late 1980s-mid 1990s	Partly: all boroughs have urban regime characteristics, but only three can be called an urban regime.
Henry, Paramio-Salcines 1999	Sheffield	1970s-1996	Yes: a declining (old industrial) city transformed in the 1990s to a symbolic regime focusing on a sports agenda.
Hamilton 2002	Metropolitan regions of Chicago	1990s	No: no established patterns of cooperation between all regional actors.
Sellers 2002	Metropolitan regions in the U.S., France, and Germany	1980s-early 1990s	Partly: where there were locally dependent interests in services and related high-tech activities, urban regimes existed (six out of eleven yes, four contested, one no), but departures by local businesses in the mid 1980s prevented or diminished urban regimes.
Hamilton 2004	Metropolitan regions of Chicago and Pittsburgh	From about 1990 until 2004	Partly: Hamilton makes a typology of regime development (high, medium, low) by which Chicago can be labelled as having a regional governing regime, Pittsburgh not.
Burns, Thomas 2004	New Orleans	1970s-2004	Yes: caretaker regime from 1945-1970, developing into a corporate regime after 1970.
Kilburn 2004	fourteen U.S. cities	1990	Yes: six developmental, six progressive, and two caretaker regimes.
Burns, Thomas 2006	New Orleans	1990s-2005	No: resource providers are unable to agree on a common agenda to create a stable and long-lasting partnership.
Rast 2006	Milwaukee	1948-1960	No: city government and business fail to unite around a common agenda.

Holman 2007	Portsmouth	From the 1990s	Yes: urban regime that exemplifies Stone's framework has been in existence for more than thirteen years.
Hamel, Jouve 2008	Montreal	1950s-2008	Yes: two successive urban regimes from the 1950s, with the one from the last decades focused on Montreal's place within a global network.
Tretter 2008	Glasgow	1980s	Not yet: Glasgow resembles some aspects of Stone's Atlanta but not yet its durability.

Not all scholars appreciate this consequence of the concept's popularity. The already-cited article by Orr and Stoker is the first of several that the British scholar Gerry Stoker wrote alone or with others about the urban regime concept in which more attention is given to the concept itself. The authors are worried that the concept will be used to describe all sorts of urban processes (something that is more or less confirmed by table 1). Misuse of the concept should be prevented by providing a more solid theoretical base (Orr, Stoker 1994; Stoker, Mossberger 1994; Stoker 1995; Mossberger, Stoker 2001).

> Regime is a label that scholars have used for different purposes. The regime framework and theory… has at its core certain key propositions and a way of understanding urban politics. A regime analysis as defined here needs to make use of that particular framework and conceptualisation (Stoker 1995: 63).

Stoker agrees with Stone's definition of an urban regime as a relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions (Stoker 1995: 58-59). The main contribution of the urban regime concept, according to Stoker, is that it focuses on problems of collective organisation: how cooperation is established between governmental and nongovernmental entities. The issue is 'how to bring about enough cooperation among disparate community elements to get things done' (Stoker 1995: 58). Stone's statement that a viable governing coalition must be able to mobilise resources commensurate with its main policy agenda is what Stoker calls the iron law of an urban regime (Stoker 1995: 61).

Stoker distinguishes the power of social production from three other types of power (Stoker 1995: 64-65). *Systemic power* has to do with the formal position of actors within the socioeconomic structure. This position can be so self-evident that actors do not even have to act; their power is a matter of the context, of the logic of the situation. *Command power* is a more active form of power that mobilises resources such as information, money, knowledge, or reputation. This kind of power is only active in limited areas and for certain activities. Because of the limitations of command power, a third category of power can be distinguished: *coalition power*. Coalition power deals with the

way in which actors use their relative autonomy for negotiating with other actors to form a coalition. The most distinguished form of power of an urban regime, however, is what Stoker calls *pre-emptive power* or *the power of social production*. This form of power is about the ability of a group of actors to form a structure that can solve collective action problems. It is about the establishment of a structure to build a regime and gain the capacity to govern (Stoker 1995: 65). This form of power is intentional and active: it accomplishes; it has the ability to produce results. Leadership is essential in the process. As Stoker states:

> In a complex society the crucial act of power is the capacity to provide leadership and a mode of operation that enables significant tasks to be done. This is the power of social production. Regime theory suggests that this form of power involves actors and institutions gaining and fusing a capacity to act by blending their resources, skills and purposes into a long-term coalition: a regime (Stoker 1995: 69).

Orr and Stoker address the issue of regime transition, a subject absent in Stone's work on Atlanta because Atlanta was a case of a relatively stable regime (Orr, Stoker 1994). In Orr and Stoker's Detroit case there is no stable regime, which makes the authors elaborate a few points about regime change. They argue that new actors do not necessarily change the regime. Stone's Atlanta case showed that regimes can cope with changes in personnel and that such a transition does not have to change the way of working or the direction of the regime. Creating an alternative regime is problematic. It requires a new set of material incentives and a new framework of meaning to become dominant. Moreover, the challengers always face a subordinated position, since they have to work around a regime in power. Orr and Stoker develop a three-stage model for regime change:

1. The first stage revolves around the questioning of the established regime. Doubts may be raised about its capacity and about the goals it is pursuing. Questions and doubts have to find some vehicle of expression among corporate, political, or other potential leaders.
2. The second stage involves a conflict about redefining the scope and purpose of the regime. Here competing groups of elite actors may organise to seek new ways forward and a new policy direction. This is a period of much uncertainty and debate. Hostility between opposing camps may find public expression. There will be a battle for the 'hearts and minds' of established actors and a search for new actors to support a new way forward.
3. A third stage involves the institutionalisation of the new regime. The institutionalisation of a new regime involves the establishment of a new set of material incentives and a new ideological outlook (cited in Orr, Stoker 1994: 68-69; Stoker 1995: 68).

The authors further elaborate on three ways actors can be motivated to join an urban regime. The first motivation is tangible results. These are 'pull' factors to join ('What is

in it for us?'). The second motivation is local dependency. This is more of a 'push' factor. Especially in the U.S., local businesses, such as Coca Cola in the Atlanta case, see the quality of the area where they are based as crucial to the development of the company itself. The last factor, expressive politics, is less instrumental than the former two and focuses around ideology and symbolism. Joining the urban regime can be motivated by pride, seen for instance in a commitment to improving one's city, or by public relations motives (for businesses) or electoral motives (for politicians). Expressive politics and the strategic use of symbols are ways to develop a common purpose within an urban regime.

The question of motivation plays an important role in the authors' distinction between regime types (Stoker, Mossberger 1994: 199, 208-209):

- An *organic regime* focuses on maintaining the status quo. This resembles the caretaker regime described by Stone (Stone 1989: 188). The need for cooperation and coordination between actors is limited. This type of regime exists primarily in small cities.
- An *instrumental regime* focuses on economic development and short-term results. A process of bargaining and the use of selective incentives are the foundation of the instrumental regime building process. Much of the development is generated by an extensive strategy of exclusion and elite participation. Actors deemed unnecessary for the regime are excluded. Because of the economic development goals, an instrumental regime also depends on non-local actors. According to Stoker, Stone's description of Atlanta offers a perfect example of an instrumental regime.
- A *symbolic regime* strives for a clear change of direction within society. A symbolic regime needs broad acceptance. Symbols play an important role in this process of image formation. Stone's middle-class progressive regime and his regime devoted to lower-class opportunity expansion are part of this category.

The organic or maintenance regime is not widely debated in literature. It seems that a coalition not focused on change does not merit scholarly study. The instrumental regime is more widely known, because it is mirrored in Stone's Atlanta. The last regime according to Stoker and Mossberger is the symbolic regime, which in their article is still only a hypothetical model.[4] In a symbolic regime, more is at stake than just economic development. The goals of a symbolic regime most often come down to a redirection of a city's ideology or image, internally as well as externally. Such goals are about pride, competition (with other cities in order to put one's own city 'on the map'), and identity politics. Just as individuals seek to distinguish themselves, so do cities. Regime partners can be driven by this urge, but other motives can also play a part: a concern for the environment, or a desire to advertise the city or just to be associated with prestigious projects.

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[4] For an empirical reflection on the symbolic regime, see Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999.

Economic growth exists not as a goal in itself, but as an activity that must conform to the regime's broader values about what the city is or should be (Stoker, Mossberger 1994: 201).

Because a symbolic regime pursues more ambitious goals than an instrumental regime, a symbolic regime requires broad support and uses symbols strategically to seduce new actors into the regime and to gain citizen support for the new ideology or image. A symbolic regime accepts the expressive dimension of politics as well.

Politics and policymaking are about saying as well as doing things. They are about communicating values, intentions, and symbolic rewards… Politicians may win support not through achieving outcomes but by expressing… widely held, popular, but potentially contradictory, beliefs (Stoker, Mossberger 1994: 203, 205).

There are some other aspects in which a symbolic regime differs from an instrumental regime: symbolic regimes are characterised by competitive agreement and inclusive orientation. Competitive agreement means that partners in a regime work together out of necessity more than out of choice. There is less commonality of perspective than within an instrumental regime.

What is involved here is an issue network focused around a common concern but one where the various interests lack a deep, shared understanding and where there is an absence of consensus and the presence of conflict (Stoker, Mossberger 1994: 206).

Stoker also addresses some criticisms and undeveloped areas about the urban regime concept that he considers challenges for the years to come. One such challenge is the need to study the role of power in urban regimes more closely. Stoker outlines other challenges:

Urban regimes need to escape the localist trap, meaning that the literature on urban regimes provides too little attention to a regime's relationship with the wider, non local, context. Urban regimes should avoid being misused, e.g. using regime terminology for atheoretical case studies of city politics. And urban regimes should be made applicable for cross-national comparison. Urban regimes should be viewed in a dynamic perspective; more insight is needed in regime continuity and change (Stoker 1995: 55, 66-69).

In sections 2.5 and 2.6, this critique will be addressed further. However, despite some of Stoker and Mossberger's fears about the development of the concept, neither Stoker nor other scholars can prevent the increasingly popular use of the phrase 'urban regime' with little reference to the original concept as developed by Stone or as elaborated by Stoker and Mossberger. Sometimes it is even used without a definition or defining characteristics at all (e.g. Hamel, Jouve 2008). In some cases, an urban

regime is stripped of any theoretical baggage and regarded as something every city has. In this way, it becomes a synonym for any kind of urban coalition or government, which blurs a better understanding of the concept.

> This broadening of the regime concept is clearly intended to enable its application in a wider range of cases and contexts, yet it runs the risk of blunting the definition of the original formulation and, in some cases, simply using the term urban regimes as a synonym for "urban politics" or "urban governance" (Painter cited in Lauria 1997: 130).

It is hard to argue how extensive this last (mis)use of the concept is. There are dozens of articles that have the phrase 'urban regime' in the title and make at least some, though limited, reference to the concept's origin. There are, however, relatively few articles that try to explain or elaborate on the more theoretical notions of the urban regime. And the fact that the phrase 'urban regime' still attracts thousands of hits on a popular internet search engine (Google, 12,000 on 8/11/2008; 29,400 on 13/12/2009), could indicate that the use of the concept, without referring to related work by founding scholars, is widespread. However, in the articles and book chapters that do elaborate more on the theoretical notions of the concept, there is no agreement. Some authors even take issue with Stone's own contributions.

> The inclusion of maintenance regimes in particular seems to sit oddly with the definitions advanced in the Atlanta study. If a regime involves building a coalition between the local state and private interests to generate governing capacity, in what sense is a maintenance regime (which seems to require few resources, limited involvement of nongovernmental interests, and little active governing) a regime (Painter cited in Lauria 1997: 129-130)?

With this quote, Painter provides a good bridge to the next section of the chapter. Because if there is no agreement when a particular governing coalition can be called an urban regime, the question what an urban regime is becomes all the more pressing.

2.5.   What is an urban regime?

After *Regime Politics*, some scholars start to discuss certain characteristics of the original urban regime studies that are less common in other (mainly non-U.S.) cities, mainly focusing on the role of the private sector and business. This divergence from the original interpretation leads to a discussion in the literature about what an urban regime is. This urban regime debate revolves around the *characteristics* of an urban regime.[5] In this discussion, a distinction can be made between a strict and a more lenient

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[5] By 'urban regime debate' I mean the discussion waged mainly through journal articles in which the concept is applied, most often accompanied by statements on how

line of thought. The strict line of thought stays close to the characteristics of Stone's Atlanta research (Stone 1989), while the lenient line of thought opts to make the concept more abstract. I consider Mossberger and Stoker's characteristics in their 2001 article, on the one hand, and Stone's characteristics in some of his later work, on the other, as the most important representations of these two lines of thought (see figure 2). Some differences between these characteristics will be explained later.

Figure 2: The characteristics of an urban regime

Mossberger and Stoker (2001: 829)	Stone (2005a: 329) [6]
- Partners drawn from government and non-governmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation - Collaboration based on social production – the need to bring together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks - Identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants in the coalition - A longstanding pattern of	- An agenda to address a distinct set of problems - A governing coalition formed around the agenda, typically including both governmental and non-governmental members - Resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition - A scheme of cooperation through which the members of the go verning coalition align their contribution to the task of governing.

the concept should be interpreted and in which scholars implicitly and explicitly respond to each other's stands and arguments relating to the urban regime concept.

[6] In an earlier article, Stone elaborates a bit more on the characteristics: '1) There is an identifying agenda – arrangements adhere to some set of recognized purposes, sometimes capsuled in a slogan… linked as well to concrete courses of action through which diverse bases of support are gained and maintained; 2) The arrangements are relatively stable – though not static, they are not de novo constructions around each issue as it comes into play [in a footnote Stone differentiates this from pluralism, JvO]; 3) The arrangements have a cross-sector foundation (and thus are broader than the informal aspect of the workings of a single organization or institutions) and this foundation is embodied in a governing coalition. The identifying agenda therefore reflects the coalition character of its support and is not the agenda of a single highly cohesive group ('the elite'); 4) The arrangements are informal – that is, they are not fully specified by the formal structure of government. The informal character combined with the cross-sector foundation means that no power of command directs the overall arrangements – hence some form of cooperation plays an important role; 5) The arrangements have a productive character – that is, they provide a capacity to act and bring resources to bear on the identifying agenda to a degree that would not happen without the arrangements that constitute the regime' (Stone 2001: 21).

cooperation rather than a temporarily coalition.	

There are other scholars who present their own lists of urban regime characteristics, such as John (2001: 50-52), Sellers (2002: 291), Davies (2003: 256), and Holman (2007: 450), which all lean towards the strict line of thought.[7] The main feature that these scholars have in common and what strongly characterises the strict line of thought is that they hold on to the participation of the private sector, mainly business, as an essential characteristic of an urban regime. In the lenient line of thought this participation is optional and mainly depends on the content of the agenda. In addition, there is also a strict/lenient discussion about how 'durable' an urban regime should be, and there is consideration of whether non-local developments and actors are given sufficient recognition in urban regime studies and whether and how they should be taken into account. Those discussions and my own interpretation and definition of the urban regime will be dealt with in the remainder of this section.

2.5.1. *Is business participation essential?*

One of the main discussions within the urban regime debate is about which actors constitute an urban regime; this discussion focuses mainly on whether the private/business sector is a necessary participant in any urban regime. In this section, I will show that while most urban regime studies have focused on the role of business, its requirement should not be seen as an essential characteristic of an urban regime.

In Stone's 'Atlanta urban regime', a group of top businessmen functioned as an important regime partner. Several if not most scholars using the concept after Stone have often looked for a similar role for the private sector in (mainly U.S.) local governments, and they have most often found one. Several of these local coalitions have therefore been labelled (a particular form of) urban regime (see also the studies in table 1).

Several scholars argue that business participation is not merely a possible outcome of urban regime analysis but an integral part of the concept itself. Mossberger and Stoker, for instance, are clear about that when they state their first characteristic of an urban regime:

> Partners drawn from government and non-governmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation (Mossberger, Stoker 2001: 829).

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[7] Some lists fall in between, such as that of Dowding (2001: 14), which is rejected by Mossberger and Stoker because he leaves incorporation from the private sector optional (Mossberger, Stoker 2001: 823-824).

Their main argument is that without business participation, the concept loses its uniqueness and becomes too broad, potentially indistinguishable from the idea of networks or urban governance itself (Mossberger, Stoker 2001: 832, 825). Others, however, argue that such close connection to urban governance is necessary to make the concept more internationally applicable (e.g. Pierre 2005: 448).

Stone takes a more lenient approach than Mossberger and Stoker do. One of his requirements regarding the coalition is the 'engagement of non-governmental actors' (Stone 2002: 7), which requires two things. First, more actors than just government ones should be involved, because otherwise, 'we would simply talk about the institutions of government' (Stone 2002: 7). The second point is that not all non-governmental actors need be from business; 'labor-union officials, party functionaries, officers in nonprofit organizations or foundations, and church leaders may also be involved' (Stone 1989: 7). In later work, however, Stone is even more lenient and seems to revert to seeing the agenda as the main determinant in influencing the content of the coalition.

> It is a mistake, however, to think of urban regimes as composed of a fixed body of actors, taking on an ever-changing agenda. Instead the question is about who needs to be mobilized in order to take on a given problem effectively… urban regime analysis holds that the issue addressed determines whose participation is needed. Neither business nor any other group is necessarily a required member of the governing coalition (Stone 2005a: 313-314).

With those two stands in mind, the strict and lenient lines of thought around the issue of business participation can be presented as follows (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Which actors are essential?

The strict line of thought	The lenient line of thought
The private sector is a necessary actor within an urban regime. The private sector, in practice, is often business. Without it, the concept looses its exclusivity.	The important aspect is cooperation between the actors needed to implement the agenda. In practice, this coalition can include business, but this is no strict requirement.

In my view, business or private sector participation should be dropped as an essential urban regime requirement. Some authors argue that the combination between business and politics is less relevant as soon as it concerns European or other non-American cities. In many European countries, municipalities experience stronger control from the state but also receive more money from it, which makes local dependence on businesses decrease (e.g. DiGaetano, Klemanski 1993a; 1993b; Hard-

ing 1994a: 365; Strom 1996: 477; John, Cole 2001; John 2001; Mossberger, Stoker 2001: 819-820; Dowding 2001; Davies 2003: 262; 267). This means not that there are no economic development agendas in European local governments but that they are mostly run by politicians and bureaucrats (e.g. John, Cole 1998: 384), or that they are only one of many supported agendas and not the dominant one (e.g. Harding 1997: 299).

Although the scholars listed above all see that the context in Europe is different, many of them do not opt to drop business participation as an essential urban regime requirement. And they are partly right. After all, the fact that business participation in several European local governments is less intense does not make the concept less applicable, it just makes these scholars see no or fewer urban regimes in Europe (e.g. John, Cole 1998; Dowding et al. 1999; Sellers 2002; Tretter 2008).

Others scholars, however, do propose to drop the requirement of business as an essential actor within an urban regime – for instance, by admitting several types of urban regimes that do not all include business participation (e.g. Kantor et al. 1997), by providing a different conceptualisation of the private and public sphere (e.g. Brown 1999), or just by making the concept more abstract (e.g. Ward 1996). The main reason they engage in these efforts is to make the concept applicable for cross-comparative research.

Nevertheless, to drop the requirement of business participation solely for cross-comparative reasons, however sympathetic, would not be satisfactory if it damaged the original meaning of the concept. In my view, however, business participation has never been a core characteristic of the urban regime concept in the first place.

For a line of reasoning that does not take the private and business sector to be an essential characteristic of any urban regime, I start with the work of Stone. Governing, according to Stone, is creating the capacity to get things done (see also section 2.3.1). Getting things done mainly means that a coalition comes together and has the resources to prioritise and implement an agenda. The coalition functions through what Stone has called the social production model of power ('power to'). This means that the coalition actors have no hierarchical power ('power over'). Each of them possesses some amount of autonomy, which makes bargaining necessary to forge a coalition. The (potential) regime partners are, in other words, mutually dependent.

In localities that have a locally-oriented business sector and an agenda based on economic development, the business sector most likely will be in a coalition as one of those (semi-)autonomous actors. However, this does not mean that the business sector is, in all localities or for all agendas, the most obvious coalition partner. In localities where there are different actors dominating the government scene – that is, different 'structures and institutions' – an urban regime will likely look different, as it also will when there are agendas that do not need the resources of business (e.g. Kantor et al. 1997: 370). Menahem (1994) is thus correct in saying that a broader range of

actors can constitute an urban regime as long as it demonstrates cooperation between actors that have a certain level of autonomy and thus no complete hierarchical control over one another. And based on that criterion of mutual dependency, a broad range of actors comes into mind. If (semi-)governmental actors such as schools, public health organisations, housing corporations, or the police have some form of autonomy – for instance, in the way they allocate resources or the way their leadership is appointed – then the same mechanism as for businesses applies: they have to be bargained with to become part of the urban regime.[8]

> It remains the case that coalitions in European cities often tend to be public-public rather than (or as a precursor to) public-private, be they agreements between local authorities and higher levels of government, between different local authorities at the metropolitan level, between various public and quasi-public agencies operating in and on behalf of particular territories or even between different departments of the same bureaucracy (Harding 1997: 300-301).

The central idea of the urban regime is thus not public/private cooperation, but cooperation between (semi-)autonomous actors to get things done. In Atlanta this amounted to cooperation between city hall and business around a (mainly) economic agenda, but in other cases and cities this can amount to dissimilar coalitions.

In conclusion, the core of an urban regime is the coming together of actors that possess some form of autonomy by which they cannot be assumed to act according to the will of others. Business in many occasions and for many urban agendas is indeed such an important (semi-)autonomous actor, but in other localities that have a different structure or in which other agendas are dominant, the resources of other (semi-)autonomous actors, even (semi-)governmental ones, can be needed to implement the agenda. This can lead to other coalitions than merely city hall/business ones.

2.5.2. *How durable is an urban regime?*

Another characteristic that has provided some discussion in the urban regime debate is about an urban regime's durability. Most authors agree that without a certain amount of durability there is no regime, or at best an emerging regime or a failed regime (Mossberger, Stoker 2001: 830). In that discussion, it is again possible to distinguish a strict and a lenient line of thought.

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[8] The argument that this brings the urban regime closer to urban governance is true, but the extension of that argument – that this makes the urban regime too much like governance (Mossberger, Stoker 2001: 825) – is not. With a focus on a citywide agenda, a strong base in the four analytical tools (section 2.6.), and requirements regarding durability (section 2.5.2), an urban regime still has more focus than governance or policy networks. This discussion is however beyond the scope of this research.

Mossberger and Stoker criticise Sites, who describes regime change under three consecutive mayors in New York, for confusing temporarily strategic policy shifts with regime change (Sites 1997). For them, 'this clearly violates the idea that regimes represent relatively enduring orientations and coalitions' (Mossberger, Stoker 2001: 815). But it remains less clear what these authors take to be a longstanding pattern of cooperation, and they do not provide much information. Other authors also note that an urban regime should endure over an extended period of time but fail to give an exact time frame. John and Cole conclude that an urban regime develops over 'several decades' and even then it is not always clear whether it can really be labelled an urban regime (John, Cole 1998: 399). Austin and McCaffrey do not label the partnerships they find as urban regimes, even though they mainly discuss partnerships running from 20 to 50 years (Austin, McCaffrey 2002). In contrast, there are plenty of articles that describe urban governments for only a brief period of time, a few years or one legislative period, and do label this as the existence or emergence of an urban regime. In addition to the example of Sites (1997), table 1 shows more examples.

The question that thus remains is this: When is a specific governing coalition durable enough that we may speak of an urban regime? Stone's definition, 'arrangements capable of sustained action rather than ad hoc reactions', seems more flexible on the durability criterion, as durability in this way is not based on a specific period of time but is connected instead to the urban regime agenda. According to Stone, an urban regime can be described as a 'set of informal but relatively stable arrangements by which a locality is governed' – a definition in which governing should be understood as 'bringing together the resources needed to pursue… a strategic policy direction' (Stone 2002: 7). The power of a regime involves not a complete overview of all decisions, but the capacity to give priority to a direction-setting agenda. This implies that for Stone, the perceived durability of the urban regime resides in its competence to implement the agenda, not in a specific measurement of time. Stoker and others seem less flexible, but, apart from criticising short-term policy changes and strategies like the one from Sites (1997), Stoker as well as others do not seem to make clear how long a certain governing coalition should exist in order to call it an urban regime.

Figure 4: How durable should an urban regime be?

The strict line of thought	The lenient line of thought
Even though there are never any concrete numbers given (for instance in years), the strict line of thought seems to refer to Stone's study of decades (Stone 1989), or at least to periods that exceed an actor's specific legislative period.	The lenient line of thought sees the durability of the regime in its ability to implement the agenda. This automatically applies some sort of durability without attaching concrete time frames to it.

In my view, neither line of thought is satisfactory. First of all, it is not wise to attach a certain period *in years* to which an urban regime should comply. Not only would such a choice be arbitrary (why six, why eight?) but it would also disregard different international institutional contexts and thus harm cross-national comparison. If we, for instance, attach a time frame of five years to an urban regime, this will make an urban regime in theory independent from local elections in Belgium (as there are local elections every six years), while in the Netherlands the urban regime should maintain itself through at least one election (as Dutch local elections are held every four years). On the other hand, the lenient line of thought makes the question of durability completely dependent on the agenda. Instead, the urban regime should show some durability in maintaining its existence over at least one local election. As many Anglo-American and West European local elections take place every four to six years, and most urban regime studies (including this one) are focused on undertaking urban regime analysis in democratic societies, local elections seem the best indicator for urban regime durability. The durability of an urban regime is therefore expressed through its endurance through at least one municipal (council) election.

2.5.3. *Should the 'non-local' be included in the process?*

The urban regime concept has been criticised for not sufficiently incorporating the 'non-local' – that is, urban regime scholars have been accused of overlooking important non-local actors or/and non-local developments (e.g. Harding 1994a; Ward 1996). This section of the chapter summarises the criticism and shows that there is in fact not really much to argue about, as good urban regime analysis takes aboard all aspects important in local decision making, local as well as non-local.

With the critique that scholars disregard non-local developments, it is argued that the local decision-making process is being made more important than it is. Relevant to this discussion is the increasing disappearance of boundaries between states, especially in the economic field that is also referred to as globalisation (e.g. Sassen 1991). If states are increasingly influenced by global developments that they no longer can control on their own (economy, safety, immigration, et cetera), this influence will also come to bear on cities (e.g. Ward 1996). In relation to this idea, Peterson's book *City Limits* already demonstrated the relative powerlessness of cities (Peterson 1981). Also, in regulation theory, there is criticism of scholars' disregard of the non-local (Lauria 1997). Beauregard, for instance, argues that urban regimes do not emerge solely out of local motivations, but that national regulation, the retreat of welfare state activities, and global industrial restructuring are also reasons for the emergence and breakdown of regimes (Beauregard 1997: 146). Some scholars suggest that urban regime research can benefit from insights from regulation theory. In an anthology about the connection between urban regimes and regulation theory, various authors suggest that regulation theory could be a valuable addition to the literature about urban regimes, since the latter neglects the role of the non-local (Lauria 1997; e.g. contributions of Lauria, Goodwin and Painter, Leo, Cox, Beauregard, and Jonas, pages vii, 7-8, 14, 95, 106,

173, 208). In the final chapter of this book, Lauria nuances the critique to some extent.

> It should be clear that regime analysts do not, in my mind, equate local governance and urban regimes with the dominant municipality's politicians plus engaged economic actors. On the other hand, what this criticism makes clear is that regime analysts have excluded other suburban and exurban municipal politicians from the mix (Lauria 1997: 234).

Stone does not regard the local level as an inappropriate level of analysis, and he never said that urban regimes were isolated with no influence from outside the city. In the preface of *Regime Politics*, Stone mentions that national developments (the abolishment of the Jim Crow system, national urban development programmes) and even global developments (the internationalisation of economies) affected the way the local actors could and did play a part within the urban regime. In fact, the way local actors deal with this is precisely what an urban regime is all about.

> Urban regime analysis thus concerns how local agency fits into the play of larger forces. Local actors are shaped by and respond to large structures, but the appropriate lens for viewing this wider field is local agency – what motivates actors at this level, what affects their ability to cooperate or puts them into conflict, the leverage they can gain in tackling problems, and in general what they make of the structural forces in which they are enmeshed. These forces manifest themselves locally through such phenomena as agenda feasibility, coalition formation, resource mobilization, and the ways in which modes of cooperation are worked out. Capitalism is a very large presence in these processes, but not the only one (Stone 2005a: 324).

This insight nevertheless does not erase the critique, also stated by Lauria, that urban development is not only a case of local actors. Different scholars argue that with the local focus of urban regime scholars, the role of actors on other levels is neglected too much (e.g. Sites 1997). This critique overarches the urban regime concept, as it is a critique often heard about urban research in general.

> Urban politics has been seen as no more than local politics, and very frequently as concerned only with local government politics (Dunleavy cited in Harding 1994a: 366).

Different authors therefore argue for more attention to other levels of authority, both outside the urban regime literature and within it (e.g. Harding 1994a: 376). Urban regime scholars should not only have eyes for local actors, because non-local actors can also play a role in an urban regime (Harding cited in Ward 1996: 436; Burns, Thomas 2004: 808).

Burns and Thomas put these notions into practice when they study the case of New Orleans and take the state level into consideration. Participating in the New Orleans urban regime through cooperation with mayors and the Chamber of Commerce, state governors filled the leadership and resource gap that businesses abdicated when leaving the area. Burns and Thomas emphasise the importance of the non-local level of government. The state governors 'set the legislative agenda; guide important bills through the state legislature; shape public opinion; manage crises; and negotiate with federal, state, regional, and city officials' (Dye cited in Burns, Thomas 2004: 793). The authors argue that more attention should be paid to the possibility that non-local players are part of a local regime (Burns, Thomas 2004: 809).

Another way of broadening the concept is to consider the development of regional regimes. Hamilton applies the urban regime concept to the regions of Chicago and Pittsburgh (Hamilton 2002; 2004). The most important threshold for the development of these regional regimes seems to be the lack of a strong political authority on the regional level and the absence of established patterns of cooperation between regional actors. According to Hamilton, business sometimes takes the lead, but the important political actors are more embedded within their electoral territory, mainly the city and not the regional entity (Hamilton 2002). Nevertheless, Hamilton considers an urban regime an appropriate concept to analyse the regional level (Hamilton 2002; 2004).

In general, the 'localist trap' discussion reveals opposing views whether or not urban regime studies disregard non-local actors or developments. Some scholars react against a perceived tendency in urban regime studies to prove the dominance of the local level. However, the fact that the urban regime concept takes local actors or developments as a point of analysis is one of its basic characteristics. Stone confirms the importance of non-local developments and actors in urban regime analysis: they can play a role in explaining *local* change. But the fact that the *local* is taken as the starting point of the *urban* regime analysis should not be confused with any normative assumption that the local is more important than the non-local. It is up to every individual scholar to determine the balance between a local point of view and a non-local analysis in each and every case study.

2.5.4. *Toward a definition and characteristics*

The underlying question in the urban regime debate is to what degree any urban regime should resemble Stone's Atlanta urban regime, particularly in terms of a cooperation between city hall and business and its durability. Stone defines an urban regime initially as 'the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions' (Stone 1989: 6). Later, he emphasises that he considers no particular actor to be a required member of the governing coalition and that the agenda or 'given problem' determines the body of actors that constitute the regime (Stone 2005a: 313-314).

To approach a definition of an urban regime that resonates with Stone's insight, I believe the public-private distinction between actor categories should be changed to reflect the more general cooperation of '(semi-)autonomous actors', indicating that a broad range of partners (including the business sector) can be eligible to act in an urban regime, depending on its agenda. No actor is required from the beginning. If these actors formally or informally support and implement a citywide governing agenda (in Stone's words, 'carry out governing decisions') and show signs of durability, meaning that the collaboration maintains itself through at least one munici-pal (council) election, it can be labelled an urban regime. This set of criteria leads to the following definition: *an urban regime is a durable constellation of (semi-)autonomous actors supporting and implementing a citywide governing agenda.* The requirements or characteristics for an urban regime are a prioritisation and implementation of a citywide agenda, a mobilisation of (semi-)autonomous actors around that agenda, and a maintenance of that agenda beyond at least one municipal (council) elections.

2.6. The urban regime concept to describe political change in local government

The discussion portrayed in the previous section indicates that many scholars regard the urban regime as a specific *constellation* of actors around an agenda, sometimes limited to certain actors (city hall, business), to a certain period (several decades), or even to a certain agenda (economic development). This specific view of the urban regime can be used in case study research, comparing a particular governing situation against a certain ideal type of urban regime. But the urban regime concept can also be used to study governing *processes* (e.g. Orr, Stoker 1994). Stone comments that such a use

> concerns how particular regimes come into being. It is about significant his-torical details – how an agenda came to be framed in a particular way, what brought coalition partners together (or, after a period of time, what caused a break), why coalition partners devised the scheme of cooperation they did, and so forth (Stone 2005a: 331).

The urban regime concept, when it is used to study governing processes, deals not with the question whether there is an urban regime in locality X or Y but with the process that may or may not lead to one. Or more precisely, it says something about how governing processes occur, since establishing an urban regime is no goal in itself but deals with how local communities are governed and how they pursue problem-solving capacities (Stone 2005a: 329).

> The use of the term 'urban regime' does not imply that every community has a strong and effective set of arrangements. Quite the contrary, the concept is intended to focus on the question of when and how effective arrangements come into existence and are sustained over time (Stone 2001: 23).

Even though some of the earlier urban regime articles stress the ability of the urban regime concept 'to explain a process' (Stoker 1995: 66), these articles do not provide many conceptual tools for doing so. The academic discussion on how the urban regime can analyse governing processes is somewhat overshadowed by the question of what an urban regime should look like (its constellation). Even though there is also no agreement on the composition of such a constellation, the authors in this discussion produced several lists of characteristics (see section 2.5). For the use of an urban regime concept to study a process, Stone's 'lenient' list of characteristics forms a starting point:

- An agenda to address a distinct set of problems
- A governing coalition formed around the agenda, typically including both governmental and non-governmental members
- Resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition
- A scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing (Stone 2005a: 329).

These characteristics, or 'elements', as Stone calls them, provide the building blocks for a more structural regime analysis. In short, they are:

- Agenda
- Coalition
- Resources
- Scheme of cooperation (also called 'mode of alignment') (Stone 2005c).

Stone also uses these elements to summarise the findings in his Atlanta study and a smaller case in Boston (see table 2).

	Atlanta	**Boston**
Agenda	'The city too busy to hate'	Anti-violence campaign
Coalition	Black community, business elite	Black clergy, police, other law enforcement, youth workers, business
Resources	Control of city hall, investment capital, civic skills, political access to governor's office	Community-based information, enforcement authority, jobs, services
Scheme of cooperation	Behind-the-scenes negotiations	Informal collaboration through Operation Cease-fire

The agenda, according to Stone, is 'the set of challenges which policy makers accord priority' (Stone 2005b: 1). But agendas do not emerge or become a priority spontaneously. Assuming that every possible regime actor in a certain locality has its own agenda, then agendas need to be supported by other actors to gain priority. This engenders a process in which different agendas vie for dominance, and a new over-arching agenda does not always emerge. Sometimes, however, a certain agenda does become dominant and gain the status of a priority when it achieves enough support. This is a very dynamic process. To accomplish this, the agenda and the coalition forming around that agenda are in constant interaction.

> Agendas are never static, and they undergo adjustment as conditions change. But the direction of the adjustment is influenced by the particulars of the network, who composes it, and the concerns they embody (Stone 2005a: 319-320).

The agenda, as it were, is the magnet or the cement that holds the governing coalition together despite internal differences, especially in the beginning, when trust among the coalition actors is still being built. The (governing) coalition in turn implements the agenda. As the various actors work together and learn more about each other, trust develops to reinforce the coalition. The governing coalition is

> the group of actors who come together, in many instances unofficially and tacitly, for the purpose of setting a locality-wide agenda and giving it priority standing (that is, they provide "guiding and steering") (Stone 2004: 3; see also Stoker 1995).

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The coalition brings in resources to implement the agenda. These resources can be tangible, such as money or material, or intangible, such as knowledge or status (Stone 1993: 11; Stoker 1995: 65). The scheme of cooperation is the way in which the coalition actors interact with each other (e.g. Stone 2005a: 329). In Atlanta, this was through behind-the-scenes negotiation.

The four urban regime elements interrelate. According to Stoker, the iron law of an urban regime is that a coalition is 'able to mobilise resources commensurate with its main policy agenda' (Stoker 1995: 61). This means that when an agenda emerges and a coalition forms around that agenda (sometimes partly creating the agenda itself in the process), the actors in the coalition have and use sufficient resources to implement the agenda. The scheme of cooperation is the way these actors coordinate their efforts.

By analysing local government in light of these four elements, it is possible to gain more insight into how change in local government takes place.

> The model itself is… a guide to help identify those elements that are key, how they are related, and how changes in those elements can account for continuity and change in capacity to govern (Stone 2005a: 330).

Suppose, for instance, that a city experienced a failed school reform. By comparing the city's circumstances to the elements of the model (agenda, coalition, resources, scheme of cooperation), it may become clear that the city lacked resources for school reform, that the agenda did not become a priority, or that a scheme of cooperation between the necessary actors was never established (example from Stone 2005a: 331).

This form of urban regime analysis also makes it possible to determine which actors 'win' or 'lose' in governing processes. Burns and Thomas have made this analysis of the attempt to move a basketball team to New Orleans. By applying urban regime analysis they showed that the main regime winners are the state government, which generates rent from the basketball team, and the team owners, who see an increase in their income. Tourists, who experience an increase in hotel/motel- and food tax, and residents, who see millions that could have been spent on education and economic development going to the deals to bring the NBA team to New Orleans, can be considered the main regime losers (Burns, Thomas 2004).

To have some explanatory value, the elements thus have to be applied to a specific case, in this research the implementation of the political agenda of Liveable Rotterdam. The elements are then analysed over a period of time. One of the few conceptual aids available for a framework to do so is a chronological model by Orr and Stoker (1994) in which they describe how urban regime change takes place (see section 2.4.3). Because the goal of the process described here is not urban regime change, but the implementation of a political agenda or programme, Orr and Stoker's phases are somewhat adjusted (see also figure 5):

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0. The starting point takes account of the situation before the agenda takes shape.
1. The first stage revolves around the formulation of an agenda for how the desired change should look. Who instigates it and what should be the main priority? Further, what coalition partners are currently willing to contribute resources for the implementation of this agenda?
2. The second stage revolves around how that agenda develops broader support and the changes become realised.
3. The third stage revolves around institutionalising the changes. This means that the changes have to be maintained over a longer period of time, at least one local election.

Figure 5: Urban regime analysis

	Urban regime elements			
Urban regime phases	**Agenda**	**Coalition**	**Resources**	**Scheme of cooperation**
0) Starting situation				
1) Emergence of the political agenda for change				
2) Development of the proposed change				
3) Institutionalisation of the change				

The next step is to make the phases in the model more concrete in terms of time. Regarding the discussion on regime durability, it has been argued that looking at municipal (council) elections – and thus considering legislative periods rather than more arbitrary dates – is the right way to judge a regime's durability. Based on this observation, the three phases in the model correlate to three legislative periods. In the first phase of the model, which corresponds to the first legislative period, a particular agenda for change is analysed – let us, for instance, say an agenda to decrease unemployment or to extend the coalition with labour unions. This period functions as the starting situation, to see if that agenda already is a governing priority and whether important actors for its implementation, such as labour unions, are already part of the governing coalition. If not, this phase can be used to analyse what the agenda and governing coalition

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of a specific municipality looks like instead and how the agenda of decreasing unemployment and extending the governing coalition relates to it. The second phase of the model, which corresponds to the second legislative period, analyses how the agenda to decrease unemployment develops and whether labour unions are included in the (governing) coalition to implement the agenda. It also analyses what are the main resources of the coalition to implement the agenda and the way of coordination within the coalition. The third phase of the model, which corresponds to the third legislative period, analyses whether the changes are maintained after a new municipal (council) election has taken place (see figure 6).

Figure 6: Urban regime analysis

Urban regime phases	Urban regime elements			
	Agenda	**Coalition**	**Resources**	**Scheme of cooperation**
0) Starting situation (Legislative period 1)	What is the agenda?	Who is behind the agenda?	What are the resources to implement the agenda?	How does the coalition align?
1) Emergence of the political agenda for change	What is the agenda?	Who is behind the agenda?	What are the resources to implement the agenda?	How does the coalition align?
2) Development of the proposed change (Legislative period 2)	What is the agenda?	Who is behind the agenda?	What are the resources to implement the agenda?	How does the coalition align?
3) Institutionalisation of the change (Legislative period 3)	What is the agenda?	Who is behind the agenda?	What are the resources to implement the agenda?	How does the coalition align?

2.7.   Conclusion

The urban regime concept has been developed by a group of scholars. Clarence Stone is regarded the main founder. Based on his work especially, I consider an urban regime to be *a durable constellation of (semi-)autonomous actors supporting and implementing a citywide governing agenda.* The discussion in the literature focuses mainly on what characteristics an(y) urban regime should comply with, particularly discussing the participation of business. According to the 'strict' line of thought that mainly opts to stay faithful to the characteristics established by Stone's research on the empirical circumstances of Atlanta, business participation is an essential component of an urban regime. The 'lenient' line of thought does not consider any particular actor to be essential but instead suggests that the coalition depends on local circumstances and the content of the agenda.

What is somewhat overshadowed by this discussion is that there is another way to use the urban regime concept: as a mode of analysis to study how local governing processes occur and how change can take place within them. According to Stone, successful change depends on a good fit between the four urban regime elements derived from his 'lenient' list of characteristics: agenda, coalition, resources, and scheme of cooperation – or, in other words, on a coalition that is 'able to mobilise resources commensurate with its main policy agenda'.

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CHAPTER 3   DUTCH DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

3.1.   Introduction

This chapter addresses the context of Dutch local government to which the urban regime concept will be applied. The chapter starts by describing some basic characteristics of Dutch democracy and ends by focusing on the characteristics of Dutch local government.

3.2.   Politics of accommodation and consensus

The Netherlands has a political system in which decision-making is based on accommodation and consensus. Political decisions continuously have to be weighed not only against competing elite interests but also against public interests, in a 'tightly interwoven network of consultation structures and a large conglomeration of lobbies' (Raanderaad, Wolffram 2001: 56; Hendriks 2009). According to critics of this model, this leads to a very rigid and conservative system in which changes, if possible at all, proceed only incrementally.

The most basic distinction in democracy models is made by Arend Lijphart (1984; 1999). He distinguishes the *majoritarian model,* in which a majority of the people makes decisions, from the *consensus model,* in which majority rule is accepted as a minimal requirement and as many people as possible make the decisions (Lijphart 1999: 2). These differences empower democracies to function in different ways. The 'majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterised by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise' (Lijphart 1999: 2).

Lijphart uses a coordinate system of two axes to label thirty-six countries as either consensual or majoritarian. The first axis is the executive-parties dimension, referring to the arrangement of executive power, the party and electoral systems, and interest groups. The second axis is the federal-unitary one, referring to the contrast between federalism and unitary government (Lijphart 1999: 3).

When we compare the Netherlands with the U.K. and the U.S., differences on the executive-parties axis are clear and large. The Netherlands, together with most continental European countries, has a consensus system, while the U.K. and the U.S. are majoritarian democracies (Lijphart 1999: 248, 250). The consensus democracy on this axis is characterised by executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, executive/legislative balance of power, multiparty systems, proportional representation, and coordinated and 'corporatist' interest-group systems aimed at compromise. In contrast, majoritarian democracy is characterised by a concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets, an executive-legislative relationship in which the execu-

tive is dominant, a two-party system, a majoritarian and disproportional electoral system, and a pluralist interest group system with free-for-all competition among groups (Lijphart 1999: 3-4).

On Lijphart's federal/unitary axis, though less relevant for my research here, the differences are less clear-cut. While the U.K. is clearly majoritarian and the U.S. is consensual, the Netherlands lies between them, on the consensus side but not as far as the U.S. (Lijphart 1999: 248). On this continuum, consensus democracy is characterised by federal and decentralised government, division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses, rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities, systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts, and independent central banks. Majoritarian democracy is characterised by unitary and centralised government, concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, flexible constitutions, systems in which the legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation, and central banks that depend on the executive branch of government (Lijphart 1999: 3-4).

Lijphart has also written a more extensive study of the Dutch political democratic system called *The Politics of Accommodation* (Lijphart 1968). As the title indicates, Lijphart describes accommodation as a main characteristic of the Dutch political system. Accommodation can be interpreted as a mechanism in which change does not result from external events such as revolutions, but by the integration of opposing views within the system (Wansink 2004: 167-168; see also Daalder 1995: 146).

According to Lijphart, the politics of accommodation is characterised by a set of 'rules' with which the political elite complies. The first and main rule that Lijphart adduces is that Dutch politics is business and not a game. Inspired by the Dutch merchant tradition, politics is a serious business, aimed at achieving results. This tradition differs from that of France, for instance, where politics is characterised by tactics of delay, equivocation, and avoidance of responsibility.

Lijphart's other rules are derived from that main one. The second rule is that there is an agreement to disagree, a pragmatic acceptance of ideological differences. The strong convictions of other political blocs must be tolerated, if not respected. This rule, however, only applies to questions not requiring immediate answer. Failure to agree on certain issues does not stand in the way of working fruitfully on other issues. And regarding issues that are universally considered vital, no decisions are made without everyone's concurrence or at least concession, even by (social) groups that are not strictly necessary for making the decision. Lijphart's third rule is that Dutch politics is characterised by summit diplomacy, in which compromises are reached at the level of elite government. The fourth rule is proportionality: 'If one party gets something, the other should too'. 'Depolitisation' and secrecy are rules five and six. Depolitisation, the neutralisation of a dispute by taking it out of its political context and turning it into a – for instance – legal or economic question, is another way to

solve difficult political disputes. Sometimes reforms may be deliberately hampered by this political tool – for instance, by turning a difficult question over to a commission: 'Once the Commission publishes its proposals, the original impetus for reform has been lost, or the politicians realise that the reforms do not really solve their problems' (Andeweg 1989: 57). Because the politics of accommodation is about consensus, concession, and flexibility, secrecy is important too, as it shields the long process of accommodation from distracting publicity. (The commission's strategic delay described above can be seen as an operation protected by secrecy.) A last rule is the government's right to govern. It is important to get the job done, and the level of harassment towards the cabinet should not be too high (Lijphart 1968: 122-138).

Lijphart himself expresses surprise that these rules survived the Dutch 'pillarisation system' and are still relevant decades later; the only real change in his rules is that the governing coalitions tend to be more 'minimal winning' (Lijphart 1968; 1989; Deschouwer 2001: 208).[9] Van Praag and Daalder note that the rules also apply at the turn of the present century; adjustments are limited to greater involvement of the parties in the governmental majority in policy making, general acceptance that the leader of the largest party in the coalition should become the prime minister, and agreement that the composition of the government cannot be changed without going to the voters first (Van Praag cited in Andeweg, Irwin 2002; Daalder cited in Andeweg, Irwin 2002: 43).

To explain the Dutch politics of accommodation and consensus, several authors refer to Dutch history, mainly to the perpetual battle against the sea and to the structure of the Dutch Republic (1568-1795), in which cooperation between seven autonomous provinces was vital to defeat a common enemy (Spain) and keep internal differences under control (Hendriks 2006: 86-87; Raanderaad, Wolffram 2001: 42-47). Also, the year 1848 is used to symbolise the Dutch elite's strategy of accommodation. When some European countries faced revolutions, the Dutch king Willem II turned 'liberal in one day' to prevent escalation (Euser 2009: 15-16; Leenknegt et al. 2008: 144). The same strategy has been applied more recently, for instance in the 1960s and 1970s, when the elite tried to absorb the revolt of young people, women, and other activists by inviting them to participate in governing (Wansink 2004: 167-168). This sort of incorporation of views means that conflicts are avoided and a politics of polemic is quickly transformed into one of consensus, and that changes in governing tend to take place through an evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary one.

By the end of the twentieth century, this Dutch tradition and system of accommodation and consensus had come to be seen in two different ways. In the positive view, it

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[9] The Dutch pillarisation system roughly refers to the period between 1920 and 1970 in which the Netherlands was divided in several ideological 'pillars', mainly a Catholic, Protestant, and a Socialist pillar. Each of those pillars had different political parties, newspapers, TV broadcasting companies, and labour unions attached. People generally belonged exclusively to one of the pillars.

is known as the 'polder model', highlighting the benefits of the Dutch model as a way of policy-making that gathers much support from stakeholders. From the negative angle it provides a 'viscosity-discourse', describing the Dutch system as static, with a high degree of 'institutional conservatism' in which nothing gets done (e.g. Hendriks 2001; Andeweg 1989). In this 'viscosity' analysis, Dutch policy-making structure is characterised with 'a high degree of interdependence, interwovenness and complexity: the structures of public administration form an impenetrable tangle; they lead to diluted responsibilities and, more generally, to an irretrievable leaking away of the power to take decisions and to follow through on them'. This in turn affects the policy-making processes: public decision-making in the Netherlands develops slowly, and the road to the finalisation, let alone the implementation, takes a long time (Hendriks, Toonen 2001b: 7-10). An analysis of research into public policy-making between 1982 and 1992 yields a similar conclusion, as Dutch decision-making turns out to be, among other things, about 'finding a balance within a field of many participants, and of complex dependencies and interactions… accelerating and decelerating… with acceleration proving much harder than its opposite… negotiating and reaching compromise… acknowledging that processes are difficult to control… [T]here are limited powers of realisation and large powers of obstruction' ('t Hart 1992 cited in Hendriks 2001: 29).

In comparison, the majoritarian model is associated with a 'winner takes all' system, in which the 'all' is concentrated in the hands of a small elite, a party, or an individual. Especially in a (dominantly) two-party system such as the U.K. or U.S., this means that after the elections, little political compromise is necessary. Moreover, the elite can often appoint like-minded individuals to key positions in government and within the administration, which means that after elections the elite has a strong mandate to govern. However, after new elections, a small majority of the electorate (>50%) can direct this 'all' into the hands of a different elite again (see also: Hendriks 2006: 67, chapter 3). In general, a majoritarian system lacks institutions that maintain a certain amount of power-sharing or a division of responsibilities, such as the Netherlands traditionally possesses in its executive/legislative balance of power, its proportional representation, its multi party system, and its strong tradition of civil service (Bovens et al. 2007: 182). This makes politicians and administrators in a consensus system much more dependent on each other than in a majoritarian system (Hendriks 2006: 68, 83; see also Norton 1997).

Given the history in which the current Dutch state emerged mainly out of local and regional entities, as well as the interwovenness of the local, provincial, and national levels of government (Toonen 1987; see also section 3.3.1), the Dutch culture of consensus, consultation, and accommodation also characterises government at the local level (e.g. Tops 1994; Leenknegt et al. 2008; Euser 2009).

> For many of their activities, municipalities require the cooperation or agreement from other actors... Rules and notions that exist elsewhere always have to be taken into account. Municipal policy is created by negotiation and

making agreements acceptable to all parties; this in turn requires compromises, concessions to be done, finding a satisfying instead of an optimal solution (Tops 1994: 36-37; see also Boogers 2007: 15).

One of this culture's products is the long tradition of forming local political coalitions that reflect the diverse composition of the municipal council; instead of forming a coalition that counts on a minimal majority in the council, coalitions are organised to include a wide range of parties, thereby reflecting many different interests in the main municipal governing board (Tops 1990). Also, depolitisation is a strong characteristic on the local level, where the issues at stake often are more practical and political colour is a 'relatively subordinated factor' in the activities of local politicians (Tops 1994: 36).

That being said, the Dutch tradition of conflict resolution might be changing. The year 2002 has been described as the start of a shift in Dutch political interaction. Fortuyn in 2002 and several political parties or politicians after him have expressed more hostility and directed more polemics towards the established parties and their way of doing politics, generally characterised as much talking but little action – and some of these politicians have won elections. Parties somewhat related to Fortuyn's parties, such as 'Proud of the Netherlands' (*Trots op Nederland*) and the 'Freedom Party' (see section 7.4.2), increasingly do well too. It is even argued that such parties flourish better in consensus than in majoritarian democracies, as consensus democracy gives them a better opportunity to emerge (Hakhverdian, Koop 2007: 417). It however remains to be seen in research how the participation of such parties in Dutch elections and in democratic institutions affects, in the long run, the previously described Dutch way of doing politics and making decisions. This research wants to contribute to that issue.

In the next section, I will concentrate more on the local level of Dutch government, discussing its specific characteristics and especially focusing on the broad range of (semi-)autonomous actors involved in local decision making.

3.3.   The fragmentation of Dutch local government

Some of the current Dutch municipalities have a long history. In 2005, Nijmegen celebrated its 2000-year anniversary. The southern city of Maastricht dates back to the Roman Empire. Other cities, like Breda or 's-Hertogenbosch experienced their growth during the Middle Ages. Back then, it was possible for cities to be granted some form of autonomy from landowners with what was called City Rights (*Stadsrechten*). City Rights meant autonomy in certain areas: for instance, the right to collect taxes or to administer justice. These cities existed long before we could even speak of a Dutch state. During the French influence and (later) the French occupation between 1795 until 1814, the patchwork of territories and different governing structures was replaced by a 'unitary state' (Leenknegt, et al. 2008). After the Napoleonic wars, in 1814, a new Dutch Constitution was written. In 1848, a professor in state law and a political

leader, Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, made the most important amendments considering the structure of the Dutch state, which divided the state into three parts: national government, provinces (12), and municipalities (431). In addition, there are directly elected water councils (26) that administer, among other things, dike maintenance (numbers for 1/1/2010; CBS website consulted on 2/3/2010).

Dutch municipalities have roughly two tasks: the implementation of national policy and the administration of internal affairs (article 124 of the Dutch Constitution; article 108 of the Law on Municipalities), from now on referred to respectively as co-governance and autonomy. However, it is not always easy to determine which municipal activities and competences fall in which category. Neither the Constitution nor the Law on Municipalities provides a list of which competences or policy fields belong to which group. Moreover, this distinction does not state anything about the level of discretion available to perform either of the two tasks. Sometimes municipalities have some discretion in co-governance, and sometimes, when making policy for an autonomous task, municipalities are restricted to national rules (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 105). For example: a municipality is obliged to have a local plan for infrastructure (implementation of national policy in the matter), but the way this plan looks – or in other words, where the municipality decides to build – is, within national and provincial legislation, a competence of the municipality, allowing local government a relatively high level of policy discretion (see also Willemse 2001).

The Dutch system of local government is based on the structure of the state, in which many actors are involved in policy-making and have to be bargained with – a structure that somewhat accounts for the culture of consensus and accommodation. This section deals with the actors that are relevant in that aspect on the local level (largely based on Derksen, Schaap 2007; Korsten, Tops 1998; Tops 1994):
- National and provincial government (3.3.1)
- Political parties (3.3.2)
- The municipal council (3.3.3)
- The municipal board of mayor and aldermen (3.3.4)
- The mayor (3.3.5)
- Municipal districts (3.3.6)
- The civil service (3.3.7)
- Semi-governmental and non-governmental organisations (3.3.8)
- Citizens (3.3.9)

3.3.1. *National and provincial government*

The national, provincial, and municipal governments (together with the water boards) govern what is currently referred to as 'the Netherlands'. The Dutch culture of consensus is also a defining characteristic of the way these government parts function together (Toonen 1987). Formally, the Netherlands is referred to as a decentralised unitary state (*gedecentraliseerde eenheidsstaat*). This means that the state decentralises im-

portant responsibilities to lower bodies (provinces and municipalities) that have the discretion to use these responsibilities and are not regarded as subordinate to the body that provides these responsibilities (e.g. national government). The general agreement is national government and municipalities cannot function without each other, even though the national government is more dominant (Derksen, Schaap 2007). An acknowledgement of this interdependence more or less follows Thorbecke, who envisioned the interaction between the governmental layers as being similar to the way organisms function. This theory of 'organic law' entails that there is no hierarchy between the layers but that each of them complements the other (see also Toonen 1987). In many policy fields, this mutual dependence becomes visible: On the one hand, national government is dependent on local governments to implement national policy and fulfil basic tasks in such areas as safety, police, and welfare provision. On the other hand, local governments are bounded by national regulations, and when certain problems exceed the scope of the municipal level, national government can also assist or take over.

A clear marker of dependence between local and national government is the fact that local government depends on national government for the majority of its income (36 billion Euros, or 83%). A minority (13%) comes from local revenues, which largely consist of sewage and property taxes. Other local revenues can come from all kinds of taxes and services, like a dog tax, parking fees, and the provision of passports (Derksen, Schaap 2007). The income that municipalities receive from the national government can be divided between the general Municipal Fund (*Gemeentefonds*), which is a general grant (as a fixed percentage of national government's spending), and specific funds for which specific tasks are attributed. In 2006, 21 billion Euros was a general grant; 16 billion was distributed through specific grants (Netherlands court of audit 2006). National government is able to change the amount of money going towards the municipalities, but because of this fixed percentage of national government spending, local government income is relatively stable. Also, the way the general grant is spent is up to local government; but for the specific grants this is not the case. The money from specific grants is earmarked to be spent on specific purposes, such as welfare.

3.3.2. Political parties

In the Dutch system, political parties play an important role in providing the people that make up the representative and governing bodies, on the local, provincial, and national level. They also closely follow the activities of these bodies and, more on the national than local level, 'may intervene to renegotiate crucial points' (Deschouwer 2002: 171).

The Netherlands has a system of proportional representation. This system, which operates both nationally and on the local level, provides a relatively low threshold to enter the local representative body: the municipal council. However, political parties form an important intermediary between citizens and the councilman position. Even though, formally, people are elected as individuals (the term 'political party' is not

mentioned in the Constitution), most people are elected after they have become a member of a political party and have been chosen by the party (either its members or its board) to be included on the list of candidates. Every political party that participates in the municipal election provides such a list. During the election, all Dutch inhabitants of the municipality can cast only one vote for any of these individuals on any of the lists. All votes cast in a municipality are divided between the available number of municipal council seats to indicate the number of votes someone has to achieve to be elected as a municipal councilman. As most candidates do not achieve that number of votes (as most people vote for the first person on the list), the order of the candidates on a particular list is important, because the surplus of votes (all votes cast for a particular candidate beyond the ones needed to get elected) go to the next person on the list.

Despite the system of proportional representation, national politics since the Second World War has been dominated by three political parties (or their predecessors): the social democratic Labour Party (*PvdA*), the Liberal Party (*VVD*), and the Christian Democratic Party (*CDA*). All political coalitions that have emerged on national level have included one (or often two) of these three parties or their predecessors. And these and other political parties active on the national level have local branches active in many Dutch municipalities. The local branches often have a role regarding the general (national) party, but more important for this research is their local role – the previously sketched role they play in providing the personnel for municipal councils and (we will discuss this later) municipal boards of mayor and aldermen (Deschouwer 2002: 171). Local branches from national political parties profit from the resources and knowledge from the national party offices. The total income of all political parties is almost 29 million Euros, of which almost half comes from members' contributions and about a quarter from national government subsidies (Andeweg, Irwin 2002: 67).

Apart from local branches of national parties, there are also local parties, which are active in Dutch municipalities and municipal elections. Local parties are parties that are not connected to a national party or that participate only in the municipal council election of one municipality (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 30). In 1994 and 1998, all of the local parties combined achieved almost 18% of the municipal votes, and in 2002 this share increased to 26% (Boogers 2007: 85). Because they are not a branch of a national party, they cannot rely on such a larger organisation. And in comparison to national political parties, local political parties do not (or hardly) receive government subsidy.

Even though political parties are an important intermediary between citizens/voters and their representatives, their role has been strongly debated from the 1990s onwards, as voter turnout and party membership has decreased (Deschouwer 2002: 160). In 2003, party membership as a percentage of the total vote was 3.25% and the total membership was 309,246 (Hippe et al. cited in Andeweg, Irwin 2002: 66). On the local level, branches of national parties, according to the branches themselves, have an average of about 100 members, of which 25 are active, meaning that they distribute

flyers, visit party meetings, participate on the party board, et cetera. In several small municipalities this number is lower, which means it approaches the bottom limit for keeping the party's local branch functioning at all. And in some municipalities, for this reason, there are no local branches participating in the local election (Boogers 2007: 97-98). In larger municipalities, the number of members is somewhat larger. In municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants, the average number of members for a local branch from a national party is 323.6 and for a local party 98.6. The percentage of active members among these numbers is about 15-20%. There is also some difference between different parties in terms of the intensity of the contacts. The Socialist Party maintains the closest contact with its members, the Christian Union and the Labour Party the least intensive (Boogers 2007: 89-90). In general, the conclusion seems justified that while political parties still play an important role in the political process, people regard political parties as less influential in their personal lives (Andeweg, Irwin 2002: 71-72).

3.3.3.   *The municipal council*

Every Dutch municipality has a representative body, the municipal council. The size of the council depends on the number of inhabitants of a municipality and can vary from nine to forty-five councilmen. Every four years, the citizens of a municipality have the right to directly elect the municipal council through a system of proportional representation (see 3.3.2).

The municipal council determines the general direction of the municipality's policy and distributes the money to the municipal board of mayor and aldermen, the day-to-day government of the municipality. In the council, decisions are made based on a majority (>50%) of its members' votes. In most municipalities, municipal councils meet about once every month; its meetings are public. Preparatory work for the municipal council meetings can be delegated to council committee meetings. Those committees divide the council work according to themes, such as a safety committee or a social affairs committee. Formal decisions regarding these themes are nevertheless taken in the council.

After the municipal council election, the task is to form a political coalition between parties that together have a majority of municipal council seats and that want to govern the municipality for the next four years, until the next municipal council election. For a long time, more parties would often participate than were necessary to come to a >50% majority in the municipal council (Tops 1990), something that still happens, but minimal-majority coalitions have also become more common. In any case, alignment between political parties is necessary, as it is only very rarely, following the system of proportional representation, that one party by itself achieves more than 50% of the votes or a coalition is formed that has less than 50% of the municipal council seats. When a coalition of parties that together possess more than 50% of the municipal council seats is formed, the parties generally present a document in which

they give an indication of the plans they have for the municipality. This is called the (political) coalition accord.

3.3.4. The *municipal board of mayor and aldermen*

Another important task when the political coalition is formed is that the parties constituting the political coalition must nominate aldermen for the board. Since 2002, aldermen no longer need to be recruited from within the municipal council anymore (as was obligatory before 2002) but can be attracted from outside the council or even outside the municipality. After the nominations are made public, the council votes on the candidates. Most of the time this voting is a formality, as the political coalition possesses a majority of municipal council seats. This means that the municipal board of mayor and aldermen (from now on referred to as 'the board') consists of aldermen (from different political parties) and the mayor, who is appointed by national government (see 3.3.5).

The board is the day-to-day government of the city. Its decisions are formally made as a unity, but, in practice, often a 'portfolio' form of task division is agreed upon (for instance, aldermen can be individually responsible for concerns such as housing, economy, or welfare). Also several municipal services can be headed by various of the aldermen (see section 3.3.6).

Since 2002, the relationship of the board with the municipal council has formally been one of 'dualism' (*dualisme*). Dualism means that both actors have their own competences and tasks and neither dominates the other. The board realises the decisions of the council, implements tasks given by (national or provincial) government, and acts on tasks that the council has delegated to the board (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 66). The council oversees the board and sets the frames in which it functions. Accor-ding to Professor Elzinga, who led the 2002 committee proposing dualism, the changes at that time were first and foremost meant to 'break the closed situation' and establish a clear role division between municipal council and municipal board (ANP 10/3/2002). With the initiation of dualism, the municipal council's task of setting the framework for and maintaining oversight of the policy of the municipal board was clarified. The most noteworthy change was the disentanglement of the aldermen and councilmen, so that an alderman is no longer also a councilman. The other changes are mainly found in the new instruments that the council has available to oversee the board. There is specific civil assistance for the municipal council, so that the council has to depend less on the larger civil service force that works under the leadership of the municipal board. (Some argue that this assistance in fact has led to a weakening of the municipal council as its relationship with the civil service is even more diminished.) The council has also received more investigative powers over board policy, and the instalment of a local court of audit is obligatory for every municipality in order to check municipal board policy (Derksen, Schaap 2007).

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In practice, despite dualism and the attempted reinforcement of the municipal council, the board is often still dominant over the council. The reasons for this are many: the implementation of provincial or national policy often goes directly through the municipal board and the council plays only a small role; the municipal council has hardly any role in policy preparation or implementation; the board has formal control over the civil service; and the quality of board members is greater than that of councilmen – or at least mayors and councilmen themselves think so (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 71-72).

3.3.5. *The mayor*

The mayor chairs the municipal council and municipal board. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe not to have directly or indirectly elected mayors (e.g. Schaap et al. 2009a; 2009b). Even though there is growing input from the municipal council in describing the mayor's job profile and in judging the candidates, the Dutch mayor is still formally appointed by national government. He or she is supposed to have a role outside of day-to-day party politics. A Dutch mayor, apart from chairing the municipal council and the municipal board, has legal responsibilities that include public order, the police, the fire department, and the coordination of government actors in case of a calamity. When new aldermen are elected, they can choose to grant the mayor some substantial (policy) responsibilities, but often they keep those to themselves and do not give them to an 'appointed' mayor (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 91).

A Dutch mayor is appointed for six years. Formally, a mayor therefore does not have a substantial role in the formation of a new political coalition and board. In article 35 of the Law on Municipalities, it is stated only that the mayor is informed of the outcome of the coalition negotiations. It is thus a somewhat remarkable situation that the figurehead of a municipality plays a very small role during and after the municipal election, while his or her role in the day-to-day governing of the municipality is generally much larger (Tops 2006).

3.3.6. *Municipal districts*

Many European cities have adopted a form of intra-municipal decentralisation (Iancu, Van Ostaaijen 2007; Van Assche 2005) and since 1964, the Dutch Municipal Law offers the possibility to attribute some municipal tasks to a sub-municipal level. Cities themselves can determine whether they want to make use of this possibility or not. Only Rotterdam and Amsterdam have made use of this possibility, by making practically their entire territory fall under both the rule from a municipal council, municipal board, and mayor, as well as that from approximately ten district councils, ten district boards, and ten district chairmen.

The municipal council, board, and mayor can decide which responsibilities they delegate to their district counterparts. In theory, they can also take them back. Generally, the districts in Rotterdam and Amsterdam are responsible for tasks such as the main-

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tenance of public spaces and the well-being of citizens, and they provide services such as the provision of a passport or a driving license. Some tasks, such as the mayor's exclusive responsibilities regarding safety and public order, cannot be delegated to the districts.

Districts have a certain form of autonomy, as they can be (and in Rotterdam and Amsterdam are) directly elected by the district inhabitants and have their own responsibilities. District politicians often refer to this fact and claim that they belong to the governmental level that is the closest to citizens (even though formally districts are not a separate legal entity). On the other hand, districts are also dependent on the 'central' level that provides the districts not only with responsibilities but also with the resources to act on them.

3.3.7. *The civil service*

On average, municipalities have a large civil service, led by a city manager. The size varies from a few hundred civil servants in small municipalities to several thousand in the big cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The number of civil servants has grown extensively through the years. In 1851, Amsterdam had 1,364 civil servants. Halfway through the 1980s, the number already amounted to 30,000. One of the reasons for this increase is the growth of municipalities themselves (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 122). However, between 1935 and 1974, the total number of local civil servants increased by 145% while the population grew by only 60% (Korsten, Tops 1998: 17, 23). Another important explanation, therefore, is the growth of municipal tasks (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 122). In the nineteenth century, local governments especially executed tasks to maintain the public order; for instance, 1,073 of the 1,364 Amsterdam civil servants in 1851 were policemen. Today, local governments are responsible for a wider array of tasks such as welfare, social affairs, education, housing, et cetera. This has led not only to a growth in civil servants but also to an increase in specialisation amongst them.

Today, most municipal civil servants are divided among different municipal services. There are municipal services for housing, social affairs, infrastructure, safety, and so on. It remains difficult for politicians to direct civil services in the way they want them to go (e.g. Derksen, Schaap 2007: 114). According to Bovens et al., this diffusion within Dutch bureaucracy has a strong link with the Dutch political culture.

> There is a subtle task and competence division between bureaucratic organisations and their parts on national, provincial, and local level. This leads to the fact that with every theme of any importance, different bureaucratic agencies and departments are involved. Every one of these departments will approach a policy problem from its own specific line of reasoning, task, and way or working. In this way no single bureaucratic service can dictate its vision to others. Negotiation is necessary to come to policy… [There is a risk that] policy preparation stagnates or proceeds with complications as a consequence

of disputes over procedure and content between government layers… or various bureaucratic services (Bovens et al. 2007: 182).

The services are thus in large part independent and autonomous. Although they are formally subordinated to the board(s), their expertise, expressed in areas such as policy preparation, also gives them an advantage over their bosses. Especially in Europe, the power of bureaucrats is particularly strong (e.g. John 2001: 95).

3.3.8. *Semi-governmental and non-governmental organisations*

Apart from governmental actors, there are several semi- or non-governmental actors that play a role in local policy making (e.g. Van de Donk 2001). These actors have a more independent role from local government, for instance because they receive (most of) their income elsewhere (e.g. from national government) or their leadership is not appointed by the municipal council or board. Nevertheless, because of their task and profession, they can become relevant for local government in making and implementing local policy. It is difficult, for instance, to improve education and the construction of an 'extensive school' (*brede school*, schools with pre- or afterschool facilities) without the participation of the schools themselves, or to improve neighbourhood liveability without the participation of the housing corporations that in some neighbourhoods own a large majority of the rental homes. Other semi- or non-governmental organisations are police, district attorney, health care institutions, welfare institutions, and chambers of commerce (e.g. Bovens et al. 2007: 134-143, for more on the police, e.g. Soeparman, Van den Brink 2009).

The private sector, mainly business, is also involved in Dutch local government, but less intensely than in several U.S. municipalities. In the larger Dutch cities, municipalities are often themselves large landowners and, in some cases, landlords, and it is not uncommon for municipalities to lead public-private projects in which business participates but is not the frontrunner (e.g. Harding 1997). Business participation, as we have seen in U.S. municipalities by means of several of the urban regime case studies in chapter 2 (e.g. table 1), is much less common in the Netherlands, in general because there is less need for such participation. As most income in the Netherlands is derived from the state, there is more regulation that restricts business involvement on the local level, and business interests tend to be represented by one or several of the political parties (Harding 1999: 687).

3.3.9. *Citizens*

There are several ways in which citizens are connected or have input in policy processes – first, of course, as voters. Every four years, every municipality directly elects its municipal council (and in the case of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, also its district councils), and every Dutch municipality resident over the age of eighteen and every non-Dutch resident who has lived in the Netherlands for over five years has the right to vote for the municipal council (Derksen, Schaap 2007: 27).

There are also other ways in which citizens can have some influence in policy making and politics. In the Netherlands, citizens obtained the right to be heard in government projects and the right to appeal government decisions some decades ago, mainly during the 1960s and 1970s. The last couple of decades have also witnessed the emergence of numerous initiatives in which citizens not only gained the right to give input after the decision has been taken but were granted a role before or during the policy-making process (e.g. De Graaf 2007). A broad label for several forms of citizens' participation is 'interactive policymaking'. It is a form of participation that has become renowned in the Netherlands during the last ten to twenty years and is defined as 'a government that involves citizens, non-governmental organisations, companies and/or other governments in an early stage of the policy making with the intention to find a solution for problems that have been defined together' (Van de Peppel 2001: 34). It is argued that this form of citizens' participation is not all that new, as it is consistent with the Dutch tradition of consultation, consensus, and compromise (Daalder 1995; Hendriks, Toonen 2001a). Citizen participation can take the form of working groups (professionals and citizens working together in one or more meetings), round table gatherings (discussions about certain policy processes or problems aimed at finding solutions), reflection boards (small groups of citizens that make recommendations on a certain project or question), exhibitions (demonstrations that give more visual information about a project), and interviews (personal encounters with citizens) (Van de Peppel 2001: 35-36; see also Steyaert et al. 2005; Van de Wijdeven, Hendriks 2009).

3.4.   Conclusion

In comparison to the countries where most urban regime research took place, the Netherlands can be referred to as a consensus democracy; the Dutch political system and culture is characterised by accommodation and consensus. This culture is also reflected on the local level, where Dutch government is typified by a complex interplay between many mainly governmental actors. Proponents emphasise the 'polder model', meaning that, in such a system and culture, change rests on a broad support, but opponents stress that the interplay and power-division between relevant actors leads to a 'viscosity-discourse' and tends to slow down decision-making and change.

CHAPTER 4   ROTTERDAM (POLITICAL) HISTORY UP UNTIL 2002

4.1.   Introduction

This chapter provides the background of Rotterdam's political situation prior to 2002, with an emphasis on the period between 1998 and 2002. This chapter will analyse the four urban regime elements and focus on whether the seeds of the Liveable Rotterdam political agenda were sown before its emergence.

4.2.   Agenda [10]

4.2.1.   Introduction

Rotterdam was established as a 'dam' near the river 'Rotte' in the thirteenth century. Between 1880 and 1914, big investments in the harbour helped Rotterdam develop into the most important European harbour city. Rotterdam profited from, among other things, the industrialisation of the German *Ruhr* area and the increase in transport possibilities. Due to the growth of the harbour, Rotterdam became an attractive city for people, including immigrants, to work. Rotterdam grew from 110,700 inhabitants in 1850 to 318,500 in 1900. Houses were quickly built to fulfil the growing demand. Rotterdam also expanded as neighbouring municipalities became part of the growing city.

After the First World War, Rotterdam's unilateral dependence on harbour trade backfired with the defeat of Germany. With an economically ruined hinterland, Rotterdam needed a more diverse economy and turned towards industrialisation. The first petroleum harbour opened in 1929 and the first refinery (by Shell Oil) in 1937. Soon afterwards, Rotterdam experienced its blackest day, on May 14th, 1940, during the Second World War, when the German bombardment practically destroyed the entire inner city. The bombardment and the fires it caused killed 1,100 people, made 78,000 people homeless, and destroyed 25,000 homes and 7,000 commercial and industrial buildings. Most of what was left of the harbour was destroyed in the final phases of the war.

4.2.2.   Rotterdam 1940-2002: physical, economic, and social challenges

During and after the war, the reconstruction of the harbour and the city centre became Rotterdam's main priority. This recovery proceeded surprisingly fast. The destroyed inner city was rebuilt with a strong focus on economic goals.

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[10] Unless stated otherwise, the historical agenda oversight is based on: Van de Laar 2000 and Harding 1994b.

The city centre is completely rebuilt on a grid system, in functionalist style, with wide boulevards suitable for heavier car traffic, and almost exclusively for commercial, retail, cultural, and public administrative uses. New housing did not appear in the inner city, rather it was developed in districts beyond the inner ring and outside the municipality completely (Harding 1994b: 22).

The harbour quickly flourished again. By 1962, Rotterdam had replaced New York as the largest port in the world (measured by tonnage handled), a position it held until 2004 (RD 30/12/2004). Next to transhipment, storage and distribution, the oil/petrochemical complex, and shipbuilding, 'supporting' and non-industrial services like the emerging insurance sector contributed to the success.

With the development of the harbour and the provision of houses on the way, the municipality in 1969 also presented ambitious 'City Renewal' plans to deal with the old neighbourhoods. The City Renewal focused on the physical regeneration of older neighbourhoods and remained an important Rotterdam priority until the 1990s (Bouwmeester 2000: 41). In 1969, Rotterdam government announced in its 'Sanitation Report' (*Saniteringsnota*) that pre-war slums were to be demolished and entire neighbourhoods renovated.

In the 1970s, criticism developed regarding the city's unilateral policy. Citizens became increasingly annoyed that the attention in city hall mainly focused on economic development and related traffic problems, and they started to complain about environmental problems caused by the harbour. (An alderman at the time called it the 'smell of employment' [Bouwmeester 2000: 29]). Citizens also wanted to have a voice in the City Renewal plans, as they feared these plans would make their neighbourhoods just as lifeless and cold as the city centre. They established several neighbourhood committees to draw attention to these problems.

In the 1970s, a newly appointed municipal board shifted away from business and economic policy (i.e. away from the harbour) and focused strongly on the City Renewal, giving citizens a say in the plans. Since Rotterdam's economy still depended heavily on its harbour and harbour-related activities, this departure from business interests was short-lived as Rotterdam was hit hard by the recession of the 1970s. As a consequence of the recession, but also partly because of technological advances that made fewer harbour personnel necessary, the shipbuilding industry lost around 80% of its workforce in the late 1970s and 1980s, and unemployment in the Rotterdam region increased from about 15,000 people at the end of the 1970s to more than 50,000 people by the mid-eighties (Bouwmeester 2000: 65). To fight unemployment, Rotterdam government turned to businesses again. It tried to attract new service companies and announced all kinds of measures, such as installing a prize for the best entrepreneur and various subsidies for creating new jobs (Bouwmeester 2000: 72, 76).

At the end of the 1980s, the situation improved again. Business services, often related to the harbour, grew more than 30%. However, this did not diminish Rotterdam's

large unemployment figures, as most new jobs went to highly-educated people who lived outside the city. In 1975, people living outside the city accounted for about 40% of Rotterdam employment; in 1995 this percentage increased to 54% (Burgers 2001).

In the 1990s, economic and building priorities received a new focus with the building of a 'New Rotterdam'. Based on two municipal reports from 1987, 'Renewal of Rotterdam' (*Vernieuwing van Rotterdam*) and 'New Rotterdam' (*Nieuw Rotterdam*), the municipality incorporated a newfound appreciation of Rotterdam's large-scale qualities (Van Ulzen 2007; McCarthy 1998). Rotterdam government wanted Rotterdam to become a 'metropolis' that could compete internationally. This impetus led to, among other things, a new metro line (finished in the 1980s) and the Erasmus Bridge (finished in 1996), a new connection between the city's north and south bank. Another key project in the 1990s was the *Kop van Zuid*, which provided 60,000 square meters of office space, 5,500 dwelling units, 60,000 square meters of retail space, hotels, and a convention centre (McCarthy 1998). Rotterdam also invested in its cultural image, sponsoring large events, such as Summer Carnival and various festivals.

Despite initial intentions, these large-scale infrastructure and economic projects hardly benefitted the people living in the older surrounding neighbourhoods. Unemployment numbers and the number of people on welfare or below poverty level remained high. In the end of the 1980s, the municipality responded with a 'Social Renewal' (*Sociale Vernieuwing*) programme to benefit the least well-off in the city. The idea was quickly adopted by the national government and turned into national policy. The theory behind Social Renewal is that economic renewal policies should not proceed without social measures, since economic renewal efforts affect all inhabitants (SCP 1998: 15). An important aspect of Social Renewal was *Opzoomeren*, which encourages citizens to take responsibility for cleaning streets and organising activities in their neighbourhoods. Today, the municipality still actively encourages this effort (see also Van Putten 2006).

Halfway through the 1990s, Social Renewal was more or less succeeded by the national government's 'Large City Policy' (*Grotestedenbeleid*). Large City Policy focuses mainly on the social, physical, and economic development of neighbourhoods in order to improve their livablility and quality of the environment (see for instance SCP 1998: 11). These three aims correlate well with those of the new political coalition that was formed in Rotterdam in 1998. This coalition focused on improving the local economy by providing more jobs, a powerful neighbourhood approach, and a strong social policy regarding poverty, youth development, and community development (Trouw 3/4/1998; NRC 2/4/1998).

The political coalition translated its priorities into a board programme and twelve 'implementation programmes' for issues such as economy and work, the neighbourhood approach, the multicoloured city, growing up in Rotterdam, improving the internal functioning of the municipality, and fighting social isolation and poverty (Rotterdam 1998b: 3). The 1998-2002 board programme is based on a report dated some years

earlier in which a strong city, valuable neighbourhoods, involved citizens, and entrepreneurial government are the four central themes (Rotterdam 1997a).

In 1999, the board presented the Rotterdam 'Vision 2010' (*Visie 2010*) in which all board plans are divided into three 'pillars': a physical, an economic, and a social pillar (Rotterdam 1999: 6). To bring activities in all three pillars to the neighbourhood level, the board implemented a 'neighbourhood approach' (*wijkaanpak*) (Rotterdam 2001a: 6). The neighbourhood approach was designed to improve the neighbourhoods, or, as a flyer put it, to 'strengthen the economy and social cohesion and the improvement of neighbourhoods and living environment' (Hendriks, Tops 2002a: 9).

4.2.3. *Emerging safety challenges*

In 2002, when the municipal council discussed the results of the 1998-2002 board's efforts, Labour Party faction leader Cremers was satisfied with the results from the economic programmes: jobs were created and the 'attractive city' programme had been very successful. But he considered safety to be one of the areas of failure. Other councilmen, both from inside and outside the political coalition, agreed that the approach towards the city's safety problems had been inadequate. Research reports show that Rotterdam in the 1990s had become an increasingly unsafe city (Intraval 2000; Intraval 2001). The percentage of people in Rotterdam who considered public order and safety one of the city's three largest problems increased from 38% in 1988 to 73% in 1994 (Rotterdam 1997b: 6). In the 1990s, citizens protested against what they considered an inadequate response from the Rotterdam government towards safety problems. When some citizens resorted to violence as a response to growing problems with drug addicts, it was clear that something had to be done. In 1994, mayor Peper closed 'Platform Zero' (*Perron Nul*), a place in the central train station that functioned as shelter for drug addicts and a place where they could use drugs. The closure however caused drug-related activity to spread to the surrounding neighbourhoods, and citizens protested loudly. Cooperation was established between civil servants and police to counter such nuisances (interview civil servant).

Intermezzo: The rising importance of social safety in the Netherlands

The importance of perceived and actual safety, and of policies addressing it, have increased in western European society within the last couple of decades. It by no means is restricted to a particular city. Safety is no longer regarded as a 'fact of life'; citizens expect their government to address and solve problems regarding safety (Van der Vijver, Terpstra 2004; see also Boutellier 2003). Table 3 shows that Dutch citizens increasingly want their government to act on safety-related problems.

Table 3: Order of policy priorities in percentages (SCP cited in Wansink 2004: 169)

	1992	**2000**	**2002**
Fighting crime	56	63	56
Maintaining public order	45	58	58
Maintaining social security	46	55	54
Maintaining the stability of the economy	52	50	54
Protect freedom of speech	42	43	47
Making society less impersonal	31	44	43
Fighting unemployment	52	25	30
Fighting environmental pollution	53	33	24

'Safety' is a concept that has been much debated among scholars and professionals. A distinction has been made between 'social' and 'physical' safety. 'Physical safety' in this instance refers to protection from 'the outside' such as fire, starvation, sickness, traffic, or terrorist attacks. 'Social safety', on the other hand, refers to protection from threats from 'the inside' – not from nature, technology, or even other countries, but from the citizens themselves. Social threats can take the form of conflicts, violence, or crime (Bruinsma, Bernasco 2004: 1). Social safety can be further analysed by making a distinction between objective and subjective social safety. (From now on, unless stated otherwise, 'safety' can be read as 'social safety'.) Objective safety refers to 'acts' and 'facts' (SMVP 1999: 78; Bruinsma, Bernasco 2004: 1). Most of the time, reports from police about the number of crimes reported, cases solved, criminals arrested, and related data are used to determine the level of objective safety within a city or neighbourhood. Subjective safety, on the other hand, refers to residents' perceptions and fears. In the past few years, subjective safety has been interpreted more broadly, including any nuisance or discomfort, like impoliteness, garbage on the street, rudeness, name-calling, and other situations that may be more uncomfortable than directly threatening (Bruinsma, Bernasco 2004: 1).

In the Netherlands, (social) safety as a policy issue has become more important in the last decades of the twentieth century. The policy history of social safety can be traced back to the 1980s with a report from the 'Small Crimes Committee' (*Commissie Kleine Criminaliteit*). A national policy report from the committee stated that criminal law should be the last solution in fighting crime, and that criminals should be dealt with mainly by other means such as prevention and more intensive supervision. In several national policy documents in the 1990s, preventing crime is described as a joint effort of government, businesses, citizens, and societal organisations. In 2001, the national

government stated that local governments should develop a local safety policy (Van den Brink 2006). Events such as '9/11' (the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001) and two national disasters (an exploding fireworks factory in 2000 and a severe fire in a small bar on New Year's Day in 2001, together causing more than thirty deaths) led to increased public dissatisfaction regarding safety/security, fuelling citizens' distress that government sometimes condoned felonies or offences from citizens or businesses. According to some, this dissatisfaction also paved the way for Fortuyn's popularity (e.g. Pakes 2004).

Between 1998 and 2002, 'safety' was one of the board's twelve implementation programmes. The overall goal was to improve the feelings of citizens regarding safety from a six to a seven on a ten-point scale (Rotterdam 1998b; 1998d). The municipality's 'Safety Bureau' outlined six safety themes in a 'project book', further divided into thirty projects. A few years later, the responsible alderman reflected critically:

> In the time of Bram Peper [mayor of Rotterdam between 1982 and 1998] we hoped that a lot of small projects would achieve success, in the spirit of letting a thousand flowers blossom… But despite everything we still haven't managed to get government and citizens to develop a common approach (RD 25/5/2000; for more criticism on this safety project approach see Broere et al. 2001).

Around the turn of the century, several citizens openly complained about the level of safety. The Chinese population complained about street robbery in the centre, and citizens annoyed by the municipality's drug policy occupied city hall for a short time (Lootsma 2003). In 2001, 20,000 citizens sent postcards to city hall to express that they were tired of the deprivation in their neighbourhoods (AD 28/11/2001). Some citizens who were affected by safety problems, of which some connected to neighbourhood organisations, contacted each other. They found that street robberies, burglaries, and in general feelings of fear were widespread and they decided to write a petition expressing their great discomfort over the way the city government and police handled safety issues. In March 2001, representatives of sixty Rotterdam neighbourhood organisations from all over the city (later turning into the 'Alliance of Rotterdam Neighbourhood Associations' [SBR]) sent this petition to the mayor. The representatives called on all political parties in the municipal council, the municipal board, the chief of police, the district attorney, and the district chairmen to cooperate with citizens to deal with the increasingly growing problem of crime (interview former SBR chairman).

> The safety situation in Rotterdam is bad. Citizens feel threatened and businesses are worried. With its current strength and management, the police are not able to guarantee an acceptable level of safety. It is also not being put in a position to do so. Municipal government is passive and reacts to urgent calls with soothing announcements, showing powerlessness and meekness. The

political parties, some exceptions excluded, give the impression of indifference in regard to the problem of safety (text of the petition [SBR 2001]).

Nevertheless, at the end of 2001, about half a year before new elections, the municipal council approved a document that the board presented called the 'Five Year Programme', later referred to as the 'Five Year Safety Action Programme' (FYSAP) (Rotterdam 2001c). The FYSAP announced that the 'safety project carousel' would be replaced by a safety approach that is 'systematical, structural, and integrated'. The approach was further based on a tripartite of supervision and maintenance, preservation and control, and investments. Another tripartite considered the approach's focus (perpetrator, domain, victim), instruments (prevention, repression, care), and cycle (analysis, action, evaluation). The FYSAP explicitly left room for modification of the safety approach based on practical experience. The FYSAP further indicates that the municipal districts would be the main coordinators of the 'neighbourhood safety policy'. The districts would have to make 'neighbourhood safety action programmes' (NSAPs) for all of their neighbourhoods (about sixty in total). These programmes would also contain agreements with municipal services and other partners (e.g. police, district attorney, and non-governmental organisations) on how to deal with particular neighbourhood safety problems. Extra attention would be given each year to a number of 'hot spots', i.e. specific areas with the largest safety risks. A 'safety index' would be developed to help provide the necessary analyses. The safety index would determine the safety of Rotterdam's neighbourhoods. By using 'objective' data (from police and the municipality) and 'subjective' information (an annual survey among 7,000 citizens), the safety index would reflect the level of safety in the Rotterdam neighbourhoods by a number from one to ten, one being least safe.

4.2.4. *Emerging immigration and integration challenges*

In the 1960s and 1970s, Rotterdam experienced a surge of migrants from Turkey and Morocco, soon followed by immigrants from the former Dutch colonies (Suriname and the Antilles). These immigrants mainly arrived to work in the harbour or harbour-related businesses and often lived in poor pre-First World War houses. Later, they moved into the post-Second World War neighbourhoods. In the 1970s, many foreign labourers lost their jobs due to the recession. This did not cause the number of immigrants to diminish, however. In 1995, the percentage of ethnic minorities in Rotterdam was 35%. In 2008, it had increased to 46%.

For a more in-depth look at the Rotterdam's demographic, data for 2006 is provided below (COS 2006a):

Population: 588,718
Heterogeneity: 317,943 (individual and both parents born in the Nether-
                       lands)
                        52,329 from Surinam
                        19,701 from Dutch Antilles
                        45,415 from Turkey
                        36,831 from Morocco
                        17,774 from Southern Europe
                        66,464 from other non-industrialised nations
                        32,261 from other industrialised nations

In 1972, Rotterdam experienced race riots when some neighbourhood inhabitants threw the furniture of ethnic immigrants into the streets. Afterwards, the municipal board proposed to distribute the population of 'foreigners' throughout the city, allowing only 5% in each neighbourhood (Dekker, Senstius 2001: 23). The Dutch Council of State blocked the measure because of its discriminatory character (Van Praag 2004: 68). A few years later, Rotterdam tried again. This time, it won a legal fight to install a maximum of 16% non-Dutch people in any neighbourhood. How-ever, the municipal board did not follow through with the plans. After this, the topic was not put on the agenda again (Van Praag 2004: 68).

The 1978 policy report 'Migrants in Rotterdam' (*Migranten in Rotterdam*) acknowledged that foreign immigrants – then referred to as guest labourers – were often not retur-ning to their country of origin. This revelation paved the way for an integration policy (Dekker, Senstius 2001). Nevertheless, the beginning of the report indicated other-wise.

> Reports about housing, education, transportation, et cetera, often appear. In all those plans… no distinction is made between people of Dutch origin and people of foreign origin. That is of great importance. It means that one policy is waged for both groups. That has to remain as such (quote of the 1978 pro-gramme cited in Rotterdam 1998f).

In 1986, civil servants from city hall organised a series of dialogues between mosque organisations and Labour Party alderman Simons. The themes included employment and gender relations. In the 1990s, more attention emerged regarding the efforts im-migrants have to exert in order to make a living. The next phase of dealing with immi-grants started in 1998. In 1998, the document 'Effective Immigrant Policy' (*Effectief Allochtonenbeleid*) acknowledged that the view of the 1978 report was no longer sustain-able. Rotterdam no longer consisted of a homogenous Dutch population, but an eth-nic heterogeneous one, which required the application of 'specific arrangements' (Rot-terdam1998f: 2). The board strongly encouraged that all services in Rotterdam took

this reality into consideration when developing policy. The board encouraged hiring more inhabitants of foreign origin to make the city organisation more representative of its population. It also recommended the development of 'diversity in communication', e.g. addressing inhabitants in different languages (RD 10/11/2000).

> Diversity is a fact, and as such does not require discussion… 'Inclusive' thinking (meaning diversity is the norm and the starting point in every policy area) should be stimulated within every board plan, service, institution, and politics. This means that every activity, every policy proposal should be measured to see if it fulfils the aim of diversity… Participants will be held accountable or rewarded accordingly… Too often it is forgotten that general policy starts from thinking from Dutch middle class groups, while it already is necessary (especially in certain areas) to change towards diversity policy… [We have to] challenge inhabitants from a foreign origin to make their contribution to Rotterdam society concrete in the form of *wishes*, *desires*, and *possibilities* (Rotterdam 1998e: 5, italics added).

According to some top city managers, the downside of this focus on diversity policy within the municipal services was that certain (socioeconomic) problems of these groups were not addressed.

> The crime numbers came in and tilted strongly towards our coloured fellow human beings, especially the Moroccans. This was thus nuanced and trivialised, that was the sphere… It just was not politically correct to address it (interview former top civil servant).

At the same time, problems in the neighbourhoods, especially the ones inhabited with many people from a foreign origin, increased at a surprisingly rapid pace. In the first annual report on poverty in 1996, fifteen of the thirty Dutch neighbourhoods with the most people living on welfare were situated in Rotterdam. These were also the same neighbourhoods that possessed the largest proportions of immigrants (Burgers 2001). Several extreme right parties made immigration and integration issues their main campaign issues (mainly by being against it). The extreme right won one municipal council seat in 1986, two in 1990, and six in 1994. In 1998, these parties did not win a single municipal council seat. However, the rapid growth of the extreme right parties had also resulted in a degree of public avoidance of some problems with immigration and integration lest these issues be exploited for political purposes, and this avoidance contributed to the taboo on public debate over certain problems (e.g. Linthorst 2003: 212). In the evaluation of the 1998-2002 board programmes there was little reference to any of this. The board mainly emphasised policy successes. In the evaluation of the 'multicoloured city' programme, the board regarded the focus on personnel policy as most successful as the percentage of employees of foreign origin grew from 16.3% to 18.1% (Rotterdam 2001a: 48). This positive tone was somewhat at odds with the general opinion of Dutch citizens as table 4 also shows.

Table 4: Opinions about immigrant populations in percentages that agree with the statement (CBS cited in Wansink 2004: 170)

	1991	1995	2000	2002
There are too many foreigners	46	44	53	49
They should hold on less to their own culture (strongly agree)		17	23	25
Integration will take a long time		49	56	57
People from a different race as next door neighbours: no objection	54	56	47	39
People from a different race as next door neighbours: it depends	22	21	33	45
People from a different race as next door neighbours: less comfortable	21	21	19	15
People from a different race as next door neighbours: would resist	3	2	2	2

4.2.5. *Summary*

After the Second World War, Rotterdam was very engaged in rebuilding the city and its harbour. The physical and economic improvement of the city has always remained an important part of the Rotterdam postwar agenda, while social programmes were added as social and poverty problems increased after the 1970s' recession. In the 1990s, safety problems appeared and citizens felt that governmental officials did not always adequately address them. As immigration increased from the 1970s onwards, tensions mounted; Dutch inhabitants viewed the immigrants with some distrust that culminated in riots in the 1970s and electoral victories of the extreme right in the 1980s and 1990s.

4.3. Coalition

4.3.1. *Introduction*

This part of the chapter is devoted to Rotterdam's governing coalition, which is responsible for upholding and implementing Rotterdam's postwar agenda sketched in the previous section. It also focuses on how one of the themes on Liveable Rotterdam's political agenda – citizen input in policymaking – was visible prior to 2002.

4.3.2.   From harbour coalitions to government-led partnerships

In the first two decades after the Second World War, the plans for the development of the harbour and the promotion of industrial policy took shape in 'regent coalitions' or 'political commercial coalitions', as Van de Laar calls them (2000). These coalitions consisted of important public and private actors, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the mayor. Officially they were advisory boards, but according to the head of the municipal harbour service at the time, the municipal council was deferential to them: 'Our proposals will be accepted in the council by acclamation' (Van de Laar 2000: 488).

These informal coalitions functioned until the recession of the 1970s when a new (left-wing) Labour Party board shifted away from the focus on business. One of the famous expressions attached to an alderman during that time is that the Shell business tower established in 1977 should be the 'last erection of grand capital in the city centre of Rotterdam' (Van Ulzen 2007: 76). In his farewell speech, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce publicly regretted this new policy line (Van de Laar 2000: 491).

Partly because of the recession, cooperation between the city and business emerged again, although in a different form (e.g. Wigmans 2001). The municipality developed a positive attitude towards entrepreneurs. It attracted businesses and by the end of the 1980s and also in 1999, it signed covenants with businesses to combat long-term unemployment (e.g. ANP 2/3/1999). Businesses also cooperated in many of the city's infrastructure projects of the 1990s such as the *Kop van Zuid*, the Erasmus Bridge, and the *Tweede Maasvlakte*, a large extension of the harbour. However, business participation in politics diminished. In the early 1990s, researchers studied the connection between the municipality and large corporations in Rotterdam (Engbersen 2001). About fifty boards of companies with more than 100 employees were interviewed. The involvement of these businesses in Rotterdam local politics turned out to be very limited. Businesses felt insufficiently represented in Rotterdam's municipal council, but two-thirds of them did not wish to be involved in Rotterdam local politics. They considered local politics a separate world detached from their international outlook. For many of them, Rotterdam is the place where their company happened to be located and very few of the questioned employers actually lived in the city (Engbersen 2001).

4.3.3.   A Labour Party-dominated city

In several of the 1980s and 1990s projects, the national government participated, but the municipality, with professionals within the civil service and the board of mayor and aldermen (or even specific aldermen), functioned as important project leaders. Also, regarding national programmes such as Large City Policy, local governments translated these into local policy or local action. In Rotterdam, local government has been tied to the Labour Party since the Second World War. Until 2002, the Labour Party was the largest party in the municipal council and district councils, as well as a

leading actor in the municipal board. According to many, this dominance was also reflected in the composition of the municipality's civil service.

Labour Party dominance in the municipal council and municipal board

The municipal council in Rotterdam consists of forty-five municipal council seats divided between several political parties. With an average of twenty municipal council seats in the postwar elections, the Labour Party had consistently been the largest party in the municipal council. It even received an absolute majority (23 seats or more) for sixteen years, from 1962 until 1966, 1974 until 1982, and from 1986 until 1990.

Table 5: the election results in number of Rotterdam municipal council seats, the parties that formed the political coalition afterwards (in grey) and the number of aldermen they possessed (in parentheses) (COS 2006b; Bouwmeester 2000)

	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006
Labour Party (*PvdA*)	24 (7)	25 (8)	21 (7)	24 (7)	18 (6)	12 (2)	15 (3)	11	18 (3)
Liberal Party (*VVD*)	7	6	9	7 (1)	6 (1)	6 (1)	9 (2)	4 (2)	3 (2)
Christian Democratic Party (*CDA*)	10	10	8	8	9 (2)	6 (1)	6 (1)	5 (2)	3 (2)
Liberal Democratic Party (*D66*)	-	2	2 (1)	2 (1)	7	7 (1)	3	2	1
Green Party (*GroenLinks*)	-	-	-	-	2	3 (1)	4 (1)	3	2 (1)
Christian parties (SGP, later *ChristenUnie/SGP*)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Centrum Democrats / Centrum Party (*CD, CP,* extreme right parties)	-	-	-	1	2	6	-	-	-
Socialist Party (*SP*)	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	1	3
City Party (*Stadspartij*)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	-
Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17 (3)	14
Others	3	1	4	2	-	1	1	-	-
Total	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45

With the exception of 1974-1982, when the Labour Party used its absolute majority to govern alone, political coalitions were formed after elections, with a majority of seats in the municipal council. These coalitions determine how many aldermen each party gets. From the Second World War onwards, the Labour Party, being the largest party, had always possessed the most aldermen. Table 5 shows the number of municipal council seats, the political coalitions formed (in grey), and the number of aldermen each of the political coalition parties possessed, from 1974 onwards (in parentheses).

Even though a board takes decisions formally as one entity, the aldermen and mayor divide tasks (and also often the municipal services) among themselves, which means that some board members become very associated with a certain portfolio. Alderman Van der Ploeg, for instance, who had been a Rotterdam alderman from 1967 until 1982, was strongly associated with his role in the City Renewal (Tops 2007: 17). And also within the 1998-2002 board, there were aldermen who together with the mayor left a lasting impression on Rotterdam policy, such as aldermen Kombrink, Simons (Labour Party), and Meijer (Green Party).

> The gentlemen Simons and Meijer... receive in comparison to the other aldermen important portfolios. Mr Simons has reserved for himself the harbour, economy, and employment, while Mr Meijer manages City Renewal, housing, Social Renewal, and the coordination of the Large City Policy. The fact that two municipal board teams are formed… each led by one of these two gentlemen seems to indicate that they became a sort of super aldermen (Socialist Party contribution, municipal council meeting 14/4/1998 see also the contribution of the Liberal Democratic Party for similar comments).

A break with tradition: a Liberal Party mayor

Rotterdam has a tradition of Labour Party mayors. From 1952 to 1998, a Labour Party mayor led Rotterdam. This tradition came to a temporary end when mayor Peper (1982-1998) left Rotterdam to become secretary of state of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In 1999, Ivo Opstelten, from the Liberal Party, succeeded him.

Rotterdam's Liberal Party mayor on several occasions expressed concern that Rotterdam 'leads the bad lists' (e.g. RD 12/11/1999; see also RD 04/01/2000). He regarded safety as an important issue and one of his biggest disappointments after his arrival in Rotterdam. He called the approach he encountered a 'project carousel', lacking an integrated way to handle problems he had been used to in Utrecht, where he previously was the mayor. He discovered that the goal in the implementation programme to improve safety from a 'six' to a 'seven' did not have a coherent programme attached.

> One of the biggest disappointments in Rotterdam was its safety policy. I found this lacking of consistency, not coherent. That was an enormous setback, especially since I thought in Rotterdam this would be dealt with in an adequate manner (interview mayor Opstelten).

Labour Party dominance in the municipal districts

Since 1990, practically the entire municipality of Rotterdam has been administered under district rule. This means that the council, board, and mayor have decentralised some of their authority to the sub-local, district level – namely, to the district council, the district board, and the district chairman. The districts are designated to maintain public spaces and the welfare of citizens, and they administer services such as the provision of a passport or a driving license.

Depending on the number of district inhabitants, a district council consists of between nine and 25 directly-elected councilmen, elected at the same time as the municipal councilmen (no overlap between mandates is possible). After the election, just as on the 'central' level, a political coalition is formed that forms a majority in the district council and appoints the district board including a chairman. The district chairman heads the district board and the district council, but does not have the formal jurisdiction over the public order and the police that a mayor possesses.

The districts have a certain form of autonomy as they are directly elected and have there own responsibilities. There can be however some conflicts of interest with the 'central' level, meaning mainly the board of mayor and aldermen. These can be dealt with informally or formally, for instance in the formal 'mayor committee', a meeting of the mayor with some of the district chairmen. Theoretically, the central level can also take responsibilities back from the district, but most boards value a working relationship with the districts. Until 2002, the Labour Party was strongly represented in the district councils and boards. Between 1998 and 2002, the Labour Party possessed 84 district council seats, followed by the Liberal Party with 50, and the Christian Democratic Party with 35. In most districts, the Labour Party was also part of the district board (COS 2002b).

Labour Party affiliation in the civil service

In a newspaper article before the 1998 elections, it was reported that two important civil service positions would be taken by Labour Party members. According to a national newspaper, two Labour Party members were first on the list to become director of economic affairs for Rotterdam and director of the City Development Service (AD 3/3/1998).

Many interviewees confirmed that for several decades many newly-attracted managers and employees in the Rotterdam services were members of the Labour Party or sympathised with it. A Labour Party committee that analysed the defeat of the Labour Party in 2002 also acknowledged that the Rotterdam municipal services were 'often led by party members' (LP 2002: 7). A Rotterdam professor not only confirmed this fact but also suggested that it is very bad for a (bureaucratic) system if one political party is favoured in it (Van Schendelen cited in Oosthoek 2005: 238). However, the extent of this phenomenon and how it influences the functioning of the civil service –

if it does this at all – has, according to my knowledge, never been adequately researched.

4.3.4. *The role of citizens in policymaking*

The 1998-2002 board acknowledged that citizens should be given a say in municipal policy. It referred to actions of previous boards and expressed the desire to continue such efforts (Rotterdam 1998b: 3).

> We want to aim at a more participatory way of preparing decisions and a steady role for the city debate in our way of governing. That has to be included in the development of our ten programmes. We imagine at least once a year a broad city debate about a specific theme (Rotterdam 1998b: 18).

Of course there would always be a limit to citizens' participation.

> What comes out of a debate or a forum can never be binding. You have to take citizens who participate very seriously, but elected politicians always have their own responsibility as well (alderman Simons cited in Volkskrant 29/1/1998).

The board acknowledged that there were problems regarding citizens' participation as there was insufficient knowledge whether participation in Rotterdam was adequately arranged and where it was arranged.

> All municipal services have their own way of organising participation and communicating with citizens, but it is unclear what the effect of all theses diverse methods is (RD 10/11/2000).

There was also criticism of the neighbourhood approach. Researchers noted a low level of citizens' influence on the neighbourhood plans. A lot had been established, but it remained unclear whether the measures and projects manifested the concrete wishes and needs of citizens.

> The citizens in most cases remain a social construction of bureaucracy. It is the citizens in the way the bureaucracy likes to see, as end station of sectoral policy. In the practice of the Rotterdam neighbourhood approach there is a large amount of working from the inside to the outside (Hendriks, Tops 2001: 49).

In December 2001, the board organised three meetings with citizens to discuss the results of the 1998-2002 board (FD 13/12/2001), but public turn-out was low. Some municipal council members reacted.

At the start of this legislative period, citizen debates have been held which according to the evaluation were not successful. The participants in the debates consisted at 95% of civil servants and politicians, and for the rest already known civilians, and some representatives of organisations that always show up at these kinds of occasions. And it turned out that it was the same, even worse, during the last December debates... I think we have to contemplate a new form of citizens' participation and new forms of interactive policy making, and not only in the beginning and end of a legislative period, but also during (Van Ravesteijn-Kramer from the Liberal Democratic Party during the municipal council meeting 24/1/02).

Prior to 2002, there were some reports about the views of citizens concerning the municipal government. Even though the Omnibus survey (COS 1999) dealt only with service provision and the municipality as the employer (thus relevant only for city employees), an earlier report asked citizens for their views about a wider variety of actors including the (1994-1998) board and municipal council (Intomart 1997). In this survey it turned out that 47% of Rotterdam inhabitants were not (very) satisfied with the board and only 25% were (very) dissatisfied; 49% were (very) satisfied with the council while 23% were (very) dissatisfied (Intomart 1997: 22).

4.3.5. Summary

Shortly after the Second World War, city hall and harbour entrepreneurs together developed the process of economic and harbour development in what was called 'regent coalitions'. After the 1970s, these coalitions disappeared and public/private cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s led to large infrastructural projects led by municipalities and backed by national government. In these government-led operations, the Labour Party played a dominant role through its strong presence in the municipal council, municipal districts, and especially the municipal board (which played an important role in determining and implementing the municipal agenda). Citizens were given a say in policy but did not participate in large numbers, and their input had a somewhat limited effect in determining policy.

4.4. Resources

4.4.1. Introduction

This section of the chapter is devoted to the resources that Rotterdam's governing coalition had at its disposal to uphold and implement its postwar agenda. It also focuses on how one of Liveable Rotterdam's agenda themes – greater accountability of politicians and civil servants – is visible prior to 2002.

4.4.2.   Electoral mandate

In the previous section, the Labour Party's dominance within Rotterdam government was sketched by showing its presence in the municipal council, board, districts, and civil service. The Labour Party's presence is based on winning the election and insuring an electoral/voter mandate. And from 1946 onwards, Rotterdam voters had always made the Labour Party the largest party. Moreover, the Labour Party had often been the largest party represented in Rotterdam by far; every year between 1953 and 1998 it received at least five seats more than the runner-up (see table 6).

Table 6: Number of Labour Party municipal council seats after the municipal council election compared to the runner-up, on a total of 45 (COS 2002a: 12)

	'46	'49	'53	'58	'62	'66	'70	'74	'78	'82	'86	'90	'94	'98
Labour	18	19	21	20	23	18	19	24	25	21	24	18	12	15
No. 2	15	16	15	14	13	12	12	10	10	9	8	9	7	9

However, the same table shows a steady decline of the number of municipal council seats the Labour Party received since 1978. From the absolute majority in 1974 and 1978, the Labour Party hit an all time low in 1994 with only twelve municipal council seats. In 1998, most newspapers announced the left had won in Rotterdam, but this somewhat obscured the long-term trend. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were new parties entering the municipal council that had some electoral success, such as local branches of the Liberal Democratic Party (1978), Green Party (1990), and Socialist Party (1994). They became consistent participants in the Rotterdam municipal elections. Extreme right parties had a relatively short rise and fall between 1986 and 1998, and the local City Party possessed municipal council seats from 1994 until 2006 (see table 5).

4.4.3.   Skills and networks of board members

The municipal boards often consisted of prominent Labour Party members, most often members who, prior to their local role, had experience in national government and possessed good national political party networks. Before he became Rotterdam alderman in 1994, Kombrink was a member of the National Parliament (1972-1981 and 1982-1990), a deputy secretary of state of Finance (1981-1982), and a top manager in the Ministry of Defence (1990-1994). Simons, Rotterdam alderman from 1982 until 1989 and from 1994 until 2001, was a secretary of state for Welfare, Health, and Culture. These politicians also brought some of their own civil servants with them to Rotterdam (interview civil servant).

Mayor Peper should also be mentioned as an important Labour Party politician. During his long mayoral reign (1982-1988) he was considered an intellectual (after his political career he worked as a professor), a networker, and a mayor with a strong in-

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ternational outlook for the harbour but also for his city. (Among other evidence of this internationalism, he was president of Eurocities, the network for major European cities, from 1996 until 1998.) He was also important in the large public works in the 1980s and 1990s. Peper will however also be remembered for the accusations of misuse of public money during his time as Rotterdam mayor. (Some aldermen were also accused). Peper challenged the accusations with some success at the courts. Nevertheless, the affair stirred controversy in Rotterdam, and the municipal council wanted him to pay back a large sum of money (AD 11/1/2008).

4.4.4. Financial resources

After the Second World War, the Labour Party's political dominance and the harbour officials' investment possibilities provided the necessary resources for the implementation of the municipal agenda. In the 1990s, partnerships with private actors were essential to accomplish infrastructural projects. However, national government was, besides being a large contributor to general municipal funds, an important co-financer of several of the large public works established in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the *Kop van Zuid* and the Erasmus Bridge. Similar to the rebuilding of the Rotterdam harbour, national government considered these projects to be in the national interest. National government in times of crises provided additional resources. In the recession of the 1970s for instance, Rotterdam received an additional 25 million Euros (Bouwmeester 2000: 63). And by participating in national programmes, municipalities can receive additional resources as well. Rotterdam, for instance, still participates in programmes such as the Large City Policy. And E.U. programmes such as the European Fund for Regional Development and the Urban II programme also provided some resources for Rotterdam's local projects.

Rotterdam has a budget of about four billion Euros.[11] The amount the board can actually allocate is very limited as most of the budget is reserved for expenses such as personnel costs. In the 1990s, large projects such as the *Kop van Zuid* also absorbed a large part of the available money (Wigmans 1998: 219–220). According to the newspapers, in 1998 there was minimal funding available to implement the twelve implementation programmes, and the municipality headed towards a deficit in the millions. The board, however, was able to make extra money available for the European Football Championship in 2000 and the appointment of Rotterdam as European Cultural Capital in 2001 (Trouw 26/10/1998; ANP 23/10/1998).

4.4.5. Organisational resources

The Rotterdam board formally heads the civil service of 17,000 employees (Rotterdam 2008d; 2002a).[12] Of these employees, 574 work in city hall as direct support of the

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[11] Based on the 2006 budget.

[12] For practical purpose, the information here refers to the current number and names of the services.

board, council, mayor, or the aldermen, and 831 work in and for the districts. The overwhelming majority of the civil servants, however, work in one of the municipal services spread throughout the city.

There are 26 municipal services. Not only do they implement policy (e.g. clean streets, buy dwellings, distribute welfare payments, and so on) they often develop plans as well, either on demand from the board or on their own initiative to present to the board or one or more aldermen for approval. Some of the largest services have a few thousand civil servants and function under a director or a board of directors. This has given the services so much autonomy that municipal boards have less oversight of their operations (e.g. Van der Zwan 2003: 158-160).

Several of the largest of these municipal services and those important for board policy are listed below, followed by the number of people working there and a short description of their responsibilities (Rotterdam 2008d). They are separated into the categories of *implementation services*, mainly involved in working at street-level with tasks such as cleaning and supervision, *physical services*, mainly involved in building, housing, and infrastructure, and *social services*, mainly involved with people, social policy, and sport (Tops 2007; Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006).

Implementation services
- Public Works (*Gemeentewerken*, 2180)
  Restoring and maintenance of public space and property
- Public Cleaning (*Roteb*, 1989)
  City cleaning and garbage disposal
- City Supervision (*Stadstoezicht*, 1245)
  Supervision of public spaces and parking

Physical services
- City Development (*Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam*, 419)
  Promoting and stimulating economic and spatial development
- Urban Planning and Housing (*Stedenbouw en Volkshuisvesting*, 992)
  Advising, designing, and/ or implementing infrastructural projects

Social services
- Municipal Health Service (*GGD*, 544)
  Improving and maintaining health services and preventing diseases
- Sports and Recreation (*Sport en Recreatie*, 1005)
  Improving sport and recreation facilities and activities
- Youth, Education, and Society (*Jeugd, Onderwijs en Samenleving*, 294)
  Engaging in youth policy, education, integration, and social quality
- Social Affairs and Employment (*Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid*, 2052)
  Administering welfare and Rotterdam employment programmes

Besides these services, there are a few other services within the municipality of Rotterdam that are not involved in policymaking, such as Rotterdam taxes (*Gemeentebelastingen*, 235), the Library (*Bibliotheek*, 386), the City Archive (*Gemeentearchief*, 90), and the Ambulance service (193). Two other notable services are the Centre for Research and Statistics (*Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek* [COS]), which follows trends or implements research, and a local court of audit (*lokale rekenkamer*) that functions independently on behalf of the municipal council to review the policy of the municipal board.

4.4.6. *Accountability of politicians and civil servants*

Around 2002, criticism arose from independent researchers and from inside the city itself on the ability of Rotterdam government to handle the many challenges facing the city. These criticisms mainly concerned the political and bureaucratic organisation of the municipality and can be divided into three categories: an insufficient response to problems, lack of implementation, and lack of accountability.

Insufficient response to problems

In section 4.2.3, it became clear that citizens as well as students/scholars were critical of the way the city dealt with its safety problems. Shortly after the 2002 election, a report from an independent committee appeared with similar conclusions about the city's social policy: There was no oversight in the city's social policy and the programmes were riddled with an abundance of projects with no clear goals, too little or insufficiently qualified personnel, and no 'perseverance power'. In general, the report said, too little was achieved (Diekstra 2004: 202-203).

One of the 1998-2002 board's largest projects, the neighbourhood approach, also faced criticism regarding its ability to acquire concrete results. While some researchers acknowledged creativity in the approach, it was characterised by a complex and bureaucratic organisation. Participants regarded it as an 'organisational monstrosity', 'not transparent', and 'bureaucratic' (Hendriks, Tops 2002: 48). According to the researchers, policy was developed internally by professionals and was paternalistic. They suggested that much more effort was needed to connect with citizens' wishes and to provide customized solutions. This critique was also a direct statement about the municipal services and thereby the board that formally controls them.

> Activities and efforts within the neighbourhood approach are a subordinated current inside these services; their much more encompassing year plans and regular budgets turn out to be hard to adjust; the so-called 'change agents' – employed to change the way of working in these services, to realise more consumer-directed and neighbourhood-directed policy – are too much on their own in this formidable challenge (Hendriks, Tops 2002: 23).

The board established a programme structure to get the services to comply, assigning a programme manager (the 'change agent') to enforce the necessary cooperation from

the twelve implementation programmes. In the end, however, the board had to admit this did not work well.

> We have to note that we have made it hard for ourselves and for the municipal organisation. The idea of the programme structure, that for a part stands diametrically opposed to the existing bureaucratic organisation, did not always have the desired effect. In some cases it led to confusion more than to 'perseverance power' (Rotterdam 2001a: 58).

According to a former Rotterdam alderman (1986-1990) responsible for personnel policy, some of these problems can be traced back to the Labour Party's absolute majority in the municipal council and the decision to govern without coalition partners (1974-1982). This made the Labour Party take full credit for successes, as well as full responsibility for failures, and started a 'defence mechanism', a system where 'bureaucratic and political responsibilities merged' and 'no one dared to correct anybody anymore' (AD 1/12/1999). Wim van Sluis, alderman for Liveable Rotterdam (2002-2006) also noted that responsibilities of aldermen and civil servants sometimes overlapped as both may have an internal (Labour) party relation that is different or even diametrically opposed from their professional relation (Oosthoek 2005: 225).

Too many plans and a lack of implementation

According to critics, the insufficient response to problems was partly due to the fact that the board members were more interested in policymaking than in policy implementation. In 1998, the opposition parties in the municipal council criticised the amount of plans the board presented (see section 4.2.2), saying that the board did not make choices on what it considered the most important (municipal council meeting 17/12/1998).

When the board presented the Rotterdam 'Vision 2010' (*Visie 2010*) one year after the board programme and implementation programmes, several councilmen wanted to know what policy had been initiated (NRT October 1999; municipal council meeting 11/9/1999, 9/11/1999). The board, however, defended this 150-page follow-up of the board programme since it was developed partly at the request of national government (Rotterdam 1999: 1). During the municipal council debate in January 2002, where the performance of the 1998-2002 board was discussed, several parties referred to and criticised the diffuseness of the plans. Even the Labour Party faction was critical.

> We have to succeed in turning our policy into effective governing that provides results recognisable for citizens. Not only in the area of safety does this prove a problem (Labour Party councilman Cremers, municipal council meeting 24/1/02).

According to mayor Opstelten, the Five Year Safety Action Programme (2001) would be the last plan for now: 'We should stop re-inventing policy in this city' (NRC 25/1/2002). Several councilmen had similar suggestions.

> Further, I like to emphasise that… it should revolve more around implementation… There can be times when financial aids are no longer largely available… Then we will once again really have to choose (councilman Vlaardingerbroek from SGP/ChristenUnie, municipal council meeting 24/1/02).

Under supervision of the city manager (the civil servant formally at the top of the civil service), a report was presented in the beginning of 2002 called 'Implement and Speed Up' (*Uitvoeren en Versnellen*). The report provided advice for the new board, suggesting that it should aim at a limited number of themes and give priority to implementation. The new board, the report noted, will step aboard a 'speeding train', and should focus on achieving results. Besides achieving results, the report suggested that the new board's second focus should be on the limited funds in the budget. Other issues included safety, socioeconomic structure, youth, education, and urban redevelopment.

> The new board programme will have to make tough choices, and contain only a selective number of spear points for policy instead of formulating new or sharpened goals over the whole canvas… No new policy, but implementation of existing policy and intensification of certain aspects within it (Rotterdam 2002a: 1, 10).

Lack of accountability

Municipal councilmen criticised the 1998-2002 board for a lack of accountability about what it or the organisation did. This lack of accountability was reflected in the failure of the beacons, or desired goals, which were supposed to measure the performance of its twelve implementation programmes. The beacons however had a relatively minor impact. When mayor Opstelten was appointed, he noticed that the safety programme beacon needed further specificity to improve safety (interview mayor Opstelten). The opposition parties also questioned the beacons. The Socialist Party questioned how the board intended to add 10,000 new jobs and the Liberal Democratic Party missed time frames in which the goals were to be accomplished (municipal council meeting 16/4/1998).

A report in 2000 by the local court of audit criticised the functioning of the beacons. According to the report, beacons were altered along the way, many beacons lacked consistency as they had no connection to the board programme or the implementation programmes, and political or bureaucratic commitment for working with beacons was absent (local court of audit 2002a; 2000b).

> The court of audit notes that there has been a downwards spiral. Scepticism and negative views from civil servants and some aldermen accompany a large

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number of deficiencies in the beacons… After the start, the beacons were seldom discussed in the municipal council or the municipal council committees (local court of audit 2000b).

The lack of political support especially affected adequate functioning of the beacons. According to one alderman at the time, there was no support from the important aldermen Simons and Kombrink. Neither of them wanted to have anything to do with the beacons (interview).

> When an important man like [alderman] Kombrink does not support [the beacons], you can forget about it (interview civil servant).

When the beacons report was released in 2000, the court of audit did not know if the beacons at that moment were still active (local court of audit 2000b). The court recommended the board to '(re)formulate' the beacons, enforce coordination and supervision of the beacons, and if necessary, formalise them (local court of audit 2000a).

In a reaction to the report, the board acknowledged most of the results, but was not inclined to make major changes (local court of audit 2000a). This more or less marked the end of the beacons. A self-evaluation regarding the efforts on the city's Large City Policy later showed a similar need for more accountability (Rotterdam 2002e: 17).

4.4.7. *Improving safety resources*

Apart from financial setbacks, the safety approach suffered since the police were not at full strength at the end of the 1990s. In fact, they had 500 vacancies and suffered from dissatisfaction among their employees (interview police manager). The police at that time were involved in a large reorganisation.

> This [reorganisation] was necessary. Very necessary. It was a sort of kingdom with separate isles. The top just did not know what happened. It was not directed from a central level (interview mayor Opstelten).

The new Liberal Party mayor (1999-2008) was not happy with the problems within the police department and not satisfied with the Safety Bureau that was designed to coordinate the municipality's safety policy.

> [The mayor] visits the Safety Bureau during his introduction round. So we show sketches about what we do. Hardly any response… You notice, but cannot specify it, you feel: someone is unhappy, but does not say it. This can be very uncomfortable (interview safety manager).

In 2000, the resources for the safety policy seemed to improve. The police were back at full strength and the vacancies were finally filled. The mayor also brought in a safety advisor to develop a more integrated safety approach. The advisor led an advisory bu-

reau that was involved in developing the national approach on safety for the Dutch State Department of Justice. His views formed the basis for the Five Year Safety Action Programme (FYSAP) presented at the end of 2001. The safety manager received the assignment to implement that approach in the organisation.

> [After the mayor visited the Safety Bureau] I got a call: 'You are wanted at the office of the mayor'. Before then that hardly ever happened... 'Sit down Ton. Well, Ton, the board elaborately discussed safety policy and we have decided we are going to help you'. At that moment everything in your body tightens (interview safety manager).

The mayor also personally contacted the safety advisor.

> [The mayor] called me with the request if I personally could see how safety policy was arranged in Rotterdam… He said: 'Pay attention, [the safety manager] has to stay' (interview safety advisor).

The mayor also involved the police and district attorney in the new safety approach. He was convinced that both were needed for an effective approach towards safety problems. At the end of 2001, there was even an effort to provide funding for the implementation of the programme (see section 4.5.3).

4.4.8. Summary

After the Second World War, the Labour Party's political dominance and the harbour officials' investment possibilities provided the necessary resources for the implementation of the municipal agenda. The Labour Party, until 2002, had continuing, albeit declining, support from the Rotterdam electorate. In the 1990s, partnerships with private actors remained important to accomplish infrastructural projects. However, national government was, apart from being a large contributor to general municipal funds, an important co-financer of several of the large infrastructural projects. Together with the control of and dependence on the local administration, the municipal agenda was strongly implemented with 'public' resources. However, criticism developed regarding Rotterdam's political and bureaucratic organisation, contending that it was not adequately equipped to deal with many of the challenges facing the city, mainly because of an insufficient response to problems, too many plans, lack of implementation, and lack of accountability.

4.5. Scheme of cooperation

4.5.1. Introduction

This section of the chapter is devoted to the scheme of cooperation of the coalition. This section sketches the process of political coalition formation and how the municipal board functioned after that formation.

4.5.2. Political negotiation

In the first two decades after the Second World War, Rotterdam politics experienced a time of consensus and of little political differences. Everyone considered rebuilding the harbour and the city to be undisputed priorities. Political differences became evident only during elections. After elections, the Labour Party granted other parties a place in the municipal board and political disputes subsided. Even in 1962, when the Labour Party gained the absolute majority in the municipal council for the first time, it took the Liberal Party and Christian Democratic Party aboard, and the informal advisory boards continued their decision-making regarding the harbour (Van de Laar 2000: 488).

In 1974, the (left-wing) Labour Party board departed from this form of consensus when it achieved an absolute majority and decided to govern without political coalition partners. However, since 1990, the Labour Party has not been able to achieve an absolute majority and has been obliged to negotiate with other parties to form a political coalition. The party's size, power over negotiations, and influence give the Labour Party some advantage in these talks, as the negotiation in 1998 showed. Kombrink and Simons would return as aldermen, and Simons claimed one additional alderman for his party. The Liberal Party continued in the coalition, but not without handing over the harbour portfolio to the Labour Party.

Simons declared that the consequent board programme had so many priorities because of the concessions given to other parties. He called this the 'political rationality' of the political coalition formation: every political party in the coalition needed to see its goals sufficiently reflected in the board programme (Cristhophe et al. 2001: 29). Opposition parties however criticised what they saw as an unevenness of power within the board. But the Labour Party considered this fair, since it did not get its initial way in the political coalition formation: a coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party instead of the Liberal Party (Van Dijk, Labour Party councilman in the municipal council meeting 14/4/1998).

The 1998-2002 board also adopted some disputes from the previous board. According to a national newspaper, the board of 1994-1998 performed poorly and within the Labour Party there were misunderstandings between some of the important Labour Party aldermen (Kombrink and Simons) and mayor Peper. Both aldermen at some

point even complained about the mayor to Labour Party prime minister Kok (Elsevier 6/11/1999).

> We did experience some small storms the last couple of years [in the board]. People are replaced. And what do you get when you are less of a team than you should be: you do not want to leave much to your colleagues. You trust them less (Labour Party alderman Kuijper cited in NRC 27/4/2002).

Frictions between parties also made all parties keep a closer eye on what they could achieve. Such achievements were immediately translated to party successes.

> Everyone had to say something about every subject, even when they agreed. And if I got something, that meant [my party] got something, so the other parties also had to get something (Liberal Party alderman Janssens cited in Oosthoek 2005: 234-235).

4.5.3. *Safety cooperation*

After his arrival in Rotterdam in 1999, mayor Opstelten looked to improve safety policy. As a newcomer in Rotterdam confronted with a board of experienced aldermen he moved carefully. Safety was one of the sub-themes within the social agenda and in the portfolio of a Christian Democratic alderman. And according to alderman Kombrink, there was no culture of mayors explicitly addressing their portfolios in board meetings (RTV 11/12/2008).

The mayor's first concrete step was to gather consensus for an improvement of the city's safety approach. In 2001, the mayor organised a safety conference where top politicians, police officers and civil servants were present. In this conference, he strongly put the message across that safety policy was seriously inadequate. He had previously expressed that sentiment publicly as well (e.g. RD 12/11/1999; see also RD 04/01/2000). With the organisation of the safety conference it was clear that the mayor wanted to elevate the safety theme from its subordinated position. But he proceeded with care. He stated that at the safety conference no decisions would be taken, but the summaries of the discussions would provide building blocks for a 'Five Year Programme' (*vijfjarenprogramma*). The safety manager was made responsible for getting everyone to the conference. This included aldermen, district chairmen, municipal service directors, and the police. The safety manager said that he had a very difficult time in persuading some of them to attend, as several did not see the urgency (interview). In a book appearing after the conference, the mayor stated that 'over a hundred people agree on the approach taken to address Rotterdam safety problems' (Rotterdam 2001b: 5). The alderman responsible for safety, Van der Tak (Christian Democratic Party), also agreed and said that he supported the mayor's efforts for improving safety policy (interview). However, the consequent discussions in the board, mainly regarding the funding for the programme, proved much harder.

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Real discussions on three to twelve million Euros a year. The Labour Party opted for less than three million. We wanted sixteen million (interview former alderman).

In the end, it was decided that the safety approach should receive 30 million Euros for the five year span.

4.5.4. *Summary*

In Rotterdam politics, cooperation is necessary to form a political coalition that can count on a majority in the municipal council. This means that agreements are made between political parties. Given the Labour Party's dominance, based on a large electoral mandate and strong board members, the Labour Party could often enforce concessions from other parties during the negotiations. After 1999, the mayor worked and negotiated within the board to prioritise safety and to implement an integrated safety approach.

4.6. Conclusion

Until 2002, Rotterdam's *agenda* – the first element of an urban regime – remained focused, in general, on physical, social, and economic issues, even though safety and integration issues were emerging. While business influence decreased in the decades after the Second World War in Rotterdam's *governing coalition* – the second urban regime element –, the Labour Party remained a dominant entity and, mainly through the board, an important engine for implementing the agenda. Even though the Labour Party's influence had slightly decreased over the years, in 1998 it could still count on large electoral support which ensured its continued dominant presence in the municipal council, municipal board, municipal districts, and, to some extent, the administration. This dominance, together with money received from national government, ensured control over most (public) *resources* – the third element of an urban regime. However, there was increasing criticism towards the political coalition and the municipal organisation (which is also an important resource) to deal with Rotterdam's large challenges, such as safety. Regarding safety, the mayor took the lead in establishing a new integrated approach, but within a *scheme of cooperation* – the fourth element of an urban regime – that was highly dependent on negotiations between political parties and politicians. Before 2002, the mayor was relatively alone to convince others of the importance of safety.

CHAPTER 5   THE EMERGENCE OF
LIVEABLE ROTTERDAM 2001-2002

5.1.   Introduction

This chapter describes the emergence of a new local party in Rotterdam: Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*). This party, established in 2001, participated with its leader Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 Rotterdam municipal council election. Urban regime analysis will be applied to the period of this party's emergence until the March 2002 election.

5.2.   Agenda

5.2.1.   Introduction

Liveable Rotterdam was partly established out of affinity with Pim Fortuyn, a national politician. When Fortuyn became the leader of Liveable Rotterdam in January 2002, his views in large part dominated the party's agenda.[13] Two sources will be used for the analysis into Liveable Rotterdam's agenda: interviews and writings of Fortuyn and the *Leidraad* (LR 2002), the electoral programme of Liveable Rotterdam (which Fortuyn also supported).[14] This political agenda can be separated into four main desires: improved safety (policy), a stricter immigration and integration approach (or at least more open discussion about related problems), greater accountability of politicians and civil servants, and more citizen input into policymaking.[15]

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[13] Fortuyn in general used the themes for his national campaign for his local one, such as safety, integration of immigrants, and a transparent government (Van Schendelen 2003b).

[14] The themes discussed in the *Leidraad* are safety, education, environment, harbour and industry, Rotterdam airport, traffic and transport, entrepreneurs, social affairs, urban planning, students/education, art and culture, sport, government, transparency and participation, openness, service provision, negotiating efficiently, organisation and personnel policy, administrative renewal, finance, fast internet access, and 'open society' (LR 2002).

[15] The election programme of Liveable Rotterdam dealt with other themes as well, including investment in education (especially personnel), requiring that Dutch becomes the main language in all Rotterdam schools, and creating more green spaces. The party was against the privatisation of the Harbour Company and the Public Transport Service, but it did want the Harbour Company to function more as a business and to stimulate more competition between companies in the harbour. The party wanted the *Tweede Maasvlakte* (a large extension of the harbour) to be developed immediately. Liveable Rotterdam was in favour of more night flights to and from the Rotterdam airport. It felt that entrepreneurs and businesses should be supported, meaning, among other things, more subsidies and less bureaucracy. The party pre-

5.2.2. Safety

Shortly after party founder Sørensen decided to participate with Liveable Rotterdam in the 2002 election, he was very clear on what the party's main priority should be: 'safety, safety, and safety' (Booister 2009: 31). He found an ally in Fortuyn, who, after he took on the leadership of Liveable Rotterdam, summed up the viewpoints of his party as 'giving back the city to its inhabitants, rock hard battle against crime (especially street robbery), better mixing of inhabitants, and reinforcing the middle class in our city' (Oosthoek 2005: 241). According to Fortuyn, the city had the highest crime rates and the most unsolved murders in the Netherlands. 'Rotterdam should be ashamed. We do not want to lead the bad lists' (RD 20/1/2002). 'The police should catch street robbers by their neck. It has to stop' (RD 2/3/2002). Fortuyn mentioned Giuliani's New York as a desired example, promising to improve Rotterdam's record 'just as mayor Giuliani did in New York. By forceful interventions he effectively reduced the number of murders [and] fought auto thefts' (RD 2/3/2002). Fortuyn also quoted mayor Opstelten by saying that Rotterdam 'leads the bad lists' (Booister 2009: 80). In his leadership acceptance speech, Fortuyn proposed that loitering should be punished with a fine of two Euros or 15 minutes of cleaning on the spot (RD 20/1/2002). The election programme of Liveable Rotterdam focused on safety as well.

> A liveable Rotterdam is first and foremost a safe Rotterdam. The Netherlands compared to other European countries has the lowest number of police officers. Just like the other political parties, Liveable Rotterdam wants more blue [colour of Dutch police uniforms] on the street... The police receive too many duties that do not belong there. This must stop. Current law can guarantee a safe city if this law is implemented. Liveable Rotterdam wants to keep the mayor and police to executing the law (LR 2002).

Safety was also a recurring item in several of the other themes in the election programme. It recommended, among other things, that teaching staff should be able to frisk students, the enforcement of environmental polluters should be stricter, extra staff and resources should be made available to improve safety in public transportation, entrepreneurs should be given safety protection, and the district attorney should be immediately notified when employees of social affairs are threatened or molested.

5.2.3. Accountability of politicians and civil servants

Fortuyn wanted to make a clear division between the responsibilities of different local actors. After the 2002 local elections, a new Municipal Law that disentangled the re-

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ferred building or renovating expensive houses to attract the richer part of the population [no mentioning of mixing people, JvO]. The party also supported the return of the 'human measurement' in culture policy, meaning among other things more investment in people and less in buildings and concrete (LR 2002).

sponsibilities and membership of the municipal board and municipal council took effect (see section 3.3.4). Fortuyn supported such a clear role division. He was in favour of a board that would take on the role of day-to-day government of the city and a council that would check, stimulate, and correct the board (Parool 21/1/2002).

In addition, Fortuyn was a strong proponent of holding the municipal government, including the civil service, the police, and his own party, accountable to clear and measurable goals. In this way, it would become straightforward for politicians to assess the performance of civil servants and for citizens to assess the performance of their elected politicians. Subsequently, Fortuyn felt that politicians and civil servants could and should face consequences if goals are not met. 'If you cannot [achieve the results], you should leave' (Fortuyn cited in Oosthoek 2005: 91).

In the election programme, Liveable Rotterdam proposed that all municipal plans have a measurable cost and benefits section. This would ensure that different actors within the organisation could hold each other accountable. The programme suggested that all civil servants with a managerial position have their responsibilities, tasks, set-back, and progress 'visible with the press of a button' (LR 2002). The party wanted the municipal government to ensure that the municipal council and citizens obtain more openness in 'all areas', making information available such as the names of businesses possessing licenses for dangerous materials and the percentage of absence due to sickness within each municipal service. It proposed that the appointment of aldermen should be made more transparent and that these appointments follow a public vacancy process instead of looking for someone in political party ranks (LR 2002).

Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn also proposed to focus more on implementation. According to the election programme,

> this programme is not called a *leidraad* [which can be more or less translated as 'guiding principle'] for nothing. Policy is policy only when it is implemented. Liveable Rotterdam believes that in no sector should policy be piled upon policy… It is a gain if current legalisation is enforced and decisions that have been taken are implemented (LR 2002).

Liveable Rotterdam was in favour of a government that deals with problems 'fanatically with all legal means' (LR 2002).

5.2.4. *Citizen input into policy making*

Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam wanted to focus more attention on citizen participation in policymaking, instead of the 'backroom politics' and lack of transparency of current power holders (i.e. the Labour Party). They considered their own list of councilmen candidates (including a teacher, plumber, ICT entrepreneur, ship loader, real estate agent, student, retired entrepreneur, lawyer, cleaner, drawer, bar owner, and housewife) a first step in this process. According to Fortuyn they were 'real represen-

tatives' and not professional politicians (Oosthoek 2005). But according to Liveable Rotterdam's election programme, the forty-five councilmen that made up the Rotterdam municipal council were not enough; all Rotterdam inhabitants should have a larger influence on policymaking. In its election programme, information technology was put forth prominently as a means for citizens to do so. For instance, the party suggested the internet should be made available in public buildings (LR 2002).

5.2.5.   *Immigration and integration*

Regarding immigration and integration, a theme Fortuyn became known for in his writings, the election programme stated: 'Liveable Rotterdam is a party that wants to fight all forms of racism and discrimination based on race, religious conviction, nationality, heritage, or gender' (LR 2002). The programme mentioned that the party did not tolerate opposition to hard-fought changes, such as democracy, separation of church and state, women's right to vote, workers' rights, social insurance, and equality for women and gays. Immigrants, according to the statement, should receive educational support, but also have an obligation to integrate themselves (LR 2002).

Fortuyn was in favour of women's emancipation, including ethnic women, but he did not believe in a multicultural society in the sense of different cultures living next to but not with each other. Fortuyn was very much in favour of 'free speech' to discuss these and other issues in the open. During the election campaign, Fortuyn even said that he wanted the ban on discrimination excluded from the Dutch Constitution as it limited the right to free speech too much. He was in favour of an open, rigorous debate (Chorus, Galan 2002: 199). He explained:

> The leftist church, which includes part of the media, the Green Party and the Labour Party, has for years forbade discussions that deal with the multicultural society and the problems it brings forth, by continuously combining those with discrimination, with racism, and not in the last place, with the blackest page of the history of this part of the continent: fascism and Nazism (Fortuyn cited in Chorus, Galan 2002: 198).

Fewer limitations on the right for free speech would also benefit Fortuyn himself, since he had strong views regarding immigration, the multi-cultural society, and Islam. In the 1990s, Fortuyn wrote about Islam in a book called *Against the Islamisation of Our Culture* (Fortuyn 1997). During the election campaign he said that the Islamic culture is a backward one and that if he could legally arrange it, there would be no Muslim people allowed to enter the country (Volkskrant 9/2/2002). In the summer of 2001, he gave an interview in the Rotterdam local paper claiming that the number of immigrants was a problem:

> The Netherlands is full. Rotterdam as well. In a couple of years, this city will consist for 56% of people who are not from the Netherlands… We allow too many foreign people to enter. In that way we get an underclass that consists

of too many people who are badly equipped to contribute either economically or culturally (Oosthoek 2005: 25).

Fortuyn believed that everyone who was already in the Netherlands could stay and should be taken care of, but no more should be allowed to enter before the country had solved its problems, since, he said, most newcomers have a difficult time taking care of themselves, let alone contributing to society. Moreover, he believed that people who had migrated should adjust to the dominant culture. Fortuyn was also a proponent of mixing different cultures throughout the city and of building for the middle class.

> The last ten years the city has deteriorated rapidly. We have to stop that development before it is too late... First, we have to get the middle class that now is being chased out of the city back. We have an upper class in the well-off neighbourhoods and an underclass in the deprived neighbourhoods, and before you know it nothing in between… There is no question of balance now. On the contrary, ghettos emerge (RD 2/3/2002).

However, Fortuyn, party founder Sørensen, and party member Pastors (who later became an alderman), denied being anti-immigrant or racists. Sørensen wanted the election programme to include measures for the integration of immigrants, but not their removal from the country. He also took a councilman candidate off the candidate list when he found out that he had been a member of an extreme-right party (Booister 2009: 59, 82). Fortuyn thought migrants could be good role models for other citizens and declared that he had many immigrant friends (e.g. Booister 2009: 48) When Pastors was invited to become part of Liveable Rotterdam, he wanted to know for sure that the party was no 'right-wing club' as he did not 'hate foreigners' (Booister 2009: 73). In the election campaign, it seemed that among the supporters of the party were also people from a non-Dutch background (Booister 2009: 118, 125; see also 'a short analysis of the votes' in section 6.4.2).

5.2.6. Summary

While the main priority in Liveable Rotterdam and Pim Fortuyn's political agenda was safety, the agenda also included solving or at least discussing problems regarding immigration and integration, greater accountability of politicians and civil servants, and a municipality that is more receptive to citizen input in policymaking.

5.3. Coalition [16]

5.3.1. Introduction

This part of the chapter describes the establishment of Liveable Rotterdam and how other government actors responded to the party's rapid rise to power.

5.3.2. A party originating from the kitchen table

The name 'Liveable Rotterdam' was registered by Manuel Kneepkens, leader of the City Party (*Stadspartij*), a local party in Rotterdam. Kneepkens registered the name to show his connection and affinity to Liveable Netherlands (*Leefbaar Nederland*). Liveable Netherlands was a political party that was established in 1999, in large part – in the eyes of the founders – as a reaction against the dysfunctional nature of the Labour Party and the arrogance of the political power holders in the Netherlands. The founders believed that with Pim Fortuyn they could be successful in the 2002 national parliamentary election. When Fortuyn was chosen to lead Liveable Netherlands, Kneepkens gave up the phrase 'Liveable' because he did not want to be associated with Fortuyn. With 'Liveable' attached to the City Party's name and Fortuyn leading Liveable Netherlands, Kneepkens saw a lot of new people during meetings of his party, many of whom were supporters of Pim Fortuyn. Ronald Sørensen, a former history teacher, was one of them. In December 2001, on the same day Kneepkens changed the name of his party, Sørensen registered the name Liveable Rotterdam.

Sørensen registered the name to keep it out of the hands of extreme right groups and decided to take part in the municipal council election himself. With some help he quickly established an organisation, a programme, and a list of candidates, since the election was only three months away. The first meetings took place at Sørensen's home (at the 'kitchen table'). Sørensen hoped to win five municipal council seats in the 2002 election. Some of Sørensen's friends joined the party as well as some other people who had read a local newspaper article about him (Booister 2009).

After Fortuyn sent Sørensen an email on January 2, 2002, to become a member of Liveable Rotterdam, things proceeded rapidly. One week after the email, there was a meeting in Fortuyn's home where it was agreed that Fortuyn would become leader of Liveable Rotterdam, which meant that he would lead the list of municipal council candidates for the upcoming election in March 2002. Besides his affinity with Rotterdam, the reason for Fortuyn to accept was that he considered the Rotterdam municipal council election a good test case for his national ambitions. At the meeting where the decision was made to make Fortuyn the leader of Liveable Rotterdam, someone asked about Liveable Rotterdam's election programme. Sørensen wanted to answer, but Fortuyn interrupted him and mentioned issues such as safety, the deteriorated

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[16] Unless stated otherwise, the information in this section is derived from Oosthoek 2005 and Booister 2009.

neighbourhoods, and flight of the middleclass (Chorus, De Galan 2002: 124-125; Oosthoek 2005: 40). Sørensen later said he did not mind stepping aside for someone like Fortuyn (RD 20/1/2002).

When Fortuyn took on the party's leadership, Sørensen was making the list of councilmen candidates. His first proposal to have ten people on the list was dismissed by Fortuyn, who preferred thirty, similar to the number of candidates from other political parties. It nevertheless proved difficult to find enough people. At Fortuyn's request, some people were given good positions on the list, such as Marco Pastors, a friend of Fortuyn. Some other positions were filled with people who had contributed to the party's establishment. Fortuyn declared it to be a list of 'real representatives', from housewives to lawyers. Many of the candidates had been members of or voted for other political parties in the past including, surprisingly, the Socialist Party. One had been a council member for the Labour Party (Chorus, De Galan 2002: 176; Van Westerloo 2003: 272; Booister 2009: 68). The list of candidates and Fortuyn's leadership was presented during a members' meeting in January. The hundred attendees of that meeting (mainly white middle-aged men, according to a reporter) approved of both (Chorus, De Galan 2002: 125). According to Sørensen, only one thing united this group: Fortuyn (AD 8/3/2002). While Fortuyn was the undisputed leader of the party, Sørensen was now involved in writing the party's election programme, for which a committee within the party was created to help him (Booister 2009: 61).

5.3.3. *Political isolation*

Even though Liveable Rotterdam and the other political parties shared similar themes (Van Schendelen 2003b; RD 20/2/2002; see also RD 12/1/2002), the established political parties were very sceptical of Liveable Rotterdam. They regarded Fortuyn as an extremist and several parties decided not to engage in negotiations with him after the election.

Fortuyn's views, especially on Islam and immigration, gave fuel to his political opponents. The national Labour Party chairman suggested that Liveable Netherlands was not very credible as a coalition partner. The Labour Party prime minister declared that Fortuyn was spreading hate, fear, and intolerance (Booister 2009: 108). After Fortuyn stated in an interview in February 2002 that he wanted to remove the ban on discrimination from the Constitution and wanted to close the border for Muslim immigrants, Liveable Netherlands sacked him as a leader. Fortuyn was upset, but continued his national political project with his own list of candidates for the national elections, the Pim Fortuyn's List (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*). On the local level, he managed to maintain the peace when he confirmed that he would adhere to Liveable Rotterdam's election programme.

Political parties and politicians were reluctant to negotiate with Fortuyn to form a new political coalition after the March 2002 election. By the end of February, the Labour Party and the Christian Democratic Party had explicitly stated that they would not do

so. Sjaak van der Tak, Christian Democratic Party leader, accused Fortuyn of 'arousing unrest among a large group of citizens of Rotterdam. He turns groups against each other. That is not a good way to run a city. In addition, we cannot do anything with the solutions he proposes' (Oosthoek 2005: 72). Labour Party leader Kuijper shared that opinion and did not even want to debate with Fortuyn: 'We do not speak with other parties. I have in mind the new extreme right party that wants to participate in the council election. And I do not want to debate with suspicious persons like Pim Fortuyn' (Oosthoek 2005: 50). Even though she later would abandon the resolution not to debate with him, she could not conceal (in speech or body language) that she had little affection towards him, something she later confirmed (Oosthoek 2005: 77). On the evening of the election, Liberal Party leader Janssens joined the ban on negotiating with Fortuyn after the election. He accused Fortuyn of having 'inhumane' views (Booister 2009: 107), believed that Fortuyn turned people against each other, and that Liveable Rotterdam thus had no place in a coalition (Oosthoek 2005: 71; RD 16/2/2002).

Some councilmen from the Labour Party and the Christian Democratic Party considered leaving their faction if their party cooperated with Liveable Rotterdam (RD 8/3/2002). The mayor also interfered. He stressed the importance of a stable city government and was concerned about the city's image, given what he considered the negative press from the massive (foreign) media presence: 'They [foreign media] are here, because it is not going well' (NRC 8/3/2008; Chorus, De Galan 2002: 195). Many in the civil service and districts, where the Labour Party was still quite strong, regarded the developments with a degree of distrust. Several of them interpreted Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam's popularity as a vote of no confidence on their behalf (interviews). They were particularly concerned about Fortuyn's harsh comments about immigrants and Islam and his negative attitude towards everything concerned with what he called 'old politics' (see section 5.2.2).

5.3.4.   Summary

Rotterdam teacher Ronald Sørensen established Liveable Rotterdam at the end of 2001 and decided to take part in the 2002 election. After Fortuyn became leader of the party, most of the other political parties, as well as civil servants, were worried about Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam's viewpoints, especially regarding immigrants. Due to those concerns, the Labour Party, Christian Democratic Party, and Liberal Party decided not to engage in possible coalition negotiations after the 2002 municipal council election.

5.4.   Resources

5.4.1.   *Introduction*

This part of the chapter describes Liveable Rotterdam's resources, such as the electoral appeal of Pim Fortuyn.

5.4.2.   *Pim Fortuyn, electoral appeal, and money*

Despite the fact that Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn were not considered possible coalition partners for many political parties in Rotterdam, Liveable Rotterdam had some important resources at its disposal, mainly the appeal of the party's leader, Pim Fortuyn, and a growing electoral support.

Pim Fortuyn (1948-2002) started his career in science. In 1990, Fortuyn was appointed as part-time professor at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the city where he had lived since 1988. Fortuyn, a former member of the Labour Party, also had his own advisory bureau, with little success according to Wim van Sluis, his accountant those days. In meetings with possible clients Fortuyn always said what he thought, which most of the time was something close to: 'This is the problem and you are part of it' (Oosthoek 2005: 18). In the 1990s, Fortuyn achieved fame with his writings, such as books and columns, and speeches where he mainly criticised the degradation of old urban neighbourhoods, the multicultural society, Islam, the educational system, bureaucracy, and the welfare state. In his appearance, Fortuyn was considered a dandy. Since 1997, he shaved his head and was rarely seen without a fancy suit with thick tie. He spoke eloquently, lived alone with his butler and two dogs, and never hid the fact that he was gay when asked about it. In August 2001, Fortuyn declared on national TV that he entered Dutch politics to become prime minister of the Netherlands, either with an existing party or his own list of candidates. Fortuyn was then already somewhat of a public figure, known from a bi-weekly column on a TV show and as columnist for the Dutch magazine *Elsevier*.

After his announcement of intent to become a politician, the media started reporting on Fortuyn. His ambition and comments on immigration gave him more media coverage and increased his fame. At the end of 2001 he was chosen to lead Liveable Netherlands with 89% of its members' votes.

Fortuyn's message, in which safety, immigration and Islam stood out as main themes, seemed to appeal to voters in Rotterdam as well as people throughout the Netherlands. The media devoted more and more attention to Fortuyn, who appeared to take Dutch politics by storm. Proponents and opponents agreed that he knew how to use the media and the media were fond of reporting on him. In Rotterdam, Fortuyn's leadership of Liveable Rotterdam also proved beneficial. According to a poll in the end of January, Liveable Rotterdam would be able to secure a maximum of ten municipal council seats, about 22% of the votes. By the beginning of February this had

become twelve seats. In March the number fell back to ten. In these polls, however, Liveable Rotterdam never secured more council seats than the Labour Party. Those same polls included a question about the problems in the city. In all three polls, safety and street crime were considered the largest problems (Oosthoek 2005: 82).

Liveable Netherlands' break with Fortuyn affected Liveable Rotterdam. Liveable Rotterdam could no longer expect to receive financial aid from Liveable Netherlands, so it had to rely more heavily on other funds. Subsequently, it borrowed money to finance the election campaign, received donations from entrepreneurs, and relied on several volunteers to campaign (Booister 2009). The party also received funds from its original founders, especially Sørensen, who paid some of the first sums that were needed to participate in the local election (Booister 2009).

5.4.3. *Summary*

Before the 2002 municipal council election, Liveable Rotterdam lacked political allies, but had some important resources at its disposal, mainly the appeal of the party's leader, Pim Fortuyn, and a growing electoral support in the polls. The electoral campaign of Liveable Rotterdam depended on volunteers and party members who campaigned or contributed money.

5.5. Scheme of cooperation

5.5.1. *Introduction*

This part of the chapter analyses the partnership between Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam and the hostile interaction between that partnership and the established political actors in Rotterdam before the March 2002 municipal council election.

5.5.2. *Old politics*

Fortuyn condemned what he called the 'old politics' of a small power-holding elite that used backroom negotiations (e.g. Fortuyn 2002). In the election programme, Liveable Rotterdam contended that all the political parties looked alike. It said that 'professional politicians' cannot achieve sufficient distance from their own role in the past, which would make new approaches to problems impossible. A new party such as Liveable Rotterdam would not have this problem (LR 2002). Fortuyn regarded the Labour Party as its biggest obstacle and said that Liveable Rotterdam should aim for the dismissal of the Labour Party from (at least) the municipal board. He repeated this later in a letter distributed to the voters. He considered the affair in which former mayor Peper was accused of misusing public funds (see section 4.4.3) to be a good example of the party's lack of transparency.

I will admit that the Labour Party has done much good things in the after-war period... But the vitality is gone. That is the fate of a party that has been in power too long. That party becomes more bureaucratic is not open for new ideas anymore. That is even stronger in Rotterdam, where a large part of the top managers are from the Labour Party... The Labour Party has too much power, reaching all the way to the cultural circuit... Do you think it was coincidental that Liveable Rotterdam could not participate in the election night in Now&Wow [Rotterdam night club] (RD 2/3/2002).

But Fortuyn's criticism went further than the political parties; it was also directed towards the police and the bureaucracy. Fortuyn thought that civil servants should not be members of a political party and that in Rotterdam too many of them were members of the Labour Party (RD 2/3/2002). He felt that civil servants had too much power and that it would be good to reduce their number by a quarter. Fortuyn also criticized the mayor and the police, citing the indifferent attitude in dealing with citizens' complaints regarding safety and the high number of administrative tasks the police performed instead of being out on the streets. He considered the police organisation 'sick' and totally 'bureaucratised' (RD 2/3/2002).

5.5.3. *The harshness of the campaign*

The local election campaign in Rotterdam in 2001 and 2002 was harsh, and differences were fiercely played out. This went beyond a normal election campaign since both Fortuyn and his political opponents often clashed hard and personally. Many opponents believed Fortuyn was a racist due to his proposal to abolish the ban on discrimination from the Dutch Constitution and to close the border for Muslim immigrants. In the last months before the election, when the polls indicated that Liveable Rotterdam could look forward to electoral success, the election campaign became grimmer. The mainstream parties in Rotterdam, which were still taken somewhat by surprise by Fortuyn's active role in Liveable Rotterdam, heavily opposed Fortuyn and rejected his call for restrictions on immigration and critique on Islam and the multicultural society. A number of Rotterdam organisations even lodged a complaint against Fortuyn for discrimination. Several national politicians, when talking about Fortuyn, referred to the Second World War and 'the diary of Anne Frank' (Booister 2009: 108). In Rotterdam, Liberal Democratic Party councilman Van Ravesteijn complimented the organisations that filed a complaint against Fortuyn for discrimination (Oosthoek 2005 32-33) and the Green Party leader talked about 'deportations' when talking about Fortuyn (Booister 2009: 107). Both Labour Party leader Kuijpers and Liberal Party leader Janssens labelled Liveable Rotterdam as an 'extreme right' party.

In the streets, there were people who supported Fortuyn, but others harassed him and called him the 'Dutch Haider' (referring to the leader of the right-wing Austrian Freedom Party [e.g. Oosthoek 2005: 100]). According to Sørensen, insults and threats by email increased. After an incident on the city's south bank on February 26, where Fortuyn was harassed by a small group of young people from a non-Dutch origin, Live-

able Rotterdam decided to stop campaigning on the street. Because of this, Fortuyn was called a 'sissy' (by Stefan Hulman, Liberal Party) and a 'wuss' (by Gerard Peet, Labour Party) (Oosthoek 2005: 86; RD 1/3/2002). The Liberal Party leader labelled Fortuyn a 'spreader of hate'. Manuel Kneepkens from the City Party called him a 'Polder Mussolini' and compared him and his party with fascism on several occasions. Other (national) political party leaders also compared Liveable Rotterdam to extreme right parties. On top of that, the Labour Party, Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party refused to talk with Fortuyn about a coalition after the elections. According to the local newspaper, in one of the last political debates between the party leaders before the election, the debaters [Fortuyn and his opponents] avoided each other 'as if contagious diseases can be transmitted' (RD 4/3/2002).

But Fortuyn himself had strong opinions as well. He thought the other politicians' remarks created an atmosphere of hate in the city, of which he was the target. But while Fortuyn said he had trouble with the way certain media and politicians regarded him, he continued to proclaim his controversial views. It was during this period that, in a newspaper article, he called Islam backward and wanted to abolish the ban on discrimination on behalf of free speech. Some citizens who supported Fortuyn turned against mainstream politicians themselves. In one of the debates, different leaders of the established parties heard remarks such as 'coward' and 'what an idiot' (RD 5/3/2002).

A day before the election, during the Junky Union's demonstration against Fortuyn, a campaign car from Liveable Rotterdam interrupting the demonstration was forced onto the curb by a police car. Later it turned out that Socialist Party councilman Theo Cornelissen was driving it. He declared to have briefly 'borrowed' the car. This incident somewhat illustrated the grim atmosphere the days and weeks before the election (Oosthoek 2005: 96; Chorus, De Galan 2002: 180).

5.5.4. *Summary*

The election campaign for the 2002 municipal council election was fierce. Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn turned against what they called 'old politics' and mainly but not exclusively blamed the Labour Party for what was wrong in the city. Several of the Rotterdam political parties in turn called Fortuyn an extremist and labelled him as an extreme right politician. But Fortuyn also had strong views and accused these 'established' parties of creating an atmosphere of hate in the city, of which he was the target.

5.6. Conclusion

Liveable Rotterdam is a political party that was established through a private initiative at the end of 2001. It benefitted when the nationally known politician Pim Fortuyn joined the party founders. Electoral polls in 2002 indicated that the party was likely to

do well in the elections. The *agenda* of Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn was mainly focused on safety policy but also emphasised a stricter immigration and integration approach (or at least an open discussion about the related problems), greater accountability of politicians and civil servants, and more citizen input into policymaking. Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam strongly reacted against the current political system in Rotterdam. They especially accused the Labour Party of engaging in backroom politics, not being in touch with citizens, and not accounting for their actions. Most political parties in turn found Fortuyn extreme and several declared that they would not cooperate with him and his party after the election. The *coalition* analysis showed that Liveable Rotterdam was politically relatively isolated. Money from supporters and the electoral appeal of Fortuyn were the most important *resources* at the party's disposal. The *scheme of cooperation* between Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn was productive, but the election campaign was harsh. The largest political parties regarded cooperation with Liveable Rotterdam as difficult if not impossible. Several politicians compared Fortuyn's views with fascism and racism, and Fortuyn in turn condemned other parties of targeting him in a hate campaign. Also, within the civil service and districts there was a reluctance to support Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam, as well as fear about what would happen if this party won the election.

**CHAPTER 6   THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIVEABLE ROTTERDAM'S
POLITICAL AGENDA 2002-2006**

6.1.   Introduction

This chapter examines Rotterdam government after Liveable Rotterdam became part of the political coalition and replaced the Labour Party as the largest party in the municipal council and the board. The following questions will be addressed: What happened with the political agenda of Liveable Rotterdam after that? Did safety and integration reach a more prominent place on the agenda? Was the participation of Liveable Rotterdam in the political coalition the only noteworthy change to the coalition to implement that agenda? Were citizens more included in the coalition? And what resources and scheme of cooperation supported and led to the (new) coalition?

6.2.   Agenda

6.2.1.   Introduction

This section of the chapter describes how the safety and integration agendas developed between 2002 and 2006. According to Fortuyn, Rotterdam's city government once again needed to be a true representation of its inhabitants, in people as well as problems addressed. Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam presented these problems mainly as problems regarding safety. The municipal board in 2002 placed safety on top of its agenda.

6.2.2.   Safety as priority

In April 2002, one month after the election, Liveable Rotterdam, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party formed a partnership for a new political coalition (see section 6.5). The negotiators of these parties presented the 'coalition accord', a first indication of the new plans. The political coalition announced a tough approach regarding public safety:

> Public safety is one of the largest problems of the city. Street robbery, public safety, burglary, murders, misdemeanours, and violations: they have to stop. Rotterdam is fed up! It is time we pay attention to stronger upholding the law… It is time for action.… camera supervision… [a] low tolerance policy, starting in the centre… [and] blue on the street, supervisors (Rotterdam 2002b: 3).

The political coalition nominated aldermen who – with the mayor – composed the new municipal board of mayor and aldermen. The first assignment of the board was to develop the political coalition plans further. Regarding safety, the Liveable Rotter-

dam negotiators became aware that there was a Five Year Safety Action Programme (FYSAP) approved just months ago that connected well with their plans (see section 4.2.3).

> Then all of a sudden this plan emerged. Well, if we start implementing that, we are well on the way (former alderman Pastors, RTV 11/12/2008).

The board programme appeared in September 2002 and contained the board's priorities and plans until 2006. Safety was the board's top priority, for which the FYSAP would be the 'guiding principle' (Rotterdam 2002c: 11).

> The main priority of this board programme is that Rotterdam in 2006 has become measurably safer. There are no unsafe neighbourhoods and spaces anymore. The neighbourhoods that are reasonably safe at the moment minimally will remain so. Multiple offenders will be dealt with hard and consequently (Rotterdam 2002c: 11).

The safety chapter included eighteen targets that the board wanted to achieve before the new municipal council election in 2006. (Later a nineteenth would be added.) All targets were developed such that progress could be measured. Some of the most striking were (cited from Rotterdam 2002c):

- In 2005, Rotterdam is measurably safer; the safety index nowhere is lower than it was in June 2002.
- In 2005, the eight unsafe neighbourhoods [according to the safety index] are no longer unsafe, and nine 'hot spots' [see further on] are improved.
- 'City marines' … [see further on] are deployed in the most unsafe neighbourhoods.
- By September 2003, there are no more vagabonds in Rotterdam central train station and by 2005 the central train station is no longer unsafe [measured by the safety index].
- There are no more unsafe public transport lines by 2005.
- In 2003, there will be a central safety office for citizens and camera supervision in at least two new areas.
- The prostitution area *Keileweg* is closed by December 2005.
- By the end of 2005, 700 disruptive drug addicts are placed in a treatment programme.
- Preventive frisking is allowed in safety risk areas.

The board interpreted safety as a broad concept. The general motto 'clean, intact, and safe' meant that the safety approach encompassed more than repression or the responsibility of police officers, but also included supervision, cleaning, and repairing of public property. The hot spot approach, a combination of prevention, repression, physical and social measures directed at some of the most dangerous areas ('hot spots') in the city was an equal part of the safety approach.

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The 'city marines' were a new measure to help improve safety. The concept derived from the idea that, like the military, the best men – the marines – should not be held back high in the municipal organisation, but should be on the forefront. Based on this idea, the board selected and appointed five city marines. They were given a large budget and good salaries, but worked on 'street level' to solve implementation and coordination problems regarding safety. They were given – and today retain – direct access to the mayor and aldermen to speed up policy processes. Most city marines were given responsibility for a specific area within Rotterdam in order to improve its position on the safety index, or they were responsible for a specific concern, such as youth, throughout the entire city.

Besides safety, the other four priorities in the board programme were housing, education and youth, economic development, and integration. Goals within the priorities included building 3,000 houses each year, improving the quality of schools, decreasing the number of students dropping out, encouraging more entrepreneurship, and increasing the number of Dutch integration courses and people that attend them. Safety goals within those priorities included preventing illegal construction and housing activities, increasing safety in business and shopping districts, and increasing attendance at schools by enforcement (Rotterdam 2002c: 25).

6.2.3.   *Setting the standard: zero tolerance and interference 'behind the front door'*

After 2002, the Five Year Safety Action Programme would be implemented as soon as possible, since the board was eager to quickly show some initial results in what was now rapidly reformulated as *its* safety approach. Activities included the 'youth and safety chart' (providing insight in criminality of youth until the age of 24), school safety programmes, caring communities (long term prevention strategy), support groups (integral approaches for certain groups), drug registration programmes, anti-violence strategies, more public transport supervision, and 'summer approaches' (actions regarding drugs in the summer months).

Nevertheless, the safety approach after 2002 was not only characterised by speeding up the implementation of the FYSAP but also by implementing a 'zero tolerance' approach enforcing existing laws and regulations to the fullest. Many of the measures leading up to such policy were under construction during the start of the new safety approach or were available (not obstructed by national law or regulations), but just never applied (see 'Rotterdam's 'zero tolerance' policy 2002-2006' for an oversight of some of the most striking measures).

Rotterdam's 'zero tolerance' policy 2002-2006

The Local Ordinance (*Algemeen Plaatselijke Verordening*) of Rotterdam was adjusted to give police more authority to firmly control nuisances on the street, such as alcohol use and loitering (interview civil servant). According to a local vicar working with drug addicts, this was exactly what happened (interview). Also the police noticed that many drug addicts moved to other cities (NRT November 2003: 3). The use of camera supervision and preventive frisking increased. Camera supervision started during the European Football Championship in 2000 and by 2005, 1,200 cameras were active (Rotterdam 2006a: 44). Preventive frisking started in the fall of 2002 in a few Rotterdam areas and by the end of 2005, more than 40,000 people had been frisked and 10,000 cars had been searched (Rotterdam 2006a: 43-44; Rotterdam police 20/3/2006).[17] Another visible measure was supervision. By the end of 2003, every subway or tramline had its own conductor again. Teams consisting of police, the City Supervision Service, and private security provided extra supervision in some of the most dangerous parts of the city. The City Supervision Service expanded from 650 to 1000 persons (NRT May 2002). A list was made of people who exploited renters, meaning for instance those who overcharged illegal immigrants who were often housed in overcrowded conditions. Collecting unpaid taxes and fines provided the municipality with 1.3 million Euros (Rotterdam 2005b: 62). Cooperation with energy companies and other organisations formed the basis of a strong approach to dismantle marijuana plantations. In the district of Charlois, in six days' time, 16 plantations with a total value of about half a million Euros were dismantled (Rotterdam 2006j). In 2005, a total of 285 marijuana plantations were dismantled all over Rotterdam. There was extra control on bars and restaurants and especially bell shops (places to make cheap long distance calls). In the beginning of 2006, 40 of the 200 bell shops were closed (Rotterdam 2006a: 44). Some entrances to multiple dwellings were sealed with a steel door to prevent entering, loitering, or drug trade. In the city district of Charlois alone, by the end of 2005, 147 steel doors were installed (Rotterdam 2005b: 61). The board also did not tolerate people creating a nuisance, and force was explicitly included as a way to deal with it. The 'personal approaches' such as a recovery treatment or a judicial process were developed between 2001 and 2006 to deal with offenders (NRT January 2002) including drug addicts and illegal immigrants. The board had the authority to place the individuals causing the most nuisances or engaging in criminal activities in a treatment programme. In such programmes, the possible actions could vary from care and aid to obligatory treatment and detention. According to the board, by the end of 2005, 719 addicts had been through such a three-month project and 28 illegal immigrants were deported (Rotterdam 2006b: 57). A tougher approach was also visible regarding the welfare distribution. When distributing welfare became a responsibility of the municipalities in 2004, Rotterdam established projects to connect the distribution of welfare to the performance of (voluntary) work. Not participating could lead to a reduction or ending of welfare payments (e.g. NRT September 2004: 3).

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[17] According to one interviewee, preventive frisking had already started before 2002.

Rotterdam installed a firmer approach to public nuisances. But this action was not limited to the public sphere. Between 2002 and 2006, government interfered in citizens' personal lives as well. When the prostitution zone *Keileweg* was closed, the municipality sent letters to people's homes whose cars had been spotted there. Even more confrontational were the intervention teams (*interventieteams*) by which local government literally passed through peoples' front doors.

The intervention teams started as a pilot project in 2001 when a policeman was asked to develop a project to deal with problems in one of the most disadvantaged Rotterdam neighbourhoods. The intervention teams, consisting of civil servants and police officers, visited homes in certain streets or neighbourhoods where they believed to find disruptive people, engaging in criminal activities, or needing help. After asking permission to enter people's homes, the team checked the dwelling and its residents for unlawful activities such as illegal occupation or not having the right papers to live in the Netherlands. Besides this, the team also tried to provide assistance. It directed residents to institutions such as welfare or government assistance programmes that could help them improve their current situation or to make them aware of sport facilities (Cornelissen, Tops 2006).

Between 2002 and 2006, the intervention teams reached many residents within the city. In 2004, over 1,750 dwellings were visited. In 2005, 4,300 dwellings were visited and in over 3,800 of them, the intervention teams had reported some form of trouble. The intervention team approach led to heated debates in the municipal council and the media. Opponents argued that the approach was discriminatory, because the teams only visited poor neighbourhoods and invaded people's privacy. They also claimed that the teams intimidated residents by arriving at people's doors in a large group including a policeman (in uniform). The residents (who often hardly spoke any Dutch), felt like they had no choice but to let the team enter while in fact the team could only enter when explicitly given permission. Between 2002 and 2006 there was only one legal case against the intervention team and the municipality (eventually) won (Cornelissen, Tops 2006: 26-27).

The board and the Liveable Rotterdam aldermen actively encouraged this repressive strategy. The media made several reports on what was labelled the 'Rotterdam Approach' (*Rotterdamse Aanpak*), focusing on eye-catching tactics such as the city marines and the intervention teams. Even though the board did not stop social measures (see further on), the board did not mind that the focus was on repressive action.

> If you do nothing... something will only end up in the newspaper occasionally, people will hardly care, nothing happens... When you stick your neck out, you encounter resistance and thus a profile emerges (interview former alderman).

6.2.4.   Care and repression

The fact that the media and several board members especially focused on the repressive side did not mean that care and prevention were ignored. For instance, between 2002 and 2006 a system called the 'Local Care Network' (*Lokaal Zorgnetwerk*) was implemented throughout the city for people who could not be helped by 'first line aid' (1,336 clients in 2005) (Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006), a long-term stay institution was opened, housing 20 to 25 people with chronic psychiatric problems in hoping to provide them with better lives, and care institutions were being established for drug-addicted prostitutes. Some prevention measures were visible to the larger public, such as burglary prevention campaigns or private security in shopping areas.

The most obvious repressive cases had a care component. Besides checking for illegal activities, the intervention teams also tried to help people in need. This combination of prevention, care, and repression was also visible in two of the city's largest projects between 2002 and 2006. The first was the closing of the city's *Keileweg* prostitution zone. Many of the prostitutes working there were addicted to drugs and the *Keileweg* had been nationally infamous for years. The second was the closure of the St Paul's Church (*Pauluskerk*) of vicar Visser, a place where drug-addicted homeless people could find shelter and use drugs.

In both cases, the new board's tough approach was clearly visible. The years before the closure of the *Keileweg* in 2005, the zone was put under strict surveillance. The opening hours were slowly limited and civil servants gathered information on car movements, the women working, and the women who had not been spotted for some time. They even worked on a method to measure the number of sexual activities that took place (interview civil servant). After the *Keileweg* was closed in September 2005, the board instituted harsh penalties for people who continued to look for prostitutes there. And when there were rumours that some prostitutes had moved to work in other cities, civil servants were sent to The Hague to check if it were 'Rotterdam' prostitutes. Regarding St Paul's Church, it was, according to the board, a newspaper article that addressed the board to the drug trade there. The board therefore decided to close the church. In both cases, however, care accompanied these measures. The board designated parts of the city where shelters for the ex-prostitutes would be located so they could be treated for addictions. The board also provided alternative shelter for the homeless to replace St Paul's Church. This aid however was not always voluntarily. According to the Liveable Rotterdam safety alderman (who combined safety and care in her portfolio), obligatory treatment for the ex-prostitutes was justified. While the alderman said she was not opposed to prostitution, she considered that the women working at the *Keileweg* were forced into prostitution by their drug addiction. This meant they did not become prostitutes voluntarily and thus obligatory treatment was justified (e.g. Vrij Nederland 14/1/2006). It was a line of thinking that was becoming more widespread, first and foremost in the safety approach.

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6.2.5.   Integration, social cohesion, and Islam

The media focused on Rotterdam intensively. A national newspaper installed a 'Rotterdam page' and another newspaper created its own Rotterdam correspondent (Tops 2007). It seemed that everyone was curious to find out how Fortuyn's viewpoints would turn out in this first 'test case' of governing responsibility. People especially focused on Fortuyn's controversial stands on immigration, integration, and Islam. It was thus to some a surprise that the political coalition accord and board programme were rather quiet regarding those themes. Both documents mainly focused on the word 'respect' in the way that people should behave towards each other. The board programme contained concrete measures to enhance social cohesion and to get citizens actively involved in their community. These projects were not always voluntarily, but nevertheless did not seem to resemble Fortuyn's strong stands on the subjects of immigration, integration, and Islam (Rotterdam 2002c: 33).

The first project to enhance social cohesion was a familiar one: *Opzoomeren* (see section 4.2.2). In the 2002 board programme, the board announced that the number of streets participating in this project should increase from 900 in 2002 to 1600 in 2006. According to researchers, this project changed from one strongly aimed at social cohesion to a project more directed to restore order in public spaces (Uitermark, Duyvendak 2008: 1498). The same was the case for the City Etiquette project, started in 1999 (Uitermark, Duyvendak 2008: 1497). The City Etiquette encouraged citizens to make agreements among themselves about organising activities and adopting manners. Between 2002 and 2006, the number of streets where its inhabitants had made such agreements should increase from 0 to 250. Another project was to increase the number of streets where long-lasting agreements were made regarding the care for the public space from 0 in 2002 to 150 in 2006. The board also wanted to increase the percentage of employees from societal organisations who would participate in a programme to represent and promote 'central values and norms' from 0 in 2002 to 70% in 2006. The last project was one in which civil servants in parts of the city tried to promote a 'street agenda' for residents, including greeting each other or organising street activities together.

Addressing issues such as integration or Islam more directly after 2002 initially took place mainly ad-hoc. Several Liveable Rotterdam councilmen or aldermen made remarks or proposed ideas that included the obligation to speak Dutch in mosques, installing a maximum height for minarets on mosques, or to prohibit speaking Turkish or Moroccan in municipal services (interview service director). Such remarks, however, seldom led to policy changes, and over the years this led to unease among members of Liveable Rotterdam.

> You cannot sit in a representative body with seventeen of Pim Fortuyn's seats and then do nothing about integration (Pastors 2006: 73).

In 2003, the Rotterdam research agency (*COS*) released a report that predicted that the overwhelming majority of certain areas in Rotterdam in 2017 would consist of people from a non-Dutch background (COS 2003). A district alderman from the Labour Party used the report to publicly address the socioeconomic problems in his district and said that the city should mandate a maximum number of disadvantaged newcomers entering the city (RD 1/8/2003). This district alderman separated the socioeconomic situation from ethnicity, but that issue was included when Liveable Rotterdam took it over and alderman Pastors opted for a moratorium on immigration by 'disadvantaged people from a foreign origin' (RD 22/8/2003). This quickly led to a public discussion focusing on whether or not there should be a maximum of people from foreign origin in the city. According to a national news network survey, a majority of Rotterdam inhabitants were in favour of such a limit (RTL 23/8/2003). The board responded by installing a committee to develop a report to understand what the demographic development noted by the Rotterdam research agency entailed for the city. The report appeared in December 2003 and was called 'Rotterdam Presses On: The Way to a Balanced City' (*Rotterdam Zet Door. Op weg naar een stad in balans* [Rotterdam 2003]). It contained proposals combining measures regarding migration, settlement, and integration. Some of the measures stirred controversy, especially the requirement that a person must earn 120% of the minimum wage to settle in certain Rotterdam neighbourhoods. Besides such repressive measures, there were also preventive measures such as 'Welcome to Rotterdam' (*Welkom in Rotterdam*), a project that tried to introduce new Rotterdam inhabitants to the city by connecting them with settled Rotterdam citizens. Another proposal was to provide subsidies for entrepreneurs who decided to start a business in one of the more disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

The report also led to a national law. On January 1, 2006, the 'Special Measures Law on Metropolitan Problems' (*Wet bijzondere maatregelen grootstedelijke problematiek*) became active. Outside of (and especially inside) Rotterdam this law was known as the 'Rotterdam Law'. This law made some of the measures in Rotterdam Presses On possible. Among other things, it was now possible to lower taxes for businesses, easily close buildings where there were disturbances, and (if approved by the secretary of state) to demand that newcomers in certain neighbourhoods have an 'income from work' (AD 17/2/2006; Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006: 219).

The topic of integration and Islam remained on the public agenda. In 2005, Rotterdam organised the 'Islam Debates' (*Islamdebatten*), eight public gatherings about the role of the Islam. The debates dealt with themes such as the role of women, homosexuality, separation between church and state, education, and the economic situation. Liveable Rotterdam, more specifically alderman Pastors, used these debates to define his role of Islam critic. During the first Islam debate, Pastors and faction chairman Sørensen defended the statement: 'the fear of Muslims is justified'. Other politicians at the debate and the overwhelming part of the visitors opposed that statement. According to Pastors, most other politicians did not dare to address problems surrounding the integration of immigrants. By that time, Pastors' opinion on this topic was well known. In 2003, he wanted no more new immigrants to enter Rotterdam and in the

beginning of 2005, he warned that Islamic law might be implemented in some Rotterdam districts if Islamic parties with 'some idiots of the Green Party' come to power.

> I said to Pim [Fortuyn] once that he should talk about integration. But when he was gone, I thought: who will explain the people that there are problems all over the world with the way Islam is brought into practice? (Pastors 2006: 73)

In November 2005, Pastors was quoted in a small parochial magazine talking about the fact that Muslims often use their religion as an excuse for criminal behaviour. It reached the local press and Pastors received a lot of criticism and was forced to resign as alderman. Pastors later that same evening declared on national TV that he was the victim of 'old politics'. According to him, the affair showed that it was still impossible to talk freely about all subjects even when there was support among citizens to do so. A few weeks later, when Pastors was officially elected as Liveable Rotterdam leader for the 2006 municipal council election and thereby officially stepped in Pim Fortuyn's footsteps, he repeated this message.

> The last couple of weeks showed we are still needed. While other parties in Rotterdam politics now for years have talked about the fact that safety has passed and the taboo on talking about integration and Islam has disappeared, they showed, with exception of the Liberal Party that the taboo as well as old politics is still there… Where the old political parties hoped that after the [2006] election we would be obsolete, it seems the upcoming election is about what it was about in 2002. Does this city wants to hold its chin up and deal with the problems or do we bow our heads, close our mouths, and look away from the problems? (LR 2005).

Nevertheless, by that time, the negative aspects of the multicultural society were more publicly discussed, also in policy and policymaking. Besides Rotterdam Presses On, the problems regarding Antillean immigrants was the explicit topic of a Rotterdam conference in January 2006. During the conference, it was agreed to implement an extra 'personal approach' for disruptive Antilleans. An 'Action Programme Antillean Approach' (*Actieprogramma Antilliaanse Aanpak*) was put together, and a city marine for Antillean problems was appointed. The new policy dictated that every Antillean from school age to 35 years of age must be either employed, in school, or in a judiciary programme (Rotterdam 2006b: 11).

> The report Rotterdam Presses On is a good illustration of the ideological turnabout in the Netherlands. This report presented a vision on migrants that would five years ago, even in Rotterdam, be unacceptable (Van Praag 2004: 58-59).

6.2.6. *Maintaining the safety approach for the future*

In 2004, the first texts for the second Five Year Safety Action Programme (2006-2010) were written (FYSAP II). The FYSAP II was called 'Working Together on Safety: Preventing and Maintaining' (*Samen werken aan veilig: voorkomen en handhaven*). It contained a clear distinction between the territorial and personal approach. In comparison to the first FYSAP, which mainly formed an announcement of measures, the FYSAP II contains a large oversight of all instruments at the city's disposal to deal with safety problems (Rotterdam 2005b).

The broad range in which the safety approach expanded became clear in the focus points of the FYSAP II, which included supervision; intervention, and maintenance; improving the quality of the public spaces; preventing the development of new 'hot spots'; fostering active citizenship; safe entrepreneurship and safe public transport; dealing with disadvantaged neighbourhoods; drug nuisance and multiple offenders; violence; youth nuisance and youth criminality; addressing after care and prevention; women and safety; integration and radicalisation.

According to the FYSAP II, a continuation of the Rotterdam safety approach was necessary, and at the same time enforcements should be made: the methods would have to be integrated in the regular procedures and activities of all partners, the municipal services should start to work more on demand, the role of the municipal districts as directors of the safety approach should be strengthened, and the maintenance and update of information databases should be enforced. Repression still remained important, but would be accompanied by maintenance and prevention. And moreover, Rotterdam citizens should be more involved (Rotterdam 2005b).

6.2.7. *Summary*

Safety was Rotterdam's most important priority between 2002 and 2006, and the board sped up the implementation of the Five Year Safety Action Programme and initiated a zero-tolerance approach. The combination of repression and care that characterised the safety approach – even though repression was most visible – also underlay the new social projects and immigration policy. After the report Rotterdam Presses On, problems regarding people of non-Dutch origin were discussed more in the open, such as at the 'Antillean Conference'. At the close of the 2002-2006 legislative period, Liveable Rotterdam alderman Pastors became an especially strong critic of integration practices and Islam.

6.3. Coalition

6.3.1. Introduction

This part of the chapter is devoted to the actors and institutions responsible for up-holding and implementing Rotterdam's (safety) agenda. It also analyses how governmental and non-governmental actors indirectly involved in the safety agenda related to it. Since involving citizens in decision-making was one of the themes of Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam's 2002 political agenda, the role of citizens is given particular attention in section 6.3.5.

6.3.2. Replacing the Labour Party

In March 2002, Liveable Rotterdam received almost 35% of all votes in the municipal council election. It thereby replaced the Labour Party as the largest party in the municipal council, a historical turnaround (see table 5 in section 4.3.3). But perhaps even more noteworthy is that the Labour Party was also not part of the political coalition formed after the election. The new political coalition, with a majority of seats in the municipal council, was formed by cooperation between Liveable Rotterdam, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. Unlike Liveable Rotterdam, these latter two parties had had experience on the board. The Liberal Party had been a consistent part of it since 1986, the Christian Democratic Party since 1990. However, this had always been in cooperation with the Labour Party, the largest coalition partner. In 2002, these two parties joined in a political coalition and board with not only a different party, but with one that was established only several months earlier and had a strong antipathy towards the Labour Party.

After the three political parties chose aldermen that would represent their parties, the new municipal board of mayor and aldermen presented itself in April 2002. From the previous 1998-2002 board, mayor Opstelten, alderman Van der Tak (Christian Democratic Party), and alderman Janssens (Liberal Party) continued, both with a new second alderman for their party (Bolsius for the Christian Democratic Party and Hulman for the Liberal Party). There were three Liveable Rotterdam aldermen: Wim van Sluis (Fortuyn's old accountant), Rabella de Faria (a black 'businesswoman of the year' who knew Fortuyn from Liveable Netherlands), and Marco Pastors. All three Liveable Rotterdam aldermen had worked in the private sector and had no political experience.

6.3.3. The safety coalition

The central actor in the Rotterdam safety approach was mayor Opstelten. Like all Dutch mayors, Opstelten possessed legal authority regarding safety and maintaining public order. Together with the district attorney and the chief of police for the Rotterdam region (which is larger than the municipality of Rotterdam) he formed the so called 'local triangle', a formal meeting in which coordination of Rotterdam safety policy and public order problems is discussed. As mayor of the largest city in the re-

gion, a Rotterdam mayor is also part of the 'regional triangle' on behalf of the entire region and not just Rotterdam.

The police were happy with the new municipal board's efforts invested in safety after 2002. They saw it as the confirmation from the municipal board that even though it was their core task, the police could not solve safety problems alone and efforts from the police should be aided by municipal efforts.

> Safety was more than the police. Safety was also clean and intact. Clean, intact, and safe, that approach, where all parties cooperate to improve the liveability in the city, I honestly have wanted that for years (police chief cited in NRC 28/2/2004).

Another leading police officer called the 2002 election results (after which safety becomes the main priority) a finalisation of the police's internal reorganisation, an 'external legitimisation' and 'almost a gift of God' (interview). The district attorney's office also contributed to the municipal goal to improve safety, thereby overcoming a classical view within the district attorney organisation that you should not be too heavily involved in municipal policy.

> The former chairman had very classical views. There was no room to develop a more managerial approach towards drug plantations. That was simply criminal law. And besides the priority of multiple offenders, there was no room to also lock up Rotterdam nuisance-causers… But this district attorney has adjusted its priorities to what was going on [in Rotterdam]… You always have multiple views within a district attorney: the traditional versus the more societal engaged. Here, the latter is more dominant… Deal with youth and other problems together [with police and the municipality]. That is firmly integrated in our thinking (interview district attorney employee).

The chiefs of police and district attorney's office participated in the Safety Steering Group (SSG). The SSG was not obliged by law, but created in Rotterdam for practical reasons. It had already existed under mayor Peper, but now received more tasks by becoming responsible for the implementation of the Five Year Safety Action Programme (2001) and the safety targets in the board programme (2002). For this reason, the frequency of the SSG meetings increased from every two weeks to once a week. Between 2002 and 2006, it consisted of the mayor (chairman), the safety manager (secretary), the safety advisor, the alderman for safety, the alderman for neighbourhoods and public space, the chief of police, and the district attorney chief. Civil servants were also present, mainly as advisor and/or to take notes.

The SSG kept a close eye on the progress and development of the safety approach, mainly the achievement of the targets set in the 2002 board programme. When a certain target was lagging or the SSG heard that safety was not improving somewhere, it

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summoned municipal service directors, city marines, policemen, and/or district chairmen to explain and account for this.

> In the Steering Group, people from the field, people that do the work, tell what they have noted, what they see, and how things according to them can improve (interview safety manager).

There was often harsh questioning in the Steering Group meetings and the mayor was especially tough. Most people in the mayor's surrounding knew about this.

> If you do not have your story straight, you get your ass kicked. The power of the Steering Group was that you go there with sweaty palms… And that works, because crap stories were being shattered. Every time, it was performing on the edge… [Mayor] Opstelten never weakens (interview safety manager).

After this interrogation, the SSG took decisions on how to proceed. Technically of course the SSG could not make decisions. This was – apart from some exclusive mayoral tasks – up to the municipal board. But in practice the board left decisions regarding safety up to the decision-making process of the SSG that included the mayor, who, as chairman, occupied a dominant position within it.

> The board of course decides in the end, but when it has been through the Steering Group, it needs a smart guy to change it. When it is approved by Opstelten and the Steering Group: done… It only happened once or twice that we thought 'oh, failed in the board' (interview safety manager).

In this way, the almost exclusive decision-making power of the board's main priority was in the hands of a non formal body: the Safety Steering Group, a cooperation of the municipality, the police, and district attorney, chaired by the Rotterdam mayor, a non-elected politician.

> The city is governed by the 'Opstelten Party'. He has the strongest hold on new policy. If Opstelten gets hold of something, he does not let go. He sits on it with his entire weight (councilman Kneepkens cited in AD 3/8/2002).

6.3.4.   *Governmental actors*

The board needed the participation of other actors to implement the safety programme. The municipal council had to approve important board documents. The services were needed to implement board policy, and the districts were the sub-local 'coordinators' of the safety approach. The national government was needed to implement some measures from 'Rotterdam Presses On'.

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After the Dutch parliamentary election in May 2002, a new political coalition was formed out of the same/similar parties as the Rotterdam coalition: the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and Fortuyn's national party, 'Pim Fortuyn's List' (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*). The Christian Democrat Jan-Peter Balkenende became the new Dutch prime minister.

Fortuyn, who was mainly engaged in his national campaign in the months before the national election, did not witness his party being part of this political coalition. One week before the national election, he was murdered. This political murder created great unrest in the entire country. Several people gathered at the *Binnenhof*, the place where the national government resides and shouted that politicians, mainly from the Labour Party and Green Party, were responsible for Fortuyn's death. In Rotterdam, Fortuyn's murder led to public tumult (see section 6.5.3).

Without its leader, Fortuyn's national party was characterised by internal conflicts and, in October 2002, the national political coalition fell apart. It stayed in power until a new election in January 2003. In this election, Fortuyn's party fell from 17% of the votes (28 seats out of 150) to 5.7% (8 seats) and the Liberal Democratic Party (*D66*) replaced Fortuyn's party in the political coalition and national cabinet, meaning the board of secretaries of state that govern the country on a day-to-day basis.[18]

The 2002 cabinet (as well as the consequent years' cabinets), expressed sympathy for the political coalition and board in Rotterdam. In the spring of 2002, national Christian Democratic party leader (and later prime minister) Balkenende was optimistic about the coalition that was taking shape in Rotterdam. He declared that, despite of Fortuyn's harsh proclamations, cooperation was possible and could result in a 'mature [coalition] agreement' (Oosthoek 2005: 166). As prime minister, Balkenende visited Rotterdam on several occasions, once to attend the final Islam Debate in 2005. Balkenende's national cabinet(s) and the Rotterdam board also shared some similarities. Both coalitions did not include the Labour Party, from which both of them kept some (ideological) distance, and both shared a focus on safety problems and implementation (see section 6.4.5). Later in 2002, the cabinet presented the document 'Towards a Safer Society' (*Naar een veiliger samenleving*), which proposed better control in the (semi-) public realm, more authority for police and municipalities, and a stronger enforcement of rules and regulations (Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops 2007; Van den Brink 2006).

In 2004, national government responded to the report Rotterdam Presses On (see section 6.2.5), which was partly meant as an agenda for national government. Such a concrete address from a municipality to national government was very rare, but to the surprise of many, the national cabinet responded quickly and sympathetically. The

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[18] In the parliamentary election in 2006, Fortuyn's national list would only achieve 0.26% of the votes, meaning not a single parliamentary seat.

cabinet even announced that it would quickly design and implement a new law that would give municipalities the ability to deal with several of the problems addressed in Rotterdam Presses On. Because it was clearly based on the demand of a single municipality, this law, which came into effect in 2006, was considered unique. During a conference in 2006, mayor Opstelten and one of the secretaries of state complimented each other. They considered the 'Rotterdam Law' a good example of how different Dutch government levels should cooperate. Referring to Rotterdam's city marines, the secretary of state even offered to function as a 'state marine' for municipalities.

The municipal council and the political parties

The days and weeks after the March 2002 election, politicians in most established parties were very confused and frustrated. 'Rotterdam has gone mad' or the voter 'betrayed us', declared a Liberal councilman. According to the Christian Democratic Party chairman, 'grim history' had been written (RD 7/3/2002). Another councilman hoped the party would fall on its own sword (RD 7/3/2002). According to Labour Party candidate councilman Van Muijen, it was a disgrace and the voters were dumb (RD 8/3/2002). Labour Party leader Kuijper said the election result was based on sentiments and not results. She asked 'How will this city go on?' (Chorus, De Galan 2002: 185).

The antipathy between Liveable Rotterdam and several other parties, especially the Labour Party, did not immediately or completely disappear between 2002 and 2006. In April, 2002, after Green Party alderman Meijer referred to Fortuyn's remark that Islam was a 'backward culture' by using the term to describe the views from a certain 'Fortuyn supporter', most Liveable Rotterdam councilmen left the room in disgust. In a municipal council meeting four years later, Sørensen said he still did not like to use the words 'Fortuyn' and 'Labour Party' in the same sentence (personal observation, municipal council meeting 16/2/2006). Nevertheless, there was also some release of tensions between 2002 and 2006 as the councilmen of both parties began to know one another.

> A council committee has a trip; you talk with some people; that nuances the image both sides have about each other along the way;... the drapes that were closed from both sides carefully lift again (councilman and former alderman Kombrink cited in Oosthoek 2005: 228).

Most Liveable Rotterdam councilmen in 2002 lacked political experience. It took them some time before they learned the formal rules of the political and municipal council game. The party had also hired a mental coach to help them. A journalist who interviewed the Liveable Rotterdam councilmen noted their diversity of views. They all had their reasons to become a councilman candidate and many of them thought they would never actually be elected.

> One [candidate councilman] who lays awake at night because of the Islamic rise stands against another that has no problem with that, but is terribly annoyed by junkies, homeless people and beggars whatever religion they uphold. A third fully hates the Labour Party while a fourth says that the Social Democrat can also be a good guy with whom working together is quite well possible (Van Westerloo 2003: 278-279).

This diverse team of people now entered the municipal council. They had something in common: their support for Fortuyn and a dislike of the 'current way of doing politics'.

> Harry Borst sends all documents back that he cannot read. Joanna Brand gets terribly annoyed by the pile of reading she has to go through when she opens her front door. And faction chairman Ronald Sørensen gets awfully irritated by the 'political bullshit'. He calls Labour Party colleague Cremers the biggest 'pencil pusher' of all (Van Westerloo 2003: 283).

In the system of Dutch local government, the municipal council has to approve, by a majority of votes, all of the board's important proposals. The municipal board therefore counts on stable factions in the council, mainly the factions of 'their' political parties, in this case meaning the factions of Liveable Rotterdam, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. As a new and inexperienced party, this was especially difficult for Liveable Rotterdam, but faction leader Sørensen did everything he could to keep the faction together, even though after Fortuyn's death, this task seemed even harder.

> The most important thing for me is that this board – Pim's board – performs well for four years, and preferably four years after that (Sørensen cited in ANP 18/9/2003).

However, Sørensen could not prevent several members of Liveable Rotterdam from leaving the faction and continuing as independent councilmen. By September 2003, the political coalition could therefore no longer count on a majority in the municipal council from their own parties. Nevertheless, the board did not face many difficulties there.

> We did not have trouble from the municipal council because we were so firm ourselves… Sometimes we benefited from it, sometimes we just observed what happened and went our way (interview alderman).

Most of the time, the support of several independent councilmen provided a majority, but more noteworthy was that the Labour Party supported the municipal board's safety policy on significant issues, such as approving the Second Five Year Safety Action Programme in 2005. After 2002, it took the Labour Party some time to recover from the electoral result. After the election, councilman Cremers replaced Kuijper as

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party leader and became faction chairman in the municipal council. Despite many of the Labour Party members' initial reactions, the electoral results were also interpreted as a wake-up call. According to the faction chairman, he realised after 2002 that safety was not necessarily a 'rightist' theme, but one that included social issues and should be actively pursued by government (interview). He and the other Labour Party council-men did not accept a strategy of disproving everything the board or Liveable Rotter-dam proposed. Their strategy was to beat them at their own game, sometimes to the chagrin of other Labour Party members.

> [Cremers] raised eyebrows with a 'twelve point programme' with many far-reaching measures to decrease criminality and deprivation. Many party members were upset with his plea to temporarily not house asylum seekers in Rotterdam. Another year later, he was attacked by the Cape Verdean community after the Labour Party released a report about sexual intimidation and incest within that community (Volkskrant 8/5/2006).

Regarding safety policy, on several occasions the Labour faction in the municipal council suggested improvements and questioned whether the board was doing enough. In the summer of 2004, several Labour Party councilmen presented the plan 'Enduring Safety in Rotterdam' (*Blijvend Veilig in Rotterdam*). It indicated the change the Labour Party was seeking.

> Safety in our city is evolving in the right direction. The previous board noted in 2001 that safety was not improving. A decision was taken regarding a Five Year Safety Programme and the development of a safety index. Since then, voters placed safety on top of the political agenda, the police are at full force again, and the current board invested in safety policy. And it worked. In 2004, we are in better shape than we were in 2001. The governmental grip on the safety situation is improving… The loss of confidence in government affected our party more than any other. For many Rotterdam citizens, the Labour Party was the government's face. Was Labour not responsible for all changes in the city, such as the high construction in the city centre, the *Kop van Zuid*, and the Erasmus Bridge, but also the drug nuisance in *Delfshaven*, criminal activity in the centre, and the lack of integration of newcomers? For this, the voters have punished the Labour Party during the latest municipal election. And we have learned our lessons. Since then, we worked hard at restoring trust. Also regarding safety… Now, two years later, we have to make the balance and elaborate on what has to happen to institutionalise the careful recovery of safety in our city. To make clear that safety in the city is and will be in good hands with the Labour Party (LP 2004).

This support from the Labour Party regarding safety policy strongly enhanced the board's support for safety policy in the municipal council. The Labour Party also approved the Rotterdam Law, because, as a Labour Party councilman said, the demand to earn at least 120% of the minimum wage to settle in certain neighbourhoods had

been replaced by the less strict 'income from work' demand (AD 17/2/2006). The opposition was thereby mainly reduced to several small opposition parties: the Green Party (three municipal council seats), the Liberal Democratic Party (two municipal council seats), the City Party (one municipal council seat), and the Socialist Party (one municipal council seat). The Socialist Party and Green Party were very critical of the board regarding the tough and repressive approach with little attention for social issues. These parties however played a marginal role in Rotterdam politics and in the municipal council due to their low number of representatives.

Only the Green Party, the Socialist Party, and an independent councilman opposed the second Five Year Safety Action Programme (FYSAP II), which was presented in December 2005. The FYSAP II was meant to give the outline for the safety approach until 2010. The discussion focused on certain aspects of the approach as developed in previous years. This included the ban on begging, the repressive measures, the approach for Antillean youth, and the necessity of preventive frisking. The main coalition parties and the Labour Party however did not question (the necessity of) the general approach. Green Party leader Kaya was against the repressive measures especially when they seemed to conflict with privacy. 'It is not our safety policy… We think totally differently about safety. That is why we will vote against' (municipal council meeting 15/12/2005). The independent councilman agreed with this. Socialist Party leader Cornelissen also voted against the FYSAP II, saying that while he was not against a tough safety policy, he was against 'exclusion', which he felt (part of) the programme entailed (municipal council meeting 15/12/2005). A large majority in the municipal council thus approved the FYSAP II.

> *Interviewer*: It is remarkable that there already is a new safety plan, before a new board.
> *Mayor*: Continuity is important. The former board also had a plan for the current board. Or better, a 'programme' that is less vague. Now there is a new safety programme for the next five years. A new board can sharpen it, but I expect continuity.
> *Interviewer*: A new board cannot ignore it?
> *Mayor*: No, that is impossible (NRT February 2006).

The municipal services

Several civil servants suggested that the victory of Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam was a denunciation of how Rotterdam was governed and therefore a discrediting of their functioning as well (interviews). There was scepticism when it turned out that Liveable Rotterdam would be part of the board. Would this lead to large dismissals (e.g. Volkskrant 24/4/2002; 6/3/2003)? After all, Fortuyn said that many civil servants were not needed. Several now feared that Liveable Rotterdam was in fact a radical party and that Fortuyn's remarks regarding Islam or ethnic minorities might lead to a discriminatory policy they could not support. The death of Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 added to the uncertainty of things to come. The election results prompted some

municipal services to organise group meetings to discuss the election result. In some cases, it was known that people reacted very emotionally, even crying (interviews).

It soon turned out that large-scale reorganisations or personnel reductions did not take place. There were some replacements, but most only gradually and in the top management. If the Liveable Rotterdam aldermen did encounter unwilling civil servants, their attitude was to go around them.

> Many civil servants… seemed to think, 'Well, what does an election result matter?' We do our job well for years now, so we will continue in the same way… [After giving an example of meeting such a civil servant] I did not argue with him and immediately thought 'okay, then it has to be done without you' (Pastors 2006: 69-70).

Pastors also bypassed the top of his municipal service when he was busy preparing his input for the board programme in the summer of 2002. He wanted two junior civil servants working with him.

> When [Pastors] wanted to realise his part of the board programme, he said to [the directors] 'I want each of you to give me two young civil servants, I supplement that with one myself from city hall, and those five will write my programme. I thus do not want the directors present, because I already know your story and you will say what you always say'. He wanted young civil servants with good knowledge of the city… Those people went and talked to Pastors about what he wanted and they shifted between us, the directors, and the alderman. In that game, we also inserted the hot spots, which was a new thing that really fitted the safety approach (interview municipal service director).

The new board looked for a different and more remote way of interaction with its municipal services. This led some directors of the municipal services to come somewhat closer together.

> In earlier boards, there was an attitude of 'pulling the car together'. Now it was more 'we want this to happen and you will make it possible'. Our management responsibility has become stronger. Instead of sitting on the board's lap, the role division is stricter. We never really knew that in Rotterdam. On one side it might be good, but it also leads to a less protected feeling in the top of the civil service. It also has led to more distance between the civil service and the municipal board (interview municipal service director).

Despite this more businesslike attitude from the board towards the municipal services, the Liveable aldermen quickly noticed they could also benefit from the help of civil servants. For instance, abolishing the long-term building leases, one of Liveable Rotterdam's wishes, went much quicker than expected thanks to the help of the civil ser-

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vice (Pastors 2006: 71-72). And to some of the Liveable Rotterdam aldermen's surprise, bureaucratic obedience nearly always prevailed over (open) resistance. Most civil servants argued that 'you serve who you have to serve'.

> The Labour Party bastion… it was there. But, I just notice it so little. And that worries me. How can it be! How can it be that no one has yet told me: I do not want to do that for you! (Liveable Rotterdam alderman Pastors cited in Van Westerloo 2003: 285).

Many civil servants also saw advantages in the new board and the board's policy and were able and willing to accommodate it or at least parts of it. Under Pastors, the Urban Planning and Housing service almost overnight dropped the neighbourhood approach and instead focused on making sure 3000 houses were built each year (Rotterdam 2002c). This led to mixed feelings within the service. Some regretted the loss of the neighbourhood approach, but others saw opportunities in the new focus.

> It was possible to stand on another leg quickly. Within this service there are of course a lot of people who like to accomplish things. If the one thing is not allowed and there is something else equally enjoyable, then, we will do that. That was with the hot spots, that was with the 3000 homes, et cetera (interview civil servant).

Some civil servants even called the management style of the aldermen refreshing, noting that they had no real political history in Rotterdam and were therefore not bound by other interests.

> I know civil servants who said, I did not vote for you, but I like working for you (interview Liveable Rotterdam alderman).

Some civil servants or (new) municipal service directors even shared the new party's criticism.

> There is a lot of postponed maintenance… Even the most obvious businesses are not arranged well… Some things have a taboo, you cannot even mention them (interview municipal service director).

The municipal services were necessary to implement the board's safety policy. In general they acted according to the board's wishes, especially when the board and thus its agenda proved to be relatively stable. But civil servants from the Safety Bureau that dealt with the services noted a difference in the pace and intensity with which the services complied. A distinction could be made between the social services, the physical services, and the implementation services (see section 4.4.5).

The civil servants from the Safety Bureau complained the most about the participation of the social services. They needed their participation to obtain information or data

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files. It seemed that many employees of these services had a hard time dealing with the repressive character of the safety approach since the new 'caring' and 'helping' orientation of these social services were the reasons they went to work there in the first place. Moreover, many of these services were not used to such direct interference from the municipality or the board. The Health Service board of directors, for instance, included many who had obtained a Ph.D. in medicine. They were somewhat reluctant to give up their professional autonomy and grant municipal civil servants access to medical files (see also Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops 2007). The board wanted the Health service to ensure that '700 addicts' were put in a treatment programme. This was a clear break from the organisation's past goals, which focused more on harm reduction and prevention. The new board's policy also included more attention for a legal and judicial approach. The board appointed a city marine to speed up the internal process and achieve the target. The service director reacted furiously and considered the appointment of the city marine as an indication of distrust. Over the years, tension faded as the city marine performed useful work and one year after his appointment, he even became part of the board of directors of the Health Service.

> It was such a mix of emotions and interests. There was a lot of anger towards the municipal board. That mostly revolved around ideology: it should not solely be about safety, but also about care and sick people. There was a lot of anger towards the municipality that just all of a sudden grabbed direction and told all the institutions what to do. While those institutions have their own autonomous responsibility. But at the same time, everybody in the field was very eager. They saw the opportunities. Extra money was made available (interview municipal service director).

The Social Affairs and Employment Service was also affected by the board's tougher approach. One of that service's most important tasks is to provide welfare to people who need it. The board argued for more restrictions on welfare payments, suggesting that such payments should only go to the people who were entitled to it and that people should be obligated to perform certain tasks in exchange. There was resistance to this shift from people within the service who felt that welfare first of all was a right for citizens and not something that should be accompanied by mandatory tasks. However, several directors, some of them newly appointed, understood that more attention towards repression or doing tasks in exchange for welfare could go hand in hand with providing a better life for those citizens and that more efforts to prevent people from unjustly using these services (e.g. applying for welfare while working on the side) could benefit people who genuinely needed these services.

Physical services, the second category of services, enjoyed an important status within Rotterdam local government for a long time. It helped establish the large infrastructure projects of the 1980s and 1990s (see section 4.2.2). These services often employed highly educated personnel such as architects and urban planners. At first sight they thus appeared to have little to gain with the board's emphasis on safety. Instead, they mainly dealt with the board's housing priority of building 3,000 houses each year.

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However, the safety agenda also affected the physical services. Sub-departments in the services that dealt directly with safety and supervision grew, and several civil servants agreed that apart from financial arguments, safety arguments should influence the decision to buy or sell property.

> At first I had the point of view that we should not have safety as a field of attention. After that, I did consider it part of the service. It is also about another way of thinking. Numerous demolition sites that from a City Development point of view could be maintained for some while, because it is much easier to demolish it all in once [at a later date]… You do not have to be a mathematician to know that this is also cheaper. But from a safety perspective, this of course is a drama, because all the rats of the city crawl into those to be demolished dwellings (interview municipal service director).

There were also some specific safety projects developed for the physical services that after some months or years were incorporated in the service, sometimes after the appointment of some new directors. These municipal services even supported projects such as the 'Hot Spot' approach and 'Safe Entrepreneuring' (*Veilig Ondernemen*) and participated in the intervention teams. This support and enthusiasm could often be traced back to several individual project leaders or municipal service directors.

The third category of services is the implementation services. They were the quickest to comply and to adjust to the new agenda since the motto 'clean, intact, and safe' referred to activities that were already part of their core business (see section 4.4.5). Extra money sometimes made it possible to strengthen efforts. Nevertheless, some people were not easily convinced that safety was an integral part of municipal policy or that the work of the implementation sector was important in contributing to a safer city.

> In the beginning, I said: that was not our area of attention. Whether a brick lays right of crooked, it won't make it safer. A well-placed brick will not result in fewer people carrying a gun… Looking back I thought: it was not completely true. If you have an area where the street looks degraded it reflects in the feelings people have of their surrounding. When the street looks nice, it does have a contribution to the safety-feeling of people in this area. We do play a role, even though it remains a small one (interview municipal service director).

The fact that 'safety' caught on with some directors of municipal services also led to the establishment of the 'Safety Direction Team' (*Directieteam Veilig*). During the development of the board plans in 2002, the idea emerged that several municipal services should each adopt a certain area within the municipality and be responsible for its improvement. Although this idea was eventually dismissed, it led to a continuation of contacts between some municipal service directors or vice-directors who seemed united around the board's new priority of safety (interview safety manager). This

quickly led into a bi-weekly meeting where (vice-)directors from the services of Youth, Education, and Society, Social Affairs and Employment, City Development, Urban Planning and Housing, Public Works, Public Cleaning, City Supervision, Public Transportation, and the Municipal Health Service convened with the safety manager and chiefs from the police and district attorney. The meetings were informal and mainly intended to improve cooperation between the organisations and solve implementation problems between them. A participant gave an example of how this occurred.

> Social Affairs starts telling what they are doing with their unemployed and the targets. The police replied that he had a list of a few hundred people causing nuisance. Would Social Affairs be able to do something with this list? Those people then were summoned to Social Affairs with the announcement 'congratulations, you have a job'. This had not happened to them in twenty years (interview safety manager).

The municipal districts

Until 2002, there was little difference between the political composition of the municipal council and the district councils as the Labour Party was the dominant political party in both. In 2002 this changed as Liveable Rotterdam won the municipal council election, but not the district council elections where it did not participate; finding candidates for the municipal council proved hard and time consuming enough. With the absence of Liveable Rotterdam from the district council elections, the Labour Party and the Green Party won in most of them. The Labour Party took part in ten out of the eleven political coalitions. The Christian Democratic Party took part in eight political coalitions, the Green Party in six, the Liberal Party in two (Havenloods 11/4/2002). This meant that in between 2002 and 2006 there was a clear difference in the political composition between on the one hand the municipal council and board (strong presence of Liveable Rotterdam) and on the other hand the district councils and boards (no presence of Liveable Rotterdam).

Nevertheless, many districts were not opposed to implementing a more thorough safety approach, as they were aware of the safety problems before 2002. But according to several district representatives, they had little support from the then-current municipal board.

> You see at the decentral level that safety for a long time has been part of the election programmes. We started with this in 1994… Signals from within the old neighbourhoods reached us for quite some time. We found out that the unequal stream of people led to tensions and it was by no means only fun, cosy, and colourful… As a local politician or civil servant you were addressed about the local problems and that does not always take place in very diplomatic terms… The problems approach you very intensively and you really feel

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something has to be done. But it just gets stuck in the political culture of the ruling elite (interview Labour Party district chairman).

We'd bond with the devil if that is what it takes to… benefit the people in this area (interview Labour Party district chairman).

Following the 2001 Five Year Safety Action Programme, the districts were set to be 'directors' of neighbourhood safety policy. The board's intensification of the safety approach led to the doubling of the district's safety subsidies. This gave the districts the opportunity to hire a 'safety coordinator' that would coordinate the writing of the neighbourhood safety action programmes (NSAPs). A district on average has five neighbourhoods, which meant that it had to write five NSAPs. The Safety Bureau provided the format of the programmes, which included a sociological and criminological analysis of the neighbourhood (using data from the safety index and citizens' consultation), targets to achieve, and agreements with partners for their achievement. These partners could include municipal services, police, health care institutions, or other (non-)governmental organisations (Rotterdam 2002d).

The districts in general had a dual attitude towards this approach. They appreciated the extra attention and resources for safety and valued the methodical way the Safety Bureau provided.

For instance, neighbourhood mediation; we used to organise this one project at a time. Every time we had to make a 'post' and then had to go through the entire [bureaucratic] route through the district, management team, district board. Now we have included them in the NSAP. We know now why we do mediation. We know the larger picture in which it fits. We know now how many we can handle. We document this and report about it… It leads to less fuzz and overhead (interview district safety coordinator).

Moreover, the districts found out that the safety approach was broader than just repression. Other themes that it previously dealt with under a different label could still be accommodated. It was now called 'safety', which meant it fell within the attention (and extra budget) of the municipal board.

Look. We receive a lot of resources from the safety corner… But if you manage to keep young people out of judicial hands by applying youth care… At this moment, that is safety policy too. It used to be the same, but then under social policy. And well, it does not make much difference (interview district board member).

This narrative becomes clear when looking at the NSAPs the districts wrote between 2002 and 2006. They showed the large domain the safety approach encompassed. The board and Safety Steering Group did not always like the expansion of the approach and were annoyed when it turned out that most districts were not able to write the

NSAPs in time. In addition, they increasingly doubted whether the districts were able to take on the role of neighbourhood safety directors. A report from the local court of audit confirmed that the districts had a hard time getting several actors to comply with their goals, such as the police, which did not adjust their plans to the NSAPs on sub-local level. Cooperation between the districts and the municipal services was somewhat better but still 'varied' (local court of audit 2005a: 115, 123).

While the districts recognised the benefits of the safety approach, they disliked the paternalistic attitude of the Safety Bureau and the Safety Steering Group regarding the approach. In the writing of the NSAPs, the districts (mainly meaning the district safety coordinators) were guided by the Safety Bureau civil servants, who determined if the NSAP was adequate. In the beginning, the Safety Bureau did not allow deviation from the NSAP-format, leading to much dissatisfaction within the districts, which felt that the strict method was becoming more important than the goal.

> 75% of my time I am sending information upwards, 10% of which is useful (interview district safety coordinator).

The dual attitude in the districts regarding the safety approach was also apparent in some of the tools used in this approach, including the safety index and the city marines. Some district politicians emphasised that the safety index provided useful data regarding neighbourhood safety and made suggestions on how this could be improved. Others emphasised how the safety index increased external control. When a neighbourhood showed a low level of safety, the district chairman and a number of civil servants were summoned to the Safety Steering Group to account for this and explain what would be done about it. Many district politicians felt this strongly counteracted the initial idea that the city districts were the directors of the safety approach. The same attitude was visible regarding some districts' relationship with the city marines. The districts, especially in the beginning, saw the appointment of a city marine as an indication of distrust, since a city marine was only accountable to the Safety Steering Group.

> It is noteworthy that at structured times we are pointed towards the feelings of the districts that they in fact implement central safety policy and for this are directed by the Safety Steering Group and the Safety Bureau. The role of the safety index is, according to many districts, too dominant. Also with different districts there is a feeling of lack of appreciation for their role and part in the success of the neighbourhood safety policy, and the appreciation according to them unjustly goes too strongly to the board. It is also noted that the districts are insufficiently kept up-to-date on decisions taken on the central level (local court of audit 2005a: 123).

At the end of 2003, tensions especially regarding the strict NSAP format were at a boiling point and at a conference all of the tension showed. According to a participant, it was not hard to 'make the windows burst out' of the meeting room and the

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meeting ended prematurely (interview). After the conference, some measures were taken to ease the tension. The Safety Bureau reduced some of the demands around the NSAPs and implemented an approach called 'Maintain and Reinforce' (*Vasthouden en Versterken*). The essence of this programme was to direct measures from the NSAPs to the most needy neighbourhoods. The Safety Bureau also made 'Neighbourhood Focuses' (*Wijkfocussen*) that, based on the safety index, showed which strategies could be best put in affect to deal with specific problems. In addition, the NSAPs were not discussed all at once (such as during the conference), but as much as possible one-on-one. This new approach allowed more tailor-made work and slightly eased tensions. Other tactics were also applied.

> Money is a large temptation [for the districts to implement Safety Bureau measures]. [Another is] holding a party once in a while and positively express yourself about the districts. We annually held a safety symposium. All district chairmen, members of the district boards, safety coordinators, and all related to safety, were pampered. In that way, we tried to keep the enthusiasm (interview Safety Bureau civil servant).

Districts also became more aware of the benefits of tools such as the safety index and the city marines. One district chairman even said that he did not mind if the safety index showed that his neighbourhoods were not improving, because this meant that the district was eligible for extra municipal resources. Some district board members thought that the city marines could benefit their districts as they brought political connections and money to achieve things quickly. One district chairman even asked for a city marine in the Safety Steering Group (interviews).

Despite the reduction in tension regarding the safety approach, the board and the districts clashed in 2004 and 2005 over the more general theme of the district system's legitimacy. This clash started with a report of a Labour Party committee that appeared in October 2004 in which the continuation in the current structure of the district system was questioned. The Labour Party itself did not share its committee's conclusions, but Liveable Rotterdam saw an opportunity. In a public debate later that month, Sørensen presented a clear option: abolish the districts (personal observation). Most other party leaders agreed on adaptations, but what these should be, remained less clear. One day after the debate in October 2004, the mayor stated that all parties in the municipal council should come to an agreement on the district system before the next municipal council election. Most political parties followed suit by presenting reports with proposed adaptations and urged the board to present proposals itself.

In a joint report, the districts that were concerned about the direction of the discussion emphasised their strength: the close contact with citizens, the low threshold for citizens, and the intermediate function between (central) city and citizens. Districts were able to provide tailor-made projects to suit citizens' needs. According to the districts, these qualities emphasised the need for strong districts, not their abolishment (VRD 2004).

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The board declared itself in favour of maintaining the city districts but added that 'it should be clear that the current district system... is no realistic option anymore' (Rotterdam 2005a: 23). Future boards would decide the exact (new) structure, but districts would be less independent. Even though the responsible alderman said that abolishment of the districts had never been stated, the districts considered the board report as a clear stand against the districts. Some district politicians reacted fiercely.

> I am furious. I cannot believe the board thinks this up. And you can quote me literally. Power thinking rules at [city hall]. And I start to become pretty sick of this. Our goal is not turning citizens against each other or let fear rule the city. Our only concern is the citizens. We are being reduced to a neighbourhood council (district board member cited in RD 18/5/2005).

The coalition was surprised with the strong reaction from the districts. Alderman Bolsius, the board spokesperson for the report, faced a lot of criticism. Pressure from within party channels was applied to abolish the plans. Politicians in Bolsius's own Christian Democratic party, sometimes anonymously, told him that he should give up the plans, or it could have 'consequences' for his place on the list of candidates for the next municipal council election (interviews). The board admitted defeat. In June 2005, the board had a short notice in the municipal council meeting: its report was withdrawn. In turn, the mayor installed an external committee that was required to present a plan about the district system shortly after the new municipal council election in 2006.

6.3.5. *Societal organisations and citizens*

During one of the first municipal council meetings in 2002, Fortuyn declared that the revelation of a public impetus towards 'changing the governing culture and very directly engaging the citizens within government' was the most important interpretation of the election results (Oosthoek 2005: 163). And in the coalition accord, under the heading 'government', the coalition parties announced that citizens would be included in policy-making in the form of participation, internet, polls, and referenda. 'The city government opens its windows' (Rotterdam 2002b: 6).

Prior to 2002, groups of citizens protested against unsafe conditions in certain areas and/or the lack of adequate governmental response to these problems (see section 4.2.3). The election victory of Liveable Rotterdam in 2002 was regarded as a clear signal that citizens were not satisfied, particularly with the way the municipality handled safety problems (interviews). Despite this, during the first few years after the election, the board put little effort into promoting the active participation of citizens in safety policy deliberations. The board considered that its board programme represented the 'wishes of a large majority of the population' (Rotterdam 2002c: 5). Moreover, it interpreted the election result as a clear signal from citizens to have local government handle safety problems. At that time, immediately returning the assignment by asking what citizens could do themselves was considered inappropriate (interviews).

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After 2002, the active involvement of citizens regarding the safety approach remained somewhat limited to 'classical' instruments such as neighbourhood panels, neighbourhood meetings, and neighbourhood walks, most of which had been used in the past. Most of them were implemented by the districts, which felt that citizen participation was one of their traditional tasks (see for a history of the districts: Hakvoort 1980). The Safety Bureau civil servants on occasion detected an attitude in the city districts regarding the need for citizen participation to be something like: 'we already do this', 'don't interfere', and 'we know the needs of our districts ourselves' (interviews Safety Bureau civil servants). When the districts were told to include citizen input in the neighbourhood safety action programmes, many districts reverted to existing participatory instruments that they used prior to 2002 (BOOM 2005; see also Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops, van Ostaaijen 2005).

The board and civil servants also instigated some projects regarding citizens' participation. The Grow Brilliants (*Groeibriljanten*) was one of the most noteworthy: the board reserved 25 million Euros for neighbourhood activities around economic and urban renewal (NRT October 2003: 7).

For several societal or quasi-governmental organisations there were only a few noteworthy changes. The housing corporation director noticed a shift 'from public to private law' as he was asked to contribute to the board target of providing 3,000 houses annually. The school director said that his formal connection to the board was limited. The main thing he noted was that the Liveable Rotterdam safety alderman was worried about extremism taking place at his school and organised some meetings regarding this issue. A health care organisation noticed a tougher approach regarding the obligatory treatment for prostitutes, but in this particular case the director did not mind as he favoured a strong approach prior to 2002 (interview). However, most of these quasi-governmental organisations stressed their relative independence from the board, mainly because of funding that was largely independent from it. The same was the case for community work organisations that were largely hired and paid by the districts (interviews).

While these organisations were somewhat independent, they, like the services and districts, were critical of the board, especially the board's tone against disadvantaged populations and immigrants. Nevertheless, even here the attitude was more complex. The chairman of one of the organisations that filed a complaint against Fortuyn for discrimination in 2001 (and thus could hardly be considered one of his supporters) was still able to see some positive aspects of the situation. The rise of Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn stimulated debates within the organisation about what the members could do for the multicultural society. Moreover, the organisation was dedicated to emancipating Muslims. 'If anything showed the necessity for Muslims being able to speak up for themselves, it was Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam' (interview chairman).

Instead of the active participation of citizens, the board in its first years was much more occupied in getting positive feed back from citizens. For the general view on the board's performance, the board started with the 'Perception Monitor' (*Perceptiemonitor*). Every four months, researchers of Rotterdam's research centre directed a survey to gather the opinions of citizens in Rotterdam. The Perception Monitor measured priorities of the Rotterdam inhabitants, image of the board, contact between local government and citizens, and media attention. The report always started with the same question 'do you notice anything of the actions of the municipal board to improve the city?' The answer to this question showed an improvement from 61% affirmative in February 2003 to 70% in October 2005 (COS 2005).

To keep in touch with the public opinion and priorities regarding safety policy, there was a more comprehensive measurement instrument called the safety index (see also section 4.2.3). Each year about 12,000 people in Rotterdam were questioned on how they felt about safety. These opinions account for 2/3 of the index outcome (the other part consists of 'objective' numbers such as police or municipal data). The safety index showed that safety gradually improved (table 7).

Table 7: Development of the level of safety in Rotterdam according to the safety index, represented by a number from one to ten
(The first index appeared in 2002, so the previous years were measured in hindsight.)

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
5.5	5.6	5.6	5.6	6.2	6.6	6.9	7.2	7.3	7.2

The safety index also directed solutions. When it appeared that a certain neighbourhood deteriorated, the Safety Steering Group directed more attention towards that neighbourhood. This resulted in more financial resources, or when the problems increased, a city marine. At the end of 2005, when the safety index showed that the *Oude Westen* was the only 'unsafe' neighbourhood, extra efforts (costing one million Euros) were directed to this neighbourhood.

> From early in the morning until late at night, ten extra policemen patrol the neighbourhood that is plagued by drugs nuisance. An extra garbage truck makes sure that the neighbourhood is clean at 12:00 PM. Three new cameras watch drug dealers on the *Kogelvangerstraat* and the *Westersingel*… The coming months, one million Euros is invested in trees, to make the stone neighbourhood greener, and sports fields (AD 7/1/2006).

There were also regular meetings every few months between the Alliance of Rotterdam Neighbourhood Associations (*SBR*) and the municipality, mainly represented by the mayor. At those meetings the chief of police and the head of the district attorney

were also present. The municipality members showed the progress on safety. The SBR then introduced input from its members.

> Often it starts with a current state of affairs regarding safety policy… Then we discuss themes on the agenda, such as ugly empty places in the city… They are suggested by neighbourhood organisations, often including pictures. A famous example is the *Hudsonstraat*. For ten years, there have been plans and for ten years several houses in the neighbourhood have stood abandoned in anticipation of the implementation of the plans. But in the meantime, people have lived there for ten years… Then the directors of Urban Planning and Housing and City Development are being brought in. 'Tell us, what is the current state of affairs and why does it take ten years?' (interview SBR chairman).

According to a civil servant, this kind of attention towards citizen input was a large change as the former board, to a large extent, neglected citizen complaints, especially those regarding safety problems.

> I actually was one of those few civil servants that lived in the city and I found out there was very little accessibility for my response, for things I encountered as a citizen, especially regarding safety. That was very frustrating. And in 2002 I found out that this frustration was shared. It changed completely in 2002. At that moment, those anecdotes, that first were ignored, became central (interview civil servant).

Another project that was being put more in the limelight after 2002 was to measure citizens' views regarding the level of cleanliness of the city and the state of public property. Citizen volunteers measured the cleanliness of the city four times a year at several evaluation points (e.g. Rotterdam 2002c). They used a brochure with five pictures, each one showing a different level of cleanliness or intactness of public spaces, to evaluate the areas. For the municipal services, mainly the implementation services, such measurements became more important and they had to make a transition to being more open for the direct input of citizens.

When safety, according to the safety index, gradually improved (see table 7), the board started to have more attention for citizen participation in safety policy. In the second Five Year Safety Action Programme, it was stated that this should get more attention in the years to come.

> The safety approach is strongly focused on governmental partners and police and district attorney. Citizens and societal organisations are not involved enough as 'partners in crime (fighting)'. The broad passive support for the safety approach is not sufficiently translated into active cooperation (Rotterdam 2005b: 9).

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Through different channels, the board, especially safety alderman Van den Anker, tried to get citizens more actively involved. The Safety Bureau started a campaign under the slogan 'what can *you* contribute to safety' and Van den Anker started a digital discussion.

> You showed us two and a half years ago that you want a safe city to live and to work in. Our board therefore made safety the first priority… It is my job to encourage the police to maintain the right priorities and connect the actors involved. It is also my job to solve larger societal problems, such as nuisance from drug addicts. But it is your job to contribute: If you are a shop owner, you yourself make arrangements and you do not only wait for government money to provide them for you. If you go out at night, you help other people on the street that feel unsafe or are stuck in a difficult situation. If you have a neighbour that is scared to go out at night, you guide her to the playing cards club, and so on. My question to you is: what is your effort? (Rotterdam 2005c).

Despite these new initiatives and the strong feedback measurements, the active involvement from citizens in the board's (safety) policy remained limited. And in general, oversight in the various forms citizens participate was absent (e.g. Edwards, Schaap 2006). Citizens rarely took to the streets; mainly in the neighbourhoods where some of the shelters for ex-prostitutes would be located after closing the Keileweg. Larger protests against the board were generally absent. The proposal to cut down subsidies by 18% led to the website 'Rotterdam Extinguishes' (*www.rotterdamdooft.nl*) where several organisations from the cultural sector expressed their opposition. Another initiative was 'Rotterdam Citizens out of Conviction' (*Rotterdammers uit overtuiging*). In a petition posted on the website several individuals and organisations (e.g. welfare organisations) expressed their opposition to the 'we-they contradictions, cynicism about the multicultural society, stigmatising of disadvantaged and homeless people, and distinction between wanted and unwanted citizens' (www.rotterdammersuitovertuiging.nl, consulted on 5/5/2008). Other opposing viewpoints were expressed through media channels. Some famous locals such as vicar Hans Visser and columnist 'Carrie' were able to attract somewhat larger audiences when they spoke up in behalf of drug addicts or prostitutes (Van Ostaaijen, Tops 2006).

Regarding entrepreneurs, there only seemed to be small changes. According to the entrepreneurs themselves through the appointment of an alderman who himself was a businessman, the attention for small businesses increased (NRT April 2003: 11). Some individual entrepreneurs said that they had benefited from the safety approach for their work (interview; see also: NRT February 2004: 7; NRT June 2004: 10; NRT October 2004: 11; NRT March 2005: 11). And according to the chairman of a cooperation of inner city businesses (representing 600 corporations), entrepreneurs could relate to the thoroughness of the board and especially the city marines who managed to establish certain projects much quicker than the former board, which, according to

them, took much too long. (NRT February 2004: 6). In September 2003, alderman Van Sluis established a 'Business Thermometer' to measure the business climate in the city. This led to ten surveys being held, more or less leading to an opinion that resembled the national average (6.5 on a scale from one to ten) (NRT November 2005: 13). The board also promoted a project called Safe Entrepreneuring (*Veilig Ondernemen*). This project had been developed and carried out prior to 2002, but expanded quickly after 2002 (NRT January 2002). In it, entrepreneurs, city districts, and city government discussed how safety in certain shopping and industrial areas could be improved. The costs for the measures that followed were divided equally among the three partners.

6.3.6.   Summary

In 2002, Liveable Rotterdam won the Rotterdam municipal council election with almost 35% of the votes and became the largest party in the municipal council. Besides replacing the Labour Party as the largest council party, it also replaced the Labour Party in the board of mayor and aldermen. The board programme states that safety would be the board's main priority. The board supported the Safety Steering Group in which the municipality, through the mayor, cooperated with police and the district attorney. This cooperation could be considered the core safety coalition. The wider organisations – political parties, districts, municipal services – made the safety approach possible, but disliked some specific attributes or measures within it. Sometimes the board changed policies (for example, creating a less strict safety format for the districts) based on complaints. The active participation of societal organisations and citizens in the safety approach was limited. Through polls and surveys, the board kept track of how citizens regarded its policy. But while the outcome of such surveys could lead to some additional measures, citizens in general were not actively involved.

6.4.   Resources

6.4.1.   Introduction

This section describes the resources that Rotterdam's governing coalition had at its disposal to uphold and implement its safety agenda. It also focuses on how the desire of greater accountability of politicians and civil servants was translated into a different way of working within Rotterdam government.

6.4.2.   Interpretation of the electoral results

On 6 March, 2002, there were elections for all Dutch municipal councils, but all eyes seemed to focus on Rotterdam and Fortuyn. Would Rotterdam be an omen for the national parliamentary election later that year in which Fortuyn also participated? A large congregation of stakeholders gathered that evening in Rotterdam city hall to hear the election results first-hand. After only counting 10% of the votes, mayor Opstelten did not want to read them. He could not believe that the large number of votes for

Liveable Rotterdam was representative of the final result. After counting 50% of the votes, it was clear that Liveable Rotterdam would achieve a massive victory. After hearing these preliminary results, the stakeholders remained silent for a while. The shock was visible on the faces of all political party leaders. Fortuyn at that moment was not yet present (Oosthoek 2005).

In the end, Liveable Rotterdam won almost 35% of the votes, 97% of which were for Fortuyn, and thus the party earned 17 seats in the municipal council. All incumbent parties lost seats, except for a small Christian coalition (*ChristenUnie/SGP*) that kept its one seat. The Labour Party lost four seats (from 15 to 11), the Liberal Party lost five seats (from 9 to 4), the Christian Democratic Party lost one seat (from 6 to 5), the Green Party (*GroenLinks*) lost one seat (from 4 to 3), the Socialist Party lost three seats (from 4 to 1), the Liberal Democratic Party (*D66*) lost one seat (from 3 to 2), and the City Party lost one seat (from 2 to 1). While the political coalition (Labour Party, Liberal Party, Green Party, Christian Democratic Party) still held a minimal majority in the municipal council (even though they fell from 34 to 23 municipal council seats), the shock among all members was tremendous. Shortly after 10:00 PM, Fortuyn entered city hall in triumph. He was surrounded by followers and Dutch and foreign press. Fortuyn declared that the electoral result indicated that people were tired of the old mainstream politics.

A short analysis of the votes (COS 2002a; 2002b)

The 55% turnout in Rotterdam was not that high, but it counteracted the national trend. In Rotterdam, turnout was 5.5% higher than the previous election while the turnout nationally was 1.2% lower. The turnout in the more prosperous neighbourhoods was higher than in neighbourhoods that were less prosperous (R2 = 0.84). The Labour Party was the largest party in twelve neighbourhoods. Liveable Rotterdam was the largest in 53 and gained votes in all neighbourhoods. There was no clear connection between the number of votes for Liveable Rotterdam and the level of prosperity of a neighbourhood (R2 = 0.17). There was also no connection with the number of Liveable Rotterdam votes in a particular neighbourhood and the number of people from a non-Dutch origin in that neighbourhood (R2 = 0.25) or former voters for extreme right parties. In contrast, the Labour Party had a much stronger profile. It fared best in neighbourhoods with low prosperity. In the five neighbourhoods with the lowest prosperity, Liveable Rotterdam scored about 10% below its average. Also noteworthy was the fact that almost 97% of the Liveable Rotterdam voters voted for its leader Fortuyn. This was a very high percentage compared to the other parties, for instance the Labour Party (52%), the Liberal Party (68%), and the Christian Democratic Party (61%). Non-Dutch Rotterdam residents could vote if they had been in the country for five years. In general, the turnout of non-Dutch voters in 2002 was lower than that of Dutch voters. Antilleans scored the lowest with less than 20% and only the Turkish voters had a turnout of over 50%. According to the researchers, this was probably due to the large amount of Turkish candidates (14) in the different (municipal and district) council elections. Also compared to other (large) cities, the Rotterdam

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election results were remarkable. In Amsterdam and the Hague there was also a 'Liveable' party participating in the elections, but they won only two and four municipal council seats respectively (out of a total of forty-five). Utrecht's 'Liveable' party had a well-known Dutch artist and radio personality as its leader who was also connected to Liveable Netherlands. His party had already advanced from nine to fourteen council seats in a separate election in 2000.

Despite the attitude of most political parties towards Liveable Rotterdam in the election campaign and their immediate reactions afterwards, most significant political parties (according to their size) said that they wanted Liveable Rotterdam to participate in a political coalition as that was the only way to do justice to the electoral results. They recognised that the result represented the wishes of a large part of the Rotterdam population that could not be ignored, despite what they themselves thought about Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam. Most of these parties expected that since Liveable Rotterdam was the largest party it would take the initiative for coalition negotiations. Even the Labour Party faction announced that it would wait for 'an invitation to talk' (Chorus, Galan 2002: 196).

6.4.3. Skills and style board members

From the three politically inexperienced Liveable Rotterdam aldermen who started in 2002, two were generally regarded as good administrators (interviews). Van Sluis received credit in the municipal council for the way he handled the Harbour Scandal in 2004 (the harbour director distributed 100 million Euros of bank guarantees without informing the board of directors) and from entrepreneurs themselves (see section 6.3.5). Regarding his portfolio of physical infrastructure, Pastors was considered a capable alderman and manager. Nevertheless, due to his position and remarks regarding immigrants, Pastors lost the trust of a majority in the municipal council in 2005. Even though Christian Democratic alderman Geluk said that Pastors might 'very well be the best alderman for housing since the war' (NRC 4/11/2005), his party supported the vote of no confidence that led to his resignation. Rabella DeFaria, Liveable Rotterdam's third alderman, was responsible for safety, but her party dismissed her because the faction agreed she did not perform well. To find a successor, Liveable Rotterdam placed ads in several newspapers, eventually finding Marianne van den Anker, a criminal scientist. Van den Anker turned out to be good in what Pastors had already mastered: arousing controversy through public remarks on sensitive matters such as immigrants or less prosperous or vulnerable people such as prostitutes or single teenage mothers. She favoured, for instance, obligatory treatment for certain prostitutes and, close to the election campaign, she proposed to (under certain circumstances) force pregnant Antillean teen girls and mentally handicapped girls to have abortions. Van den Anker later claimed to have said the latter only to ignite a discussion on the topic, which was often precisely what happened when she or Pastors launched such ideas.

> Fortuyn stirred things up. Pastors does that now. Van den Anker too. I have meetings with aldermen and school boards about homosexual discrimination

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in schools. That is pretty heavy… Only at the very last moment you draw the gun. If you start with it, you immediately create a fighting sphere and I strongly believe this is very unproductive. When the school boards walk away from such a meeting because the alderman says 'I will publicly announce the results of the Rotterdam Monitor on how bad your school is doing', then the schools are furious with anger (interview civil servant).

It was a style Liveable Rotterdam displayed on more occasions. When alderman Pastors, alderman Van den Anker, and faction chairman Sørensen – often these three – made suggestions such as the obligation to speak Dutch in mosques, a maximum height for minarets on mosques, the right of police to frisk everyone, or the abolishment of the municipal districts, it aroused unrest and raised questions.

At first sight, it seemed that this style was mainly unproductive. But not everyone shared that opinion. Some people inside and outside of Rotterdam government found such a style welcome and even productive. They found it useful that 'things were first stirred up' so that afterwards they could help facilitate a solution that was less harsh (interview civil servant).

> Society has stumbled too hard over Liveable Rotterdam. Respect to them for calling things by their name. For me it was easy to start a discussion with some organisations about radicalisation afterwards (interview civil servant).

One Muslim organisation acknowledged that Fortuyn's rise and style stimulated the internal debate about Muslim rights. Despite protests against the board's proposal to restrict the height of minarets, it led to more discussions with different Muslim organisations. In 2005, while on other points the board gave in (according to the opposition parties the proposal on 'houses of prayer' lost the initial harsh edge and was nothing more than 'symbolic policy'), the plan that included restrictions on the height of mosque minarets was approved and became policy (AD 10/1/2006; municipal council meeting 19/1/2006; committee meeting for physical infrastructure and traffic 7/9/2004).

Other measures regarding integration also needed time and negotiation to get accepted. Initially it appeared that making stricter policy regarding integration would offend the other coalition parties, especially the Christian Democratic Party. After all, the topic had been somewhat avoided in the coalition negotiations. It thus proved convenient that a Labour Party district alderman started a discussion that included ethnicity (see 6.2.5). Moreover, a research report regarding the demographic changes (COS 2003) was used to express urgency. Even though the 'older' board members said that the report hardly contained new information, Pastors urged the board to take action. The board installed a committee that would reflect on the consequences for Rotterdam of the demographic change noted in the research report.

> Our board programme was pretty straightforward and businesslike. It was politically quite neutral, dealing with upholding the law, integration, those kinds of things. It reflected the image of that time. A board programme is of course always pretty broad. Rotterdam Presses On is less broad, and more sensitive. We used it to place some political accents. If we had done this in the beginning, the Christian Democrats would have walked away screaming. Dominic Schrijer [the district alderman] started [the discussion]. I thought: 'well, that is convenient'. In this way, we can immediately dispose of the idea that it was a 'rightwing' idea (interview former Liveable Rotterdam alderman).

By installing a committee, the controversy that surrounded the discussion quieted down to some extent. In December 2003, the committee presented the Rotterdam Presses On report, which generated controversy again, especially in the media. Critics said that it was too harsh, even discriminatory. According to one district board member, 'the board, and mainly Liveable Rotterdam, finally shows its true and ugly face' (interview).

> [When Rotterdam Presses On appeared] I was worried… Because for the first time there was a policy report based on discrimination. Look at the sentence, 'Colour is not the problem, but the problem does have a colour'. Well, can you see yourself walking as a black man? Everybody sees your colour, so you must be a problem. And you probably haven't earned that Mercedes in an honest way. But many work hard for it. In very honourable professions. I think it is an outrage. I really do. Right from the start. 'Rotterdam grows from 200,000 to 300,000 migrants'. People from non-Dutch origin. Two pages further: 'we will stop this trend'. Why? How come? What for (interview district alderman)?

But despite the controversy, the Labour Party supported the efforts, even though it stressed on several occasions that it was in favour of the 'weakened' national cabinet proposal and not so much the board report (RD 25/6/2004). Installing a committee was also used to deal with other somewhat controversial problems such as cutting back on subsidies and the future of the districts.

Alternative, moderate opinions not only came from civil servants or other political parties, they often came from within the board itself. When top civil servants initially were very sceptical about the board and the Liveable Rotterdam aldermen, the mayor met with the top civil servants and made it clear that he expected everyone to cooperate and remain loyal. And while Liveable Rotterdam alderman Van den Anker fought a public battle with vicar Visser regarding the closing of St Paul's Church, behind the scenes, the mayor, the safety manager, and the vicar looked for solutions. Alderman Van der Tak (and later Geluk) also had such a role. Most multicultural organisations negotiated with the Christian Democratic alderman and not directly with the Liveable Rotterdam aldermen. A representative of a Muslim organisation men-

tioned that he disliked what he saw and heard from the Liveable Rotterdam board and council members, but considered the contact with Van der Tak and Geluk pleasant.

> At one point, we wanted to pull out [of participating in the Islamic Debates], but civil servants talked us into staying: 'Geluk would find that awful'. I regarded Geluk as an decent person (interview).

6.4.4.   Resources for the safety agenda

Apart from previously mentioned general resources, money, expertise to develop safety approaches in the Safety Bureau, and the mayor himself were specifically noteworthy resources for the implementation of the safety approach.

Money

While the board worked on its board programme in the summer of 2002, it made 185 million Euros available for new priorities. This money was generated by stopping other priorities, such as the neighbourhood approach, by working more efficiently, verifying subsidies, and 'critically examining tasks' (Rotterdam 2002c). From this 180 million Euros, the board announced that it would spend more than half, or 100 million Euros, on safety measures (Rotterdam 2002c).[19] In the FYSAP II, appearing in 2005, the board announced that it would make another 100 million Euros available for safety from 2007 until 2010.

> With sixteen thousand civil servants and a budget of four billion Euros each year you can buy safety and liveability by setting other priorities (Pastors cited in Binnenlands Bestuur 25/7/2008).

The safety manager and his Safety Bureau controlled most of the safety budget and thus its distribution. He noticed the consequences.

> I all of a sudden am dressed up to be the most important man within the organisation. I am priority number one and take away 60% of the money to implement my programme. This leads to: 1) A lot of people are upset they have not gotten anything, and 2) Some people look at me as 'you have money, and I need money'. Both categories of people ask themselves the same question: 'is he going to make it?' That is the underlying current you feel (interview safety manager).

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[19] When looking at Rotterdam's 4.5 billion Euro budget, the millions for the board's priorities seem rather small, but most of this money was already reserved. Taking the 2006 budget as reference, the largest expenses were reserved for social affairs and societal service provision (1.3 billion), resources and ICT (0.73 billion), neighbourhoods and public space (0.62 billion), education and youth (0.43 billion), physical infrastructure (0.28 billion), and traffic and transportation (0.28 billion).

According to the safety manager, his starting point for distributing money was to assess whether the measure contributed to the safety goals. If so, money was most often distributed (interview). In practice, money went to the services and the districts to develop and implement safety programmes or projects.

The police and district attorney also received funding from the Safety Bureau. They used it to establish projects to combat safety problems. However, they also brought in resources themselves: in 2002, the police were at full strength and through the Safety Steering Group and an appendix to the 2002 board programme they agreed to help in fulfilling several board targets. The police for instance committed to bring 350 of the 700 'most disruptive addicts' to health care agencies, bring 5,600 suspects of violence annually to the district attorney, engage in one preventive frisking action a month, bring 500 suspects on the list of 'multiple offenders' annually to the district attorney, work on 25 files of illegal criminals in order to deport them, in every neighbourhood and/or district lead the 25 most disruptive young people into a judiciary process, and organise two meetings with citizens every year in all police districts (Rotterdam 2002c: 17-19). The district attorney also contributed to several targets, provided data for the Rotterdam safety index, and assisted the Safety Bureau in making analyses and approaches, such as methods for a preventive and repressive approach aimed at young people. In 2005, the police and district attorney again attached targets to a board document, this time the FYSAP II.

Safety Bureau

The board formally controls the municipal organisation, but for the safety approach the participation of the safety manager in the Steering Group Safety and his control of the Safety Bureau were particularly important. The Safety Bureau was placed somewhat apart the normal bureaucratic hierarchy to function more flexibly. The safety manager and Safety Bureau were mainly accountable to the mayor and the safety alderman. Direct access to the mayor and Safety Steering Group, money, and responsibility for the most important priority increased the status and influence of the safety manager and Safety Bureau considerably after 2002.

The Safety Bureau developed and implemented important programmes for the safety approach, but also made sure that other organisations within the municipality (mainly the districts and services) contributed. It collected data from municipal services, police, and the district attorney, which they used to develop the safety index. The bureau's civil servants also collected data if it was not available elsewhere, such as information regarding the prostitution zone *Keileweg*.

The process by which the Safety Bureau made its plans and approaches to act on safety in general functioned as follows: Based on the analysis of the problem (for instance drugs or youth nuisance), some civil servants from the Safety Bureau developed an approach to deal with this particular problem. This method would be applied and tested in a few areas within the city. The pilot approach, possibly with some altera-

tions, was promoted to a 'city method' and implemented in other parts of the city. Often, the Safety Bureau then handed the responsibility to implement the method over to other parts of the municipal government, such as a municipal service or a district. Some of the Safety Bureau's most prominent methods, such as the NSAPs and the intervention teams, were published, making it easier to pass them on.

The mayor

The mayor strongly supported the safety approach, saying that he would resign if the targets regarding safety were not met. This increased his prominence and importance within the safety approach, despite the fact that he already had formal safety responsibilities and chairmanship of the Safety Steering Group (see section 6.3.3).

> During the presentation we [the board] formulated the Rotterdam Approach. That presentation was important because there we said 'if we do not meet the targets, we will resign'. Somebody then asked: 'the mayor as well?' 'Yes, me as well'. I know I am appointed, but the Rotterdam Approach is something I support. It is possible that I write a letter to the queen saying I think the city deserves better. It did play a part. It was not only a joke (interview mayor Opstelten).

Moreover, the mayor on occasions suggested that if the safety targets were not met and he has to keep his promise to resign, he would not be the only one to leave. He would hold the chief of police and the safety manager, among others, responsible for failing as well.

> *Mayor*: It did inflict a certain sharpness. Also within the organisation. I said to the chief of police that if he cannot make it, there are plenty of candidates. If I don't make it, I will not be the only one. Those kinds of jokes.
> *Interviewer: They could be made, they had something of a serious undertone?*
> Mayor: Yes, every joke of course has something like that (interview mayor Opstelten).

6.4.5. *Aligning the organisation*

The board was well aware that it needed the participation of the municipal organisation, mainly the services, to develop and implement its policy. There were some ways in which this participation was enforced: first, by focusing on certain policy themes; second, by focusing on certain accomplishments within those policy themes; and third, by focusing on policy implementation and not on policy-making.

Focusing on certain policy themes

In 2002, the board chose to focus on a selected number of priorities (safety, housing, education and youth, economic development, and integration). It did not hide the fact

that safety would be its main priority and most efforts and resources would be directed to improving safety in Rotterdam neighbourhoods (see sections 6.2 and 6.4.4). Nor did it hide the fact that it would use existing plans or programmes if they were useful (see section 6.2.2). On several other policy themes, it only made few adjustments, such as Rotterdam's economic policy that was above all considered as a sharpening of existing policy (NRT December 2003: 8) or its housing policy in which the idea of building houses for the middle class turned out to already be policy in the related municipal service. This provided the board with time and energy for other themes.

> The Labour Party now says: you are executing the policy that we have thought out. That is true. And they have developed good policy indeed, for example with respect to housing: no more affordable rental housing, only expensive and medium-prices owner-occupied dwellings. They just did not communicate that policy. It was not done of course, to construct expensive houses. With the results that the policy did not really take off (alderman Pastors cited and translated in Uitermark, Duyvendak 2008: 1495).

Enforcing accountable goals: the targets

The board was keen on achieving visible results. It formulated measurable goals (targets) to not only show citizens what it wanted to achieve, but also to align the municipal organisation, mainly the civil servants.

The idea of accountability was already embedded in the new safety approach developed prior to 2002. In the neighbourhood safety action programmes, agreements were required to be written down in order to make it possible to hold the responsible partner accountable for its contribution (see section 4.2.3). The board that started in April 2002 found it important to set clear goals for all policy themes and make them visible to citizens as well as civil servants. Some Liveable Rotterdam aldermen were accustomed to working this way in the private sector and considered that it should be applied in the public sector as well.

For the five priorities in the board programme, 56 total targets and 87 desired 'results' were formulated. For safety, there were 18 (later 19) targets and 27 desired results (local court of audit 2005b). Table 8 shows what several of the safety targets looked like (see also section 6.2.2).

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Table 8: Several of the safety targets (Rotterdam 2002c)

Board target	Result
Priority 1: Neighbourhood safety	
Improving the safety index for the current eight unsafe neighbourhoods	Four neighbourhoods in 2004 Four neighbourhoods in 2005 The eight unsafe neighbourhood are no longer unsafe in 2005
No single neighbourhood becomes more unsafe	The safety index is nowhere lower than it was in June 2002
Priority 7: youth nuisance and youth criminality	
Criminal 'hard core' youth in judicial or care programme	For every neighbourhood, 25 should be placed in a programme annually
Priority 18: Clean and intact	
The entire city becomes cleaner and public property is/remains intact	The entire city on 'quality level 3' by 2003

Many of the targets in the board programme were passed on to the municipal services and then on to departments within those services. The targets of course did not replace most activities that took place in these services. With just under a hundred targets, and an organisation of 17,000 employees, the targets were not meant to change the entire working of the Rotterdam organisation. The targets showed what the board found important, where extra steps should be taken, and as a consequence which activities were temporarily less important.

The board strongly supported the targets and said that it would resign if they were not met. This provided a strong urgency to the Safety Bureau and Safety Steering Group to make progress on the targets. In addition, the mayor put effort into getting other actors such as the police and the district attorney to work on the targets.

> In the triangle [see section 6.3.3], I said I was in favour of working according to... targets. And we will do that that for police and public attorney as well. That was before [the national government] came up with targets for the police. When that happened, we had ours ready. At that time [other Dutch police corps] were not into the whole targets-system yet (interview mayor Opstelten).

The targets were also used to connect the municipal organisation to the safety approach.

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> We established eighteen targets with our own organisation… The organisation is therefore co-responsible. The programme is established in cooperation. They have to be a bit at unease about these targets: 'are we going to make it?' (interview mayor Opstelten).

The targets caused a similar dual feeling within the municipal services and the districts as did the safety measures (see section 6.3.4). There were civil servants who liked to work with such targets. Some of them faced somewhat of a dilemma as the targets were strongly connected to a board that set policies they disagreed with. For some of them it took some time to separate content and process.

> The safety approach is good because it adds focus. In the beginning, I was somewhat confused being socially left-orientated. The focus on the safety index, the repressive approach, and the short-term outlook. The last couple of years, I saw my mind shift. The positive side of establishing targets and dealing with the index, a sharp analysis of the neighbourhood, and from there looking for cooperation. You cannot keep producing piles of paper over and over again. You have to make choices and do things right. That provides a kick. It used to be one big black box (interview district civil servant).

By the end of 2005, the board pointed out that of its 88 targets, 77 were 'green', meaning achieved, four were 'red' (not achieved), five were 'orange' (still possible to achieve in the remaining months), and two were still 'insecure/uncertain' (Rotterdam 2006b). The local court of audit that checked the targets was more critical. It noted that of the 88 targets, 38 were clearly met and 11 in majority, 7 were not met and for 27 it was uncertain if they had been met (local court of audit 2005c). However, the court was pleased that the board applied and committed itself to this strategy and regarded the commitment to the targets successful. According to the director of the court, this was 'how it should be in public administration everywhere' (Volkskrant 10/2/2005).

All efforts towards implementation

The board wanted to limit time spent on policymaking and focus on policy implementation. Only days after the 2002 election, the mayor said 'There is much bureaucracy, yes. That is a core theme.… Much more effort should be made towards implementation.… Less priorities. Define what you promise the citizens and then realise it' (NRC 8/3/2002). In the board programme, the board's stress on implementation found its first outlet. Its motto was: everything is directed toward results. 'Implementation' was added to words such as 'policy' and 'organisation'. 'Plans' became 'implementation programmes and the coalition stressed that the time of making plans was over (see also Tops 2007; Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006). Civil servants sometimes noticed this vividly.

> At the end of the legislative period, vision was a bit more allowed, but in 2002 it would have meant my death sentence (interview civil servant).

Implementation was also visible within municipal services. The board wanted the percentage of civil servants dealing with implementation tasks to increase from 70% to 80% (NRT October 2002: 6). Dealing with implementation for instance excluded management functions, meaning people only managing the tasks of others (NRT September 2004: 5).

> You see for example much development in the supervision departments [within several municipal services]. For instance the department of housing and supervision grew in those years from 55 employees to 85… They cut back in development and policymaking departments… The Urban Planning and Housing service has had a department of housing and about three or four hundred people worked there. That is about ten years ago. Now there only work about thirty (interview civil servant).

Implementation became prominent in some new tools such as the city marines (see section 6.2.2). The board deliberately did not give the city marines a thorough description of their roles. In this way, they could intercede where and how they felt it was necessary to accomplish their tasks and solve implementation problems. It was an attitude the board displayed on other occasions as well. People or actors demonstrating they could work within the board's desires and focusing on concrete problem solving received more leeway. The intervention teams were a good example. They grew considerably between 2002 and 2006 and the board liked to be associated with this tool since it demonstrated the municipality's commitment to solving Rotterdam's problems in an unorthodox way. When its manager conflicted with the safety manager (at that time the intervention teams reside under the Safety Bureau) alderman Pastors relocated his team to one of the municipal services.

6.4.6.   Summary

The electoral support gave Liveable Rotterdam a mandate that political actors interpreted as a clear signal from citizens for change. They therefore regarded Liveable Rotterdam's participation in a political coalition desirable. The skills and styles of the 2002-2006 board and its members provided extra impetus in making change possible. Other important resources for the safety approach were money, the Safety Bureau, and the mayor.

6.5.   Scheme of cooperation

6.5.1.   Introduction

This part of the chapter describes the scheme of cooperation that Rotterdam's political coalition applied to come together in 2002, sketching the process of political party formation and the way the municipal board and safety coalition worked following that formation.

6.5.2.   Political negotiation [20]

During the 2002 election campaign, the political parties' leaders often met to exchange views, such as during political debates. In the weekend after the elections, Fortuyn privately met with Janssens, leader of the Liberal Party, and Van der Tak, leader of the Christian Democratic Party. He made it clear that they were his desired coalition partners (Chorus, Galan 2002: 196). Together, they would possess 26 municipal council seats, a little over the 23 needed for a majority. Fortuyn was very generous in the division of aldermen. He proposed a 3-2-2 split, in which his party, with three aldermen, would be heavily underrepresented compared to the other two parties who together only possessed nine council seats. Fortuyn said he wanted to negotiate with both men further about a political coalition after the installation of the new municipal council on March 14, a week after the election (Oosthoek 2005: 125-126).

The day after this installation, Fortuyn held a public meeting to discuss the possibilities for a new political coalition. During the meeting, Fortuyn became annoyed when Labour Party leader Kuijper asked several questions regarding Fortuyn's stands on the multicultural society and the lack of enthusiasm from other parties to cooperate. 'You are apparently not eager to form a board with us. In that case, we quit right now' (Oosthoek 2005: 134). Fortuyn ended the meeting and said that he wanted to hear from the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party before March 18 to see whether they were willing to negotiate about a coalition. Otherwise, he would leave the initiative to form a political coalition over to the Labour Party.

On March 18, talks between Liveable Rotterdam, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party continued behind closed doors. Van der Tak however wanted the Labour Party included in the negotiations and the political coalition. Sørensen and Fortuyn stated that they did not want this. They consulted with the city manager who was present at that meeting and later announced that the coalition negotiations failed and the Labour Party should take over the initiative. Liberal Party leader Janssens later said that Fortuyn at this point moved too fast and that both he and the Christian Democratic Party were willing to be part of a political coalition with Liveable Rotterdam,

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[20] Most information on the coalition negotiations is based on Oosthoek 2005 and Van Schendelen 2003a.

but he should have given them more time to adjust to the idea. Van der Tak later said that 'Fortuyn wanted to finalise the marriage… while [we] were not even ready for an engagement' (cited in Oosthoek 2005: 135).

The Labour Party did not accept the initiative for coalition negotiations. Van der Tak in turn suggested a compromise. He proposed to install an *informateur* (someone to find out which parties could form a coalition). In a meeting with the mayor, this idea was approved. A Rotterdam professor in politics, Rinus Van Schendelen, took up the task. At the same time, Fortuyn, who felt that he needed to spend more time on his national campaign and realised that others may considered him responsible for the difficult coalition process, left most of the work in Rotterdam to Pastors and Sørensen.

Van Schendelen believed that coalition negotiations were mainly about bringing people together and did not look into the parties' election programmes (Oosthoek 2005: 151). He began by talking to delegations from all parties, which made it clear that Liveable Rotterdam should be part of a new coalition; no one wanted an 'Antwerp situation'.[21] Van Schendelen first tried to bring Liveable Rotterdam and the Labour Party together, but the meeting with Pastors, Sørensen, Kuijper, and Cremers (councilman and soon leader of the Labour Party) was short and according to Van Schendelen 'ice cold', as 'Liveable did not want, Labour did not offer' (Van Schendelen 2003a: 257).

Van Schendelen then aimed to form a coalition between Liveable Rotterdam, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party. Van Schendelen discovered that in the meantime there had been several meetings among these political parties. Pastors and Geluk, the latter councilman and the second negotiator from the Christian Democratic Party, had a private meeting to talk things through and Christian Democratic leader Van der Tak consulted with local and national party members. The Christian Democratic party saw no objection anymore in forming a political coalition with Liveable Rotterdam. Janssens and councilman Van Gent from the Liberal Party agreed, but were already more or less willing from the start (Van Schendelen 2003a: 257-258). It seemed that with some time for reflection and the standing offer that both the Christian Democratic Party and Liberal Party could continue with the same number of aldermen (and Van der Tak and Janssens thus also could remain alderman) eased the negotiations. Nevertheless, Liveable Rotterdam claimed the portfolios of safety, physical infrastructure, the harbour, and economic affairs and it was agreed that whenever any issue came to a vote in the board, a unanimous view of the three Liveable Rotterdam aldermen would overrule the majority of the four other aldermen.

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[21] In Antwerp (Belgium) the Flemish Block (*Vlaams Blok*) was the largest party in the municipal council, but was boycotted by the other political parties because of its (in their eyes) extreme views.

The parties now worked on a mission statement. Van der Tak said that he wrote most of this during the weekend with one of Fortuyn's books to find the right words (Oosthoek 2005: 154; interview). To avoid friction on the integration theme, the parties referred to the word 'respect' in the way Rotterdam inhabitants should live together (Van Schendelen 2003a: 258). According to Van Schendelen, the declaration was presented before the press so that the public announcement might strengthen the still fragile commitment between the parties (Van Schendelen 2003a: 259).

After the presentation, the parties started to work on a more elaborate document, the coalition accord. This was meant to give a first indication of the coalition plans. The coalition accord required a broad commitment and there was a core group of six people working on it: Sørensen and Pastors (Liveable Rotterdam), Van der Tak and Geluk (Christian Democratic Party), and Janssens and Van Gent (Liberal Party). Other newly elected councilmen from the three parties were involved in the process by working on different themes. A 'secret' Liveable Rotterdam document was the basis for most negotiations (RD 28/3/2002). Fortuyn was nevertheless also willing to accommodate some of the wishes of his coalition partners: 'If you want to receive thrust, you shouls also provide it' was what he told Pastors (Van Schendelen 2003a: 261). Van der Tak said that in this time, a long talk between Fortuyn and Van der Tak at Fortuyn's home helped him overcome his last objections in cooperating with Fortuyn. Van der Tak was relieved that Fortuyn valued the importance of community-building and social cohesion. Van der Tak and the Christian Democrats regarded these values as important.

During the negotiations, there was some criticism from the Labour Party. Kuijper referred to the meetings behind closed doors and asked if this was the 'new politics' Fortuyn mentioned (Oosthoek 2005: 148). Former alderman Simons criticised the long process and mentioned that in 'his days' he would just 'write the whole thing up at once with one civil servant'. Pastors reacted that this was one of the reasons for the downfall of the Labour Party in the first place (Oosthoek 2005: 153).

Together with writing up the coalition accord, it became clear who would become aldermen. Even though Liveable Rotterdam initially preferred external aldermen, Van der Tak and Janssens would continue as aldermen. According to the local newspaper, the alderman position of Van der Tak was especially remarkable, since in the previous board he had safety in his portfolio, the portfolio heavily criticised by Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn (Oosthoek 2005: 161).

After the coalition accord, it was now up to the board members to write the board programme. This was not done in isolation; the Safety Bureau was involved and coordinated the writing of the safety chapter. It met with representatives from the bureaucracy to write the eighteen (later nineteen) targets (Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops 2007). The other chapters also relied on input from the municipal organisation (e.g. see section 6.3.5). This ensured a somewhat broader commitment. The initial coalition negotiators were satisfied with the results. Both the Christian Democratic Party

and the Liberal Party noticed that they were able to realise many of their wishes. Van der Tak was pleased with the attention for social cohesion and integration. The Liberal Party agreed with Liveable Rotterdam's desire for a tougher approach on safety problems and noticed that in this coalition there was much more room for liberal policy, including the economy and building.

> It is… ridiculous what happens. With nine seats and two aldermen, we had to fight in a leftist board [1998-2002] to maintain just a little bit liberalism. Now with two aldermen in a rightwing board, I am almost the left conscience… We can accomplish more from our election programme than we have been able to in all these years when we had more people in the council (alderman Janssens cited in Oosthoek 2005: 233).

6.5.3. *Liveable Rotterdam loses its leader*

When the board was presented in 2002, Fortuyn was involved in his national campaign. In the beginning of May 2002, the national polls predicted that Fortuyn's national party 'Pim Fortuyn's List' (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*) would receive 38 out of the 150 seats in the national parliament. This would make Fortuyn's party the largest faction in the national parliament. But then, on May 6, 2002, Fortuyn was shot when he left a radio studio at around 6:00 PM. The killer was caught but Fortuyn died on the curb. The impact was enormous. The local Rotterdam newspaper reported that within one hour the place where Fortuyn lived had become a memorial. Thousands of people placed flowers, accompanied by football shirts, teddy bears, and Dutch flags. People cried and cursed. A riot broke out when some Moroccan teenagers said he deserved it. Also in The Hague, near the place where Dutch government and parliament resides, people shouted and cursed. The atmosphere was grim. When the councilmen of Liveable Rotterdam heard the news, they gathered in their faction office in city hall. Sørensen heard the news from the mayor.

> The aide came in and pressed something in Opstelten's hand. Opstelten put on his glasses and said 'Gentlemen, I have appalling news. Mister Fortuyn has been shot. He was shot down'. I immediately walked away and was intercepted. There was a small television in the mayor's office where we all went. We saw the consternation on the spot, but at that moment still had hope. When we heard there was a doctor for the autopsy it was of course clear. I immediately called Marco [Pastors]; Wim [van Sluis] had already been contacted. Marco was completely upset. I told him 'it is best if you come here' which he did. Everyone came to the faction room where we sat together in astonishment. I kept getting called away. The media arrived quickly as well. Then our colleagues came. When Hans Kombrink came, we had to hold someone. Still kind of brave of him that he showed up. Kuijper did not… Then Opstelten came to the faction room. We talked… We prayed the Our Father together… You are totally intoxicated' (Sørensen cited in Oosthoek 2005: 181-182).

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Many Liveable Rotterdam councilmen could not control their emotions. They however appreciated the moment of prayer with the mayor. When the news reached city hall that Fortuyn deceased, Opstelten opened city hall for the entire night and condolence registers were made available. Later, the mayor led a silent march in the memory of Fortuyn. The two registers quickly turned into twenty and three days later the waiting cue for the condolence register was still two to three hours long. In the end, 65,000 people had signed the register.

The dramatic happenings of May 2002 contributed to a strong bond between the board members. The board went through this tough period together and the aldermen, especially from Liveable Rotterdam, did not want to fail on 'Pim's board'. The mayor built on the goodwill he generated with the new Liveable Rotterdam faction in his handling of the aftermath of Fortuyn's murder, mainly by praying with the Liveable Rotterdam councilmen, opening condolence registers, and leading the silent march together with his wife. The board programme that appeared in September 2002 was dedicated to Fortuyn, 'the man who co-founded the board and whose vision and views were important sources of inspiration' (Rotterdam 2002c: 5). As one of the aldermen explained: 'strange as it sounds, the murder on Fortuyn also gave us more energy to make things happen' (interview).

6.5.4. *Trust and cooperation*

In the board, the mayor had some room to act, even though several of the Liveable Rotterdam councilmen did not like that their safety alderman had a hard time claiming the safety portfolio. Both successive Liveable Rotterdam aldermen found out that the mayor was handling some safety issues outside their reach. He withdrew certain topics from the Safety Steering Group agenda, and discussed them in the regional or local triangle. These meetings took place prior to the SSG meeting, but in comparison to the SSG, the alderman responsible for safety – despite some demands from Liveable Rotterdam – was not allowed to attend.

> [The mayor] is someone who, in cooperation, often uses his formal position if this benefits him: 'that is not your competence' (interview safety alderman).

Pastors later claimed that the end (improving safety) justified the means (mayor's dominance) and thus the increasingly dominant role of the mayor in the safety approach was accepted as long as the approach achieved results (interview).

> In the old board Opstelten was always being pushed aside and he often had to face the arguments between the Labour Party aldermen Hans Kombrink and Hans Simons. Terrible, when one said yes, the other said no… Then the safety file, the only file where a mayor has something to say, becomes important. In this file, the mayor plays a prominent role; in contrary to the alderman of safety, De Faria. But Opstelten was clever enough to take her by the hand. There has never been a conflict between them. Opstelten covered for De

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Faria, gave her time, so in the meantime he could pose as the big man on the safety file [interview from December 2003] (Van Schendelen cited in Oosthoek 2005: 238).

The mayor was important as the linking pin in the safety file. He had the contacts with the police and district attorney in the SSG. This cooperation strengthened after the hectic week in which not only Fortuyn was murdered, but local Rotterdam football club Feyenoord played the UEFA cup final in Rotterdam.

The week after [the murder] was so unpredictably intense... A few hours after the murder, we came together in 'the triangle'. From that moment on until the funeral we only left that for a few hours of sleep. How could we keep order in the city? If you get trough this together, you can deal with anything (district attorney chief cited in AD 8/7/2006).

There were also good relations between other aldermen, between Van der Tak and Pastors for instance. Van der Tak thought that the electoral results should give the agenda of Liveable Rotterdam some leeway.

In the board, we had Sjaak (van der Tak)… He said: 'Well, they have been elected for this policy, and they have seventeen seats. That gives you the ability to give your colleague a little room' (interview former alderman).

Van der Tak not only approved of the new course, he seemingly agreed with it, such as with the need for implementation, as he suggested that he did not want to see another policy report anymore (ROM September 2002) and regarding the need for Rotterdam Presses On he stated that no measures were excluded beforehand (RD 5/9/2003). The second Christian Democratic alderman, Lucas Bolsius, also found himself at ease on the board. His personal style of interceding with his municipal service connected well to the discourse of listening to citizens and a focus on implementation. When he was informed by citizens about certain problems such as full waste containers, unsafe traffic situations, illegal dumping of trash, he contacted his municipal service directors.

He calls and mails. We mail about once or twice every day. About thing he hears, sees or receives as question… He is being served well, because, well, he is my alderman (interview municipal service director).

Only when Van der Tak was replaced with Geluk, more frictions emerged. In 2005, the coalition faction of the Christian Democratic Party supported a motion of no confidence against Pastors who resigned as alderman in 2005. Mid-way through February 2006 there was a reconciliation meeting between Pastors and Geluk as both wanted to continue with this board's policy after the new election in March 2006.

Pastors and Geluk; they will never be good friends. For that both gentlemen differ too much. In conviction but also in character... Pastors: 'we were used to Van der Tak's style. [With five seats] he knew his place. Leonard [Geluk] has much more his own ideas' (AD 22/2/2006).

6.5.5.   *Summary*

When Liveable Rotterdam became the largest political party, both Liveable Rotterdam and most of the established political parties turned from a polemic style towards engaging in political coalition negotiations. Especially after the murder of Fortuyn, the board united and several board members got along well. The mayor received goodwill in his handling of the aftermath of Fortuyn's murder and became the main actor within the safety approach and the cooperation with the police and district attorney.

6.6.   Conclusion

The analysis shows changes in the different elements of the urban regime. Between 2002 and 2006, the *agenda* regarding safety developed into a broad approach and affected other policy fields. It was part of an all-encompassing agenda in which local government acted firmly regarding citizens who do not comply with local regulation or norms. This led to the emergence of a zero tolerance policy regarding such behaviour. Problems regarding integration of immigrants needed to be dealt with in the open and without taboos. And with the report 'Rotterdam Presses On', the Islam Debates, and the 'Antillean Conference' this consequently happened. The *coalition* experienced a strong change with the replacement of the Labour Party by Liveable Rotterdam not only as largest party in the municipal council, but also as a participant in the board of mayor and aldermen. Cooperation between the municipality, police, and district attorney regarding the safety approach took place in the 'Safety Steering Group' with the mayor as most important actor. Other governmental actors such as political parties, municipal services, and the districts in general complied with the new agenda, out of pragmatism but sometimes also out of agreement. Citizens were mainly passively involved, but nevertheless could have had some impact on the implementation of safety policy. To implement the agenda, the actors involved were in possession of a variety of *resources*. The electoral mandate of Liveable Rotterdam – which was accepted even by the losing parties – helped to get the agenda accepted. Participation of the board was important as it provided control over the municipal organisation, mainly meaning the civil servants and budget. The board possessed some aldermen who sometimes took on leading roles to address controversial issues and the board strongly supported working according to targets, and a focus on implementation to improve the way the organisation functioned. Regarding the *scheme of cooperation*, in both the board as well as the Safety Steering Group, there was a good atmosphere and the mayor was free to act on safety. Especially after the murder of Pim Fortuyn, there was a strong sense of unity within the board.

CHAPTER 7   THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF LIVEABLE ROTTERDAM'S POLITICAL AGENDA 2006-2008

7.1.   Introduction

This chapter describes the period after the 2006 municipal council election when the Labour Party returned as the largest party and replaced Liveable Rotterdam in the board. How did the agenda – safety in particular – and the coalition, resources, and scheme of cooperation develop during this period?

7.2.   Agenda

7.2.1.   Introduction

This section illustrates how the agenda developed between 2006 and 2008. It focuses on the development of the safety agenda that the new board promised to maintain, the emerging social agenda as the new priority next to safety, and – as part of Liveable Rotterdam's 2002 political agenda – integration policy.

7.2.2.   Safety maintained

In May 2006, the negotiators of the political parties that formed the political coalition (the Labour Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Green Party) presented their political coalition accord. The accord dealt with a large number of themes,[22] but the negotiators made it clear that their aim was to continue the successful [safety] policy and improve it with more attention for social policy (Rotterdam 2006c: 2). The board confirmed this in its board programme that appeared in September, which contained four priorities: social, safety, housing, and economy.[23]

> We continue with the approach of safety, with an even higher ambition... On top of that, there is an ambitious and robust social programme to make Rotterdam stronger on that area too (Rotterdam 2006d: 7).

The new board immediately wanted to counter the idea that with the departure of Liveable Rotterdam from the political coalition and board, safety would diminish in

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[22] Integration; participation; emancipation and citizenship; work; participation and social agenda; education; youth and families; economics and employment; culture and sport; safety; living and living environment; environment and nature; traffic and transport; functioning of city and government; finance.
[23] According to the mayor, policy around safety, housing, and economy mainly showed continuity with previous policies, whereas the social programme was a clear addition (personal interview).

attention. The board programme made it clear that the safety approach would continue based on the Second Five Year Safety Action Programme approved in 2005.

> Safety in the city has been improved significantly in recent years. Still, we are not there yet. And this is why we continue the safety approach on the basis of the Five Year Safety Action Programme. On certain subjects we will even enforce the approach (Rotterdam 2006d: 13).

Most measures regarding safety stayed intact, such as the Safety Steering Group, the personal and territorial approach, the safety index, the neighbourhood safety action programmes, the city marines, and the hot spot approach. The safety goals were again formulated as 'targets'. Some of the new targets included (Rotterdam 2006d):

- No more safe or problem neighbourhoods in 2010 [according to the safety index]
- Identification of nine new areas where the hot spot approach will be applied.
- Personal approaches annually for 450 disruptive or criminal individuals, 1,500 young people, and 700 Antilleans
- By 2010, 85% of entrepreneurs never feel unsafe in their business
- By 2010, social safety in public transport improves to a 7.5 in vehicles and 7.3 in stations.

The police and district attorney once again attached their own goals to the board programme. The board continued where the former board left off. In the beginning of 2006, it turned out that one neighbourhood was still in the lowest category of the safety index and that problems with Antilleans were not under control. The new board wanted to deal with both issues (Rotterdam 2006d: 13-14).

According to stakeholders, the zero-tolerance character of the city hardly changed. The Local Ordinance was not changed back, nor was the approach based on it. All other measures that proved successful were continued or even expanded (see 'Rotterdam's safety approach 2006-2008').

> The Labour Party hardly differs from the former policy. It is a little bit less extreme, but still too repressive... The Liveable policy regarding homeless people and drug addicts is simply continued (interview local vicar working with addicts).

There were some controversial measures applied, such as the establishment of a 9:00 PM curfew for disruptive young people in a certain part of Rotterdam (AD 19/2/2009b). The city also installed so-called 'mosquitoes' that created a very high tone that could only be heard by young people. The mosquito was used to keep young people from gathering in certain neighbourhoods. By 2009, 37 mosquitoes were active in Rotterdam (AD 14/7/2009). New coffee shops, known as places where people could buy and use soft drugs, were not permitted in Rotterdam (Rotterdam 2009a: 65). After national law made it possible for mayors to install 'housing prohibitions' to

enable cities to temporarily ban some people (such as those involved in domestic violence from their own house, Rotterdam was a frontrunner. In 2009, 100 out of 154 Dutch local housing prohibitions were implemented in the Rotterdam region (Stadskrant 2009, week 14).

Rotterdam's safety approach 2006-2008 [24]

The safety approach from 2006 until 2008 was in part a continuation of what had been previously developed and in part ignited new projects and approaches. Regarding the continuation of the safety approach, several projects that had proved their value remained active such as the 'neighbourhood service teams' and the supervision model in which teams of the districts, City Supervision, Public Transport, and private security together patrolled the streets. Camera supervision and preventive frisking expanded (even though the board announced that it would investigate its effectiveness). In 2007, over 8,400 people were frisked and 1,500 cars were searched. In the same year, the 'summer approach' changed from a project approach into a structural approach lasting throughout the year. In 2007, 336 marijuana plantations were discovered and dismantled; in 2008 the number was 312. In 2007, the municipality bought 268 dwellings to prevent them from ending up in the wrong hands and 182 in 2008. In 2007, 1,700 people reported to the homeless shelter (called the 'Central Reception' [*Centraal Onthaal*]) and 1,300 were admitted. In 2008, every Rotterdam coffee shop had been checked at least twice and intervention employees from City Supervision made over 18,000 house visits. In the end of 2008, intervention employees also checked many uninhabited dwellings. In almost 60% of the 8,600 dwellings they found some form of tenancy. Also in 2007, 554 people were placed in rehabilitation, 35 such programmes had been successfully completed, 1,500 young people had been treated (a year later this was 1,515), and 1,396 people, including 255 Antilleans, had been placed in some type of rehabilitation programme.

Also new projects and activities started. 'Local Domestic Violence Teams' (*Lokale Teams Huiselijk Geweld*) were initiated in 2007. In these teams, local partners cooperated to detect and deal with domestic violence at an early stage. Another project involved about 30 intervention employees and parking controllers who received the responsebility to respond to minor annoyances, ranging from littering on the streets, failing to clean up dog waste, and urinating in public. A special approach also began in twenty neighbourhoods where problems with youth occurred. And an organisation was established to prevent exploitation of prostitutes and other people who were victims of human trade and to provide them with care. In 2008, 139 people were taken out of the human trade market.

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[24] Based on the safety indexes from 2008 and 2009 (Rotterdam 2008a; 2009a).

The board established a social programme to make it clear that apart from continuing former board policy the board also wanted to improve the city mainly with more focus on social themes, such as improving employment, improving education, and improving social cohesion.

> We face a large challenge. In some neighbourhoods over 40% of the working population is unemployed and over 15% depends on welfare... In many Rotterdam neighbourhoods more than 60% of the people have low to very low education. Too many Rotterdam inhabitants do not speak the language well enough (Rotterdam 2006d: 9).

The board regarded improving these statistics as the main challenge for its 'social programme' (*sociaal programma*). 'Safety was a restoration operation, social is investment' explained one of the Labour Party alderman (interview). As a consequence, targets were formulated to achieve a turnabout in the social realm. Some of these targets included (Rotterdam 2006d):

- 20,000 people starting a Dutch language and participation course
- More schools focusing on preschool and afterschool care of children
- An additional 20,000 Rotterdam inhabitants finding a job
- Social services taking a personal approach for homeless people
- More attention and support for citizen initiatives, sport in school, and cultural and artistic activities in neighbourhoods to improve the connection with the city and each other.

In practice, the social programme was a label that encompassed a diversity of projects. It dealt partly with existing projects. The aim was that these different projects would become 'less fragmentary, fit more in an encompassing whole, and receive an extra momentum' (NRT February 2007). One of those projects was *Opzoomeren*, but it also included approaches and policies such as language and integration courses, before- and afterschool activities, incentives to attract companies to Rotterdam, financial guidance programmes to resolve individual debt, facilitation of citizen initiatives, delivery of care, and stimulation of culture (Rotterdam 2006d: 10-12). There were also several new programmes and initiatives included. The South Pact (*Pact op Zuid*) was one of the largest projects affiliated with the social programme. The South Pact originally was an initiative of three housing corporations to invest in the city's south bank. The agreement to invest was signed in September 2006 by the housing corporations, districts, and the municipality of Rotterdam (Rotterdam 2007c). The housing corporations would by 2015 invest 850 million Euros and the city 170 million Euros. The aim of the South Pact was to stop the 'selective migration' within ten years and to improve inhabitants' 'enjoyment of their neighbourhood' (Rotterdam 2006d: 26). Another initiative was the Rotterdam 2009 European Youth Capital. Several national government programmes were also translated into a local approach and thereby became part of the social programme, such as many care and welfare tasks that had been decentralised to

the municipalities in 2007 and a plan from the Dutch secretary of state for Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration to upgrade forty Dutch neighbourhoods to 'power neighbourhoods' (*krachtwijken*) including five in Rotterdam.

7.2.4. *Social and safety: tough with care*

The social programme was aimed to improve the 'weakest' in society whose lives, according to one alderman, had not been improved under the former board (interview). The board announced that everyone should participate and no one would be left behind. It proclaimed that Rotterdam would once again be a city 'where everyone counts', and where all work 'together towards a non-divided city' (NRT September 2006).

> Nothing but positivity is coming from [City Hall]. The last summer months, mayor Opstelten and his aldermen appeared everywhere in the city to meet inhabitants… [Alderman] Kaya believes that the gap between people from Dutch origin and people from foreign origin… will be somewhat more closed. Alderman Kriens (Labour Party) refuses even to think in those categories: 'The gap for us is interpreted as between people who participate and people who keep other people from participating' (Trouw 19/9/2006).

It quickly turned out that the board, apart from its all-encompassing social programme to help the most needy, also continued to take a tough stance towards people that in the board's view 'limit other people to participate'. This stance, developed under the previous board legislature, is described as entailing a series of changes in common views of social issues:

> Connecting repression, care, and prevention with all consequences attached; from thinking about social welfare payments in terms of a right to [thinking of] it being something that also includes an obligation ('reciprocity'); from thinking about every individual's right to self determination to [fostering] much more coercion and compulsion to live differently (not only to fight misbehaviour, but also because it is in the better interest for the involved individual); from considering addiction as a personal and societal matter to considering it as a 'disease' with all consequences for treatment and cure attached; from considering access 'behind the front door' as an invasion of privacy to [thinking of it as] a way in which government is strong and social (for instance regarding domestic violence) (Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006: 266; Tops 2007: 291).

This approach was demonstrated through plans and projects (see section 6.2.6 and 6.2.4). The 2006 coalition accord uses phrases such as 'establishing clear borders', 'reciprocity', and 'firmly address people' who 'pass on opportunities' (Rotterdam 2006c: 2). Such rhetoric and the desire to help people go hand in hand (Rotterdam 2006c: 4-11):

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- People that need it should receive welfare, but should also do voluntarily work or follow an education (Rotterdam 2006c: 5).
- Education should be provided by the city, but it is the duty of parents that the child is on time and does his/her homework (Rotterdam 2006c: 7).
- The city creates positive conditions for economic activities, but entrepreneurs should create employment and fight discrimination (Rotterdam 2006c: 8).
- The municipality invests in building more houses, but is also tough on 'anti-social' renters (people who rent houses to others) (Rotterdam 2006c: 10-11).
- There will be a youth office (*jongerenloket*), to help young people, but also to make sure that every person under 27 is either working or in school (Rotterdam 2006c: 5).
- The programme 'Participate or Be Left Behind' (*Meedoen of Achterblijven*), which was developed under the 2002-2006 (but also approved by the Labour Party) after the killing of film director Van Gogh in Amsterdam and aimed at preventing radicalisation, is maintained, but should be supplemented with more attention to 'stimulate positive developments and prevent young people from slipping' (Rotterdam 2006c: 4).
- The safety programme will be connected to the social programme to invest in 'durable safety', and to ensure it 'contributes to a safe living climate' (Rotterdam 2006c: 10).

While the board programme that appeared in the autumn of 2006 focused less on the 'tough' side as compared to the coalition accord (listing mainly what it would do itself), the board supported the combination of setting borders and offering opportunities (Rotterdam 2006d: 6). The intervention teams, for instance, were continued and expanded. By the end of 2007 over 30,000 homes were visited (local ombudsman 2007). And the board was pleased with the 'Rotterdam Report Code' (*Rotterdamse Meldcode*) that provided guidelines on how and where health care workers should report domestic violence. In 2008, 75 institutions had agreed to follow those guidelines and '500 professionals [had] been trained' (Rotterdam 2009a). Alderman Geluk was pleased with the continuation of the family coaches, a coach available around the clock to improve a family's behaviour by 'taking over the administration' of the household which included getting the children in and out of bed, arranging language courses, and helping to clean the house (NRT June 2005: 3). In 2008, nineteen families were assigned a family coach without that family's permission and in 29 cases, the Social Affairs and Employment service threatened to make cuts on welfare distributions (AD 9/4/2009).

The local ombudsman became a critic of many of these measures. He noted that they tremendously increased the municipality's control over and repression of its inhabitants (RTV 28/4/2008). He said that 'the goal [apparently] justifies the means' when referring to such methods as area prohibitions, large scale camera supervision, lists of exploiting home owners, surveillance of individual garbage disposal, the 'Rotterdam Law' (see section 6.2.5), and the 'mosquitoes'. He directed most of his criticism to-

wards the intervention teams. In November 2007, in a 183-page report 'King of his Castle' (*Baas in eigen huis*), he concluded that the intervention teams barely complied with basic democratic rights regarding housing, privacy, fair trial, and fair play (local ombudsman 2007: 8). He proposed to use the teams only as a last resort and suggested numerous alterations such as significantly reducing the number of people comprising the teams (local ombudsman 2007: 11-15). In reaction, the board did not agree with many of the observations, such as the violation of judicial norms. The board emphasised 'broad societal problems' such as acts of criminality, nuisance, and social problems that Rotterdam has to deal with. The board felt that the intervention teams made a valuable contribution and did not seem inclined to make many changes or reducing their numbers.

> You fail to include the fact that intervention teams, next to control of regulation, have an important function in detecting poverty, care needs, and problems regarding children… Practice has proven that the performance of intervention teams in general is not regarded as negative and the visible approach of the municipality is appreciated (local ombudsman 2007, board's reaction as attachment).

7.2.5. *Immigration and integration*

Although the tone at the board seemed to indicate otherwise, the board continued the practice of offering opportunities and setting borders for immigrants. After the 2006 election, alderman Pastors admitted having been somewhat too harsh.

> A mistake is also that I have continued too harshly on integration, while many immigrants in the city are developing. I have insulted them when I meant those who do not perform well, cause nuisance, arrange marriages for their children, and oppress their wives. On those occasions, I should have watched my words more carefully. We however did not have time for nuance and I hope you forgive us our anxiety to achieve things… We acknowledge our mistakes, offer our apologies to everyone we unjustly insulted (LR 2006).

From its start, the board indicated that it would stop using the word 'integration'. Instead, it promoted the word 'participation' to indicate that everyone should be included, with no distinction between groups of people (such as people from Dutch or foreign origin).

In the beginning of 2007, the board presented a more elaborated vision on 'participation' in the report 'City Citizenship: the motto is participation' (*Stadsburgerschap: het motto is meedoen*). This document was partly presented as a reaction to integration documents from the municipal council factions of the Labour Party and Liveable Rotterdam that had 'rightly urged us to continue previously developed policy' (board letter sent with the report to the council). The report consists of five themes: city pride, reciprocity, identity, participation, and establishment of behavioural norms. The report

emphasises the importance of participation in society and stresses that every inhabitant has duties as well as rights, such as 'to use Dutch as the common language' and to uphold Western values such as the equality of men and women, hetero- and homosexuals, believers and non-believers, and not to accept honour killing, or female circumcision' (Rotterdam 2007d: 6-7).

One year earlier, the previous board presented the 'Rotterdam Code' (*Rotterdam Code*) which listed seven guidelines every Rotterdam citizen should follow: to take responsibility for the city and each other and not to discriminate, to use Dutch as common language, to reject radicalisation and extremism, to raise children as genuine citizens, to treat women equally to men and with respect, to treat homosexuals equally to heterosexuals and with respect, and to treat (different) beliefs or non-believers equally and with respect. The phrase 'use Dutch as common language' led to turmoil in the municipal council some time after the presentation. In 2007 however, a newspaper noted that the City Citizenship report contained all seven points of the Rotterdam code that led to that turmoil and alderman Kaya (the alderman mainly responsible for the 2007 report) had called discriminating (as Green Party faction chairman) (Parool 5/5/2007). Personal aides of alderman Kaya acknowledged that his vision was not that much different from that of his Liveable Rotterdam predecessor (interview). And even though words such as 'ethnicity' and 'integration' were avoided in the City Citizenship report, they were more evident in other aspects of board policy. In 2008, following the Antillean Approach, a 'Moroccan Approach' was created to decrease the high rate of recidivism among Moroccans. This approach provides family coaches, homework assistants and a 'case manager' for several young Moroccans to help them find jobs, internships, and housing (Rotterdam 2009a: 63-64).

7.2.6. *Summary*

Between 2006 and 2008, the safety approach continued. A social programme was added to improve employment, education, and social cohesion. Both approaches were characterised by enforcing some repression as well as providing care and prevention. The board wanted to offer opportunities to all of Rotterdam's inhabitants to improve their living conditions, but would firmly address everyone that did not participate in society or limited the ability of others to do so. The same approach was directed at immigrants, even though the tone had changed to 'everyone should be included' and 'no one should be left behind'.

7.3. Coalition

7.3.1. Introduction

This section focuses on the development of Rotterdam's governing coalition. In 2006, the Labour Party once again became the largest party in the municipal council and, after a four-year opposition period, took a seat on the board.

7.3.2. The return of the Labour Party

In October 2005, about 1,000 of the approximately 2,200 Rotterdam Labour Party members chose a new leader to lead the list of municipal council candidates for the 2006 election (AD 15/10/2005). This was somewhat unique, since most often the party board (meaning the party's leadership) nominated a candidate. However in 2005 and 2006, many Dutch political parties (including the Liberal party) also let their members choose their leaders (NRC 6/9/2005).

The four candidates running for Rotterdam Labour Party leader presented themselves on different occasions to the Labour Party members. According to a journalist, the four candidates looked very similar: 'male, white, and all very much concerned with safety' (Volkskrant 6/10/2005). Nevertheless, the first debate between the Rotterdam Labour Party candidates attracted 200 members (Trouw 6/9/2005). According to faction chairman Cremers, this large turnout was due to the beating the party received from voters four years earlier. The poor results in 2001 sparked a renewal of the party and led to more vitality within it (NRC 6/9/2005). Another active Labour Party member confirmed that there used to be just a 'handful of party members' at meetings (interview).

Peter Van Heemst, a member of National Parliament, won the election. Van Heemst's programme contained four elements: safety, engagement of young people, decency regarding old people, and employment (NRC 13/10/2005). Van Heemst, born and raised in Rotterdam, had been concerned with safety in the Rotterdam region for a long time. According to him, 'if we leave safety, problems with migrants, and drug policy over to 'the right', we will be 'left' behind by voters' (Vrij Nederland 25/3/2006). Among other things, Van Heemst had been Labour Party spokesman for safety in the National Parliament. After the election, Van Heemst declared that he would continue the successes of the 2002-2006 board. This was also what the national party leader advised him:

> Choose exactly the same themes as Liveable. And do not campaign against the current board policy. Say we will do the same, only much better (national Labour Party leader Bos cited in RD 4/4/2005).

In one of Van Heemst's first public appearances regarding Rotterdam politics he agreed with Pastor's remarks that Islamic people sometimes used their religion as an

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excuse for criminal behaviour. According to Van Heemst, 'I could have said that too' (NOS 12/11/2005). This was somewhat uncomfortable for the Labour Party faction in the municipal council since it had voted in favour of the motion to urge Pastors to resign because of this. Also on other occasions, Van Heemst did not shy away from acknowledging the successes of the 'Liveable board'. He, for instance, acknowledged that safety had improved over the last four years (Telegraaf 25/2/2006). However, he also said that Rotterdam had neglected its social problems (e.g. NOVA 14/10/2005). Van Heemst wanted to focus more on these problems, and he did not shy away from a tough or compulsory approach and considered the intervention teams, though they were a controversial method, to be a crucial technique in dealing with such problems.

> Peter van Heemst spoke with passion about the new Rotterdam approach. The core of his story was identification with problems that take place behind the front door. Several participants worried about the maintenance of employment for the low educated in Rotterdam. Others had great trouble with the idea that government looks behind the front door to register the problems and then deal with them. Peter van Heemst responded to this by saying that the problems we ignore, become worse and worse. The problems should be dealt with starting from their core. Everyone in Rotterdam deserves an equal chance (LP 2006a: 4).

After the 2006 election, the Labour Party's board also declared its support for Van Heemst's policy line. In a letter to its members, it writes: 'We will make policy based on decisions that have been taken the last four years and the developments that have been started' (NRC 12/5/2006).

The new political coalition and board is formed out of the Labour Party (18 council seats, 3 aldermen), the Liberal Party (3 council seats, 2 aldermen), the Christian Democratic Party (3 council seats, 2 aldermen), and the Green Party (2 council seats, 1 alderman). Labour Party leader Van Heemst was not one of the aldermen, but became Labour Party faction chairman in the municipal council and led his party from there. According to Van Heemst, a 'leader of a list that wants his party to regain the first place has to look its voters straight in the eye and have no other interests', meaning that as the first person on the list of candidates for the Labour Party he should restrict himself to the role of municipal councilman (Trouw 15/10/2005).

The Labour Party aldermen were in favour of Van Heemst's strategy of continuity, change, and a tough approach regarding social problems. Both alderman Schrijer (Employment, Social Affairs, and Large City Policy) and alderman Kriens (Public Health, Welfare, and Care) had been committed to such policy even before Van Heemst's leadership. As a district alderman, Schrijer started the discussion about the level of poverty in his district, a discussion that eventually led to Rotterdam Presses On (see section 6.2.5). And Kriens, as councilman in 2004, was the co-author of Enduring Safety in Rotterdam (*Blijvend Veilig in Rotterdam*), the text that confirmed the Labour Party's acceptance of safety as an important government task (see section

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6.3.4). The new aldermen were invited by civil servants to accompany them to see that approaches such as the intervention teams worked in practice. Afterwards, some aldermen made efforts to transfer these practices to other services (interview civil servant). Incumbent alderman Geluk (Christian Democratic Party) also wanted to uphold former board policy, but mentioned that on some issues (such as integration) he felt more at home with the Labour Party (AD 20/3/2006). The mayor seemed to adhere to the same view.

> The art of maintaining the good things is something I find good on the current board. Maintain good things and add what is necessary... Impressive, as well, politically speaking, to basically continue the same policy on three aspects: safety, physical, and economy. With the accent on a new pillar: social policy (interview mayor Opstelten).

Labour Party member Achmed Aboutaleb, a former Amsterdam alderman and national deputy state secretary and the successor to mayor Opstelten in 2009, has not diverted from that view. Although he is obliged to adhere to board policy, his past performance seemed to indicate that he personally supported that policy. From his previous occupations, he was known for his strong views, such as a remark that immigrants should adjust to Dutch values or leave the country (e.g. AD 18/10/2008). During his time as alderman in Amsterdam he also supported the Liveable Rotterdam board and alderman Pastors in dealing with the city's problems (AD 16/10/2008). However, with his Moroccan heritage and former mainly 'social' portfolios in his time as alderman and deputy secretary of state, several stakeholders hoped that the new mayor would also be able to provide bridges between different ethnic groups and firmly support social issues. Looking at his agenda in his first months in office in 2009, his interests indeed seemed to lie with the latter (interview civil servant). Some of his repeated phrases are 'invest in people' and 'it is not possible to invest too much in education' (AD 19/2/2009a).

7.3.3. The safety coalition

After 2006, the safety coalition that between 2002 and 2006 directed and implemented safety policy stayed largely intact. The 2006-2010 board supported the safety approach, but the mayor and the Safety Steering Group still implemented it. And the mayor was not inclined to make many changes.

> Continuity always has to do with persons. I am who I am and just won't make other policy all of a sudden. On the area of safety… everyone says it goes well (interview mayor Opstelten).

The coalition decided not to include an alderman for safety again, because, according to Van Heemst, the safety alderman and mayor 'were just in each other's way' and safety was now included in 'every aldermen's portfolio' (interview). In practice however, other aldermen hardly interfered with the safety approach. Even though there

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were connections with other board members (aldermen Kriens and Geluk were part of the Safety Steering Group), others attended when their responsibilities required them to do so, but the role division seemed to be clear. One of the aldermen noted: 'We support the mayor in his safety approach. He supports me [in the social approach]' (interview alderman).

Despite the continuation of the safety approach, the changes on political level after the 2006 election affected the safety approach. Liveable Rotterdam was now an opposition party and all stakeholders in Rotterdam government knew the importance this party had held regarding safety. And even though the mayor was the important representative of the approach, after the elections, the rumours spread within the municipal organisation that the neighbourhood safety action programmes and the Safety Steering Group would decrease in importance. The attention the board now also paid towards a social programme made some people think the continuation of the strong and harsh safety approach would diminish. Moreover, the most difficult safety problems seemed under control. At the end of the 1990s, citizens' protests showed the sense of urgency to control safety problems. But by 2006, things were much more quiet and safe. The safety index showed that most areas had greatly improved, which made it seem more a question of maintenance now.

> I think that our longest time has passed. Look, I will give you an example. [The area of] *Spangen* was a 2.4 [in the safety index]. In the beginning of this year, it turned out a 7.0. That step has nowhere been that large. So, actually, looking at the numbers, my time here has ended (interview civil servant).

The interviewees, in general, felt that the largest safety problems had been dealt with between 2002 and 2006 and that only the secondary problems remained. But those were in an entirely different category.

> So, first we dealt with 'unsafe neighbourhoods' [category in the safety index]. Those are not unsafe anymore. So Opstelten screws it up a notch: ´In 2010 I don't want to see any 'problem neighbourhoods' [a more safe category in the safety index]. This means that every neighbourhood minimally has to score a 5.0. We also achieved that... Those urgent problems that we experienced two years ago, we do not have them anymore. But it has to stay exciting. If it isn't exciting anymore, I quit (interview civil servant).

The Rotterdam safety approach founders did not agree. They believed that the safety problems were far from solved and weakening or abandoning the approach at the moment would be fatal for both the approach and the level of safety in the city.

> *Interviewer*: In some districts there was supposed to be some thinking along the lines of 'good to be rid of safety [policy] now'.
> *Mayor*: There will no doubt be someone who said that. But then you haven't understood the election. And then they of course underestimate me. Van

> Heemst is a safety man as well. He also keeps sharpness… Liveable and other
> parties too (interview mayor Opstelten).

The Safety Steering Group remained the most important institution within the safety approach and the mayor continued to be the most important representative and actor within it. In 2006, the mayor ensured that the police and district attorney remained part of the Safety Steering Group by attaching their targets to the board programme. The district attorney appreciated a municipality that proactively handled safety problems. 'You do not have to tell [this] municipality that around... youth, prevention, et cetera... things need to be done' (interview). Nevertheless, the municipality's strong director's role made it sometimes also difficult for the district attorney's office to retain its own independence and not to become the municipality's 'repression service' (interview). Some people in the district attorney's office supported the close involvement with the municipality in societal problems, but others preferred a more distant role. This latter view was, at that time, less visible (interview). The police appreciated that the approach was maintained. One of the police chiefs emphasised that he was glad that the new board focused more on care and prevention. He was convinced that such a policy was necessary for the thorough approach to safety problems (interview).

Civil servants from the beginning of the safety approach emphasised the urgency and necessity to maintain it, but acknowledged that doing so with the same intensity became more difficult after 2006. This, in part, was due to the approach's development. The first year of the approach under the 2002-2006 board was a phase of urgency and innovation. Citizens, especially in 2002, made it clear that a more thorough safety policy was needed. Even though an 'integral approach' was developed in 2001, there was little practical experience with it. With trial and error it was implemented. Some things had to be adjusted (such as the neighbourhood safety action programmes). Other tools such as the intervention teams and the hot spot approach proved successful and were quickly expanded. When the safety index increased almost a full point in 2004, it became clear to many civil servants and politicians in Rotterdam that the safety approach worked. Civil servants working for the safety approach talked about this phase as an interesting, energetic, but also intensive period that was then followed by an exciting, but perhaps more predictable period.

> [For the Safety Bureau] it used to be 70% short term, ad hoc solutions and
> 30% structural. Now it is more the other way around (interview safety
> manager).

From 2005 onwards, the safety approach entered a consolidation phase. From 2006 until 2008, the safety index showed that Rotterdam safety improved to well above a 'seven' on a ten-point scale, but the consolidation phase was probably better represented after and symbolised when the Safety Bureau lost its somewhat independent position in 2006 and became more embedded within city hall and city hall bureaucracy (also literally – as the Bureau physically moved closer towards it).

This phase could not be seen separately from the departure of some important actors from the safety approach or from Rotterdam altogether. Mayor Opstelten announced he would retire in the beginning of 2009. Since the mayor had been such an important actor within the approach, everyone working for the safety approach acknowledged that his successor would be important for the continuation of the approach. During most interviews conducted for this research, the name of his successor was not yet known, but most people involved in safety policy expected that the safety approach would suffer from the mayor's departure, whoever his successor would be.

The safety manager also announced his departure and was succeeded in 2008 by one of his deputies. Even though the safety manager who departed cared a great deal for safety policy and was involved with his succession, he explained that after many years of putting tremendous effort into the safety approach, it was time to look for another position. He also did not hide the fact that the pressure of the position affected him and his personal life quite intensively. Several civil servants working for the Safety Bureau (who had worked there since 2002) also decided to look for other work. It is noteworthy that several of them became part of the social programme. Also the Safety Direction Team (see section 6.3.4) faced some change in participants that affected the meetings. Some participants in the 2007/2008 interviews idealised the starting phase as a time of a club of rebels and one of the participants in 2008 even dared to predict that the meetings would cease to exist.

At the start of the social programme, the civil servants in the Safety Bureau did not notice much enthusiasm on the part of 'social' civil servants for their cooperation in the social programme. Even though they worked on the same floor, the Safety Bureau staff was not asked to participate when social programme civil servants engaged in the first pilot for the 'neighbourhood [social] action programmes'. On other occasions, Safety Bureau staff noticed that they were no longer the centre of attention.

> We had to fight to be part of the South Pact. At first we were not invited. We have to stay alert regarding meetings being held (interview Safety Bureau civil servant).

The development and implementation of the social programme also created more room for other municipal services. The development of the Youth, Education, and Society service is a good example. Under the 2002-2006 board it resided under a Christian Democratic alderman (first Van der Tak, later Geluk). In the beginning, especially, it was held back as it dealt with (social) issues that were kept somewhat out of the spotlight. Issues that came into the spotlight and in which the service could play a role, such as integration, were constantly being claimed by Liveable Rotterdam alderman Pastors. Close to the end of that legislative period, however, the Youth, Education, and Society service received some additional projects under its authority, such as the Islam debates and a part of youth policy that appeared to increase in importance after a municipal youth conference. After 2006, this service continued under alderman

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Geluk, and, much like the Health service, received more room to develop policy and initiatives.

> Services such as Youth, Education, and Society now start to develop things without us. For instance regarding integration and participation, [but] that also includes safety. The same goes for the 'Societal Support Law' (*Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning*). That partly deals with people that belonged to us, prostitutes, addicts. Now they reside under the Health Service. We have to make ourselves alert to that. It partly has to do with the alderman. Kriens is 'social'. That means you have to bring safety under her attention. Van den Anker had safety *and* care in her portfolio, so that included the Health Service (interview Safety Bureau civil servant).

In time, there were efforts to combine the social with the safety approach. According to the 'social index' that appeared for the first time in June 2008 to measure the social development in the city, the 'necessity to connect the domains of social and safety is large' (Rotterdam 2008b: 48). And while the social index of 2008 mentions the importance of the 'neighbourhood action programmes', the social index of 2009 emphasises the development of 'integral neighbourhood action programmes' (*integrale wijk actieprogrammas*) and the 'neighbourhood visions' (*gebiedsvisies*) in which the activities for the neighbourhood on both social as well as safety policy are integrated (Rotterdam 2009b: 3).

7.3.4.   *Governmental actors*

The previous chapter showed how the governmental actors related to the 2002-2006 board and its safety approach. This section discusses how these relationships developed with the 2006-2010 board in the context of a new priority besides safety.

National government

There was again overlap between the Rotterdam board and the national cabinet in the beginning of 2007, with a new national political coalition between the Christian Democratic Party, the Labour Party, and the Christian Union. The Christian Democratic leader Jan Peter Balkenende once again remained prime minister. The new national cabinet seemed to follow the example of the Rotterdam board by its own '100 days' initiative of going into the country and talking with citizens (Trouw 21/5/2007; see section 7.3.5). The cabinet's programme also seemed to resonate well with the Rotterdam priorities. According to Rotterdam civil servants, the cabinet programme was 'positive for Rotterdam' as it focused on participation, social problems and citizenship, and there was much overlap regarding youth, work and income, environment and living, and neighbourhoods and integration. According to the civil servants this meant that the 'Rotterdam lobby seems to have had success' (Rotterdam 2007).

According to some, the Rotterdam board may seem somewhat meek and bleak, the new national cabinet has a strong Rotterdam colour... The content of the government accord and the words in which the leaders presented the ambitions... seem to fit perfectly with [the Rotterdam board],... especially the social programme (NRT February 2007b).

However, this overlap and affinity did not lead to explicit public displays of cooperation such as regarding the 'Rotterdam Law' (see section 6.3.4). According to observers, cooperation took place more behind the scenes such as the work between the Christian Democratic alderman Geluk and a Christian Union secretary of state that focused on youth and family policy (interview observer).

The municipal council and the political parties

In 2006, the Rotterdam municipal council again faced a large renewal with 34 (out of 45) new councilmen (Binnenlands Bestuur 6/11/2009). After 2006, with Liveable Rotterdam in the opposition, there were two large parties again in the municipal council (the Labour Party in the coalition and Liveable Rotterdam in the opposition).

After the 2006 election, Van Heemst and the Labour Party did not want to give the impression that they cared less about safety than Liveable Rotterdam. The Labour Party faction also presented several initiatives and critically questioned the board and the mayor. In October 2006, for instance, Van Heemst proposed that the board should apply the same tough approach for people causing domestic violence as the one that was being applied to disruptive youth or Antilleans. Van Heemst also felt that proposals from the board to improve safety were too 'meagre' and that 200 extra policemen for the neighbourhoods were needed (Telegraaf 12/10/2006, municipal council meeting 12/10/2006).

The Liberal Party and Christian Democratic Party were part of the 2002-2006 political coalition and board and became part of the coalition once again in 2006. They did not object much to the 'tough' policy as did the fourth political coalition partner and board member, the Green Party. In the 2006 municipal council debate regarding the presentation of the board programme, the Green Party indicated that it was satisfied with the board programme and the continuance of the safety approach (municipal council meeting 12/10/2006). Since the Green Party was very critical about that approach prior to 2006, Van Heemst was pleased that the Green Party was now part of a coalition that supported a different view (interview). A year later however, during the municipality's budget talks, the Green Party councilmen expressed dissatisfaction with what they felt were the board's repressive measures. 'The board searches for the borders and sometimes deliberately crosses them'. The councilmen referred to measures such as preventive frisking, camera supervision, and the intervention teams (municipal council meeting 6/11/2007). The Green Party nonetheless remained part of the coalition, but when research concluded that preventive frisking was more or less 'carefully

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and subtly done', the mayor insisted that Green Party alderman Kaya attended the presentation (interview observer).

Before the 2006 election, Liveable Rotterdam believed it could continue in the same political coalition. At first it seemed it would not do so with a leader elected by its members. Only when a second candidate besides Pastors entered did Liveable Rotterdam's 400 members have a choice to make (NRC 26/9/2006). In the end, Pastors was officially chosen as Liveable Rotterdam leader. According to Sørensen, members of Liveable Rotterdam also made themselves heard on other occasions such as when they forced the party to take several non-Dutch councilmen candidates off the candidate list for the municipal election (AD 27/2/2009). In 2006, Liveable Rotterdam also participated in the district council elections and the party thus also grew in political offices. Observers noted that the party had become more mature. It could still and often did react out of emotion, but it also started to make alternative policy proposals. Some of them, such as regarding the city district system, were praised by several parties, even political opponents. However, now that Liveable Rotterdam was an opposition party, it had to get used to the fact that most of its proposals and documents have little clout. Today, the party nevertheless still has a way to draw attention to certain issues. During the instalment of new mayor Aboutaleb, Pastors gave him an empty envelope. He wanted the new mayor to renounce his dual identity (Dutch and Moroccan) by sending his Moroccan passport back to the Moroccan king. This 'gesture' made national news.

Liveable Rotterdam also experienced some internal differences. Pastors was a member of a municipal council committee that judged several candidates and nominated one for mayor. In 2008, this resulted in the nomination of Labour Party member Aboutaleb. Pastors was obliged not to comment on the work of the committee, but later admitted that even though he preferred Liveable Rotterdam candidate Van Sluis, he was not unhappy with Aboutaleb since Aboutaleb holds some views he supported such as the opinion that immigrants should adjust to Dutch norms and values and should not portray themselves as victims. According to Pastors, it is a 'tribute to Fortuyn' that someone like that could be mayor in Rotterdam (NRC 6/1/2009). Sørensen, however, heard the news about Aboutaleb from the newspaper and was less pleased. Because of Aboutaleb's Dutch and Moroccan passports, he called him a 'man with two loyalties' and a 'representative of a group that causes many problems in this city' (NRC 6/1/2009). Even after Aboutaleb's start, Sørensen was not impressed. He said the new mayor 'has left a bad impression' and it 'remains old politics'. 'As faction chairman I can have a normal conversation with him… but there are still old issues. Aboutaleb once expressed himself very indecently about Fortuyn' (Elsevier 28/2/2009a).

In the municipal council, Liveable Rotterdam was after May 2006 faced with a board that retained much of the policy of the former board. During the 2005-2006 election campaign, it turned out that on several issues such as safety, Van Heemst and Pastors actually did not differ that much (e.g. Telegraaf 25/2/2006). However, due to his

aversion to the Labour Party, Pastors remained firmly against cooperation with the Labour Party. And while a newspaper journalist noted a friendly understanding between the two men by the end of 2006 (AD 22/12/2006), Pastors later claimed 'to feel nothing for that man.... He says one thing, but does the other' (AD 9/7/2009). As an opposition party, Liveable Rotterdam critically monitored the board's safety policy. It was pleased that much policy was continued, but also felt that the board lacked character: it did not have enough ambition and was too soft, especially concerning its targets (Sørensen in the municipal council meeting 12/10/2006). It was regarded a 'Liveable Light' board (NRC 12/5/2006).

> We receive more and more signals from within neighbourhoods that it deteriorates again. On the *Spanjaardstraat* prostitution returned and on some places on the south bank it deteriorates too (Sørensen cited in NRT December 2006).

As an opposition party, Liveable Rotterdam regretted that it could not do anything concrete to improve the city. Pastors especially missed being part of a political coalition and board to do so (Binnenlands Bestuur 25/7/2008). Even the ban on cooperation with the Labour Party slowly seemed to lift in order to increase the likelihood to make that happen again in the future.

> It is apparent that the Labour Party has a more constructive attitude. It is a different party than when we entered the municipal council four years ago. Everything we did was bad. That chairman even called us the worst board ever. We will judge them the next three years on their results. But if they continue to waste community money, we almost have the moral obligation to cooperate. At least then will we be able to counter that waste. But if possible, then preferably without them (Pastors cited in NRT December 2006; see also Binnenlands Bestuur 25/7/2008).

Both the Labour Party and Liveable Rotterdam urged the 2006 board to uphold and enforce safety. But the left wing opposition, mainly the Socialist Party, urged the board to do more on social issues, such as building more social housing (e.g. municipal council meeting 12/10/2006). The Socialist Party is not opposed to safety policy. In May 2008, it released the report 'Rotterdam Goes Crazy' (*Rotterdam draait door*) in which it blamed the safety approach for using 'too many random and ineffective measures' and the Labour Party and Liveable Rotterdam for using safety to draw attention to themselves in the media. The Socialist Party however did not deny the necessity for a safety approach as 'safety has been regarded too long as an exclusive police and justice domain' (SP 2008: 3, 5).

The municipal services

The attitudes from the municipal services can be compared somewhat to the 2002-2006 period. In general, the unexpected result of the 2002 election or its emotional

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impact were not repeated and the paradigm of bureaucratic loyalty once again prevailed.

In the 'Local Memorandum 2006' (*Lokaal Memorandum 2006*) civil servants advised the new board to build on existing policy such as safety, economics, housing and living, and education policy. They also proposed to focus on a 'social balance' in the city, to offer chances to all Rotterdam inhabitants to participate, to care for the disadvantaged and vulnerable, to deal with cultural and social diversity in a productive way, and to deal in an effective way with the tensions that are inherent in a socially and culturally diverse society (Rotterdam 2006e).

Within the services, there were mixed reactions to the continuation of the safety approach. Some civil servants referred to it as the 'shock of 2006', in some ways worse than the 'shock of 2002' because at least then the changes seemed temporary. Some municipal service directors supported the safety approach and many directors, including those from the social services, were pleased that a combination of care and repression was maintained. Several of those directors were new at their posts. After the Harbour Scandal in 2004 (see section 6.4.3), a rotation system was instituted to make sure that municipal service directors could not be the director of the same service indefinitely. In fact, according to the city manager, by 2008 nearly all service directors from 2002 had moved (interview). Many social services in 2008 have directors from the physical sector. Many of them believe that a tougher approach is sometimes necessary and can coincide with providing care for people who need it. If not, then at least they can use some of its instruments for social aims as well.

> For instance the intervention teams… At one point, we said that in the list of questions, [the intervention team manager] should include questions such as: are there children, where do they go to school?… where do they work? We try to get all 16 to 23 year olds off the street, to school or to work… We [in this municipal service] also have the idea that we do not accept it when they do not. And if [the intervention team] gathers information anyway… (interview municipal service director).

Most services welcomed the board's attention towards social measures, since many people were aware of Rotterdam's bad record and historically low levels of employment and education (see section 4.2.2). The board's priority regarding these themes also reflected on the (social) services.

> Not that I used to feel left out, but health has emerged more now. For instance in municipal council committees, motions, et cetera. There is more respect for what we do (interview municipal service director).

The way in which the social programme was modified and implemented in the years after 2006 did not always lead to positive reviews. Especially in the first year of the social programme there was friction between the board and the social municipal ser-

vices. The board felt that the services did not cooperate with each another and the services felt that the board bypassed the social services. The latter for instance referred to the organisation of the social programme that resided in city hall instead of with the services. When the social manager resigned, coordination however turned to one of the services. Some directors from the other services (physical, implementation) were often even more critical. They criticised the complicated steering and organisation of the social programme, and felt that it was too broad and had no focus. They referred to the safety approach that was much more compact, direction-setting, and comprehensible: 'I do not feel led by this board' (interview municipal service director; see also section 7.4.4).

The municipal districts

In the 2006 municipal district elections, the Labour Party performed well, increasing its holdings from 78 to 106 district council seats. However, Liveable Rotterdam also participated and gained a total of 61 district council seats to become the second-largest party in the districts. The Labour Party and Liveable Rotterdam together occupied almost two-thirds of all district council seats (COS 2006b).

> We were not really warmly welcomed within the city districts, with their small kingdoms, where the political relations from prior to 2002 had to make way for large Liveable Rotterdam factions. Despite a few exceptions, the strangest [political] coalitions were forged under leadership of the Labour Party with only one goal: to keep Liveable Rotterdam out of the district board (LR 2007).

With the constellation of the new board and the district boards, there was once again more political overlap between the two as – despite Liveable Rotterdam's participation in the district elections – the Labour Party took seats in most district boards and Liveable Rotterdam did not. Both board and district boards declared new partnerships with each other and the districts signed covenants to contribute to the accomplishment of the board targets (Rotterdam 2006f).

> We had a meeting of Labour Party elected officials yesterday. We exchanged experiences and asked each other the question what went right and what should improve. The cooperation between city and districts has improved considerably to everyone's judgement. We know how to find each other and that helps to keep the city safe and make it social. With 26 elected officials we as Labour Party carry a great responsibility in Rotterdam and it is good to find out that all of us try our best to be approachable, to cooperate with others, and to really make a difference in our city (LP 2007).

All Liveable Rotterdam members who became district councilmen had to agree to Liveable Rotterdam's stance on the districts, which more or less meant that the districts would be abolished as soon as possible (interview Liveable Rotterdam council-

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man). Nevertheless, Pastors realised that his party members in the districts may grow accustomed to their role. One of the reasons to enter the districts for Liveable Rotterdam was that it opposed what it considered the 'patronage' and 'clientelism' of some subsidy relations in the districts. A national newspaper article about community work on the city's south bank provided Liveable Rotterdam with ammunition. It claimed that about 200 people, mainly from the Labour party, made most of the decisions on the city's south bank. Most of these decisions were characterised by 'non-transparency and smart acts of meddling', and some people were both connected to an institution giving assignments (for instance a district) as well as the institutions performing the task (for instance a community work organisation). According to a city marine, communication lines on the south bank were very short, with powerful people arranging things themselves, and for an outsider this system was hard to penetrate, as 'everyone has known each other for such a long time' (Volkskrant 16/1/2007). According to a former Labour Party district chairman who was dismissed by his district council, there 'traditionally was a strong connection between community workers, neighbourhood organisations and the Labour Party', and politics was characterised by nepotism and clientelism (AD 14/11/2008).

According to the Safety Bureau, the districts nevertheless had become more mature and professional in implementing safety policy and writing and making agreements for the neighbourhood safety action programmes. The intervention teams were also handed over to the districts and were generally welcomed. However, the rumour that the safety policy and thus these tasks would diminish reached the districts. In the beginning of 2007, the mayor visited all districts to emphasise that the neighbourhood safety programmes were still obligatory programmes and that the Safety Steering Group would check on their accomplishments. If a district did not yet have a 'District' Safety Steering Group he made sure to establish one. If a district did have one, he suggested that it should meet more often. When he suspected that a city district was reducing its efforts regarding safety, he intervened.

> It was suspected that the district somewhat declined in the approach. During his visit there, Opstelten mentioned he assigned a city marine to the district. When they asked, 'may we think about it' he replied 'fine, but he starts tomorrow at 8:30' (interview Safety Bureau civil servant).

Despite this, it appeared that several districts had adopted the safety approach method of writing neighbourhood safety action programmes. The formulation with targets and a 'who does what and when' paragraph was, after 2006, also evident in several social and even district board programmes. The districts had to write (social) 'neighbourhood action programmes' (NAPS) to indicate their efforts to contribute to the board's social programme. But the extra work did not end there. Over the years, they were also asked to write youth programmes and, if they were located on the south bank, they were also required to draft a separate programme for the South Pact. And the neighbourhoods that were part of the national programme for 'power

neighbourhoods' (*krachtwijken*) were also required to write a 'power neighbourhood' programme.

This number of projects not only increased the workload for the districts, but it also led to confusion. For example, one of the district neighbourhood coordinators wanted to appoint a project manager for the 'group approach'. She assumed she could get money for it from the safety approach and therefore wrote it down in the neighbourhood safety action programme. The Safety Steering Group however redirected her to the Social Steering Group, so she wrote it down in the neighbourhood [social] action programme. The Social Steering Group then directed her to the 'powerful neighbourhood programme' in which her neighbourhood participated. However, these plans were not yet ready and it was unclear how the national government would contribute, so she ended up writing the plan in the 'youth programme' that the board talked about at the time, but which was still in development. She eventually received part of the money from a city marine (interview district civil servant). In another district, there is someone who is engaged full-time in connecting the different programmes (interview district civil servant).

All of these obligations put pressure on the districts, a political level that was already regarded as weak by many central government politicians and civil servants. However, despite some critical reports there was little discussion or opportunity to change the district system. In 2006, a committee installed by mayor Opstelten reported on the district system. The committee concluded that 'a heavily equipped decentralised political level' limits the effectiveness of Rotterdam government (AD 17/2/2008). But the fate of this report was that of many others: it ended up 'in a large pile' (AD 17/2/2008). Even Van Heemst had to pull back from attempts to alter the system when he openly discussed the district system in the local newspaper. After party members called his remarks 'thoughtless', he declared that he would leave the system intact. Other party members found it regrettable that he addressed this issue in the media instead of within party lines (AD 13/6/2006; AD 26/11/2006).

7.3.5.   *Societal organisations and citizens*

The dramatic election result for the Labour Party in 2002 resonated for a long time within the Labour Party. In its evaluation of the result, it realised that it had been too internally focused and that it needed to reinforce contact with city inhabitants (NRC 27/4/2002). When the board convened in May 2006, it implemented a '100-day programme', visiting different places in the city and talking with people (Rotterdam 2006d). According to an observer, it had learned from 2002 and the 'Liveable Rotterdam board' (interview). One of the aldermen promised 'to visit something in Rotterdam' twice a week (interview). There were 'alderman talks' (*wethoudersgesprekken*) where an alderman spoke with citizens regarding a specific theme connected to the board programme. In 2008, ten alderman talks were held (Rotterdam 2008c: 15). The plan was that this would lead to a 'bond of Rotterdam' (*band van Rotterdam*), a network of 1000 Rotterdam citizens that could function as a sort of advisory body for the board

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(NRT Augustus 2007). In 2008, the bond of Rotterdam consisted of 300 people (Rotterdam 2008c: 16). From October 2007 until June 2008, the board organised a series of 'educational debates' (*opvoedingsdebatten*) to talk about how to raise children. In the first meeting, about a hundred people attended (NRT December/January 2007/2008). On June 28, 2008, about 250 people attended the 'City Conference' to discuss the first two years of board policy (Rotterdam 2008c: 16).

The 'Rotterdam Idea' (*Rotterdam Idee*), a large project in terms of funding, awarded 100 citizens' initiatives with a maximum of 5,000 Euros each (Rotterdam 2006d: 12). In 2007, half a million Euros was available for the project in which people were encouraged to submit ideas that would improve the liveability of their neighbourhood (www.rotterdamidee.nl). In June 2007, about eight months after the start, almost 800 ideas had been entered. According to the local newspaper, the majority of project ideas came from institutions such as community development organisations that wanted to get funding for projects that had been unable to fund in the past (AD 31/10/2006; interview observer). Many projects also continued such as *Opzoomeren*. A total of 1,600 streets were planned to be maintained and the number of street agendas were to increase from 250 to 500 (Rotterdam 2006d: 12).

Based on the efforts of the previous board, the 2006-2010 board also wanted to make some structural changes in city government to be of service to citizens. The board wanted to install 'city shops', places where inhabitants could go for all municipal services. Moreover, it aimed to have one phone number, one internet shop, and one postal- and email address for the entire city (Rotterdam 2006d: 30).

After 2006, the districts in general still preferred to organise citizen participation with minimal interference from the municipal board, meaning still a bit 'old fashioned' (interview Safety Bureau civil servant). A representative from the SBR was critical of the way districts involved citizens and believed that the genuine influence of citizens on policymaking was limited (interview SBR member). The board upheld the importance of the views and opinions from citizens. Large-scale surveys for the safety index continued and were also developed for the new social index. The board also continued to assess its performance by measuring public perceptions (see table 9).

Table 9: Percentages of respondents who agree or strongly agree with statements in a citizens' survey by Rotterdam research agency COS. These figures have at most 1% discrepancy (COS 2005; COS 2007).

Image of the municipal boards	Spring 2007	October 2005	October 2004	October 2003
Stands for values and norms	40	39	38	40
Has brought improvement of municipal services	32	38	37	38
Explains well what and why they do	30	35	42	36
Shows decisiveness	28	34	36	25
Tolerates few infringements/breaches of the rules	25	28	32	21
Quickly addresses big problems	22	24	28	19
Does not let citizens pay for extra costs	17	15	17	14
Discards unnecessary (municipal) rules	13	16	17	15

Several non-governmental organisations are important in implementing board policy. The participation of non-governmental actors necessary for the municipality's social programme included schools, health care organisations, and community workers. With community work, the municipality, mainly the districts, maintained contract relationships, meaning that they were paid with municipal money to perform certain tasks, such as implementing projects for and with citizens. Other organisations such as schools or health care organisations were hard to align as they only receive a small portion from their resources from local government. Alderman Geluk said that he worked on the basis of 'persuasion' with schools, but has no 'means of pressure' (Binnenlands Bestuur 17/8/2007). Regarding the housing corporations, pressure is also hardly possible. According to alderman Karakus 'local government is no longer responsible for the housing corporations, but you do have to do business with them', sometimes through 'a strategy of seduction'. In general, the municipality played the role of 'big brother', bringing corporations, commercial project developers, and others together (Elsevier 28/2/2009b). Alderman Kriens said that she talked with these organisations mainly behind closed doors (interview).

Regarding business, board policy was directed mainly to small entrepreneurs. Alderman Schrijers was a strong proponent for easier conditions for small business startups, through programmes such as the Business Improvement Districts (Rotterdam 2006d: 24). Entrepreneurs and other societal leaders were invited to participate with citizens to create new programmes or goals regarding the future of the city. One ex-

ample is the 'City Vision' (*Stadsvisie*) programme, created based on consultations with citizens, districts, educational organisations, corporations, and project developers (Rotterdam 2007a).

7.3.6. *Summary*

The most important change in 2006 was that the Labour Party achieved a place in the political coalition and Liveable Rotterdam became an oppositional party. However the new board upheld the support for the safety approach and the combination of repression and prevention. The safety approach was strongly upheld by the mayor and Safety Steering Group even though the approach seemed to be in a phase of consolidation and several governmental actors saw less urgency than between 2002 and 2006. The board also kept promoting citizens' participation; the electoral results in 2002 especially made the Labour Party aware of this necessity. This view was reflected in several old and new projects, but nevertheless actual influence in policy remained somewhat limited as citizen input into policy making mainly resided with the districts and was manifested through surveys, not in projects influencing board policy.

7.4. Resources

7.4.1. *Introduction*

This section discusses the development of Rotterdam's resources after 2006. It also looks into the functioning of the municipal organisation and whether several of the measures such as targets and a focus on implementation were maintained.

7.4.2. *A dual electoral mandate*

From an electoral standpoint, the Labour Party seemed to quickly recover from its electoral loss in 2002. Translating non-local elections into municipal council seats, the Labour Party in Rotterdam could count on eighteen municipal council seats in 2003, sixteen in 2004, and fifteen in 2005 (COS 2006b).[25] However, Liveable Rotterdam participated in none of these non-local elections, which adds to the fact that such a calculation is of course somewhat arbitrary. Most local election polls before the 2006 election predicted good results for the Labour Party and small losses for Liveable Rotterdam. Only one poll, after Pastors' resignation, indicated that Liveable Rotterdam would win seats and would become larger than the Labour Party (see table 10; Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006: 240; Tops 2007: 274).

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[25] Respectively the national elections in 2003, provincial elections in 2004, and European elections in 2005.

Table 10: Number of seats for Liveable Rotterdam (LR) and the Labour Party on the basis of opinion polls administered by two agencies, here labelled A and B)

	Result March 2002	Oct. 2005 (A)	Dec. 2005 (A)	Jan. 2006 (B)	Feb. 2006 (B)	Feb. 2006 (B)	March 2006 (A)	Result March 2006
LR	17	12	19	9	11	13	15	14
Labour	11	14	12	21	20	21	17	18

On March 7, 2006, election day, many people, politicians, and journalists gathered in city hall to hear the results of what the papers have labelled the 'clash of the Titans' (AD 8/3/2006) and the 'battle of Rotterdam' (Volkskrant 2/3/2006). In the end, the Labour Party won over 37% of the votes, eighteen municipal council seats, and Liveable Rotterdam almost 30%, which translated into fourteen municipal council seats. According to Pastors, 'a splendid result... but not good enough', even though Liveable Rotterdam was an exception from other local or Liveable parties that lost in many Dutch municipalities (Volkskrant 8/3/2006; Telegraaf 8/3/2006).[26] The Labour Party's victory was much more in line with national results as it won in almost every Dutch municipality (Telegraaf 8/3/2006). The 2002-2006 political coalition of Liveable Rotterdam, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party together possessed only twenty council seats, not enough for a majority in the municipal council.

A short analysis of the votes (COS 2006b)

The turnout of over 58% was higher than it was in 2002 and almost as high as the national average. In 2002, in neighbourhoods with many people earning a high income, a larger percentage voted than in neighbourhoods with many people earning a low income. In 2006, this relationship disappeared (from R2 about 0.65 towards about 0.4). At the neighbourhood level, there was a strong division between Liveable Rotterdam and Labour Party voters. The Labour Party was the largest party in 37 neighbourhoods, while Liveable Rotterdam was the largest in 30. Even looking at the level of individual voting districts, a division is evident: the Labour Party was the largest in 212 districts, Liveable Rotterdam in 171. (In 3 voting districts they got an equal amount of votes and in 3 others the Liberal Party was the largest.) And the higher the number of Liveable Rotterdam votes in a neighbourhood, the smaller the victory of the Labour Party there.

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[26] In The Hague and Amsterdam, the Liveable parties did not achieve any municipal council seat. In Utrecht, the liveable party fell back from fourteen to three council seats.

The COS researchers further noted a stronger distinction between the votes for Liveable Rotterdam and those for the Labour Party than was the case in 2002. The Labour Party received more votes in neighbourhoods with a lot of people from a foreign origin ($R2 = 0.9$), many of which did not vote before. In neighbourhoods with more voters from a foreign origin, the percentage of people that voted for Liveable Rotterdam decreased ($R2 = 0.75$). Other characteristics that contributed to a vote for the Labour Party were the number of people with a low income ($R2 = 0.75$) and people that benefit from welfare ($R2 = 0.75$). The larger the share of these groups in the total neighbourhood population, the higher the percentage of people in that neighbourhood that voted for the Labour Party. Liveable Rotterdam lost votes because some of its voters stayed at home, others voted for the Labour Party. Liveable Rotterdam however did attract some voters who previously voted for the Liberal Party. Finally, the number of votes for Liveable Rotterdam did not correlate with the scores on the safety index – that is, there was no proportionally large vote for Liveable Rotterdam in neighbourhoods that improved considerably according to the safety index. Regarding votes for the party leaders, Liveable Rotterdam again scored high (79%) compared to the Labour Party (50%), Liberal Party (58%), and the Christian Democratic Party (69%).

A poll administered by the University of Amsterdam during the election campaign provided more signals about the voting preferences of Rotterdam voters (Volkskrant 25/2/2006). Even though Liveable Rotterdam in that poll only gained 20% of the votes, 40% of Rotterdam voters would, on national level, vote for either Fortuyn's national list or Wilders' Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*). This indicated that there was still fertile ground for Fortuyn and Fortuyn-minded parties. The Freedom Party was established on national level by former Liberal Party national parliament member Geert Wilders. The party did very well in the polls. The Freedom Party announced that it would probably participate in the 2010 municipal elections in a number of cities, including Rotterdam. Since Liveable Rotterdam feared that the two parties might partly appeal to the same voters, it was not keen on the Freedom Party's participation. The Freedom Party was considered more radical than Liveable Rotterdam. It would not accept Aboutaleb and propose that streets should only have a maximum of 50% of people from a foreign origin (AD 9/3/2009). According to Pastors, that last proposal, which would force people to move just for being of foreign origin, 'goes too far even for us' (AD 8/3/2009).

Nevertheless, in Rotterdam there was support for such policy or at least a fiercer stand regarding integration and immigrants. From the Rotterdam voters, 62% agreed that it is regrettable that mosques increasingly dominate the street image (among Labour Party voters this support was 52%; among Liveable Rotterdam voters 82%). And a large majority, also from Labour Party voters, supported the statement that 'criminal Antilleans should be deported'.

On the other hand, a lot of voters of foreign origin had also voted in the 2006 council election. While in the poll, only 5% mentioned 'improving integration of minorities' as something the municipality should act on, the newspaper predicted that Pastors harsh tone on integration would attract a large proportion of people of foreign origin to the voting booth. This prediction came true (COS 2006b), even though events on the national level also played a role in this turnout. For instance, the Liberal Party secretary of state for integration stirred up controversy during the campaign and through her policy on integration and immigration and seemed responsible for the large turn out of non-Dutch inhabitants at the municipal elections (e.g. Tops 2007: 277). In Rotterdam, many of the non-Dutch Labour Party voters voted for a non-Dutch candidate. In turn, the Liveable Rotterdam faction mainly consisted of people from a Dutch origin. This meant that not only the electorate was different: 'the Rotterdam municipal council will make clear in an instance what happened.... Left of the mayor is the coloured Labour Party faction, to his right the people from a Dutch origin from Liveable Rotterdam' (Volkskrant 10/3/2006).

The Labour Party interpreted the election result as a dual assignment. Councilman Cremers announced: 'We do not only want to build bridges towards the people from a foreign origin, but also to the embittered Liveable Rotterdam voter' (AD 8/3/2006). Van Heemst and several elected councilmen felt that the electoral result meant a division in Rotterdam, but also the task of overcoming that division (e.g. LP 2006b: 3).

> *Interviewer: The city is largely divided into two camps, you said. What do you mean?*
> Mayor: When I talk to some people from a Dutch origin, I notice their fear of numerically being trampled; a fear of losing their own identity. What is interesting is when you talk to people from a foreign origin, many of them share the same fear. The last thing you should do is downplay those feelings. You have to take them seriously (mayor Aboutaleb cited in AD 18/4/2009).

This division and a harshening of views were also visible when looking at the voting results from Rotterdam voters in the 2009 European election. These results show that the Freedom Party is the largest Rotterdam party with 22.5% (about ten municipal council seats), the Labour Party received 15% (about seven municipal council seats) (ANP 4/6/2009). According to mayor Aboutaleb that does not say much: 'The turnout that has not reached 30% [in Rotterdam] was very low. Moreover, people from a foreign origin are hardly interested in the European elections. They are a substantial part of the Labour Party's support' (AD 5/6/2009). Pastors however saw the result as a clear indication that the voters were fed up with the Labour Party and in local elections both the Freedom Party and his party will have a chance to do well (AD 5/6/2006).

7.4.3. Resources for the safety coalition

Much like in the former period, the mayor and the Safety Bureau are important in maintaining the safety approach (see section 7.3.3). The good national economic situa-

tion, some financial reallocations in the services – much to their dismay –, and the sale of the Garbage Disposal Rijnmond (*Afval Verwerking Rijnmond*) provided the board with 200 million Euros, which is enough money to support both the existing programmes such as the safety approach as well as the new social programme.

The political coalition made large amounts of money available for social measures (150 million Euros), participation and integration (100 million Euros), and environment (70 million Euros). The 2007 budget mainly followed the expenses already announced. The executive would spend 53 million Euros on the social programme in 2007, 215 million Euros total for the entire four years. For safety the figure was 92 million Euros (Stadskrant 2006; see also Rotterdam 2006g). Regarding the budget for 2008, the board wanted to donate another five million Euros for Dutch language courses. Funding for safety also increased. An extra 6.5 million Euros would be available for the dismantlement of marijuana plantations and five million to control disruptive youth. Despite the large sums for the social programme, the safety manager was satisfied.

> I think [Rotterdam] politics, especially the Labour Party, has shifted. On several aspects there is even a competition with Liveable Rotterdam, because the Labour Party at once wanted five million Euros extra [for safety]. We never asked for it, but all of a sudden received five million Euros extra, well fine (interview safety manager).

7.4.4.   *Aligning the organisation*

The 2006-2010 board wanted to maintain some of the previous board's methods regarding the municipal organisation, now labelled as the 'Rotterdam Approach' (*Rotterdamse Aanpak*). According to the board, this approach consists of four elements (Rotterdam 2006d: 5):
   1. Firm choices, clear priorities
   2. Emphasis on implementation
   3. Accountability, measuring achievement against predetermined goals
   4. Responsiveness to what inhabitants and entrepreneurs have to say, giving space for citizen initiatives and facilitating them where necessary.

This list was based on the Local Memorandum 2006 (Rotterdam 2006e: 3). This section deals with how three out of the four parts of this approach have developed. (Citizen participation has already been dealt with in section 7.3.5.)

New priorities

The board programme contains four priorities (social, safety, housing, economy). The board can thus claim that it focused more than the previous board since that board's programme contained five priorities. The social programme however is an umbrella in itself. It encompasses several plans and projects.

> Policy plan makers work overtime in Rotterdam The board… presents an action programme on almost a weekly basis. For less obese children, cleaner air, an attractive inner city, child-friendly neighbourhoods, poverty reduction, cared-for elders, creative entrepreneurs, and the revival of the south bank, to name just a few (editorial introduction in NRT October 2007).

Friends and foes recognised that the social problems Rotterdam faced were large and demanded action. Many stakeholders thus praised the intention of the board to deal with them. However, participants regarded the social field as a tough terrain to gain results on, much more difficult than the safety field. According to them, the safety approach also faced the largest problems with issues related to social themes.

> In the safety programme, youth is the most complicated issue. And they did not start with it. They started with the personal approach, the *Keileweg*, the hot spots, and the city marines (interview municipal service director).

> [The district of] Spangen has become safe in about three, four years, physically okay in ten years, but social cohesion, if possible in this day and age, takes fifteen years at least (interview safety manager).

Moreover, to achieve all the results the board has set for itself, it needs the participation of a broad array of actors. And while the police and district attorney are somewhat accustomed to hierarchy and could be persuaded to work with targets, schools, housing corporations, welfare organisations, and health organisations are less willing. The social theme also has to be translated to different sub-sectors such as employment, education, participation, youth policy, et cetera. According to participants: 'It does not make much sense to talk with schools about the urgency of 'social' as they only care about schools. Thus you have to talk with people from that sector about the educational urgency and not that of 'social'' (interview). The same can be noted from other sub-fields as well. This means that the social programme can be broken apart into several sub-projects. Some even say the social programme is a project carousel, similar to the safety project carousel in 2000. This should not have to be a problem in itself, as also the safety approach after 2002 can be labelled as a project carousel (Tops, Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops 2007), but the key factor is whether a connection exists between all these projects. The social programme looked for that connection, but has not yet found it (2008). According to the opposition, the board wanted to do too much and keep everybody happy (therefore also explaining the desire for the 'broad political coalition', see section 7.5.2). On the district level, first experiments started with 'integral neighbourhood programmes'. These programmes not only included the priorities for that neighbourhood regarding the social programme, but also those regarding safety, housing, and economy.

Just as in the 2002-2006 board, the 2006-2010 board programme's goals were translated into targets. Nevertheless, some questions arose at the end of the 2002-2006 legislative period. To understand some of the discussions after 2006, it is necessary to first look at that period again. The targets for the 2002-2006 board programme were established in the summer of 2002. When civil servants found out that the board assigned much importance to these 'targets', the first questions emerged. First was the way they were formulated. Since many civil servants could not see the impact of the targets when they helped to formulate them in 2002, according to some participants it was possible that some of the targets 'did not have the most optimal formulation' (interview civil servant). But the discussions were more fundamental as well. What was, for instance, the use of 'putting the 700 most disruptive addicts in a treatment programme for three consecutive months'? What would happen after three months?

These discussions however did not often reach centre stage. Working with targets was complicated enough as it was (interview civil servants). The fact that there were targets and the board gave them such strong political backing was a strong enough statement. This was considered quite an improvement coming from the 'failed beacons' (see section 4.4.6).

In the end of the 2002-2006 legislative period, discussions emerged again, partly due to the local court of audit's report which shows a clear difference between the way the board regarded its results on the numerous targets and the way the local court of audit did. This led to more discussions to establish tangible, well-defined criteria. For instance, with the housing target, what counts as achievement: a finished construction or the plan to build? Also around the City Etiquette streets, some civil servants mentioned that the desired implementation in streets with low social cohesion was not always met. It was much easier to implement the project in streets that already had a certain level of social cohesion. Finally, it was also possible that the target partly failed through its own success and/or the target was too ambitious. Some districts for instance complained that they did not have many nuisance-causers, so they found it hard to comply with their part of 'taking 700 disruptive people of the street'. Also in time, complying with a target could become more difficult, such as a target to close a certain number of dwellings.

> I had to deal with about 250 dwellings and for this, I visited 500. At a certain time I visited 1000 and could only close 200... This due to the fact that the approach worked (interview civil servant).

However, what results in 2006 was that working with the targets had been a fruitful way of working, especially considering the history of the failed beacons. This was also something that the Labour party and the local court of audit could agree with (Volkskrant 10/2/2005). After 2006, the board wanted to uphold this way of working

and formulated 23 targets, many of them divided into several sub targets (see table 11).

Table 11: several board targets from the 2006-2010 board programme (Rotterdam 2006d)

1. 20.000 Rotterdam inhabitants, educators, women, and people looking for work start a programme aimed at language and participation. Minimal 70% of these programmes will be successfully completed.
7. a) Annually, 450 of the most disruptive and/or criminal adults are placed in a personal approach directed trajectory. b) From the 1,500 youth until the age of 23 that… cause nuisance, 90% are placed in a treatment programme. c) 700 Antilleans each year are placed in a treatment programme.
12. a) 12,800 new dwellings will start construction between 2006 and 2009 (3200 each year), from which: - 4500 ground bounded dwellings - 1500 specifically for elders - 2200 in the inner city (including *Kop van Zuid*) - 500 affordable houses for young starters in and around the inner city b) 400 starters loans are distributed to buyers of houses between 2006 and 2009.

The board again strongly supported the targets. An aide of one of the alderman said that the board even did so in a forced way, including the alderman: 'he does not want to hear about a failure of the targets'. Again, this seemed to overshadow the discussion on the value of the targets themselves. According to stakeholders, especially in the social programme, the targets have to be achieved even though one of the aldermen also agreed that there was a high risk that when the targets were achieved, the goal might be missed (interview civil servant).

> We do it more than before. In such a strong effort, it becomes counterproductive. The 'traffic light model' [that indicates if a target is on course] becomes more a goal than a means. We only focus on what goes wrong; the council is not interested in 'green'. Recently we received a letter, probably from the city manager's club, to look again at the report for the board and if all the green really was green. You could hear the whole corridor laughing (interview civil servant).

The opposition in 2007 criticised the board for the fact that on the integration theme no targets were formulated. Pastors could not understand why the board did not do so on such an important issue (interview). Nevertheless, the targets became more embedded within the municipal organisation after 2006 than was the case before. The districts had to work with targets for the neighbourhood safety action programmes,

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but after 2006, it showed up in some district board programmes too. The district board of *Charlois* for instance mentioned that it based its new plans on the 1999 'neighbourhood visions', but nevertheless formulated all goals in a 'target-way'. And also in the services, the targets trickled down. Several civil servants said that they have 'personal targets' while before 2006 there were 'department targets' or 'group targets' at most (interviews). Sometimes the targets even had a symbolic way of working. The internal computer network of the Social Affairs and Employment service for instance showed a counter that displayed the number of people on welfare. The 'target' was to stay below 30,000 (interview civil servant).

The local court of audit followed the Rotterdam proceedings regarding the targets and was pleased that they were applied again. It noted that this working style had also become more common in the Netherlands. The national government for instance presented its own targets in June 2007. Nevertheless, Rotterdam court of audit chairman Mul thinks national government could still learn a lot from the way Rotterdam formulated them since those were much more concrete and measurable (Binnenlands Bestuur 22/6/2007).

Implementation difficulties

The 2006-2010 board members wanted to show that the 'social approach' was essentially different from the safety approach and they did not want the social programme to reside under the safety programme. 'You do not only act on education on behalf of safety' (interview alderman).

The social programme however had much more difficulty in maintaining a similar emphasis on implementation as did the safety approach. The social programme was led by a 'Social Steering Group' (*Stuurgroep Sociaal*) that was led by four aldermen from three parties (Kriens, Geluk, Kaya, Schrijer). Within the social programme, there were several sub programmes that were being led by individual aldermen, such as the South Pact, led by alderman Schrijer. Within the Social Steering Group, each alderman had his or her own points of attention.

> Kriens deals with social policy and the 'Societal Support Act' (*Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning*). That includes the participation of youth. But participation is Kaya's portfolio and youth is Geluk's portfolio. Karakus is responsible for housing and living. Schrijer has the Large City Policy [of which housing is part]. That is complicated. Integration is Kaya's responsibility, but what really matters, women, nuisance, are other aldermen's competences (interview civil servant).

According to participants, this involvement led to complexity when issues were discussed. Several compared it to the Safety Steering Group where the mayor was the clear boss and only the safety point of view mattered (interviews). In the Social

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Steering Group, discussions were larger and accompanied by 'piles of paper' (interview civil servant).

> I was in the Social Steering Group to discuss [Polish guest labourers]. In the Safety Steering Group, the focus is clear, that is nuisance. In the Social Steering Group there is an alderman who approaches the problem from a social perspective, someone that does so from a social-economical perspective, and someone who looks at it from a physical-infrastructural perspective (interview civil servant).

There was more criticism on the social approach's way of working. Apart from a Social Steering Group, there was a 'director', who sat with a small group of civil servants in city hall, and a 'Social Direction Team'. The Social Direction Team was initiated top-down and prepared the agenda for the Social Steering Group. Civil servants, especially those experienced with both Steering Groups, noticed what the bureaucracy around the social programme led to.

> We make something for our alderman. The service also writes something. That is then offered to the Social Direction Team. That team also has to give its opinion on it. My director is in that Team and consequently comes back for advice. It is a large split and indicates bureaucracy. Not until all that is done, it will go to the Social Steering Group, and sometimes it even is discussed in the board as well (interview civil servant).

Such processes led to much delay. Civil servants, especially in the districts, noticed that many of these plans and resources from the social programme took a long time to arrive (interviews). Council members also had some worries about the implementation of the social programme. Liveable Rotterdam thinks that the board is not effective and Labour Party faction leader Van Heemst had a hard time keeping oversight (Van Heemst, municipal council debate 13/11/2008).

7.4.5. Summary

As an opposition party, Liveable Rotterdam in 2006 lost its hold on important resources such as formal control over the administration and budget. The new 'Labour Party board' took this over. While the Labour Party felt that the electoral outcome provided a strong mandate for more attention to social policy, it could not ignore the voter support for Liveable Rotterdam and in general the growing support for parties that take on similar stands, especially regarding immigrants. The board also wanted to maintain working with targets and a focus on implementation. The targets even reached lower levels in the organisation than before 2002. The focus on implementation within the social programme however faced more difficulty after 2006. Making different plans and programmes took time, and the harmonisation between all the approaches especially limited implementation of the social programme.

7.5. Scheme of cooperation

7.5.1. Introduction

This section will discuss the scheme of cooperation that Rotterdam's political coalition used to come together in 2006. This section sketches the process of political formation and the way the municipal board worked following that formation. The safety coalition has already been discussed in section 7.3.3.

7.5.2. Political negotiation

After the 2006 municipal council election, the leader of the largest party, Van Heemst, was expected to take the initiative for a new political coalition. But this did not prove easy. Before the elections, Pastors already announced that he would not to step into a political coalition with the Labour Party and the Liberal Party said the same (Telegraaf 9/3/2006). Christian Democratic leader Geluk talked with Van Heemst on a possible coalition after the elections (AD 21/2/2006), but also Geluk announced that he wanted to continue board policy (Telefgraaf 21/3/2006).

After the election, Liberal Party leader Van Gent resigned and was succeeded by councilman Harbers. Geluk announced that he was not fond of a coalition that included the Socialist Party. The Green Party in turn preferred that the Socialist Party would be included, but did not want to work with the Christian Democratic Party (Telegraaf 9/3/2006). The Liberal Party announced that a Labour Party/Socialist Party/Green Party coalition made sense looking at the electoral result (Trouw 10/3/2006).

Pastors' refusal to engage in a coalition with the Labour Party did not resonate with a poll prior to the election. According to that poll, 43% of Liveable Rotterdam voters were in favour of a coalition with the Labour Party while 40% favoured the continuation of the current coalition. In comparison, only 20% of the Labour Party voters favoured a coalition with Liveable Rotterdam (Volkskrant 25/2/2006).

It was expected that Van Heemst would opt for an *informateur* again to find out which parties could form a coalition, and on March 10, Christian Democratic Party member Boekhoud took up this job (Trouw 10/3/2006). Van Heemst gave the informateur an assignment to form a coalition that was 'as broad as possible' (Trouw 13/3/2006). Van Heemst said that he preferred a coalition with Liveable Rotterdam. Reacting to the tone in the campaign, Van Heemst (later in an interview with Pastors) replied 'Ah, well…. That was the campaign' (AD 22/12/2006). Van Heemst preferred to avoid a 'left-wing' coalition between the Labour Party, the Socialist Party, and the Green Party as he considered such a coalition 'not broad enough' to solve Rotterdam's problems (Telegraaf 21/3/2006).

Liveable Rotterdam sent the *informateur* a letter saying that it did not want to talk with him: 'We cannot cooperate with policy that will lead to more beggars in the city centre, more black schools, more black neighbourhoods, more uncontrolled subsidies, and the wrong people that are being protected' (NRC 17/3/2006). This surprised Van Heemst. He regarded the content of the message premature; the talks would have to show if such differences between the parties indeed existed and if cooperation would be possible. Nevertheless, now that the message was there, Van Heemst realised that talks with Liveable Rotterdam would amount to nothing (AD 18/3/2006). Christian Democratic leader Geluk at that moment was not opposed to cooperating with the Labour Party: 'It is no secret that we had a large difference of opinion with Liveable regarding the tone and integration. On these points we feel more at home with the Labour Party' (AD 20/3/2006).

Van Heemst now turned his attention to a coalition between the Labour Party, the Socialist Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. This represented Van Heemst's desire for a broad coalition, as there were more parties than necessary, together they possessed 27 council seats, and these parties represented continuity and renewal. The Liberal Party and Christian Democratic Party would continue from the former coalition and the Labour Party and the Socialist Party, the two winners of the 2006 election, would complement the coalition and would be its new members (AD 20/3/2006). To make this coalition possible, Van Heemst hoped that the Socialist Party and Liberal Party, the parties ideologically the most far detached, would make a 'great gesture' towards each other. Socialist Party leader Cornelissen was surprised with this remark: 'I do not mind to talk, but wonder what gesture I should make and in which way I should make it'. Cornelissen nevertheless expected difficult negotiations: 'Regarding the continuation of safety [policy] we all agree, but regarding dealing with unemployment or poverty, our vision is completely different than that of the Liberal Party' (AD 20/3/2006). Liberal Party leader Harbers also did not mind negotiating, but could not think of two larger political opposites than the Liberal Party and the Socialist Party (AD 20/3/2006). Christian Democratic Party leader Geluk was also a bit doubtful that continuation of policy was possible with the Socialist Party (Telegraaf 21/3/2006).

A few days later, Liberal Party leader Harbers made his view clear: the views of the Socialist Party were too far detached from that of the Liberal Party and cooperation would not be possible (NRC 22/3/2006). According to Harbers, differences regarding housing, infrastructure, and public transport were irreconcilable. The Socialist Party also found out that other parties were reluctant to meet its demand of stopping the demolition of neighbourhood *Nieuw Crooswijk* (FD 28/4/2006).

Van Heemst was not amused that first Liveable Rotterdam did not want to talk to the *informateur* and now the Liberal Party did not want to talk with the Socialist Party. After a brief promise to strive for a 'small base coalition', he quickly promised again to strive for a broad coalition, but this time with the Green Party instead of the Socialist Party. While this was expected to provoke similar problems with the Liberal Party re-

garding issues such as the Rotterdam Airport, the expansion of the harbour, and the Rotterdam Law (AD 11/4/2006), the Liberal Party responded positively. The Liberal Party professed to 'hold good memories' of cooperation with the Green Party in earlier boards. When Van Heemst in addition announced a generous division of aldermen, three for his party, two for the Christian Democratic Party, two for the Liberal Party, and one for the Green Party, negotiations proceeded smoothly. According to Van Heemst this generosity showed the ability of parties to overcome political antagonisms (Ref. Dagblad 11/4/2006). In a personal interview, he later stated that this was just one of his ways to show the Labour Party had genuinely changed since 2002. Other ways included the following: he as Labour Party leader would not be an alderman for his party, but would lead his faction (and party) in the municipal council; the list of municipal councilmen candidates did not explicitly include aldermen (aldermen would be found after the election); the Labour Party electoral campaign emphasised good things [from the opponents]; the willingness (and desire) from him and the Labour Party to engage in a broad coalition; and finally by not demanding an informateur from the Labour Party, but agreeing with a Christian Democratic informateur.

Van Heemst's decision to only ask for three aldermen led to criticism within his party. Former Labour Party mayor Peper called it 'ridiculous' and wondered if the Labour Party had 'lost the ability to count?' 'In my days we kept as many parties excluded' (AD 13/4/2006). However, Van Heemst did not share the critique: 'That is old men politics, I do not do that. I am a proponent of a Labour Party that cooperates' (Havenloods 17/5/2007).

When the political coalition presented itself in May 2006, Van Heemst emphasised the balance between continuity and renewal. The Green Party gave in to several measures such as the continuation of using the Rotterdam Law. The political coalition nevertheless indicated that more attention would go to social issues and an explicit wish of the Green Party to investigate the effectiveness of preventive frisking was granted. Money also seemed to be part of the negotiations. Green Party leader Kaya received a portfolio to which a budget of 100 million Euros was attached (NRC 12/5/2006). The Liberal Party was again given the responsibility for the harbour.

In internal meetings, all political parties from the political coalition did not obstruct the formation of the coalition (e.g. LP 2006c). After the political coalition was formed, the partners worked on a coalition accord. The civil service was also involved in this, mainly by presenting its plans and programmes, so the political negotiators could take them into account when writing their own plans (interview participant).

7.5.3. Trust and cooperation

Van Heemst's desire to establish a broad coalition led to a political coalition of the Labour Party, the Green Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. The Labour Party nevertheless by far was the largest party and Van Heemst was aware of its dominance.

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> I am well aware that this board is our [Labour Party] board. Its success is our success. If it fails, it will affect the Labour Party. That is why it is very important it works as a close team (LP 2006d).

According to some (former) alderman it was harder to come to agreement when the board includes four parties instead of two or three. Some interviewees also noted that they found it somewhat strange that the leader of the largest party was not part of the board, but resided in the municipal council (interviews).

The board faced some internal personnel shifts and problems. In 2007, alderman De Boer (Liberal Party) resigned due to health reasons. Friction emerged somewhat later around alderman Kaya. He was already criticised for the City Citizenship report that was regarded as 'vague' and 'nothing new' (see section 7.2.5). When it later turned out that there were also insufficient checks on subsidy provision regarding the 'Rotterdam Idea', criticism increased (AD 24/7/2008). Kaya politically survived the uproar as he was still supported by his coalition partners in the municipal council. However, one year later, in the summer of 2008, he resigned. According to him, because Van Heemst had demanded his resignation and had used power play as leader of the largest party: 'Now I do not fit in Van Heemst's picture anymore. He was with eighteen seats the largest and has the last word' (AD 10/8/2008). Van Heemst denied he had forced Kaya to resign, but alderman Kriens (Labour Party) mentioned that the coalition partners had given Kaya a 'last chance' and some months to prove himself (AD 10/8/2008). And less than one year later, the Liberal Party stepped out of the political coalition due to unclear (Arabic) remarks of professor Ramadan, an external advisor of the municipal government, regarding homosexuals' and women's rights (AD 22/4/2009). The Liberal Party aldermen declared that they were not satisfied that the Green Party did not allow them their own view on the matter (AD 22/4/2009). A few months later, alderman Geluk also resigned. He wanted to start a new job in the beginning of 2010 (AD 7/6/2006).

7.5.4. Summary

Labour Party leader Van Heemst opted for a 'broad coalition' to do justice to Rotterdam's electoral results and the 'dual assignment' following. Political negotiation and concessions led to a political coalition and board of four parties: the Labour Party, the Green Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. Van Heemst as leader of the largest party did not become an alderman, but decided to lead his faction in the municipal council. He wanted the board to function as a unity, but the resignation of Green Party alderman Kaya led to the first cracks in the coalition. The Liberal Party withdrew from the coalition less than one year later and by that time – for several reasons – alderman De Boer and Geluk also resigned.

7.6.   Conclusion

After the 2006 municipal council election, the *agenda* of safety policy, even though less influential towards other policy themes, was maintained in intensity. The underlying paradigm of an active intervening government and reciprocity towards its citizens was also maintained and applied in the social programme, a new priority of the new board. Regarding the *coalition*, the Labour Party became part of the political coalition and board again and Liveable Rotterdam as the oppositional party had to leave both. The safety coalition remained unchanged, but faced some replacements, particularly the departure of the mayor and safety manager. Regarding *resources*, the electoral results were generally interpreted as a dual assignment, pleasing both the Labour Party voter as well as the Liveable Rotterdam voter. Apart from that, the board upheld the practice of working with targets, which became more strongly embedded in the organisation. The focus on implementation however faced difficulty and that became mainly visible in the social programme. Regarding the *scheme of cooperation*, political negotiations again formed the basis of a new political coalition, but the broad coalition also had more difficulty in putting differences aside.

CHAPTER 8 POLITICAL CHANGE AND URBAN REGIME ANALYSIS IN ROTTERDAM AND DUTCH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter, we return to the central research question:

Is 'urban regime' a valuable concept in analysing political change in Dutch local government, particularly Rotterdam's safety policy between 1998 and 2008?

The mainstream theory about Dutch politics and policymaking is that it takes place through a system and culture of consensus and accommodation. This insight proved useful in explaining Dutch politics throughout most of the twentieth century (Lijphart 1968; Andeweg, Irwin 2002), a time characterised by a stable political/electoral landscape that seldom saw harsh polarisation. This characterisation is equally true for Rotterdam, the second largest city in the Netherlands.

In 2002, Rotterdam's stable political landscape was fiercely disrupted by Liveable Rotterdam, an anti-establishment party whose entrée captured 34.7% of the votes. This landslide achievement was preceded by a harsh and polarising campaign. Rotterdam's 2002 situation was thus at odds with the previously mentioned characteristics attached to accommodation and consensus politics. Also, because change in such a context is understood to happen gradually, the question arises as to how changes in Rotterdam could have taken place, as it seems there have been several since 2002. For the purposes of this study, I have been examining the concept of 'urban regime' to see if it can shed light on this issue. A chronological analysis of the elements that constitute an urban regime and an exploration of how Dutch communities 'pursue problem-solving capacities' might explain why the political agenda of Liveable Rotterdam (or at least large parts of it) was implemented between 2002 and 2006 and maintained after 2006.

This final chapter contains the results of this research. The second section of this chapter lays out the mainstream understanding of how political change takes place in the Netherlands and why that characterisation of accommodation and consensus has been under some pressure from recent Dutch political developments, certainly in Rotterdam. The third section analyses what changed in Rotterdam politics between 1998 and 2008, based on Liveable Rotterdam's 2002 political agenda, mainly in terms of safety policy. The fourth section analyses how these changes have taken place by looking at them from an urban regime perspective and asks what that perspective adds to the insight on how change takes place in Dutch local government. The fifth section returns to the context of accommodation and consensus. What is possible in such a context when a political party with a seemingly oppositional and adversarial attitude such as Liveable Rotterdam wants to ignite change? The concluding section of this chapter gives a brief summary of the results of these inquiries.

8.2. The end of accommodation and consensus politics?

In the Netherlands, both local politics (the focus of this research) and national politics are characterised by a fragmented system in which many (semi-)autonomous actors are involved in decision-making, in 'getting things done'. In the context of Dutch local government, these actors are mainly public actors. In this dissertation, I have articulated some distinctions between national and provincial government, political parties, the municipal council, the municipal board of mayor and aldermen, the mayor, municipal districts (if present), the civil service, semi- and non-governmental organisations, and citizens.

The system and culture in which these actors come to local decision-making is described as accommodation and consensus (see chapter 3). Accommodation refers to the fact that conflicts are solved by the various actors' mutual accommodations. Lijphart (1968) mainly describes the way politicians and political parties maintain control of possible conflicts and accommodate themselves to the wishes of different groups.

The Netherlands is also characterised as a consensus democracy. In a consensus democracy, as many people as possible make the decisions. Following out of the structure of the Dutch electoral and administrative system (proportional representation, executive-legislative balance of power, the previously cited fragmentation) and a strong tradition in Dutch culture, which some historians trace back to the Dutch Republic (1568-1795), the consensus model in the Netherlands is characterised by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise. Also on the local level, decisions are continuously weighed out against other interests (e.g. Tops 1994).

In recent history, this model has been praised as a 'polder model', a system where decisions, when taken, are based on a broad base of support, but critics regard it as a 'viscosity-model' and emphasise that changes can only take place gradually. For these critics, this way of doing politics and making decisions is not equipped to produce significant results, as too broad a range of actors profit from the status quo and do not benefit from making many alterations (Hendriks, Toonen 2001a; Lijphart 1968).

Nevertheless, this system and culture have served the Dutch well. During the pillarisation of Dutch society, it kept internal differences from erupting into large uprisings or even worse. Instead, the elites made sure that conflicts were always resolved between each other and in peace. After the era of the pillarised society, this accommodating and consensual way of politics and decision-making remained essentially the same (Hendriks, Toonen 2001a; Andeweg, Irwin 2002).

Some implicit or explicit preconditions enabled this system to function as it did. One was that the electoral landscape remained stable (something that was the case for the period Lijphart mainly refers to in his book about Dutch politics [Lijphart 1968]). Even when the leaders of the pillars would make a decision that seemed to counteract

some pillarised needs, people would still remain loyal to their political leaders and parties, and the decisions would be accepted (Lijphart 1968: 158). A second precondition underlying the Dutch 'politics of accommodation' was that the elite always tried to avoid antagonising their opponents (Lijphart 1968: 125). In a stable, somewhat closed system strongly dependent upon accommodation, too much adversariness among the leading characters was avoided.

However, it is in precisely these two aspects that Dutch (political) society seems to be changing. The year 2002 is often seen as the turning point, a 'crisis year' according to some (e.g. see Bovens, Hendriks 2008). The rise of Pim Fortuyn on both national and local levels showed that fierce antagonism was certainly possible in Dutch politics.

This research is not meant to exactly pinpoint the impact of Fortuyn in national politics, as others have done a far better job in this (e.g. Wansink 2004), but it is widely acknowledged that Fortuyn marked a turnaround in the Dutch political system. While Fortuyn and his party were not the first to apply a much more harsh and anti-establishment style – expressing more hostility and polemics towards the 'established parties' and other political or administrative institutions and their way of governing or doing politics – they were remarkable for being able to achieve good results in Dutch elections. With Liveable Rotterdam, Fortuyn won almost 35% of the votes, making Liveable Rotterdam the largest political party in Rotterdam, and some months later his national list won 17% in the national parliamentary election, making it the second largest party in national parliament.

In this way, Fortuyn in 2002 set the example for others after him. Several such others, often completely new parties or movements, have not only adopted a comparable anti-establishment style but have also focused on similar topics such as safety and a stricter approach towards immigration and integration. Several of them, such as Proud of the Netherlands (*Trots op Nederland*) and the Freedom Party, have performed well in the electoral polls and elections (see section 7.4.2). In 2009, the Freedom Party was especially successful, receiving 16.97% in the European elections, making it the second largest Dutch party in the European parliament.

As these successes are relatively new, it remains to be seen how the participation of these new Dutch anti-establishment or 'populist' political parties and movements in Dutch politics and representative bodies will relate to the previously described Dutch way of politics and decision-making, as well as to the established local actors making up that system. This issue is addressed in this research by focusing on Fortuyn's local party, Liveable Rotterdam.

The Rotterdam municipal council election in 2002 was preceded by a fierce campaign. Apart from Fortuyn's – in the eyes of the other parties – extreme views, especially on immigration and Islam, Fortuyn was also very critical of what he saw as the Rotterdam establishment. Rotterdam was governed by a small power-holding elite. He directed his criticisms mainly towards the Labour Party but also towards the police, the mayor,

and the civil service. In turn, the three largest political parties (at that moment occupying two-thirds of the municipal council seats) declared that they would not engage in coalition negotiations with Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn. They regarded Fortuyn as an extreme right-wing politician with unacceptable views and thus not as a desirable or credible coalition partner.

This aversion among most established Dutch and Rotterdam political parties towards Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam was clearly not shared by all Rotterdam citizens. Liveable Rotterdam's surprising success in the March 2002 elections unseated the Labour Party, who had held the most municipal council seats for about half a century. The impact this had was enormous: except for the small Christian Party, all parties lost seats in the municipal council. When Fortuyn's party and not the Labour Party also achieved a place in the political coalition and thus in the board of mayor and aldermen, Liveable Rotterdam's remarkable entry into Rotterdam politics was finalised, and the party would have four years to act out its agenda.

8.3. Political change and continuity in Rotterdam local government 1998-2008

This research focuses on four central desires in Fortuyn's and Liveable Rotterdam's 2002 political agenda: improved safety (policy), a stricter immigration and integration approach (or at least more open discussion about related problems), greater accountability of politicians and civil servants, and more citizen input into policymaking. The complete analysis of all four themes between 1998 and 2008 shows significant changes in several aspects. This paragraph discusses those changes and briefly elaborates on ways that these changes actually represent some continuity with trends that preceded Liveable Rotterdam's rise.

If we compare the standing of the safety agenda within Rotterdam government in 1998 and in 2008, there is a clear change. Despite varying opinions about the exact intensity, in 2008 there was broad agreement that a (local) government should take action on safety and that this action was not (only) the responsibility of the police and the district attorney. In 1998, this conviction was much less widespread – as the mayor, for instance, found out when he organised the Safety Conference – and even less acted on. Illustrative of this turnaround is the debate on the Second Five Year Safety Action Programme (FYSAP II) in December 2005. The FYSAP II shows that the municipality by then was involved in an integral approach and that the districts and services were involved respectively in making neighbourhood safety action programmes and in supporting and implementing several safety projects. Nevertheless, the FYSAP II recommended that the approach should be further expanded and integrated in the municipal services and districts and with citizens themselves. A total of almost 100 million Euros, the same amount the board made available in 2002, was deemed necessary to uphold and expand the approach until 2010. In the municipal council, only five councilmen opposed the programme, three of them being the three

seats of the Green Party, which entered the board one year later, in 2006, and in that way still supported the safety policy.

The safety approach experienced its best days between 2002 and 2006. However, after 2006 it by no means fell back to a subordinated position. While it was the most important priority between 2002 and 2006, in 2008 it could still claim to have a position equal to the classical Rotterdam postwar priorities of physical, economical, and social policy. Illustrative of its status was the announcement of the municipality's 'social strategy' in July 2009, in which the four themes together – the traditional three plus the newer emphasis on safety – shaped the strategy laid out for Rotterdam's urban development until 2020.

Moreover, what not only underlay the safety approach at its inception but has also entered the other policy areas since then was a new approach of strong government intervention that explicitly combines repression with care (also referred to as 'prepression' [*prepressie*]) and does not shy away from intervening in people's personal lives (for instance with intervention teams and family coaches). This might be the most profound change of all between 1998 and 2008, partly because it has been strongly upheld since 2006. Over the years, critique against this way of intervention has grown harsher but also diminished in volume as the number of proponents within Rotterdam government for the new way of intervention has increased. This was illustrated by the reaction of the 2006-2010 board towards the critique from the local ombudsman in 2007 about the intervention teams. According to the Labour Party board, the intervention teams were not only a measure of repression (to detect acts of law violation) but were important in detecting care needs as well, and thus should continue.

Rotterdam government has experienced some other changes too, but we must be careful not to label everything from 2002 onwards as 'new'. Even part of the safety approach – not the zero tolerance approach but the integral approach – was based on developments and programmes that already started prior to 2002, such as the first FYSAP.

There have been some noteworthy changes in the organisation. Even though extensive dismissals have not occurred, the number of services has been reduced, and efforts to align the services – something that the 1998-2002 neighbourhood approach also attempted – have continued after 2002. It seems that the safety approach has offered a better focus for such alignment than the neighbourhood approach was able to do. The Safety Steering Group is a top-down effort regarding service alignment (among other things), but with the Safety Direction Team there is also alignment from the services themselves. After 2006, this alignment continues in a more general way with efforts from the board and city manager in setting up several intra-service bodies, establishing management contracts to ask service directors for their 'contribution to the organisation', and working towards the establishment of one front and back office and one telephone number for citizens to reach the entire Rotterdam organisation.

However, what has impacted the services and their employees more is working according to measurable goals. Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam stressed that government – not just politicians but also civil servants – should be held accountable for their actions. The 2002-2006 board translated that ideal into the idea of working according to 'targets'; the whole board programme is written up in a way that enables measurement of performance regarding all priorities. Such an attempt to work according to measurable goals (and to base accountability on the results) was nevertheless not new. In the 1998-2002 legislative period, a similar attempt failed, illustrated by the 2000 local court of audit report 'Beacons in the Mist' (*Bakens in de Mist*). Between 2002 and 2006 the attempt was more successful, as in comparison to 1998 there were clearer goals and time frames, and the board members gave stronger backing and priority to the accomplishment of the goals. This way of working survived the 2006 political coalition change. In fact, in 2008, the targets were even more strongly enforced than before, as after 2006 more civil servants who previously had to deal only with service or department targets were given personal performance targets as well.

In 2008, the local court of audit approved the 2006-2010 board's continued work with targets. The board even referred to the target work as part of its 'Rotterdam Approach' (*Rotterdamse aanpak*). A focus on implementation was also part of that approach. In 2002, the board made the implementation of plans and programmes a priority, and the city marines became a particular instrument and symbol for this. Furthermore, the establishment of direct contact in the Safety Steering Group between the safety coalition (mainly the mayor, police chief, and district attorney chief) and the civil servants or (district) politicians that work on the 'ground level' made sure that safety policy could be implemented and adjusted relatively fast. Also, the so-called 'methodological working' (*methodologische aanpak*), the larger process of which the targets were one part, expanded after 2002. In this approach, the safety targets on the neighbourhood level are based on sociological and criminal analyses of problems or neighbourhoods, after which the district has to make accountable agreements with governmental and non-governmental actors.

Most of these measures continued after 2006. They are visible in the social programme (e.g. through the social index) and in several district board programmes and/or neighbourhood programmes. Similar to the safety programme, the social programme has embedded within it aspects of previous Rotterdam policy and is thus not completely new. Social policy has for a long time been important in Rotterdam and is now linked to some prominent aspects of 2002-2006 policy, such as the targets, the methodological way of working, and the underlying approach of 'prepression'.

Immigration and integration was another important theme in the 2002 electoral campaign (as it was again in 2006). Most political parties in 2002 were appalled by Fortuyn, who continuously raised the issues of immigration and integration. In spite of this mainstream dismay, (perceived) problems regarding immigrants were being discussed much more openly in 2008 than was the case ten years earlier. Whereas in 1998 some crime statistics were suppressed by the board because of the stigma they might

have provided for certain immigrant groups, in 2008 it was widely acknowledged and proclaimed that in some ethnic groups criminal behaviour was more common (even though the reason for this might not be their ethnicity) and that these trends should be more explicitly addressed, leading to policy such as the Antillean Approach or the Moroccan Approach. The report 'Rotterdam Presses On' (*Rotterdam Zet Door*) in 2003 was considered a symbol of this turnaround, and misdemeanours committed by immigrants have since then kept more in the eye of policymakers.

A final theme from Liveable Rotterdam's agenda was that of involving citizens more in policy-making. This inclusion is also part of the 2006-2010 Rotterdam Approach and was one of the changes Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn wanted Rotterdam government to make after 2002. Citizens' participation in 2002, however, did not start from zero. Between 1998 and 2002, there were several avenues besides the election for citizens' input. However, all boards between 1998 and 2008, despite their participatory discourses, could not and did not escape making decisions that upset (groups of) citizens, and the role of citizens has remained largely a passive one. This passive role has been mainly limited to elections and – with greater intensity since 2002 – input in surveys and questionnaires (see also Tiemeijer 2006 for a description of this change for the national level). This passiveness is sometimes due to citizens themselves. However, there are nevertheless changes regarding this (passive) role. The voters' break with Labour Party dominance in 2002 has increased the politicians' awareness that citizens stand as the basis of political coalitions and that their views should be realised, or at the very least not disregarded. The safety index and social index show that the boards between 2002 and 2008 found citizens' input regarding important themes such as safety policy and social policy useful enough to have policy consequences, though usually at the level of implementation adjustments rather than large policy changes.

To summarise, after 2002, safety policy increased in priority, developed into a zero tolerance approach, developed a combination of repression and prevention (also referred to as prepression), and was strengthened by a focus on implementation. Discussions on not only the benefits but also the downsides of Rotterdam's multicultural society (e.g. high criminal statistics for some ethnic groups) were more publicly discussed, and an accountability system of 'targets' was implemented with strong political backing. In addition, the number of surveys and questionnaires in which citizens were asked to give their views about the board and board policy increased strongly after 2002. All these changes had some background prior to 2002 and have displayed a thorough amount of continuity after 2006. Moreover, several policy themes not thoroughly discussed in this research – such as economic policy – have faced many fewer changes altogether. Before we return to continuity, the next section provides the answer to the central question: How did the change particularly in Rotterdam's safety policy take place, and has the urban regime concept been a valuable theoretical tool to analyse this?

8.4.   Urban regime analysis in Rotterdam

After Stone's introduction of the urban regime concept in 1989, many scholars have used the concept by looking for types of cooperation in (for the most part) U.S. cities that resemble the public-private cooperation in Stone's Atlanta. However, this form of urban regime analysis seems to end in a deadlock, as it is only able to compare a particular governing situation and see how it measures up against a certain urban regime ideal type.

In this research I have taken another perspective on the urban regime concept. I began by focusing on the four urban regime elements that, according to Stone, are not only central in an urban regime, but 'can account for continuity and change in [a locality's] capacity to govern' (Stone 2005: 330):

- An *agenda* to address a distinct set of problems
- A governing *coalition* formed around the agenda
- *Resources* for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition
- A *scheme of cooperation* through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing (Stone 2005: 329, italics added).

Stone shows that in the case of Atlanta all elements are aligned and the task of governing is met. Or in other words, when actors possessing sufficient resources to put an agenda into practice are attracted to a particular agenda and align around it, implementation of that agenda is likely. In Atlanta, there was such an agenda ('a city too busy to hate'), supported by a coalition with the necessary resources to implement it (the black community with control of city hall and the business elite with investment capital), and there was a scheme of cooperation that structured the way the coalition actors interacted (through behind-the-scenes negotiations).

Stone's interpretation of an urban regime was taken as a starting point for the Rotterdam analysis. The four elements combined with a chronological perspective led to a model to show what these elements for Rotterdam and Rotterdam's safety policy looked like and how they changed over a period of ten years. The expectation was that this analysis would provide insight into the way Rotterdam's political changes have taken place – the implementation of the 2002 political agenda of Liveable Rotterdam and its leader, Pim Fortuyn, particularly regarding safety policy. Based on the information from chapters 4-7, this section addresses that analysis and those insights, first per element.

8.4.1.   *Agenda*

The agenda, which can be defined as the desired policy priorities, works best when it is attractive both for citizens (in order to win elections) and for possible coalition actors (in order to construct governing coalitions). I will establish, first, whether Dutch

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local government is able to construct its own agenda, and, second, what the appeal of the Rotterdam safety agenda was.

Dutch municipalities have roughly two tasks: autonomy and co-governance. There is no exclusive list of what municipalities can do; they can act on whatever they consider important tasks that are not explicitly a task of another government. Municipalities are, however, restricted by national regulation. If they go against provincial or national law or regulations, these decisions can be made undone.

In Rotterdam, the second largest city in the Netherlands, the local agenda and national agenda have often been strongly related. National City Renewal (*Stadsvernieuwing*) and Social Renewal (*Sociale Vernieuwing*) programmes have a clear Rotterdam background, and some Rotterdam (infrastructural) projects are considered in the national interest and national government therefore contributes. In the 1990s, the national government's Large City Policy (*Grotestedenbeleid*), addressing the physical, social, and economical upheaval of neighbourhoods, found a translation in Rotterdam into the Strategic Neighbourhood Approach (*Strategische Wijkaanpak*). In this way, the municipality profited from cooperation with the national level. On occasion, the municipality also encountered limits. For instance, an initial attempt in the 1970s to install a maximum number of 'foreigners' for neighbourhoods was obstructed by the Dutch Council of State, the highest administrative court in the Netherlands, for its 'discriminatory' character.

In the 1990s, problems regarding safety manifested themselves strongly in Rotterdam. The percentage of people in Rotterdam that considered public order and safety as one of the three largest problems increased from 38% in 1988 to 73% in 1994. Representatives from a large number of neighbourhood organisations called for more action against the growing number of safety problems. Liveable Rotterdam and its leader Fortuyn presented themselves visibly on this issue. They used the theme of safety as a symbol for all kinds of citizen concerns and declared that safety clearly had to improve. After 2002, while other themes were not disregarded or discontinued, safety became the governing priority of the new political coalition and board. And also within government, this agenda received support. Several Labour Party-dominated districts emphasised the need for more attention to safety, and in the 2002 election campaign, most political parties and politicians expressed the same concern. They were put somewhat in the shadow of Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam, who drew all of the media attention to themselves. While the safety agenda was not unjustly connected with Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam, the exclusive attribution somewhat clouded the fact that other actors within the municipality supported a similar agenda. After 2006, the board maintained the safety approach as a priority, but added an emphasis on investing in a social programme.

8.4.2. Coalition

Dutch local government is based on fragmentation, meaning that several (semi-)autonomous actors are involved in local decision-making. Coalitions between such actors are necessary for getting things done. Which actors should be involved depends on the content of the agenda, but in Dutch local government, public actors and certainly political parties are important. The role of the latter is central because the political parties provide the people who occupy most of the important governmental institutions, such as the municipal and district councils and boards, but indirectly they also have some influence on the municipality's personnel policy and the appointment of the mayor. When a political coalition is formed – when a number of political parties that constitute a majority of municipal council seats decide to cooperate – this coalition can ensure that their desired aldermen are approved in the municipal council as board members.

Because of this central role political parties have in Dutch local governments, the disappearance of the Labour Party from the political coalition and the appearance of Liveable Rotterdam in it were important. The Labour Party had been the largest party in the Rotterdam municipal council for decades and a continuous participant in the board of mayor and alderman. In 1998, its position in the council and board was even reinforced. It won the elections and demanded and received more aldermen and more responsibilities. The Labour Party dominance was also to some extent reflected in the civil service and the long tradition of Labour Party mayors. The introduction of a Liberal Party mayor in 1999 broke this tradition, but the real break followed in 2002 at the municipal council election, when the Labour Party lost its position as the largest party and did not become part of the new political coalition and the board. Instead, Liveable Rotterdam took over those roles between 2002-2006. The retreat of such a central actor as the Labour Party created room for others. Not to suggest that the Labour Party was always against change, but there was always someone in the party that was able to successfully resist (Tops 2007: 310).

The (governing) coalition, in urban regime terms, is defined as the actors that implement the agenda. An important part of political change is finding the adequate governing coalition to support that agenda. This 'coalition building' process is selective, meaning that not everyone has to be mobilised, only the actors needed for the implementation of the agenda. Between 2002 and 2006, such a coalition existed, but its formation had started earlier. In 2002, the political coalition including Liveable Rotterdam, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party agreed on implementing a thorough safety policy. This (political) coalition successfully connected to two coalitions that were already available: one between the mayor, police chief, and district attorney chief, and one between the mayor, safety manager, and safety advisor. These coalitions constituted a powerful governing coalition for Rotterdam's safety policy, symbolised by the 'Safety Steering Group' (*Stuurgroep Veilig*). The way this governing coalition was constructed was nevertheless an incremental process.

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Several steps in the incremental process of building Rotterdam's safety coalition

1994   The Safety Bureau is created and led by the safety manager; the first experiences with cooperation between police and municipality through the Bureau occur.

1998   In the board programme 1998-2002, safety is one of twelve implementation programmes and resides under the social pillar. There is cooperation between the mayor, police, and district attorney.

1999   The new mayor from the Liberal Party declares safety approach 'lacks concreteness'.

2001   Cooperation between the mayor, safety manager, and safety advisor leads to the development of a plan to change the safety approach from a project into an integral approach.

2002   The municipal council approves the 'Five Year Programme' (FYSAP) that turns the ideas for an integral approach into municipal policy.

2002   Liveable Rotterdam desires a tougher approach on crime and wins the election. The new political coalition and board consisting of Liveable Rotterdam, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party declare safety its most important priority. The police and the district attorney add their targets to the board programme.

2002-   The integral safety approach is rolled out over the city and is augmented by a zero tolerance approach and an intervention policy. In the Safety Steering Group, an informal body, the municipality (mayor) meets once a week with the police (chief) and district attorney (chief) to coordinate the implementation of the FYSAP and to make sure the board targets are achieved.

2004   Several Labour Party councilmen present 'Enduring Safety in Rotterdam' (*Blijvend Veilig in Rotterdam*) in which they acknowledge prior lack of an adequate safety approach and promise to do better.

2004   The safety index shows an increase in the way citizens regard safety.

2005   The municipal council almost unanimously approves the Second Five Year Programme (FSYAP II), in which the necessity of a stronger integration of the approach in the activities of governmental actors and citizens is announced.

2006   The new political coalition and board consisting of the Labour Party, Green Party, Christian Democratic Party, and Liberal Party declare to uphold and reinforce the safety approach based on the FYSAP II.

2009   The new (Labour Party) mayor declares that safety will be in good hands with him.

Despite the large political turnover in 2002 that changed the composition of the political coalition and the board of mayor and aldermen, most other (semi-)governmental actors that make up Rotterdam's fragmented system of local government remained unchanged. Liveable Rotterdam was not active in the district councils and boards and – disregarding a reorganisation and some transfers – most municipal personnel remained in place. These actors, similarly to societal organisations and citizens, complied

with the new (safety) agenda out of pragmatism but sometimes also motivated by genuine agreement. On the political level, in 2005, almost all of the political parties supported the new Five Year Safety Action Programme that confirmed the strong role the municipality should maintain in safety policy. One year later, the Labour Party, which re-emerged out of the election as the largest party once again, became part of the political coalition, and the board of mayor and aldermen, upheld the safety approach. Liveable Rotterdam by then was no longer part of the board. Nevertheless, even the Green Party faction, one of the few council factions that did not approve of the second Five Year Safety Action Programme, now supported Rotterdam's safety approach based on that programme.

8.4.3. *Resources*

Some resources, mainly public ones, are consistently necessary for the implementation of a municipal agenda in general and for Rotterdam's safety agenda in particular. Being part of a political coalition and board, and thereby having control of the municipal budget and formal control of Rotterdam's large civil service, is one of the most vital. But from a political party perspective, this control is in general shared with other political parties. Still, the 2002-2006 board allocated most of its resources towards the safety approach. The board reserved about 100 million Euros for safety measures, more than half of what the board made available for new policy and measures.

One of the reasons why safety was so strongly supported in the board plans had to do with another resource that cannot be completely analysed back to Liveable Rotterdam, but did emerge from this new party's electoral result in 2002. The size of the result and its strong divergence from the relative stability of Rotterdam's electoral history attached a sense of urgency to Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam's political agenda that even the strongest opponents of Liveable Rotterdam did not ignore.

This feeling of inevitability that attended the agenda, however 'stupid' or 'unwise' that agenda may have seemed in the eyes of several politicians, was not felt only by the political parties. The mayor and many civil servants also recognised the electoral result as a demand that was not to be ignored from a large part of the Rotterdam electorate. This popular backing aided the agenda's acceptance both in coalition negotiations and in policy implementation. When the 2006 election result again showed a large number of votes for Liveable Rotterdam, this feeling was upheld, even when Liveable Rotterdam was no longer part of the political coalition and board.

Some other actors' resources were also important in the implementation of the safety approach. The police in 2002 were at full manpower strength again, and both the district attorney and the police pledged to contribute to the achievement of the board's safety targets. It was also helpful that in 2002 there was already a safety approach developed and approved by the council no more than a year earlier. The safety index and Five Year Safety Action Programme were in operation, and several districts had already started to write neighbourhood action programmes to which the new board

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could refer. Support from national government and the Labour Party also helped in making sure that relevant programmes faced no problems in getting approved by the municipal council or – in the case of the Rotterdam Law – by national parliament.

8.4.4. Scheme of cooperation

In most urban regime studies the working of the cooperative process does not need to be debated, as cooperation between (semi-)autonomous actors is assumed to be informal and/or behind-the-scenes. In Stone's Atlanta, for instance, elected politicians and important businessmen negotiated behind closed doors about the future of the city; and in Rotterdam, the mayor, police, and district attorney discussed the development of the safety approach in the meetings of the Safety Steering Group.

In the Netherlands, informal negotiation is not uncommon; and in Rotterdam, despite some harsh campaigning, most important actors are on speaking terms with each other and occasionally meet. Nevertheless, some kind of companionship and trust between several of the most important coalition actors – within the board and also outside – helps. The 2002-2006 board, especially after the murder of Fortuyn, considered itself to be on a mission, engaged in something unique, and there were good personal understandings between the aldermen, especially in the beginning. Liveable Rotterdam also respected the mayor for his role in the aftermath of Fortuyn's killing, which smoothed over what would have been a potentially conflicted working relationship between the new party and several non-elected actors such as the police and the district attorney. The mayor already enjoyed a good working relationship with the latter two (which was reaffirmed during the hectic aftermath of Fortuyn's murder), and he functioned as the important linchpin between Liveable Rotterdam and several of those actors.

This does not mean that the quality of relations depended only on the lucky fallout of a crisis. In Rotterdam, bargaining was important as well. The willingness of the Christian Democratic Party and Liberal Party to cooperate with Liveable Rotterdam also rested on the possibility these parties saw to accomplish their own political agendas by doing so. The generosity of Liveable Rotterdam in granting them proportionally too many aldermen was an important incentive too. Such bargaining is possible, or perhaps inevitable, in a fragmented context where not only are several more or less independent actors necessary for change but there is more than one agenda or interest to which these actors can adhere. This background of multiple overlapping priorities implies that it is possible to implicitly or explicitly bargain between agendas and interests and that support for one agenda can be exchanged for (freedom to act on) another. The way that the Green Party in 2006 was drawn into the political coalition to support the safety approach was essentially such a process.

In Rotterdam, such bargaining processes are visible on both the political and the more organisational level. The political formation process is the clearest example of this. In the 2002 political coalition negotiations, the word 'respect', used when dealing with

ethnic minorities, avoided or at least postponed friction between Liveable Rotterdam and the Christian Democratic Party. It was at that moment more important to acquire the participation of the Christian Democratic and Liberal Party for the safety approach than to dwell on irreconcilable differences on other themes. Only when the safety approach was well underway, with broad support in the municipal council, did Liveable Rotterdam move problems regarding immigrants and integration to a more central position on its agenda. With 'Rotterdam Presses On' (*Rotterdam Zet Door*), it seemed that the choice of timing was appropriate, but the reception of alderman Pastors' continuous remarks on immigrants and Islam revealed that there are also limits to putting new things on the agenda; the Christian Democratic Party contributed to Pastors' dismissal. It is worth noting, however, that the Christian Democratic Party's stand on this topic did not end its cooperation on other themes, such as the safety approach.

The mechanism and the limits of this form of bargaining and agenda-exchange are also articulated in the series of political manoeuvres related to the district system. The districts profited from the extra attention given to and resources allocated for safety, and even when the districts' continued existence was questioned, pragmatic cooperation to enhance safety did not stop between the districts and the central level – mainly district and Safety Bureau civil servants. Only when the discussion grew more harsh were the two themes combined, and the districts declared that if the board followed through with its plans to change the district system, there would be consequences in terms of the districts' cooperation on other themes.

Similar mechanisms are visible in the municipal services. First, few dismissals were made in the bureaucracy as a whole after 2002. According to a Liveable Rotterdam alderman, such restraint was exercised in order to avoid union fights that could have hampered change on more important issues. Several municipal services complied with the safety approach because they also profited from it or from other actions of the board. Some municipal service directors disliked the focus on repression, but found other aspects of the broad safety agenda useful, such as using the intervention teams to detect poverty or using the coalition's backing to combat welfare identity fraud more strongly.

8.4.5.   The value of the urban regime concept

In this research, I have used an analysis of the individual urban regime elements to gain insight into how the 2002 political agenda of Liveable Rotterdam and its leader Pim Fortuyn, mainly regarding safety policy, was implemented between 1998 and 2008. First and foremost, the urban regime – through application of the urban regime elements – was able to provide a solid structure to analyse Rotterdam's evolving (safety) policy.

Table 12: urban regime elements applied to Rotterdam's safety approach and compared to Atlanta

	Atlanta 1946-1988	**Rotterdam 2002-2006**
Agenda	The city too busy to hate	A Rotterdam in which everyone feels safe
Coalition	Black community, business elite	Board, mayor, police, district attorney
Resources	Control of city hall, investment capital, civic skills, political access to governor's office	Sense of urgency following the elections, political skills among board members, financial and organisational resources
Scheme of co-operation	Behind-the-scenes negotiations	Formal and informal negotiations, trust

The analyses of the elements taken together support the basic assumption that this implementation took place through a process in which actors possessing sufficient resources to put an agenda into practice were attracted to a particular agenda and aligned around it and that this alignment was the strongest between 2002 and 2006.

The safety agenda traced its origins prior to 2002. The percentage of people in Rotterdam who considered public order and safety to be one of the city's three largest problems increased from 38% in 1988 to 73% in 1994. (District) councilmen also supported giving more governmental attention to safety. And at the turn of the century, the mayor took the initiative to develop a new safety approach (the Five Year Safety Action Programme), which was approved by the board and council. At more or less the same time, a new local political party emerged and drew on the growing unrest among citizens, especially regarding safety. When this party won the municipal council election in 2002, the elements of agenda, coalition, resources, and scheme of cooperation fell into place. The municipal (at that time mainly mayoral) efforts embodied in the Five Year Safety Action Programme now united with a political party with an electoral mandate broadly regarded as a strong sense of urgency regarding some of the city's problems, mainly regarding safety. After the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party joined Liveable Rotterdam in a political coalition that could rely on a majority in the municipal council, this sense of urgency also entered the board of mayor and aldermen. The board ensured control of important resources, such as formal control over the organisation and the municipal budget. The police and district attorney were other important coalition actors willing to contribute to the agenda of improving safety (policy).

The urban regime analysis is able to make clear not only why some political changes succeed but also why some changes are less successful or face more difficulty. The 2006 social programme and safety approach both lacked some appeal compared to the safety agenda in 2002. Even though Rotterdam is a city that has historically faced many social problems, such as poverty and unemployment, the social programme missed an important resource the safety approach did have in 2002: an already developed and integral programme on how to deal with those problems. In the first years after 2006, the social programme was mainly involved in making plans and building an organisation to support its unfolding. Coalition-building around the social programme also proceeded with more difficulty than regarding safety; most social measures need the cooperation of hard-to-align actors such as schools, housing corporations, welfare organisations, and health care institutions. But it must be said that the safety approach also lacked some appeal after 2006. Civil servants important for parts of its implementation felt that the approach had become less urgent, and some looked for other challenges. This disaffection was stimulated by the electoral result (mainly the Labour Party's victory), by the board's additional focus on social topics, and also, paradoxically, by Rotterdam's progress on safety since 2002; because the city had become safer, the very agenda that seemed to have made it so now carried less urgency.

The urban regime analysis showed that in Rotterdam – much like in Stone's Atlanta – electoral results do not completely account for decisions being made. Instead, a broader – partly non-directly elected – coalition of (semi-)autonomous actors accounts for (local) governing and for the implementation of any particular agenda. But while Stone's research in Atlanta and many consequent urban regime studies (mainly Anglo-American) showed that local business was important in the local governing coalitions, the coalitions in the Netherlands and Rotterdam mainly consist of public actors.

Apart from the horizontal analysis of the model – the alignment of the urban regime elements – the urban regime has also provided more insight in the chronological process of Rotterdam's political change. The chronological analysis of the four urban regime elements showed a certain amount of continuity and hampering effects accompanying the changes desired by Liveable Rotterdam and the governing coalition. The political change did come about through a recognisable agenda, supported by a powerful (selective) governing coalition in possession of indispensable resources, but the analysis showed that this coalition came together and related to the broader range of (semi-)governmental actors involved in Rotterdam local government through accommodation and consensus. Because political change and a model of accommodation seem to contradict, the next section will elaborate on these processes.

8.5.   Aversion and accommodation

This research started with the observation that local government in Rotterdam and the Netherlands is strongly embedded in a system and culture in which conflicts are re-

solved by consensus and accommodation. In this section, I will turn more attention to the way a process of accommodation lay at the foundation of creating the 2002 political coalition and agenda and the way the wider array of (semi-)governmental actors accommodated themselves to this new agenda. In short, the implementation of that agenda benefited from a mutual process of accommodation between Liveable Rotterdam and the establishment – the other actors already involved in local decision-making.

The first part of this process of mutual accommodation was political. The harsh accusations of the establishment that Liveable Rotterdam and Fortuyn made in 2002 were not common in Rotterdam or in the Netherlands as a whole at that time. The response from (parts of) the establishment was, however, just as unsympathetic. On top of that, the three largest political parties banned Fortuyn and his party from local political coalition negotiations.

Nevertheless, after Liveable Rotterdam won almost 35% of the votes, negotiations started after all. Fortuyn met in private with the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, and most consecutive meetings were in private as well. Both sides accommodated each other in a way that can be characterised as political negotiation and thus is not uncommon in Dutch practice (see section 3.3.3). Fortuyn proposed that his two desired coalition parties be given two alderman positions each, much more than could have been expected from their electoral results. The Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party also went along with a strong emphasis on improving safety. The leaders of the three parties discussed with other party members (even with national party members, in the cases of the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party) to come towards a broadly supported political 'agenda', the coalition accord. When the aldermen were presented and approved by the municipal council, civil servants were included in the process of translating the coalition accord into a board programme. Both documents avoided the sensitive matters of immigration and integration, in which Fortuyn and the Christian Democratic Party, especially, differed. Instead, the word 'respect' was used to suggest how all Rotterdam people should live together, and friction was avoided in this early stage of political cooperation between the new political coalition partners.

The second part of the accommodation process took place outside the Rotterdam political coalition. Most actors involved in Rotterdam's decision-making and safety approach – national government, the Labour Party, the mayor, the municipal districts, police, district attorney, and the civil service – all generally went along with the new agenda. Motivations varied from democratic belief (e.g. 'This is what citizens have voted for'), to pragmatism ('We'd bond with the devil if that benefits our district'), to conviction such as the Labour Party chairman ('I only then realised safety is an important municipal task') or the police (they considered it 'a gift from God'), to a sense of professional obligation, such as that expressed by some civil servants (e.g. 'You serve whomever you have to serve'). The implementation of the safety agenda would, in any case, not have been possible without these actors' contributions and their accommo-

dation of the safety agenda. These actors either coordinated the safety approach (mayor, police, district attorney), carried out the safety objectives (districts, civil service), helped to acquire a majority in the municipal council to approve safety-related reports (Labour Party), or even made a law at Rotterdam's request, thereby also giving that board and thus Liveable Rotterdam a more acceptable face and reducing Liveable Rotterdam's initial outcast character (national government).

However, accommodation constitutes more than just making an agenda possible. The idea of accommodation suggests not only that a system accomplishes change by acquiescing to it but that the change does not drastically alter the status quo or completely assimilate or surrender to the 'challengers' of that status quo. In that way, accommodation also functions as a safeguard against too much or too extreme change. In Rotterdam, this was visible in the fact that the establishment gave in to the changes substantially, but not completely. Some local actors served as a buffer between Liveable Rotterdam's harsh proposals and the people or institutions they were directed at.

First of all, since Liveable Rotterdam's tremendous electoral result in 2002 still did not amount to a majority in the municipal council, cooperation and concessions on the political level remained necessary to get things done. The cooperation of the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party made it possible to implement (parts of) Liveable Rotterdam's agenda, and the word 'respect' took some 'extreme' edges off of Liveable Rotterdam's policy. The safety approach was tough, but never incorporated all of Fortuyn's initial proposals (see section 5.2.2). After 2002, moderation was practiced in the political coalition, for instance by alderman Van der Tak (later Geluk), who despite Liveable Rotterdam's views on integration and Islam maintained good contacts with many of the city's multicultural and Muslim organisations; or by the mayor, who, regardless of public arguments between Liveable Rotterdam's safety alderman and the vicar of the St Paul's Church, worked behind the scenes with that same vicar to approach a good solution (see section 6.4.3).

Second, a similar moderation mechanism functioned when Liveable Rotterdam aldermen and councilmen publicly addressed controversial issues. This kind of strategy generally provides mixed results. Unconventional remarks, for instance, about immigrants or prostitutes can be seen as unorthodox ways of agenda-setting that, though they may antagonise local actors such as other political parties, district politicians, civil servants, or community workers, can also set dialogue in motion. Most of the time, such agenda-setting is followed by conciliatory negotiations from other board members or civil servants towards the addressed groups or their representative bodies. Such negotiation then leads to moderate change. For instance, in Rotterdam, after a process of negotiation, the discussions about the influx of immigrants resulted in an accommodation of the establishment to some of the agenda's initial ideas, but not all of the initial proposals reached the final plans. Some of them had been filtered by the local committee that wrote the Rotterdam Presses On report or by the national government, which made a national law incorporating some proposals but not others (see section 6.2.5).

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In Dutch local government on the whole, there are a number of actors and moderation mechanisms that constitute the process of accommodation. In general, the fragmented system of Dutch and Rotterdam local government is a powerful safeguard against too much or too extreme change. While Rotterdam's political constellation changed in 2002, many other local actors did not. Neither the civil service, districts, mayor, police, district attorney, or neighbourhood organisations experienced a comparable change in constellation or leadership. This administrative continuity ensured sufficient (passive) resistance to some proposals, as the status quo was still a viable alternative. The upholding of the district system functioned as a good illustration on how this mechanism could even prevent change altogether (see section 6.3.4). And apart from the constellation of local government, further continuity is provided by the legal and governmental framework of the Dutch state and the entanglement of local, provincial, and national government. Local governments cannot make regulations or policy that contradict provincial and national regulations or ignore certain legal procedures, such as the authority of civil courts or the Dutch Council of State – let alone international law. On the local level, this judicial system is to some extent enforced by the local ombudsman and local court of audit, which form a check on municipal policy, after which the municipal council can take further action.

The process of accommodation to temper change can also be seen in the years after the Liveable Rotterdam board was replaced by the Labour Party board. In 2006, the establishment again accommodated itself to the new board's initiatives, but also tried to maintain the new status quo that had begun to emerge during the tenure of the 2002-2006 board. The Christian Democratic Party and especially the Liberal Party expressed their willingness to be part of a political coalition with the Labour Party, but opted for the continuation of large parts of past policy. The Labour Party members in 2005 also chose a new leader who had no intentions of changing the successful and electorally supported (safety) policy. Also, several civil servants, mainly service directors, had incorporated the benefits of that policy. Some civil servants, for instance, through presentations for the new board members or by showing how well instruments such as the intervention teams worked, even tried to export some of those successes to the new board. In the districts, the newly installed methods of the safety approach and the ways of writing up the neighbourhood safety action programmes were maintained, even expanded to social or general district board programmes, thereby becoming more embedded. And when the board instigated the social programme, several former members of the Safety Bureau switched to the social programme, using their knowledge to integrate parts of the safety approach into the working of the new social approach as well.

8.5.1. *Summary and outlook: the impact of new anti-establishment political parties in government*

Liveable Rotterdam had to adjust to the system and culture of Dutch accommodation and consensus to get things done. At first glance, this adjustment would have seemed to contradict the party's outspoken reaction against current government practices and the actors involved in local decision-making. Liveable Rotterdam, however, seemed to

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realise fairly quickly that to achieve implementation of (parts of) its agenda, it had to make compromises with other political parties and local actors. Even though the anti-establishment tone of Liveable Rotterdam never faded away completely, the party learned that its political opponents were 'not all bad' and in 2008, Liveable Rotterdam no longer excluded cooperation with the Labour Party. This rapprochement resembles situations in other municipalities, where other new local parties in the course of time also tempered their dissatisfaction about the way local politics or democracy works (Boogers et al. 2006: 21).

On the other side, the established political parties and other local actors, despite their initial reluctance to cooperate with the newcomers, also proved willing to compromise and accommodate. In several Dutch cities, since 2002, such political parties have formed political coalitions with anti-establishment or protest parties (even though in many municipalities, newcomers were also excluded [Euser 2009]), in order to accomplish parts of their agenda. The establishment parties have become reconciled to the views of these newcomers, sometimes even to the point of agreement.

This narrative is an example of how mutual accommodation can develop between anti-establishment parties and the establishment. Even though there may still be clear separations between the two – anti-establishment parties do not shy away from strong controversy and make that partly their style – they also come closer together. Research into the exact degree of this type of mutual accommodation will be necessary and fruitful as anti-establishment or 'populist' parties reach greater heights in the polls and in representative bodies, not only in the Netherlands, but all over Europe. While most of the research to date into those kinds of parties seems limited to the way they are part of a populist or radical right party family or party type (e.g. Mudde 2007; Albertazzi, McDonnell 2008), such research needs to be supplemented with inquiries into the impact such parties have on other political parties, citizens, or the system of local (and national) government as a whole (see Deschouwer 2008 for some first results related on this topic). Are such anti-establishment or populist parties able to change municipal, provincial or national policy or agendas, in the Netherlands as well as abroad? Are they a credible alternative, and can they act out their own agenda? Only in that way can we really determine if these parties form a negative challenge for democratic systems as is often claimed (e.g. Frissen 2009) or whether they revitalise local governments and can account for change based on citizens' agendas instead. I hope this dissertation may also be regarded as a first contribution to exactly that type of research.

8.6.   Conclusion

The concept of an urban regime and theories about politics and policy-making as accommodation and consensus share the assumption that electoral results do not completely account for decisions being made. Instead, a broader – partly non-directly elected – coalition of (semi-)autonomous actors accounts for local governing and for

the implementation of any particular agenda; and informal cooperation lies at the basis of forming such a coalition. The urban regime analysis shows that in Rotterdam, a recognisable agenda, supported by a governing coalition in possession of indispensable resources, can set political change in motion. In the Dutch context, the chronological analyses of the four urban regime elements show that this coalition came together and related to the broader range of (semi-)governmental actors involved in Rotterdam local government through accommodation and consensus.

Using the urban regime model as analytical framework has in addition highlighted two important insights. The first is that with sufficient resources – among others, the public mandate that comes with a large electoral victory – even an anti-establishment party such as Liveable Rotterdam can become part of the Dutch accommodation process. To do so, Liveable Rotterdam accommodated itself somewhat to that system and culture in which cooperation is essential to get things done. But more than that: the establishment accommodated the agenda of Liveable Rotterdam. A broad range of local actors, such as national government, political parties, the mayor, the districts, and the civil service, accommodated the new party sometimes out of pragmatism and sometimes out of a growing conviction, but one thing should be clear: without this accommodation, the changes described in this research would not have been possible. The second observation is that this process of mutual accommodation does not mean a complete assimilation or surrender to the challengers, but entails a safeguard against too much or too extreme change.

To conclude, I hope the insights provided in this dissertation can help to analyse the impact on democratic systems and political actors of other anti-establishment parties that at the present moment are emerging and gaining electoral success all over Europe.

ENGLISH SUMMARY

Aversion and Accommodation. Political Change and Urban Regime Analysis in Dutch Local Government: Rotterdam 1998-2008

This research focuses on how political change takes place in Dutch local government, mainly in Rotterdam. Political change in this context should be interpreted as the implementation of a political agenda or programme.

In 2002, a political party in the Dutch city of Rotterdam called Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*) won the Rotterdam local elections with almost 35% of the votes. The party and its leader Pim Fortuyn had an ambitious agenda on which safety policy featured prominently. They took a quite hostile position towards the established local actors, such as other political parties, the mayor, and the civil service. Most of these actors in turn were not willing to cooperate with Liveable Rotterdam. In the Dutch (local) political system and culture, change is achieved through cooperation and consensus, and it therefore seemed unlikely that the implementation of Liveable Rotterdam's political agenda could succeed. Nevertheless, four years later, changes consistent with Liveable Rotterdam's agenda seemed to have been effected on several issues, most notably safety policy. If this was indeed what happened, the question is, how? In trying to answer this question, this study aims to shed light on the relationship between anti-establishment or adversarial politics and the Dutch political and democratic tradition of accommodation and consensus. After 2002, this question has only gained in relevance as more parties have emerged both locally and nationally that also display an anti-establishment attitude and focus on similar themes.

The theoretical tool with which to explore this topic is 'urban regime', a concept that is familiar in Anglo-American urban studies, but less so for Dutch and other European cases. This dissertation is therefore also an exploration into the usefulness of the urban regime concept to study political change in Dutch local government. This leads to the following central research question:

> *Is 'urban regime' a valuable concept in analysing political change in Dutch local government, particularly Rotterdam's safety policy between 1998 and 2008?*

The urban regime concept, whose main originator is considered to be Clarence Stone, has been developed by several authors. Over the years, the urban regime concept has been seen mainly as an intense and durable cooperation between public and private actors. However, there are other strands of thought about what an urban regime is or how it can be used (see Chapter 2). One of them is that an urban regime captures all aspects of local governing by making a distinction between four analytical elements:
- An *agenda* to address a distinct set of problems
- A governing *coalition* formed around the agenda

- *Resources* for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition
- A *scheme of cooperation* through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing (Stone 2005a: 329, italics added).

In this research, the four urban regime elements first and foremost provided a solid structure to analyse Rotterdam's evolving safety policy. The results are that after 2002, Rotterdam safety policy increased in priority, evolved into a zero tolerance approach, developed a combination of repression and prevention, and was strengthened by a focus on implementation. Discussions on the benefits as well as the downsides of Rotterdam's multicultural society (e.g. high criminal statistics for some ethnic groups) were more publicly discussed, and an accountability system of 'targets' was implemented with strong political backing. In addition, the number of surveys and questionnaires asking citizens for their views about the board and board policy increased strongly. Practically all these changes had some pre-2002 background and have displayed a thorough amount of continuity after 2006.

The urban regime model also presupposes that when the four elements are aligned – in other words, when actors possessing sufficient resources align around a particular agenda – implementation of that agenda is likely. The urban regime analysis showed that in Rotterdam – much like in Stone's Atlanta (Stone 1989) – electoral results do not completely account for decisions being made. Instead, a broader – partly non-directly elected – coalition of (semi-)autonomous actors, aligned around an agenda and in possession of indispensable resources, accounts for local governing and for the implementation of any particular agenda. For Rotterdam's safety policy, this alignment was strongest between 2002 and 2006. With regard to Rotterdam's safety policy, the urban regime elements show the following results:
- Agenda: a city where everyone feels safe
- (Governing) coalition: board, mayor, police, district attorney
- Resources: sense of urgency following the elections, political skills among board members, financial and organisational resources
- Scheme of cooperation: formal and informal negotiation, trust.

The urban regime also provided more insight in the chronological process of Rotterdam's political change. The chronological analysis of the four urban regime elements showed a certain amount of continuity and hampering effects accompanying the changes desired by Liveable Rotterdam and the governing coalition. The political change did come about through a recognisable agenda, supported by a powerful (selective) governing coalition in possession of indispensable resources, but the analysis showed that this coalition came together and related to the broader range of (semi-)governmental actors involved in Rotterdam local government through accommodation and consensus.

In the fragmented context of Dutch local government, a governing coalition needs the participation of a broader range of actors. And most actors involved in Rotterdam's decision-making and safety approach – national government, the Labour Party, the mayor, the municipal districts, the police, the district attorney, and the civil service – generally went along with the (safety) agenda. This attitude not only influenced the development of the changes, but was also partly the reason why the changes were maintained after Liveable Rotterdam withdrew from the political coalition. Explanations for cooperation varied from democratic principle (e.g. 'This is what citizens have voted for'), to pragmatism ('We'd bond with the devil if that benefits our district'), to conviction (e.g. the Labour Party chairman: 'Only then did I realise that safety is an important municipal task' or the police who considered the electoral victory of Liveable Rotterdam 'a gift from God'), to a sense of professional obligation, such as that expressed by some civil servants (e.g. 'You serve whomever you have to serve'). The implementation of the safety agenda would, in any case, not have been possible without these actors' contributions and their accommodation of the safety agenda. These actors either coordinated the safety approach (mayor, police, district attorney), carried out the safety objectives (districts, civil service), helped to acquire a majority in the municipal council to approve safety-related reports (Labour Party), or even made a law at Rotterdam's request, thereby also giving the board and thus Liveable Rotterdam a more acceptable face and reducing Liveable Rotterdam's initial outcast status (national government).

However, accommodation constitutes more than just making an agenda possible. The idea of accommodation suggests not only that a system accomplishes change by acquiescing to it but also that changes do not drastically alter the status quo or that local actors do not completely assimilate or surrender to the 'challengers' of that status quo. In that way, accommodation also functions as a safeguard against excessive or extreme change. In Rotterdam, this was visible in the fact that the establishment gave in to the changes substantially, but not completely. Some local actors served as a buffer between Liveable Rotterdam's harsh proposals and the people or institutions they were directed at. In Dutch local government on the whole, there are a number of actors and moderation mechanisms that constitute the process of accommodation. In general, the fragmented system of Dutch and Rotterdam local government is a powerful safeguard against excessive or extreme change. While Rotterdam's political constellation changed in 2002, many other local actors did not. Neither the civil service, the districts, the mayor, the police, the district attorney, nor neighbourhood organisations experienced a comparable change in constellation or leadership. This administrative continuity ensured sufficient passive resistance to some proposals, as the status quo was still a viable alternative. And apart from the constellation of local government, further continuity is provided by the legal and governmental framework of the Dutch state and the entanglement of local, provincial, and national government. Local governments cannot make regulations or policy that contradict provincial and national regulations or ignore certain legal procedures, such as the authority of civil courts or the Dutch Council of State – let alone international law. On the local level, the judicial system is to some extent enforced by the local ombudsman and local court of audit,

which form a check on municipal policy, after which the municipal council can take further action.

Urban regime analysis shows that with sufficient resources even anti-establishment political parties can become part of the mainstream of Dutch politics and policy making. Even though establishment and anti-establishment political parties may remain far apart on controversial issues, they can also establish common ground. Research into the exact degree of this type of mutual accommodation will be necessary as anti-establishment or 'populist' political parties reach greater heights in the polls and in representative bodies, not only in the Netherlands, but all over Europe. Only through additional research can we really determine if these parties pose a threat or negative challenge to democratic systems as is often claimed, or whether they revitalise local governments and can account for change based on citizens' agendas instead. This book may be regarded as a first contribution to exactly that type of research.

Afkeer en Aanpassing. Politieke verandering en urban regime analyse in het Nederlands lokaal bestuur: Rotterdam 1998-2008

Hoe vinden veranderingen plaats in een context die vooral door accommodatie, consensus en behoud gekenmerkt wordt? En hoe verhoudt die context zich tot een partij die zich van een dergelijke traditie niets lijkt aan te trekken? Dit onderzoek richt zich op politieke verandering in het Nederlands, in het bijzonder Rotterdams, lokaal bestuur. Politieke verandering moet in dit onderzoek opgevat worden als de uitvoering van politieke agenda's of programma's.

In 2002 wint een nieuwe lokale politieke partij, Leefbaar Rotterdam, de Rotterdamse gemeenteraadsverkiezing met bijna 35% van de stemmen. De partij en haar lijsttrekker Pim Fortuyn hebben een ambitieuze agenda, met name op het gebied van veiligheid(sbeleid). Maar daarnaast keren Fortuyn en Leefbaar Rotterdam zich ook stevig tegen het 'establishment', onder meer tegen andere politieke partijen, de burgemeester en de ambtenarij, die zij beschuldigen van onvoldoende aandacht voor de problemen van de stad. De verkiezingscampagne is voor Nederlandse begrippen hard. Fortuyn beschuldigt verschillende politici van het creëren van een sfeer van haat in de stad waarvan hij het slachtoffer is en verschillende politici van de 'gevestigde' partijen noemen Fortuyn een extreemrechtse politicus en sluiten samenwerking met hem en zijn partij uit.

In het Nederlandse (politieke) systeem waar verandering is gebaseerd op samenwerking en consensus (zie hoofdstuk drie) en dus op niet teveel aversie leek de uitvoering van de politieke agenda van Leefbaar Rotterdam dus vrijwel onmogelijk. Vier en een half jaar na de oprichting van Leefbaar Rotterdam en vier jaar na diens verkiezingswinst in 2002 lijken er echter wel degelijk veranderingen gebaseerd op Leefbaar Rotterdams agenda te zijn doorgevoerd, met name op het terrein van veiligheid. Als dit inderdaad het geval is, rijst de vraag hoe dat kan? Hoe vindt in de specifieke Nederlandse en Rotterdamse context politieke verandering plaats? Deze vraag is ook na 2002 relevant, aangezien er op nationaal en lokaal niveau verschillende succesvolle partijen zijn bijgekomen die een vergelijkbare anti-establishment houding hebben en op soortgelijke thema's, zoals veiligheid en integratie, focussen.

Voor het beantwoorden van deze vraag wordt gebruik gemaakt van het 'urban regime', een concept dat bekend is uit verschillende Anglo-Amerikaanse stedelijke studies, maar minder is toegepast in Nederland en Europa. Dit proefschrift is daarmee ook een verkenning naar de bruikbaarheid van het urban regime concept voor politieke verandering in het Nederlands lokaal bestuur. Dat leidt tot de volgende centrale onderzoeksvraag:

Is 'urban regime' een geschikt concept voor de analyse van politieke verandering in het Nederlandse lokaal bestuur, met name voor het Rotterdamse (veiligheids)beleid tussen 1998 en 2008?

Clarence Stone wordt met zijn studie *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946 - 1988* (1989) beschouwd als de belangrijkste grondlegger van het urban regime concept. Na deze studie ontwikkelen verschillende auteurs, waaronder hijzelf, het concept verder. In de loop der jaren is het urban regime concept echter vooral vereenzelvigd met een intensieve en duurzame stedelijke samenwerking tussen publieke en private actoren. Maar er zijn andere manieren hoe het urban regime in lokale studies gebruikt kan worden (zie hoofdstuk twee). Eén opvatting is dat het urban regime alle aspecten van lokaal bestuur omvat via de volgende vier analytische elementen:

- Een *agenda* om een reeks van problemen aan te pakken
- Een bestuurlijke *coalitie* gevormd rondom die agenda
- *Hulpbronnen* voor de uitvoering van de agenda
- Een *samenwerkingsmodus* tussen de leden van de bestuurlijke coalitie (Stone 2005a: 329, cursivering toegevoegd).

In dit onderzoek zijn de vier urban regime elementen vooral een waardevol analytisch kader gebleken om de veranderingen in het Rotterdamse (veiligheids)beleid te analyseren. Het resultaat van die analyse is dat het veiligheid(sbeleid) na 2002 in prioriteit steeg, ontwikkeld werd tot een zero tolerance-aanpak en gekenmerkt werd door een expliciete combinatie van repressie en preventie. Er ontstond meer publieke discussie over niet alleen de voordelen maar ook de nadelen van de multiculturele samenleving (bijvoorbeeld over de hoge misdaadcijfers onder bepaalde etnische groepen). Deze inhoudelijke aanpassingen werden vergezeld van een stevige focus op uitvoering van beleid. Daarnaast werd er een systeem van verantwoording – de 'targets' – ingevoerd met stevige politieke steun en steeg het aantal enquêtes en vragenlijsten om burgers naar hun mening over het beleid en het bestuur te vragen. Uit de analyse blijkt verder dat vrijwel al deze veranderingen hun oorsprong deels vinden in de tijd vóór Leefbaar Rotterdam en dat ze na 2006, als Leefbaar Rotterdam niet meer in het college plaatsneemt, grotendeels worden gecontinueerd.

Het urban regime model veronderstelt ook dat wanneer de vier elementen op elkaar zijn afgestemd – met andere woorden, wanneer actoren over voldoende middelen beschikken en deze aanwenden voor een bepaalde agenda – die agenda ook daadwerkelijk uitgevoerd kan worden. Uit de analyse blijkt dat in Rotterdam – net als overigens Stone's Atlanta – electorale resultaten niet de enige verklarende factor zijn in het begrijpen van politieke verandering, maar dat bredere – deels niet-direct gekozen – coalities daar een belangrijke rol in spelen. Voor wat betreft het Rotterdamse veiligheidsbeleid was de koppeling tussen die coalitie en de agenda, hulpbronnen en samenwerkingsmodus tussen 2002 en 2006 het meest hecht. Voor het Rotterdamse (veiligheids)beleid laat de analyse met de urban regime elementen de volgende resultaten zien:

- Agenda: een Rotterdam waarin iedereen zich veilig voelt
- (Bestuurlijke) coalitie: college van burgemeester en wethouders, de burgemeester, politie, openbaar ministerie
- Hulpbronnen: gevoel van urgentie na de verkiezingen, politieke vaardigheden in het college, financiële en organisatorische middelen
- Samenwerkingsmodus: formele en informele onderhandelingen, vertrouwen.

De chronologische analyse van de vier urban regime elementen laat daarnaast zien dat de in Rotterdam geconstateerde veranderingen met de nodige continuïteit en nuance gepaard gaan. De politieke verandering hangt dan wel samen met een herkenbare agenda, ondersteund door een krachtige (en selectieve) bestuurlijke coalitie in het bezit van de noodzakelijke hulpbronnen, de analyse toont aan dat de manier waarop deze coalitie samenkwam en zich verhoudt tot de bredere bestuurlijke omgeving is te kenmerken als een proces van accommodatie.

In het enigszins gefragmenteerde systeem van Nederlands, in dit onderzoek Rotterdams, lokaal bestuur heeft een bestuurlijke coalitie de medewerking nodig van een breed veld van actoren. In Rotterdam was het proces om daarmee tot samenwerking te komen duidelijk zichtbaar. Nadat de bestuurlijke coalitie ten opzichte van veiligheid was gevormd, pasten vele actoren – de nationale overheid, de PvdA, de burgemeester, de deelgemeenten, politie, openbaar ministerie en de ambtenaren – zich in belangrijke mate aan de nieuwe agenda aan. In deze aanpassing zit ook grotendeels de precieze vorm en richting van de veranderingen en deze veranderingen bleken na 2006 mede daardoor ook relatief onafhankelijk van de wijzigingen in de bestuurlijke coalitie.

De redenen voor de aanpassing aan de agenda van de coalitie en van Leefbaar Rotterdam varieerden van democratische overtuiging ('Voor dit beleid hebben burgers gestemd'), tot pragmatisme ('We sluiten zelfs een pact met de duivel als dat de burgers van dit gebied ten goede komt'), persoonlijke overtuiging, zoals de fractievoorzitter van de Partij van de Arbeid ('Pas toen realiseerde ik me dat veiligheid een belangrijke gemeentelijke taak is') of de politie (een van de officieren had het over een 'geschenk van God') of een gevoel van professionele verplichting, zoals de meeste ambtenaren ('Je dient wie je hebt te dienen'). De uitvoering van de (veiligheids)agenda zou in ieder geval niet mogelijk zijn geweest zonder de accommodatie van deze actoren. Zij coördineerden de aanpak (burgemeester, korpschef, officier van justitie), droegen bij aan het halen van de veiligheidsdoelstellingen (deelgemeenten, ambtenaren), droegen bij aan het vormen van (grote) meerderheden in de gemeenteraad voor belangrijke documenten (PvdA) en toonden zich op verzoek van het Rotterdams college zelfs bereid tot het maken van een nieuwe wet, waardoor het college ook een meer aanvaardbaar gezicht kreeg en daarmee het initiële outcast karakter van met name Leefbaar Rotterdam verminderde (nationale overheid).

Accommodatie is echter meer dan alleen het aanpassen aan een agenda. Het houdt ook in dat door enigszins mee te bewegen de oorspronkelijke voorstellen van hun scherpste kanten worden ontdaan. Accommodatie is dus tot op zekere hoogte ook een

bescherming tegen te veel of te extreme verandering. In tegenstelling tot de samenstelling van de gemeenteraad en het college veranderden na 2002 (de samenstelling van) veel andere lokale actoren in Rotterdam, zoals de deelgemeenten, politie, openbaar ministerie en ambtelijke diensten, niet of nauwelijks op eenzelfde manier. Enkele van die actoren functioneerden in de rol van buffer tussen de harde voorstellen van Leefbaar Rotterdam en de personen of instellingen op wie ze waren gericht. Het gaat dan bijvoorbeeld om het persoonlijk optreden van burgemeester, wethouders of ambtenaren. Daarnaast is er ook continuïteit door het juridische kader van de Nederlandse staat en de verstrengeling van de lokale, provinciale en nationale overheid. Lokale overheden kunnen geen regelgeving of beleid initiëren dat in strijd is met provinciale of nationale regelgeving. Ook kunnen zij bepaalde juridische procedures niet negeren, zoals het gezag van de civiele rechter of de Nederlandse Raad van State – laat staan het internationale recht. Op het lokaal niveau, wordt dit justitiële systeem tot op zekere hoogte aangevuld door de lokale ombudsman en de lokale rekenkamer, die een controle voeren op gemeentelijk beleid, waarna de gemeenteraad verdere actie kan ondernemen.

Uit de urban regime analyse blijkt dat met voldoende hulpbronnen zelfs 'anti-establishment' partijen zoals Leefbaar Rotterdam deel uit kunnen maken van de reguliere manier van politiek bedrijven binnen de Nederlandse accommodatie en consensus cultuur. Hoewel er nog steeds duidelijk scheidingen zijn tussen het establishment en de anti-establishment partijen, deze laatste gaan controverse bijvoorbeeld niet uit de weg en maken dat deels hun handelsmerk, zijn ze ook in staat dichter tot elkaar te komen. Onderzoek naar de precieze mate van dit soort wederzijdse aanpassing is nodig nu anti-establishment of 'populistische' partijen steeds betere resultaten bereiken in peilingen en verkiezingen, ook buiten Nederland. Alleen op die manier kunnen we vaststellen of deze partijen een negatieve uitdaging voor democratische systemen vormen, zoals vaak wordt beweerd, of dat ze nieuw leven inblazen in door gevestigde politieke partijen gedomineerde systemen en door burgers gewenste veranderingen kunnen doorvoeren. Ik hoop dat dit proefschrift ook wordt beschouwd als een eerste bijdrage aan dat type onderzoek.

APPENDIX 1 (SCIENTIFIC) LITERATURE AND INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORTS

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APPENDIX 2 MEDIA REPORTS

Abbreviations

AD	*Algemeen Dagblad*, national newspaper with a Rotterdam edition
ANP	*Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau*, Dutch news agency
Binnenlands Bestuur	*Binnenlands Bestuur*, weekly political and administrative magazine
Elsevier	*Elsevier*, a national weekly magazine
FD	*Financieel Dagblad*, a national newspaper
Havenloods	Rotterdam local newspaper
Metro	*Metro*, (free) national newspaper
Netwerk	Dutch TV programme (www.netwerk.tv)
NOS	Dutch TV network (www.nos.nl)
NOVA	Dutch TV programme (www.novatv.nl)
NICIS	Website of NICIS: Netherlands Institute for City Innovation Studies (www.nicis.nl)
NRC	*NRC Handelsblad*, national newspaper
Parool	*Parool*, national newspaper
RD	*Rotterdams Dagblad*, Rotterdam newspaper
Ref. Dagblad	*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, national newspaper
RTL	Dutch TV network (www.rtl.nl)
RTV	*Rijnmond TV*, Rotterdam regional TV network
Telegraaf	*Telegraaf*, national newspaper
Trouw	*Trouw*, national newspaper
Volkskrant	*Volkskrant*, national newspaper
Vrij Nederland	*Vrij Nederland*, weekly magazine
Zembla	Dutch TV programme (www.zembla.vara.nl)

References

- AD 3/3/1998, Ruil PvdA'ers Van den Berg en Simons.
- AD 1/12/1999, PvdA Rotterdam moet schoon schip maken; Peper in 1984 al door Den Uyl gewaarschuwd.
- AD 28/11/2001, Rotterdam rouwt over gebrek aan veiligheid.
- AD 8/3/2002, De gezichten van Leefbaar Rotterdam.
- AD 3/8/2002, Nieuwe bezems vegen schoon. Wij zeggen niet meer: zo had Fortuyn het gewild. Opstelten in de rol van de Hollandse Guiliani.
- AD 15/10/2005, Tweede-Kamerlid verslaat tegenkandidaten - luid applaus in hotel New York - Van Heemst wordt PvdA-lijsttrekker.
- AD 7/1/2006, Prioriteit voor Oude Westen.

- AD 10/1/2006, Moskeedebate eindigt in sisser.
- AD 7/2/2006, VVD claimt successen.
- AD 17/2/2006, Akkoord Rotterdam-wet.
- AD 22/2/2006, Pastors en Geluk: botsende karakters.
- AD 8/3/2006, D66 verdrukt door titanen.
- AD 18/3/2006, 'Een ijzersterke formule' - Rotterdamse PvdA wil college met SP, CDA en VVD.
- AD 11/4/2006, Vorming nieuw college in Rotterdam: na vier weken terug bij af.
- AD 13/4/2006, Peper: 'Is PvdA tellen verleerd?' - Kritiek op 'knieval' partij.
- AD 7/6/2006, Rotterdams CDA gezicht vertrekt.
- AD 13/6/2006, PvdA'ers in deelgemeenten hekelen uitspraken Van Heemst.
- AD 8/7/2006, Van Brummen, 'Houd aandacht voor zware criminaliteit' - Hoofdofficier weg na tropenjaren.
- AD 26/11/2006, PvdA: 'Hervorming deelgemeenten slecht plan'.
- AD 22/12/2006, Liefde op het tweede gezicht - De blijde boodschap van Pastors en Van Heemst.
- AD 11/1/2008, Bram Peper, weeskind van Rotterdam.
- AD 17/2/2008, Dik rapport voor de grote stapel.
- AD 24/7/2008, 'Baanbrekende' Kaya blijkt brekebeen.
- AD 10/8/2008, Kaya bungelde al een half jaar.
- AD 16/10/2008, Allrounder meidt confrontaties niet.
- AD 18/10/2008, 'Zeur niet over dubbel paspoort'.
- AD 14/11/2008, Crisis bij PvdA: Baruch weggestuurd.
- AD 19/2/2009a, Profilerinsdrang.
- AD 19/2/2009b, Omstreden avondklok en gezinscoaches brengen rust op Katendrecht - De Kaap is er weer één met goede hoop.
- AD 27/2/2009, Als Sørensen het kan, kan ik het ook.
- AD 8/3/2009, 'Wilders' half-allochtone wijk is onmogelijk te realiseren'.
- AD 9/3/2009, Komst Wilders naar Maasstad is 'overbodig'.
- AD 9/4/2009, Gedwongen opvoedhulp voor Rotterdamse gezinnen.
- AD 18/4/2009, Burgemeester is volop bezig om Rotterdammer te worden - 'Rotterdammers denken na over de dingen'.
- AD 22/4/2009, Slechte gevoel VVD komt laat.
- AD 5/6/2009, Aboutaleb: Uitslag zegt weinig over verhouding in gemeente-raad - PVV verovert Rotterdam.
- AD 9/7/2009, Sluwe straatvechter met kort lontje.
- AD 14/7/2009, Rem op wildgroei mosquito's - Alleen burgemeester kan apparaat laten ophangen.
- ANP 2/3/1999, Inniger samenwerking gemeente en bedrijfsleven Rotterdam.
- ANP 10/3/2002, Verkiezingen Gemeenteraden beginnen aan nieuw tijdperk.

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- ANP 18/9/2003, 'Leefbaar Rotterdam brengt politiek bij de mensen'.
- ANP 4/6/2009, PVV grootste partij in Rotterdam.
- Binnenlands Bestuur 22/6/2007, Doelen kabinet beperkt meetbaar.
- Binnenlands Bestuur 17/8/2007, Taken zonder macht.
- Binnenlands Bestuur 25/7/2008, Met dank aan Leefbaar.
- Binnenlands Bestuur 5/12/2008, Katalysator met een beperkte blik.
- Binnenlands Bestuur 6/11/2009, Gedisciplineerde debutanten.
- Elsevier 6/11/1999, Democraat op z'n eentje.
- Elsevier 28/2/2009a, De scheldpartijen hebben mij gehard.
- Elsevier 28/2/2009b, Scherp aan de wind.
- FD 13/12/2001, Geest van Fortuyn zweeft boven Rotterdams stadhuis.
- FD 28/4/2006, 'PvdA heeft ons kunstje geflikt'.
- NOS 12/11/2005, NOS TV news broadcast.
- NOVA 14/10/2005, A political debate between Van Heemst (Labour Party) en Pastors (Liveable Rotterdam).
- NRC 2/4/1998, PvdA, VVD, CDA en GroenLinks in college Rotterdam.
- NRC 25/1/2002, Veel woorden en minder daden.
- NRC 8/3/2002, 'De kiezer heeft altijd gelijk. Dus moet het beter'; Gesprek met burgemeester Opstelten van Rotterdam.
- NRC 27/4/2002, Geen daden maar woorden; Het tobberige en bureaucratische Rotterdam.
- NRC 28/2/2004, 'Dat imago van repressieve stad is volstrekt misplaatst'; Rotterdamse politie-chef Aad Meijboom hoeft niet zo nodig een symbool van daadkracht te zijn.
- NRC, 6/9/2005, In veel gemeenten kiest partij eigen gezicht; Lokale lijsttrekkersverkiezingen populair bij politieke partijen Rotterdam.
- NRC 13/10/2005, 'We kennen ze niet, je ziet ze nergens'; PvdA-leden Rotterdam kiezen als eerste lokale afdeling zelf hun lijsttrekker uit vier kandidaten.
- NRC 4/11/2005, 'Rode loper voor links college'. CDA-wethouder Geluk houdt rekening met val college.
- NRC 17/3/2006, Weigering Leefbaar Rotterdam.
- NRC 22/3/2006, Fractievoorzitter Mark Harbers over gemeentebestuur van PvdA, VVD, CDA en SP.
- NRC 12/5/2006, PvdA volgt lijn Leefbaar R'dam.
- NRC 26/9/2006, Rotterdamse strijd met gewonemensentaal.
- NRC 6/1/2009, Aboutaleb als eerbetoon aan Pim Fortuyn.
- Parool 21/1/2002, Fortuyns 'frisse wind' waait straks ook in Rotterdam.
- Parool 5/5/2007, Van de Fortuynrevolte rest alleen nog een standbeeld; 'leefbaar light' noemen ze het nieuwe college.
- RD 12/11/1999, Gemeenteraad Rotterdam van de straat.

- RD 4/1/2000, Opstelten zet 'n ideaalbeeld van Rotterdam neer.
- RD 25/5/2000, Wethouder Van der Tak wil veiligheid koppelen aan opzoomeren.
- RD 10/11/2000, College erkent effect van inspraak niet zo te weten.
- RD 12/1/2002, Leefbaar Rotterdam rept niet over vaderlandsliefde; Maar wel forse kritiek op 'oude politieke systeem'.
- RD 20/01/2002, Fortuyn lijsttrekker Leefbaar Rotterdam.
- RD 16/2/2002, 'Fortuyn zaait haat in de stad'; PvdA en VVD openen de aanval op lijsttrekker Leefbaar Rotterdam.
- RD 20/2/2002, Rotterdammer kan kiezen: veilig, veilig of veilig.
- RD 1/3/2002, 'Fortuyn is een mietje'.
- RD 2/3/2002, 'Hoort u mij niet?'; Een dik uur Pim Fortuyn: Boosheid, tranen, maar geen sick jokes.
- RD 4/3/2002, Afstand ook na debat groot tussen PvdA en Leefbaar Rotterdam.
- RD 5/3/2002, Weer een avondje voor of tegen Pim; Eerste lijsttrekkersdebat waar het publiek zich roert.
- RD 7/3/2002, 'Rotterdam is gek geworden'; Verliezers kunnen de klap nog maar nauwelijks bevatten.
- RD 8/3/2002, Nieuw dilemma: wel of niet samenwerken met Fortuyn.
- RD 28/3/2002, LR houdt vast aan omstreden plannen.
- RD 1/8/2003, 'We kunnen de problemen nu al niet meer aan'.
- RD 22/8/2003, Leefbaar wil limiet aan aantal nieuwkomers.
- RD 5/9/2003, Rotterdam zit aan de grond'.
- RD 25/6/2004, Inkomenseis is erdoor.
- RD 30/12/2004, Rotterdam ondanks overslagrecord onttroond als Wereldhaven nr. 1.
- RD 4/4/2005, Wouter Bos: 'Kies dezelfde thema's als Leefbaar'.
- RD 18/5/2005, Onvrede over collegeplan voor deelgemeenten.
- Ref. Dagblad 11/4/2006, PvdA Rotterdam wil brede coalitie; College Neder-Betuwe ongewijzigd.
- RTL 23/8/2003, Rotterdam juicht beperking allochtonen toe (article on RTL website, www.rtl.nl).
- RTV 28/4/2008, Ombudsman: 'Rotterdam schendt rechten burgers' (article on RTV website, www.rijnmond.nl).
- RTV 11/12/2008, Radio documentary about mayor Ivo Opstelten.
- Telegraaf 25/2/2006, De slag om.
- Telegraaf 8/3/2006, Enorme verslagenheid bij Leefbaar Rotterdam.
- Telegraaf 9/3/2006, Vorming coalitie loodzwaar karwei.
- Telegraaf 21/3/2006, Boekhoud op zoek naar brede coalitie.
- Telegraaf 12/10/2006, Persoonlijke aanpak bij huiselijk geweld.

- Trouw 3/4/1998, Simons doorbreekt impasse rond Rotterdams college.
- Trouw 6/9/2005, Pure winst voor democratie; verkiezingen lokale lijsttrekkers.
- Trouw 15/10/2005, PvdA lonkt onder Van Heemst naar coalitie Leefbaren; raadsverkiezingen Rotterdam.
- Trouw 10/3/2006, Boekhoud (CDA) informateur in Rotterdam; Amsterdam en Rotterdam.
- Trouw 13/3/2006, PvdA wil met Leefbaar de kloof allochtoon/autochtoon dichten; collegevorming Rotterdam analyse.
- Trouw, 19/9/2006, Rotterdam ademt positivisme.
- Trouw 21/5/2007, Kabinet klaar met 100 dagen.
- Volkskrant 29/1/1998, Gemeenten zoeken naar nieuwe omgangsvormen met ingezetenen aan de hand van debatten. 'Zieke democratie' is toe aan toekomstvisie.
- Volkskrant 9/2/2002, Fortuyn: grens dicht voor islamiet.
- Volkskrant 24/4/2002, Rotterdamse ambtenaren vatten moed; Harde taal LR valt achteraf toch wel mee.
- Volkskrant 6/3/2003, Jaar Leefbaar Rotterdam: alsnog de schok; Ambtenaren worden steeds banger voor de maatregelen van het nieuwe college.
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- Volkskrant 6/10/2005, De onmogelijke spagaat van de PvdA.
- Volkskrant 25/2/2006, Harde toon Leefbaar R'dam speelt PvdA in de kaart; Sociaal-democraten op dit moment favoriete partij van zowel autochtone als allochtone Rotterdammers.
- Volkskrant 2/3/2006, Actualiteiten.
- Volkskrant 8/3/2006, Ruk naar links brengt Balkenende in het nauw.
- Volkskrant 10/3/2006, Rotterdam: zwart zit links, wit rechts; In Rotterdam is sinds de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen de wereld heel overzichtelijk - dat is ook meteen een probleem.
- Volkskrant 8/5/2006, Een ondankbare taak.
- Volkskrant 16/1/2007, Het rommelt op Zuid.
- Vrij Nederland 14/1/2006, De prostitutiecyclus.
- Vrij Nederland 25/3/2006, Het keffertje van de Goudsesingel; Profiel van Peter van Heemst.

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APPENDIX 3 DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS FROM GOVERNMENTAL, SOCIETAL, AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

Abbreviations

BOOM	A Dutch commercial research agency (*Bureau Onderzoek Op Maat*)
CBS	Dutch Bureau of Statistics (*Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek*)
COS	Research institute of Rotterdam municipality (*Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek*)
Intraval	Dutch Bureau for Research and Advice
LP	Rotterdam Labour Party (*PvdA*)
LR	Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*)
NRT	*Nieuw Rotterdams Tij / Rotterdams Tij*, Rotterdam municipal magazine
ROM	*Rotterdams Onderwijs Magazine*, Rotterdam magazine
SBR	Alliance of Rotterdam Neighbourhood Associations (*Samenwerkende Bewonersorganisaties Rotterdam*)
SCP	Dutch Social Planning Agency (*Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau*)
SMVP	*Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie*. Independent organisation regarding society, safety, and police
SP	Rotterdam Socialist Party (*Socialistische Partij*)
Stadskrant	Virtual magazine affiliated to Rotterdam municipality
VRD	Alliance of Rotterdam Municipal Districts (*Verenigde Rotterdamse Deelgemeenten*)

Websites used in general

www.aanpakken.videodemo.nl
www.bds.rotterdam.nl
www.binnenhofbulletin.nl
www.buurtbemiddeling.org
www.cdarotterdam.nl
www.centrumraad.rotterdam.nl
www.charlois.rotterdam.nl
www.cos.rotterdam.nl
www.delfshaven.rotterdam.nl
www.dsv.rotterdam.nl
www.edbr.nl
www.expertisecentrumveilig.nl
www.feijenoord.rotterdam.nl
www.ggd.rotterdam.nl
www.groeibriljanten.nl

www.leefbaarrotterdam.nl
www.noord.rotterdam.nl
www.obr.rotterdam.nl
www.overschie.rotterdam.nl
www.politiemonitor.nl
www.pernis.rotterdam.nl
www.prinsalexander.rotterdam.nl
www.pvdarotterdam.nl
www.rekenkamer.rotterdam.nl
www.ret-rotterdam.nl
www.roteb.rotterdam.nl
www.rotterdam.nl
www.rotterdamdurft.nl
www.rotterdamveilig.nl
www.sbr-rotterdam.nl

www.gw.rotterdam.nl
www.his.rotterdam.nl
www.hoekvanholland.rotterdam.nl
www.hoogvliet.rotterdam.nl
www.ijsselmonde.rotterdam.nl
www.jos.rotterdam.nl
www.kc.rotterdam.nl
www.kenniscentrumgrotesteden.nl
www.kennisknooppuntveilig.nl

www.senr.rotterdam.nl
www.sisa.rotterdam.nl
www.sozawe.rotterdam.nl
www.stadsdebat-rotterdam.nl
www.stadstoezicht.rotterdam.nl
www.swf.nl
www.veilig.videodemo.nl
www.vvdrotterdam.nl

TV programmes used in general

Aanpakken, TV programme from the municipality of Rotterdam, aired on *TV Rijnmond*. In March 2006, I watched all episodes from '2005/2006' until March 2006 (www.aanpakken.videodemo.nl).

Veilig, TV programme from the municipality of Rotterdam, aired on *TV Rijnmond*. In March 2006, I watched all episodes from '2004/2005' (www.veilig.videodemo.nl).

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APPENDIX 4 INTERVIEWS

Interview round December 2005 - January 2006 (with colleagues)

- Van den Akker, C., Bosch, M., Bormans, R., Dalman, S., De Leeuw, K., Nooijens, J., civil servants Safety Bureau, 26/1/2006.
- Andersson, H., the 'safety advisor' / director *Andersson Advies bv* (advisory agency), 12/1/2006 and 24/1/2006.
- Van den Anker, M., alderman (Liveable Rotterdam), 20/1/2006.
- Belderbos, F., city marine, 10/1/2006.
- Berghuis, D., fire department chief, responsible for the report Rotterdam Presses On, 9/1/2006.
- Boerman, T., district attorney office, 9/1/2006.
- Bolsius, L., alderman (Christian Democratic Party), 22/12/2005.
- Boot, O., employee of the Alliance of Rotterdam City Districts (VRD), 12/1/2006.
- Czyzewski, S., chairman of the board of directors of *BoumanGGZ* (mental health care institution), 17/1/2006.
- Dekker, M., director municipal service Youth, Education, and Society, 13/1/2006.
- Donker, M., director municipal Health Service, 13/1/2006.
- Dullaert, P.J., safety coordinator in the district of *Kralingen-Crooswijk*, 10/1/2006.
- Van Eck, N. former city manager, 2/1/2006.
- De Faria, R., former alderman (Liveable Rotterdam), 20/12/2005.
- Frank, Y., director municipal service Social Affairs and Employment, 17/1/2006.
- Grijzen, J., district alderman in *Delfshaven*, 12/12/2005.
- Haasbroek, N., independent journalist, 4/1/2006.
- Harreman, T., district chairman in *Delfshaven*, 19/1/2006.
- Hoppener, G., communication advisor Safety Bureau, 24/1/2006.
- De Kloet, J., city marine, 24/1/2006.
- Klootwijk, R., chief of the neighbourhood police in the police district of *Feijenoord Ridderster*, police corps *Rotterdam-Rijnmond*, 29/11/2005.
- Van Krieken, A., safety coordinator in the district of *IJsselmonde*, 2/1/2006.
- Kromwijk, M., chairman board of directors *Woonbron Maasoevers* (housing corporation), 4/1/2006.
- De Langen, M., director municipal service Urban Planning and Housing, 12/1/2006.
- Littooij, A., civil servant from the city hall department Public Order and Safety, 17/1/2006.

- Meijer, G., safety coordinator in the district of *Feijenoord*, 29/11/2005 and 20/1/2006.
- Nagtegaal, R., city marine in the district of *Delfshaven*, 20/12/2005.
- Van Nes, A., director municipal service Public Cleaning, 2/1/2006.
- Opstelten, I., mayor, 4/1/2006.
- Pastors, M., former alderman (Liveable Rotterdam), 22/12/2005.
- Quadt, T., safety manager, 1/12/2005, 22/12/2005, 19/1/2006, and 26/1/2006.
- Rotgans, H., director municipal service Public Works, 16/1/2006.
- Schreurs, E., advisor municipal service Public Works, 16/1/2006.
- Soetekouw, T., chairman Alliance of Rotterdam neighbourhood organisations (SBR), 13/1/2006.
- Van der Tak, S., former alderman (Christian Democratic Party), 5/1/2006.
- Tersteeg, R., former employee in the municipal service Urban Planning and Housing, 20/12/2005.
- Visser, H., vicar St Paul's Church, 2/1/2006.
- Vissers, H., deputy chief of police for the police corps *Rotterdam-Rijnmond*, 4/1/2006.
- Van Vliet, W., director municipal service City Development, 20/1/2006.
- Van der Wal, A., district chairman in *Noord*, 1/12/2005.
- Zevenbergen, L., city marine, 17/1/2006.
- Zijlmans, A., employee for the police corps *Rotterdam-Rijnmond*, 9/1/2006.

Interview round November 2007 – March 2008

- Anceaux, M., civil servant (city hall), 13/12/2007.
- Andersson, H., the 'safety advisor' / director *Andersson Advies bv* (advisory agency), 11/12/2007.
- Avci, A., De Jonge, G., Pierweijer, J., Van de Pluijm, Alliance of Rotterdam neighbourhood organisations (SBR), 25/3/2008.
- Bakker, I., director municipal service Youth, Education, and Society, 29/11/2007.
- Blom, D., civil servant (South Pact), 8/1/2008.
- Boekhoud, P., chairman of the board of directors *Albeda College* (school), 18/2/2008.
- Boer, J., journalist *Algemeen Dagblad*, 20/11/2007.
- Bolsius, L., alderman (Christian Democratic Party), 22/1/2008.
- Cornellisen, T., councilman (Socialist Party), 13/12/2007.
- Cremers, B., district chairman *Hillegersberg Schiebroek* (former Labour Party faction chairman in the municipal council), 29/11/2007.
- Czysewski, E., chairman of the board of directors of *BoumanGGZ* (mental health care institution), 11/12/2007.

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- Donker, M., director municipal Health Service, 11/12/2007.
- De Leeuw, K., civil servant Safety Bureau, 18/12/2007.
- Heijst, I., director of *Delphi* (community work organisation), 28/2/2008.
- Kriens, J., alderman (Labour Party), 13/12/2007.
- Kromwijk, M., chairman board of directors *Woonbron Maasoevers* (housing corporation), 8/1/2008.
- Littooij, A., (deputy) safety manager, 6/12/2007.
- Mulder, H., director SONOR (community work organisation), 6/2/2008.
- Opstelten, I., mayor, 14/1/2008.
- Pastors, M., councilman (Liveable Rotterdam), 18/12/2007.
- Quadt, T., safety manager, 30/11/2007.
- Rotgans, H., director social programme, 27/11/2007.
- Ruefli, R., civil servant municipal service Urban Planning and Housing, 23/11/2007.
- Schieven, E., team manager municipal service City Development, 5/3/2008.
- Spalburg, I., Vorthoren, M., *SPIOR* (Platform for Islamic organisations in the Rotterdam region), 14/2/2008.
- Spierings, G., city marine in the district of *Charlois*, 6/12/2007.
- Ten Hoope, J., district attorney, 13/12/2007.
- Toet, M., director of the municipal service Social Affairs and Employment, 5/3/2008.
- Van den Akker, C., civil servant city hall (social programme), 20/11/2007.
- Van den Bovenkamp, W., civil servant in the district *Noord*, 22/1/2008.
- Van Gils, A., city manager, 19/2/2008.
- Van Gils-Klavers, J., civil servant in the district *Charlois*, 18/12/2007.
- Van Heemst, P., councilman / faction chairman (Labour Party), 19/12/2007.
- Van Nes, A., director of the municipal service Public Cleaning, 29/11/2007.
- Visser, H., vicar St Paul's Church, 15/11/2007.
- Vissers, H., deputy chief of police for the region *Rotterdam-Rijnmond*, 8/1/2008.
- Weststrate, E., entrepreneur, 14/2/2008.

Extra interviews November 2008 – February 2009

- Van Dijke, E., civil servant municipal service Sports en Recreaction, 7/11/2008.
- Schuttevaar, R., civil servant municipal service Social Affairs and Employment, 27/1/2009.
- Sepsanie, I., civil servant city hall, 17/2/2009.

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APPENDIX 5 OBSERVED AND/OR PARTICIPATED

- Presentation of the 2004 safety index, Rotterdam city hall, 17/5/2004.
- Accountability Day Rotterdam board of mayor and aldermen, Central Rotterdam Library, 22/6/2004.
- Safety Direction Team (*Directieraad Veilig*), 25/11/2004.
- Debate between young Dutch aldermen, Arminius Church Rotterdam, 8/9/2004.
- Debate regarding Rotterdam Dares (*Rotterdam Durft*), a Rotterdam city marketing campaign, Café Floor, Rotterdam, 15/1/2005.
- Conference regarding the Safety Bureau programme 'Maintain and Reinforce' (*Vasthouden en Versterken*), InHolland school, Rotterdam, 27/1/2005.
- The first Islam Debate, World Trade Center Rotterdam, 2/4/2005.
- A conference regarding safety, organised by the Safety Bureau, in the district of *Hoek van Holland*, 9/6/2005.
- A public debate regarding the closure of the *Keileweg*, Rotterdam's prostitution area, Central Rotterdam Library, 17/9/2005.
- A public debate regarding future of the municipal districts, Central Rotterdam Library, 22/10/2005.
- Safety Steering Group, 1/11/2005.
- Municipal council committee Governing and Safety (*Bestuur en Veiligheid*), 1/12/2005.
- Municipal council meeting about the Second Five Year Safety Action Programme, 15/12/2005.
- Municipal council meeting about the board results 2002 - 2006, 16/2/2006.
- Presentation of the 2006 safety index, city hall Rotterdam, 24/2/2006.
- Debate regarding future of the city districts, *Hilligersberg Schiebroek*, Rotterdam, 15/10/2008.

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APPENDIX 6 INTERVIEW TOPIC LIST

This is the topic list of the interview round of November 2007 – March 2008 and the extra interviews of November 2008 – February 2009.

AGENDA
- What were central themes in the current and previous legislative periods and what impact did they have?
- Has the Labour Party from the election campaign of 2006 onwards focused on other themes than the 2002-2006 board, and if so, why?
- How is this for the other parties, mainly the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party?
- Does the board focus on other themes than the previous, and if so why?
- Is safety still an important theme?
- Is social policy key now and how is this different from safety?
- Are other areas neglected because of the focus on safety and/or social policy?
- To what extent is the same happening now with another name (social)? And to what extent did the same happen in 2002-2006 with another name (safety)?
- What were the main policy documents in the different legislative periods (1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010) and have they remained in effect? (e.g. Rotterdam Presses On, the safety indexes, the FYSAP, South Pact)
- Is the social programme similar to the 1998-2002 neighbourhood approach? Did 2002-2006 constitute a break regarding this?
- Is there a change in the importance of repression and the combination with prevention and care as developed during 2002-2006?
- How is integration being discussed? What about the Islam Debates?
- How has the attention to economic themes changed? Was there less attention to private interests between 2002-2006? How was this before 2002?

COALITION
In general
- Who would you say at the moment are the important persons in Rotterdam government and how is this different from 2002-2006 (and 1998-2002)?
- What drives these persons?
- Who are the drivers of the social programme?
- How does the Social Steering Group work and what is the relationship / difference with the Safety Steering Group?
- Has the role of the Safety Direction Team changed, and if so, how?
- How are economic actors, e.g. businesses, involved in city government and how was this under previous boards?
About the municipal board(s)
- In what way does the municipal board function differently from 2002-2006?

- In what way do you (have to) deal with the municipal board of 2006-2010 and in what way is that different from dealing with the previous ones?
- What is the atmosphere within the municipal board and how is this different from previous boards? Is there a 'click' between the aldermen?

About the mayor
- In what way has the role of the mayor changed compared to 2002-2006?
- Does the mayor face a more difficult board compared to 2002-2006?

About the city districts
- What is the relationship between the board (2006-2010) and districts?
- How did the demands from 'central level' to city districts change in 2006-2008? Who are responsible for this?
- Is the district system questioned? If so, by whom?
- Is there a city district Safety or Social Steering Group, and if so for how long?

About the municipal services
- What is the relationship with the municipal board (2006-2010) and services?
- How did the municipal services develop or change between 2002-2006 and do they now function differently?
- Is there a difference between hard, soft, and implementation services?
- Are there, in addition to the Safety Directors Meeting, other areas where the municipal services meet?

About citizens
- Have citizens been an important factor in policy or government in Rotterdam over the last ten years?
- Did the Labour Party lose their connection with Rotterdam citizens before 2002? And if so, how did that show?
- How were societal interests taken into consideration by previous boards?
- How did the 2002-2006 municipal board regard citizens?
- How does the 2006-2010 municipal board regard citizens? And how does that view differ from the 1998-2002 view?
- Is there any change in the relationship with citizens for you or for others in your specific area of work? And if so, how and when did this change occur?

About the municipal council and political parties
- How does the municipal council function compared to the previous ones?
- Did the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party change before and during their participation in the municipal boards, and if so, how?
- Has the Labour Party changed since 2002 and if so, when and to what extent?
- What are the reasons for this change? Is this change a result of new people?

About police and national government
- What is the relationship with the city government, the police and the district attorney in 2006-2008 compared to 2002-2006?
- What is the relationship with the city government and national government in 2006-2008 compared to 2002-2006?

RESOURCES

In general

- Has there been an agenda change and if so, how did it come about?
- Who were important in this?
- Is there external pressure for a new way of government (e.g. more repressive?) and where does it originate?

About money

- Does money follow the new themes?
- Who controls most of the 2006-2010 money?
- Is money alone sufficient for implementing a new agenda? What more?

SCHEME OF COOPERATION

In general

- How do the main actors and politicans relate to each other and negotiate?
- How did the political coalition establish?
- What is the message of the new board and how does it get that across?
- Is there such a thing as the 'Rotterdam approach'? If so, what does it mean and where did it come from?
- Was the 2002-2006 period in any way different for you personally or professionally compared to now or before (prior to 2002)?

Targets and way of working

- Are the achievements of the board monitored, and if so, how?
- Is methodical working still important and how does this show and how does this compare to previous years?
- Are targets important and how does this show in your work and how does this compare to previous years?
- Is implementation important in Rotterdam and how does this show in your work and how does this compare to previous years?
- How is the board maintaining the need for implementation and is the board gathering knowledge on/of the street-level? Are people working on street-level cherished?
- Was the repressive/mobilising repertoire of safety index, neighbourhood safety action programmes, marines, et cetera, typical of 2002-2006 or has it been maintained? And how was/is it different from earlier boards?

About communication and information

- What has become of the role of communication?
- Is repetition (through messages or high pressure and themes in the Safety Steering Group) maintained?
- How is communication dealt with in the steering groups?
- What communication campaigns were started in 2006-2008?
- Has the information position of the city and municipal service departments improved in the 2002-2006 period and after?

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